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J A P A N E S E E X P A N S I O N O N
T H E A S I A T I C C O N T I N E N T



IYEFYASU TOKUGAWA, THE FIRST SHOGUN
(1542-1616)

JAPANESE EXPANSION ON THE ASIATIC CONTINENT

*A Study in the History of Japan with Special
Reference to Her International Relations with
China, Korea, and Russia*



By YOSHI S. KUNO

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CHAPTER I

Iyeyasu's Attempt to Make Japan Asia's Commercial Center

THE TOKUGAWA GOVERNMENT was the fifth military government and the third shogunate government in Japan. The Tokugawa shogunate ruled Japan for a period of 264 years, beginning in 1603, when Iyeyasu was appointed shogun (*Sei-i Tai-shogun*) by Go-Yozei, the 106th emperor of Japan, and ending in 1867, when the fifteenth shogun, Yoshinobu (Keiki), surrendered the ruling authority to the throne and requested that His Majesty Meiji, the 122d emperor, rule Japan in person. The Tokugawa shogunate gave Japan the longest and most remarkable administration that she has ever enjoyed: in Japanese history it is called "The Tokugawa Period of Three Hundred Years of Peace and Prosperity." This period (actually of 264 years) is inseparably associated with the seclusion policies of the government.^{1*} Historians are generally agreed that the Tokugawa shogunate was only able to conduct so successful an administration by reason of its seclusion policies, and that if these policies had not been adopted and enforced, the shogunate would not have been able to last for even one hundred years.² However, seclusion was not an end in itself for the Tokugawa shogunate; it was a means by which national peace and prosperity were secured.³

Iyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate, was a man of unusual military and political ability and a great statesman. When he founded the fifth military government, he studied carefully the causes contributing to the rise and fall of all the preceding military governments, and adopted three policies of seclusion with the purpose of quieting all the troublesome elements in the nation.

* Notes to all chapters of text will be found on pp. 251-268.

The complete seclusion of Japan from the outside world was the work of three statesmen of succeeding generations—Iyeyasu, his son, and his grandson.⁴ Its purpose was to make it impossible for foreigners to approach or enter Japan, or for Japanese to sail out of their home waters. This policy was adopted and rigorously enforced as a means of preventing the Japanese from coming under the influences of Occidental civilization, especially the influence of Christianity.

Iyeyasu considered carefully the national tradition of the divine origin and powers of the emperor. He then completely secluded the emperor, the imperial family, and the imperial court from human affairs and human contacts, thus making it impossible for the emperor even to be seen by the people. This policy of seclusion was adopted in order to prevent the emperor from exercising his divine influence upon the people, and men of power or ambition from aspiring to render service to the throne.⁵

Iyeyasu secluded from one another all the feudal lords (the number of whom is generally assumed to have been three hundred). The people in the districts of the feudal lords were required to regard one another as if they were people of enemy nations.⁶ Interdistrict communications, and transactions between the local feudal lords, were rendered so complicated and difficult that they could not be conducted on a friendly basis. This plan of seclusion made it impossible for the feudal lords to form alliances with neighboring lords which might enable them to rise against the Tokugawa shogunate.

The third seclusion policy, that of shutting off Japan from the rest of the world, was fundamental. It supplies the key to the others. The putting into effect of this policy was a most difficult and complicated task, and required more than a quarter-century for its accomplishment. Originally, Iyeyasu had not the slightest idea of closing the nation's doors, and it was only with reluctance that he was finally led to do so. Indeed, Iyeyasu shares with Hideyoshi in being remembered as a statesman who

made national expansion his policy—although the expansionist ideas of the two men arose from entirely different theories. Hideyoshi planned to found a great empire on the Asiatic continent by military conquest. Iyeyasu planned to complete the work of national expansion through the extension of trade, and to make Japan one of the great economic centers of the world.⁷ In order to accomplish this purpose, when he first came into power he encouraged all seafaring Japanese to sail out far from their home waters and to extend Japanese trade, and at the same time to induce traders from the outside world to come to Japan. It was only because of ever-increasing trouble with Catholic missionaries and their converts that Iyeyasu reluctantly turned toward a policy of national seclusion as the only guaranty for the safe existence of his government and of the nation.⁸

It was in 1549, which was but six years after the discovery of Japan by the Portuguese, that Francisco Xavier [who later was canonized, and now is familiarly referred to as St. Francis Xavier] came to Kagoshima in southern Kyushu and introduced Christianity there. Later he went to Hirado, Hakata, and Yamaguchi. Finally he decided to establish his religious headquarters in Kyoto, the imperial capital of Japan. He found Kyoto in ruins as a consequence of years of national unrest. Neither the emperor nor the shogun had effective ruling power; they could not even hold court.⁹ Kyoto was almost desolate. Nothing permanent could be accomplished, as there was no ruling center and the people were restless and unsettled. Xavier therefore left Kyoto after having stayed there but two weeks. He returned to Yamaguchi, which, being the seat of government of the great military family of the Ouchi, a center for Japanese trade with China and Korea, and a place of refuge for court nobles who had fled from the imperial capital on account of wars, had become, in the mid-sixteenth century, the political, intellectual, and financial center of Japan. Xavier finally settled there, using the city as a base from which to carry

on his work in Kyushu and Honshu.¹⁰ He was eminently successful in his religious work. Everywhere he went, he converted with ease thousands of Japanese, of both the ruled and the ruling classes.¹¹

While he was thus successfully propagating Christianity, he found that Japan was politically, intellectually, and ethically under the dominating influence of China. It was very common for intellectual Japanese to ask Xavier why China had not become a Christian nation, and through this question they unwittingly revealed a doubt of Christianity as a true religion: it had not been accepted by the Chinese. This state of mind in Japan convinced Xavier that his religious work in the Orient could not be successful unless the Chinese should be converted, and that if China, which was the great center of civilization in Asia, could be Christianized, Japan and other nations would likewise accept Christianity.¹² Influenced by this conclusion, he left Japan on November 20, 1551.¹³ He did not go thence to China directly, but first went to Malacca, and then to Goa, India, where, before entering upon his missionary endeavors in Japan, he had established two Christian centers. On April 14, 1552, he finally left Goa to go to China, stopping at Malacca on the way. His voyage was beset by hardships and dangers. On December 2, 1552, he died, at the age of forty-seven years, on St. John's Island near Macao, without having even caught sight of China, his goal.¹⁴

While Xavier was in Malacca, he sent a number of able priests to Japan as his personal representatives and had them continue the work he had begun there, in coöperation with the priests whom he had left in Japan. Upon their arrival, these newcomers began to extend the field of missionary labor. Consequently, by 1559 almost the entire island of Kyushu, together with the districts of Sanyo, Nankai, Kinai, Kanto, and Tohoku in the island of Honshu, had become regions of Christian influence.¹⁵ Christianity then became the rising religious power in Japan.

This remarkable success in introducing and propagating Christianity in Japan in the second half of the sixteenth century is largely attributable to the personality and zeal of the missionary saint. However, the fact that it was introduced at an opportune time is a factor which must be considered. Catholicism was introduced into Japan in the middle of that country's Dark Age, when political, social, and religious institutions had almost entirely disintegrated and the people had been suffering for want of them for more than a hundred years. Buddhism, which had been the national religion in Japan for about a thousand years, had completely degenerated; Buddhist priests had almost wholly abandoned their daily prayers and religious ministrations and were devoting their lives to military pursuits conducted for the sake of gain.¹⁶ It was a time of piracy and of semipiratical trade. Japanese pirates and even powerful military families made the entire coasts of both China and Korea their field of operation.

There was, moreover, a striking similarity between the religious rites and ceremonials of Buddhism and of Catholicism. Because Catholicism was introduced from Goa, it was accepted by the Japanese as a reformed Buddhism from India. Even local feudal governments issued religious permits to Catholic priests and to Catholic churches under the name of "The New Buddhism from the Western Nations."¹⁷ Thus, the Japanese in the sixteenth century were led the more readily to embrace the simple doctrine of salvation through belief in Christ.

These conditions encouraged the Japanese to make no discrimination between natives and foreigners.¹⁸ Naturally, the military barons in various parts of Japan, particularly those residing in Kyushu, welcomed both traders and religious workers, affording them protection and facilities for cultivating their respective interests. From the very beginning the traders and Catholic priests were closely associated.¹⁹ The ports entered by traders became centers of Christianity. The towns and cities in which the priests established their work soon became pros-

perous centers of Occidental trade. Catholicism and Occidental trade soon became, indeed, the two foremost undertakings in Japan.²⁰ Naturally, the feudal barons who desired to increase their revenues through trade with the Occidentals rivaled each other in showing their zeal and faith in Christianity, going even so far as to send envoys to the pope.²¹ It is an undeniable fact that some of the feudal lords embraced Christianity merely for the sake of material gain—they desired to attract traders to their respective ports through the influence of the Catholic priests; and thus they obtained a lucrative trade and adopted Occidental innovations, especially firearms.²²

It was about a quarter-century after the introduction of Catholicism that Christianity in Japan gained a great ascendancy. In the latter part of the sixteenth century there arose a man of great military power and genius, Nobunaga, whose ambition was to bring about national unification. In his time, most of the leading Buddhist churches and communities became military organizations and established strongholds like those of the military barons, where they maintained thousands of fighting men. These communities frequently induced Buddhists in various parts of Japan to rise against the local authorities in order to effect secular and territorial gains, thus becoming disturbing elements.²³ Nobunaga decided to destroy all strongly armed Buddhist communities and all militant Buddhists; he considered it a necessary step toward the restoration of national peace. To counteract his efforts, the communities formed alliances with military barons who were unfriendly to Nobunaga, and strongly opposed him, denouncing him as the enemy of Buddhism.²⁴ Nobunaga, for his part, branded the communities and militant Buddhists as national enemies because they opposed his work of national unification, and he dealt with them brutally and mercilessly, being bent on destroying their fighting power.

Nobunaga was a man who had no particular interest in religion. He was neither anti-Buddhist nor pro-Christian. It was

his standing policy to destroy everything that stood in his way and to utilize everything that might further his purposes. Consequently, he became a deadly enemy of the militant Buddhists and rendered all possible material and financial assistance to Christian churches and priests in order to oppose and cripple Buddhism through the agency of Christianity.

In 1568, Nobunaga, with the consent of the emperor and the shogun, invited Catholic priests to Kyoto.²⁵ He made it possible for them to preach Christianity in that city, and gave the Catholic Church a large tract of land four blocks square in the center of the Buddhist district so that its headquarters in Japan might be built there. He also handed over to the Church a valuable and extensive estate in the province of Omi, for the maintenance of its missionary work. Although he strictly prohibited the Buddhists from establishing any Buddhist churches or institutions in Azuchi, which was his military capital, he allowed the Catholic priests to establish Catholic churches and schools in that city.²⁶ Throughout his life Nobunaga proved a staunch friend to the Catholic Church and its priests. He never refused to grant anything requested by them. He acted as if he had great faith in Catholicism. Nevertheless, his sole purpose in thus furthering the Catholic cause was to utilize this rising religious power to oppose Buddhism.²⁷

A Catholic priest who lived in Japan at the time of Nobunaga set forth in a report to his church in Portugal the real motives and personality of the Japanese nationalist. Catholics, he said, had always found a great friend and a ready support in Nobunaga. Yet, although he acted as if he were a good Catholic, he was not one; indeed, there was no possibility of ever converting him to Catholicism. Nobunaga was a man who was under the full control of worldly desires and one who would never surrender any of his ambitions for the sake of embracing the Catholic faith.²⁸

In the summer of 1582 Nobunaga was killed by Mitsuhide, one of his lieutenants, who rebelled suddenly. The work of na-

tional unification was thus left unfinished—to be completed by Hideyoshi. When Hideyoshi rose to power as the successor of Nobunaga, the general situation in Japan underwent radical changes. Because of the anti-Buddhist movement of Nobunaga, and the reaction consequent upon the rapid ascendancy of Catholicism, the Buddhist churches and their priests became more and more conscientious.²⁹ They gave more of their attention to religious work and gradually abandoned their military activities. As a result, they regained the confidence and trust of both the government and the people. This caused rivalry between Buddhists and Christians, which frequently entailed serious difficulties. Furthermore, with the adoption of Occidental innovations, men of conservative ideas, such as the Confucianists, the Shintoists, and the Buddhists, began to oppose men of progressive ideas, especially the Christian converts.³⁰ This frequently brought about local disturbances, and some of them became national in scope. Some of the Christian feudal barons, for the sake of maintaining order and peace in their respective districts, ordered that all persons who opposed Christianity should leave their provinces. Furthermore, they destroyed all the Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines in their districts and required the priests to remove the images. In order to give warning to the Christians and also to show his authority, Hideyoshi sent three thousand men under the leadership of an able general to demolish completely the Christian headquarters at Kyoto which had been built by Nobunaga, and he exiled to Nagasaki all Christian priests, both foreign born and native.³¹ This was done in 1585, three years after Nobunaga's death.

Unlike Nobunaga, Hideyoshi was not opposed to the Buddhists; in fact, he rebuilt most of the Buddhist churches and rehabilitated the Buddhist communities that had been destroyed by Nobunaga, and on one occasion went so far as to have a certain Buddhist sect coöperate in his government.³² He neither believed in Christianity nor took a personal interest in it; yet, during the first few years after he had succeeded Nobu-

naga, he showed a marked toleration of Christian churches and friendship to Christian priests. On the whole, he continued the policy of Nobunaga in dealing with Catholicism. He permitted the building of a Catholic church in Osaka, his new military capital, and was even present in person at the time of the dedication of the edifice. Historians hold that this policy was adopted by Hideyoshi in order to win the good will of the Christian feudal lords in Kyushu.³³ At any rate, his conquest of Kyushu was followed by a demarcation in his religious policy.

In the four years next following the death of Nobunaga in 1582, Hideyoshi established his ruling authority over the whole of Shikoku and in the central and southwestern parts of Honshu. In recognition of his work the emperor appointed him to the post of *Kampaku* ("Supreme Advisor to the Throne"). Hideyoshi then entered upon the final step toward the unification of the nation.³⁴

His first move was to invade and conquer Kyushu. Now, Kyushu is of no great size—it is less than half that of Scotland, being about 14,000 square miles in area—but, for Japan, it is the geographical key to the Asiatic continent. It lies very close to Honshu and is separated from Korea by but a narrow channel. It also provides the nearest approach to China. It was the first of the Japanese lands to come under the political and intellectual influence of China; in the second century A.D., when the ruling authority of the imperial government of Japan had not yet been extended to the island, most of the military chiefs there recognized the suzerainty of China³⁵ and sent tribute-bearing envoys using the title of "kings" to the Chinese imperial throne, thus making possible the existence of several "kingdoms" on Kyushu. In this way, though but nominally, China had ruling power in Kyushu before Japan gained power there. In the reign of Chuai, the fourteenth emperor of Japan, the Kumaso in Kyushu formed an alliance with one of the kingdoms in Korea and threatened the existence of Japan. The emperor thereupon invaded Kyushu, where he was defeated and

killed.³⁶ Saimei, the ruling empress, then went to Kyushu with a large army for the purpose of invading Korea; but she died in her military camp on the island. This occurred in the second half of the seventh century. In the thirteenth century Kublai Khan made two unsuccessful attempts to reduce Japan to the condition of a tributary state, and on both these occasions all the military engagements took place along the coast of Kyushu.

All these historical events are evidence that the conquest of Kyushu was essential to the completion of Japanese national unification and especially to the plan which Hideyoshi had already made to conquer China. However, in the latter part of the sixteenth century all Kyushu was under the control of unruly military barons who failed to pay due reverence either to the throne or to the central military government. Historians describe conditions in Kyushu in those days by stating that it was divided into a Christian kingdom and a military kingdom.³⁷ The Christian kingdom was made up of many Christian military barons who ruled the northern two-thirds of the island; the military kingdom, of many military barons who controlled the southeastern third. In order to conquer Kyushu, it was necessary for Hideyoshi to subjugate or destroy all the military barons in these two kingdoms.³⁸ He decided to reduce the military kingdom by force, and to subjugate the Christian kingdom by diplomacy. His plan was to invade the military kingdom in the southeastern part of Kyushu with the moral support, or at least with the tacit consent, of the military barons in the Christian kingdom. It was with this in mind that for a few years prior to his campaign in Kyushu he showed most friendly feelings toward the Christians in Japan.

He followed the policy of Nobunaga in dealing with the Catholics, and granted all requests made by the priests. On one occasion, they petitioned Hideyoshi as follows:

"1. Catholic priests should be permitted to preach and to propagate Christian teachings in all the provinces under the rule of Hideyoshi.

"2. All Catholic churches and their property should be exempt from all kinds of taxation.

"3. The Catholic churches and other buildings under the control of the Catholics should not be used as military quarters or for the lodging of soldiers."³⁹

Hideyoshi promptly granted these requests and told the priests that they might as well ask for a preaching permit throughout the Empire of Japan, since his ruling power would soon extend all over the empire. On another occasion, he told a Catholic priest that he would sometime conquer China and would then render all possible assistance to the priests toward making China a great Christian nation.⁴⁰ In this way Hideyoshi professed to be a great friend and even a patron of the Christian church. But he thus represented things merely for the purpose of winning over all the Christian military barons in Kyushu.

His plan worked well; his campaign in Kyushu was highly successful. It started in February and ended in the early part of May, 1586, when the lord of Shimazu, who was the supreme military power in the military kingdom, surrendered and placed himself at the mercy of the conqueror. The campaign was so brilliantly and speedily conducted that most of the Christian and other military lords made ready submission, and Kyushu was completely subjugated.⁴¹

But Hideyoshi discovered that the religious situation was far more serious than he had expected to find it. Kyushu had been the seat of Christianity in Japan for twoscore years. The Catholic churches and priests had steadily increased in power since the introduction of Christianity by Xavier in 1549, and had established themselves so firmly that Catholicism practically constituted a kingdom by itself.⁴² In the small district of Bungo alone there were 70,000 Christian converts. Arima and Omura were proud of their 120,000 faithful Christians. The Christian priests were revered as secular as well as spiritual leaders. Moreover, they held the keys to foreign trade, and thus it was possible for them to control the financial affairs of the Christian

provinces. Sometimes they even went so far as to interfere in the domestic and diplomatic affairs of local feudal governments. It was the prevailing practice as well as the policy of the Catholic priests in Kyushu first to convert a feudal lord and then to have him announce that the district under his control was a Christian state, and finally, through the authority of the lord, to cause the people in the district to become Christian converts. Otomo and other powerful Christian feudal lords frequently requested Christian priests to accompany them on their military campaigns. When the campaign was successful and the enemies' lands were occupied, the Christian lords usually destroyed Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines and ordered the people to embrace Christianity; in this way some of the Christian feudal lords in Kyushu acted as if they went to war to take their enemies' lands in the name of the Christian God. With the increasing ascendancy of Christianity in Japan, Catholic priests elevated themselves in the social as well as in the religious world, claiming rank and standing similar to those of bishops in the Christian nations of Europe. They usually rode about in magnificent sedan chairs, with the same dignity and pomp as was displayed by lords and princes. Hideyoshi himself was both surprised and offended when the Catholic priests came to his military headquarters at Hakata in Kyushu to congratulate him upon his victory in as dignified and pompous a manner as if they were of the same rank as Hideyoshi himself.

When Hideyoshi invaded Kyushu, the Catholic Church had gained complete ruling power in Nagasaki and in Urakami. It seemed as if these places were a part of the Church's domain.⁴⁴ The Catholics established church government at Nagasaki and exercised both religious and secular authority independently of the Japanese government; and thus they established a government within the government. This caused Hideyoshi to conclude that the existence of Christianity in Japan would stand in the way of national unification, and that the Catholic priests were infringing upon the ruling authority of Japan. It seemed

to him that Church supremacy and national existence were not compatible and that prompt action must be taken. As a result, on the night of the 18th day of the 6th month in the 15th year of the Tensho era (July 24, 1587), at Hakozaki, Kyushu, Hideyoshi completed the formulation of a law against the Christians. On the following day, at Hakata, the largest seaport in Kyushu, he promulgated this anti-Christian law and at once put it in force.

Essential among its provisions were the following:

1. Japan, the nation of the *Kami* [Japanese native deities], should not accept the evil religion sent by Christian nations.
2. The Japanese who have been converted to this evil religion have frequently destroyed Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples. These outrageous acts should be promptly checked.
3. All Christian priests are hereby ordered to leave Japan within twenty days.
4. The black ships [Occidental ships] that come to our country for the purpose of trade will still be allowed to continue to buy and to sell according to the established custom.
5. Traders and others, even though they come from Christian nations, will be allowed to sojourn in Japan providing they do not meddle with Buddhism.⁴⁴

Later, taking into consideration the lack of shipping facilities, Hideyoshi granted a petition of the Catholic priests that the time of their departure should be extended from twenty days to six months.

Thus did Hideyoshi take prompt and definite steps to root out Christianity immediately after his successful campaign in Kyushu; indeed, even while he was still on the island.⁴⁵ Historians differ over whether he deemed it necessary to uproot Christianity in Japan in consequence of his observations of conditions among Christians in Kyushu, or whether he had from the beginning planned to destroy Christianity in Japan but had temporarily postponed doing so because he hoped to utilize Christian influence in the conquest of Kyushu.⁴⁶

The noted historian Kaempfer apparently held the same views as did the Japanese historians who considered that the acts and practices of the Christian priests in Japan in the sixteenth century constituted a contributory cause of the adoption of Japan's anti-Christian policy. In his work *The History of Japan* he described the life of Christian priests in Japan and said that the Christian priests had in the first place entirely disregarded the national interdict, and that furthermore they were as a rule both arrogant and insolent. These priests sought to duplicate the practices of the bishops and cardinals in Rome.⁴⁷ They acted in an independent and haughty manner, and frequently failed to salute Japanese nobles of high rank whom they met on the streets. They taught the Japanese Christian converts that the word of God and of the Church should always be held above the commands and instructions of the rulers of Japan. Such teachings caused the Japanese to disobey the laws and ordinances both of the shogunate government and of their lords, whenever these laws or ordinances did not accord with the Christian regulations and teachings. On the same day that Hideyoshi promulgated his anti-Christian law, he deprived of rank, title, and estate one of the noted Christian lords, Takayama, who had destroyed both Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines in his province and had forced all the people under his dominion to embrace Christianity; and soon afterward he exiled Takayama to a distant island. He took the city of Nagasaki from the Christian Church and placed it under the direct control of his military government.⁴⁸ He ordered that Christian churches and other religious edifices throughout Japan should be destroyed. The twenty-two beautiful Christian churches that stood within the seventy-five-mile district between Kyoto and Sakai, the largest seaport in Japan, he ordered to be razed. The Christian converts were warned to renounce their faith on penalty of death or exile. In this way Hideyoshi decided to uproot Christianity completely from Japan, while at the same time he strenuously endeavored

to increase the national wealth by affording all possible protection and facilities to traders from foreign nations. In his reply to a letter from the Portuguese governor of Goa he stated that although Japan had prohibited the introduction and propagation of Christianity because its teachings had caused great harm to the nation, yet traders from Christian nations would be both welcomed and protected.⁴⁰

At the time of Hideyoshi, Christian priests and traders had carried on their work side by side for nearly half a century as if their respective undertakings were inseparable. It was their practice to render each other assistance, even to violating the law. Therefore Hideyoshi's plan for dealing with the priests and traders separately by forbidding the Christian teachings and destroying Christian edifices, and at the same time by developing trade with Christian nations, was quite impracticable. Consequently, the Anti-Christian Law was practically ineffective, notwithstanding that it was rigorously enforced. The priests were either exiled or crucified. To counteract this, a number of priests were smuggled into Japan in the guise of traders, and they engaged secretly in religious work with great zeal and considerable success. Although the Christian converts in Japan were forced to renounce their faith, those refusing being either exiled or put to death, new converts soon filled their places. This situation is to be seen in the years 1590 and 1591. In 1590, according to official records, the Japanese government put 20,570 Christians to death; in 1591 the number of Japanese who were converted, not including those who secretly embraced the faith, was considerably greater than 12,000. How to carry out the anti-Christian policy became an increasingly puzzling and serious problem. At the very time that Hideyoshi was fighting Christianity in Japan, because of the changed conditions in the nation, he also found it necessary to tolerate Christians—as will be seen presently.

In 1590 the Hojo, the last and the most powerful military family, which ruled eight large provinces in eastern Japan, was

destroyed by Hideyoshi. By this successful military campaign the national unification of Japan was completed. Two years later, Hideyoshi was ready to put in motion his long-cherished plan of conquering the Asiatic continent. Because of the refusal of the king of Korea to open a road to Hideyoshi's army for the invasion of China and to lead the vanguard in compliance with Hideyoshi's demand, Hideyoshi found it necessary to crush Korea before undertaking the conquest of China.⁶⁰ Although the Korean campaign was but a preparatory step, yet it was conducted on a grand scale in order to impress the people on the continent. Nearly half a million soldiers were called up and half of them were sent to Korea. As Hideyoshi turned his entire attention to this great military undertaking, his anti-Christian movement naturally became a matter of secondary importance.

He used both Christian and Buddhist military lords, as well as military men of both faiths, without discrimination, in his Korean campaign. The first division was commanded by a Christian lord, Konishi, the second by a devout Buddhist, Kato; and thus the campaign was begun as if there was a rivalry between the Christian and Buddhist soldiers. Within ten weeks after the landing of Hideyoshi's army, the national capital of Korea was occupied by the Christian force under Konishi, the Buddhist force under Kato soon following. The Christian soldiers then advanced far into northern Korea and stormed and occupied Pyeng Yang, the ancient capital, which had the strongest and largest fortifications of any city in Korea and offered a convenient approach to Manchuria. The Buddhist soldiers, under the command of Kato, followed the retreating royal Korean army and succeeded in capturing the crown prince of Korea and his brother. Like Konishi, several other feudal Christian lords of Kyushu commanded one or another of the nine divisions of Hideyoshi's army, and included among their men their Christian followers. While in the field, those Christian feudal lords and their military men were fighting

loyally and brilliantly for the cause of national expansion; hence, Hideyoshi could not enforce the Anti-Christian Law and kill the members of these men's families who were left at home in Japan. Hideyoshi apparently tolerated Christianity in order to meet the situation. It is said that some of the Christian feudal lords in Korea were permitted to send for Christian priests from Japan and have them conduct Christian services in the military camps.

In 1598 Hideyoshi died, at the age of sixty-three years, without having accomplished his long-cherished ambition of world dominion; neither had he been able even to check the spread of Christianity, although he firmly believed that Christianity and the national existence of Japan were incompatible.⁵¹ In 1600, two years after the death of Hideyoshi, a decisive battle was fought at Sekigahara; all the military lords and families that were unfriendly to the ambitious Iyeyasu were either destroyed or rendered powerless, and Iyeyasu became the undisputed master of Japan.

In 1603, with the appointment of Iyeyasu as shogun by the emperor, the organization of the Tokugawa shogunate was completed. Like Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu made the national expansion of Japan the fundamental policy of his government; but, as has already been noted, the plan followed by Iyeyasu in carrying out this great undertaking was entirely different from that of Hideyoshi.⁵² Iyeyasu abandoned military aggression and the conquest of other nations. His policy was to establish peaceful and friendly relations with all countries, and to invite both traders and ship captains to come to Japan and thereby make Japan eventually the greatest commercial center in Asia. It was also his policy to encourage Japanese traders to sail to other parts of the world for the dual purpose of developing trade and establishing settlements, toward the end that Japan should become the great financial center of Asia.⁵³ This national undertaking was begun in 1599 by Iyeyasu at the time of his attempt to restore peace with Korea. In that year, Iyeyasu in-

structed Lord So, of Tsushima in the Korean Channel, to approach the Korean government for the purpose of establishing amicable relations. Three times, the representatives sent to Korea by Lord So were arrested and sent to Peking.⁵⁴ When he sent representatives the fourth time, they were allowed to return to Tsushima, where they reported to Lord So that Korea would not take up any national question with Japan until the latter should show her sincerity by returning to their native land the Koreans who had been taken prisoner. In response to this demand, Japan gathered Korean prisoners of war during the next five years and sent more than five thousand of them back to Korea. In July, 1606, Ibun Sei, councilor of state in the Korean government, wrote to Lord So saying that if Japan desired to restore peace with Korea, she would first have to meet two minimum requirements, namely:

1. The ruler of Japan should send a state paper suing for peace, thus indicating that peace proposals originated on the part of Japan.

2. Japan should arrest those Japanese who had dug up and dishonored the graves of Korean kings, and should send them to Korea to be punished in accordance with Korean laws.⁵⁵

In response, a state paper of Japan bearing the name of Iyeyasu was sent to Korea, and Lord So, on his own initiative, sent two young common criminals as the offenders who had dishonored the graves of the kings. Although the Korean government had lively suspicions that these young men were not the real offenders, yet, because Japan had made the gesture of meeting Korea's demands, the government caused them to be executed in a public place in a most ceremonious manner.⁵⁶ The king of Korea then sent a memorial to the Ming throne of China, giving therein a complete account of the preliminary negotiations with Japan and petitioning for imperial permission to conclude with her a treaty of peace.

In 1607 the king of Korea sent an envoy to bear the reply to the state paper of Japan.⁵⁷ The substance of this reply was as

follows: "For a period of two hundred years the Kingdom of Korea enjoyed peace and prosperity, leading a happy national existence under the magnanimous protection of the Great Emperor of China. Despite the fact that Korea had neither offended nor opposed Japan, in 1592 Japan without cause or provocation sent a large army to Korea and subjected her to extreme privation, suffering, and calamity, even to the opening and desecrating of the graves of Korean kings. Both the ruled and the ruling in Korea feel the pain of this experience deep in their hearts and bones. For several years past, Japan has caused Lord So repeatedly to approach Korea with proposals for peace. Korea has each time rejected the proposals because both the government and the people have felt that Korea should neither maintain her existence under the same skies with Japan nor disgracefully associate with a nation having the standards and practices of Japan. But Japan now regrets what she has done in the past and has completely reformed, thus entering upon a new national life. She therefore asks for the good will and understanding of Korea. This attitude on the part of Japan is sure to bring happiness and blessings." Korea therefore sent an envoy in return and acknowledged and approved the contents of the state paper sent by Japan.⁵⁸

In 1609—after twenty years of effort on the part of Japan—peace was restored and a trade treaty, *Kiyu Joyaku* ("The Treaty in the Year Kiyu"), was entered into between Japan and Korea. Japan gained by the treaty the privilege of engaging in trade with Korea once a year at Fusan, the Korean harbor nearest to Japan.

In this way Iyeyasu succeeded in restoring peace with Korea. He met all demands made by Korea, even though it entailed lowering the national dignity and prestige of Japan. Historians are of the opinion that he did not make so great a sacrifice merely for the sake of gaining trade privileges with so small and resourceless a country as Korea, but rather that his real

purpose was to secure trade privileges with China through the medium of Korea.⁵⁹ Just as it had been planned by Hideyoshi that Korea should be made a road for the invasion of China in his military conquests, Iyeyasu planned to make of Korea an avenue for his peaceful financial conquest of China.⁶⁰ In fact, Iyeyasu earnestly hoped to establish diplomatic relations with China and thereby to gain trade benefits in that vast country. In the seventeenth century, China was the trade center in Asia of the Occidental nations, India, and various countries in the South Sea islands. Therefore, for Iyeyasu to gain trade privileges in China was tantamount to securing trade facilities with all the known nations in the world.⁶¹

However, Iyeyasu failed in his attempt to utilize Korea in his approach to China for financial and trade purposes, just as Hideyoshi had failed to utilize Korea for military and aggressive purposes in his proposed conquest of China. No matter in what ways Iyeyasu and his government approached Korea and tried to induce her to give assistance to Japan in establishing peace with China, with the hope of gaining trade privileges with that nation, the king of Korea and his government steadfastly refused to comply with the request of Japan because they doubted the sincerity and good faith of Japan, and because they feared that they might incur the ill will of China, the suzerain of Korea, if they should render friendly service to Japan, the long-standing national enemy of both Korea and China.⁶² Nevertheless, Iyeyasu persisted in his efforts to open China to Japanese trade. He attempted to approach China through all possible channels and utilized all available means and ways to accomplish this end. But China had closed her doors entirely against Japan. There was no chance for Japan to send an envoy or state papers directly to the Chinese imperial court. Iyeyasu therefore on several occasions sent letters couched in most humble terms to the viceroy of Fukien Province, sometimes by Chinese traders as intermediaries, sometimes in the name of his advisor, and on other occasions in the name of the gov-

ernor of Nagasaki, asking the viceroy to obtain trade licenses for Japan from the imperial government of China so that Japanese ships might engage in trade in Chinese harbors.⁶³

Having suffered from the ravages of Japanese pirates for a period of nearly two hundred years and, after that, from a seven years' bloody campaign in Korea, China had had only sorry experience with Japan and the Japanese; consequently, the policy of keeping hands off Japan and of not permitting the Japanese to approach the coast of China was rigorously observed by the imperial government as well as by the provincial governments of China. As a result, none of the letters sent by Iyeyasu were acknowledged by the government of Fukien. However, Iyeyasu succeeded in inducing Chinese traders of the Nanking and Fukien districts to come to Nagasaki, Japan, where they were permitted to establish trade settlements on very liberal terms, and to engage in trade with the Japanese.

Iyeyasu succeeded in inducing the kingdom of Liu Chiu to engage in trade with China on behalf of Japan.⁶⁴ Liu Chiu was a small kingdom the total population of which numbered scarcely half a million. The archipelago which was its territory lies between southern China and Kyushu, Japan. For hundreds of years it had maintained its existence under suzerain and tributary relations with China; but it had also recognized the ruling authority of the feudal lord of Satsuma Province, in Kyushu, and had sent a sort of tribute to that local government. During the seven years' Korean campaign of Hideyoshi, Liu Chiu was greatly dissatisfied because of the heavy military requisitions made upon her by Japan, and therefore discontinued the sending of tribute to the lord of Satsuma.

In the spring of 1609, under instructions from Iyeyasu, the lord of Satsuma sent an army 3000 strong to Liu Chiu as a punitive expedition. In a campaign lasting less than a month, Liu Chiu was conquered. The king and his family were taken prisoner and brought to Japan. In the autumn of 1611, after having been detained in Japan for more than two years, the

king of Liu Chiu was permitted to return to his kingdom upon pledging loyalty to Japan and recognizing the suzerainty of Japan through the lord of Satsuma.⁶⁵ Upon his return, with the full knowledge of Japan, the king of Liu Chiu assumed a tributary relationship with China. In addition to the sending of tribute regularly to the imperial throne of China, it was made the state obligation of Liu Chiu that each new ruler of that kingdom was to ascend the royal throne only after having received investiture through the imperial throne of China and having pledged himself to use the Chinese national calendar. The king of Liu Chiu also, in compliance with the request of Japan,⁶⁶ made it possible for Japanese traders to engage in trade with China, disguised as subjects of his kingdom.⁶⁷

In 1609, and again in 1616, Iyeyasu sent a trade expedition to Formosa with the purpose of making that large island a center for Chinese and Japanese traders. Formosa lies so close to China that it functions as a part of Fukien Province. These trade expeditions found that Formosa had been inhabited by many powerful wild tribes, and as there was no real central authority in Formosa to deal with the proposals for trade, they had to return to Japan without having accomplished anything.⁶⁸ The ambitious attempts on the part of Iyeyasu to establish friendly relations with China and thereby to gain trade privileges in that vast nation ended in virtually complete failure. The securing of the privilege to engage in trade with the Koreans under great restrictions in one Korean harbor once a year, trade with China once a year through the instrumentality of Liu Chiu, and the establishment of Chinese trade settlements at Nagasaki was the sum total of what Iyeyasu gained for Japan in a score of years of ceaseless effort. China had closed her doors against Japan, the traders and trade ships from Japan being shut out from every Chinese harbor.⁶⁹

In striking contrast with his failure in trade undertakings in China and Korea, Iyeyasu was highly successful in expanding Japanese trade in southern Asia and in the South Sea islands.

In the early part of the seventeenth century, Japanese trading ships plied continuously between the harbors of Japan and those of India, the Malay Peninsula, Siam, Annam, Java, Sumatra, the Philippines, Cambodia, Cochin China, Formosa, Borneo, and Macao, among others. Japanese traders also established trade settlements inhabited by several hundred Japanese in the ports just named. The number of large ocean-going ships provided with red-seal licenses issued by the Japanese government, which was only 9 at the time of Hideyoshi, was increased to 198 in the time of Iyeyasu. Thus Iyeyasu's plan for national expansion by means of trade was successful so far as southern Asia and the South Sea islands were concerned.⁷⁰

Iyeyasu held the same ideas in regard to Christianity as had Hideyoshi: he believed that Christian teachings were entirely contrary to the national traditions and doctrines of Japan, and that therefore Christianity and the national existence of Japan were incompatible. At the same time, however, Iyeyasu recognized that Christian activities and the development of trade with Occidental nations were inseparable because Christianity constituted part of the life of the Occidental traders, especially those from Spain and Portugal. He therefore concluded that trade with those nations could not be carried on successfully unless Christianity should be tolerated in Japan, and, having so decided, he neither repealed nor enforced Hideyoshi's Anti-Christian Law of 1587. Although this law was retained, yet, on account of his strong desire to develop trade with Portugal and Spain, Iyeyasu neither opposed nor prevented the coming of Catholic priests to Japan to engage in missionary work among the Japanese.⁷¹ Iyeyasu took this stand because, in addition to gaining trade, he urgently desired to bring into Japan the art of shipbuilding, and mining and other industrial practices. Consequently, unless Christian priests flagrantly violated the national laws, thus threatening the existence of the nation, Iyeyasu permitted them to enter Japan and engage in missionary work without interference. By reason of this toleration, Catho-

lic priests and their converts in Japan enjoyed an entirely different life from those of the time of Hideyoshi. Hence, in the early part of the Keicho era (1596–1614), almost immediately after the death of Hideyoshi, priests of the Jesuit, Franciscan, and Dominican orders came to Japan in increasing numbers, and openly engaged in religious work in Nagasaki, Osaka, and Kyoto. Within a few years they had restored the Christian ascendancy in the five Kinai provinces which surrounded the imperial capital, Kyoto.

In 1600, after the Battle of Sekigahara, with the betterment of foreign relations and the increase of trade, Christianity and its converts came to be fully recognized. The field of Christian operations was steadily extended. It is said that with the exception of but eight provinces all Japan, which was then divided into sixty-six provinces, had come under the dominating influence of Christianity.⁷³ According to religious records, the number of grown men and women actually converted was 500,000 between the years 1549 and 1598, and 152,900 between the years 1598 and 1614. Unofficial records state that in 1605 the number of Christian converts exceeded 750,000, and that in 1613–14, when Christianity in Japan reached its peak, the number approached 1,000,000. Hence it is safe to assume that during these periods the total number of Christian converts, including children born in Christian families, certainly exceeded 1,000,000.⁷⁴ Some authorities state that the number of Christian converts in 1611 was 2,000,000.⁷⁴

Iyeyasu was very persistent in his attempts to extend Japanese trade to the American hemisphere. As early as 1601 he sent a state paper to Don Francisco Tello, the governor of the Philippines, asking that he make it possible for Japan to enter into trade relations with Nueva España. In 1602 Iyeyasu again addressed a letter to the Philippine governor, in which he stated that trade should be established between Japan and Nueva España because both lands would be greatly benefited. In the same year he also wrote to say that all Spanish ships

plying between the Philippines and Nueva España would be privileged to enter and anchor in any Japanese harbor.

In 1609 Iyeyasu again wrote to the governor of the Philippines, voluntarily guaranteeing to safeguard the Catholic priests and their religious work in Japan. He took this step with the hope that toleration of Christianity might gain the governor's good will and thereby make it possible to establish a trade route between Japan and Nueva España. However, all these efforts failed to bring about the desired results.⁷⁵

In 1609 Don Rodrigo de Vivero, the retired governor of the Philippines, was shipwrecked off the coast of Japan while sailing for Spain by way of Nueva España. He was rescued by Japanese. Upon reaching Yedo, the military capital of Japan, he had a series of audiences with Iyeyasu and the latter's son. They discussed trade affairs and the question of the employment of Spanish mining engineers to work in Japanese mines. On one occasion, Iyeyasu authorized Honda, his advisor, to promise Don Rodrigo that full protection would be accorded to Christian missionaries in Japan. Because his plan to approach Nueva España through the office of the governor of the Philippines ended in failure, Iyeyasu decided to enter into direct negotiations for trade. He took advantage of the fact that the shipwrecked governor of the Philippines was staying in Japan, and planned to send an escort with him to Nueva España in a Japanese ship, at the same time sending Japanese envoys to that country for the purpose of entering into trade negotiations. He appointed two Spanish priests, Alonzo Muñoz and Luis Sotelo, as envoys from Japan. He also instructed twenty-three Japanese traders to accompany the party for the purpose of investigating trade possibilities in Nueva España. Iyeyasu instructed his son, Hidetada, to send a state paper to the governor of Nueva España. The contents of this state paper, and of the state paper of Iyeyasu prepared by his advisor Honda and addressed to the Spanish throne, reveal that Iyeyasu planned to have his envoys, Muñoz and Sotelo, approach both the king of Spain and the

governor of Nueva España and present his plan to permit the ships from Nueva España to enter the harbors and ports of all parts of Japan, and to provide Spanish subjects with land upon which they might build their residences, as well as to permit the Catholic priests to settle in any part of Japan with the privilege of carrying on their religious work. The envoy Muñoz was to discuss orally trade and other matters with the Spanish authorities. Iyeyasu hoped that in consequence of these concessions Japan might be able to conclude a treaty of commerce with Nueva España.⁷⁶

The Japanese ship aboard which were the shipwrecked governor of the Philippines and the two Spanish priests representing Japan, accompanied by Japanese traders, sailed from the Bay of Yedo on August 1, 1610, and reached Manzanillo, Lower California, on October 27 of the same year. It proceeded to Acapulco, Nueva España. Having heard that Iyeyasu had shown great kindness and courtesy to the shipwrecked governor, Don Rodrigo, and had returned him to Nueva España with an escort, in a Japanese ship specially prepared for the purpose, the king of Spain appointed Sebastián Vizcaíno as his envoy to Japan to convey Spain's appreciation of Japan's action. This envoy and his party, together with the twenty-three Japanese traders whom Iyeyasu had sent to look into the possibilities of trade with Nueva España, sailed from Acapulco on March 22, 1611, and reached Uraga, Japan, on June 10 of the same year. Upon their return, the Japanese trade inspectors reported to Iyeyasu that as Nueva España lay from 8000 to 9000 miles distant it lacked trade possibilities for Japan, and that not only had the people of Nueva España discouraged the coming of the Japanese, but also some of them had strongly opposed the opening of their country to Japanese trade.⁷⁷

In the summer of 1611 the Spanish envoy, Vizcaíno, went to the military capital of Japan and had an interview with Iyeyasu and his son, Hidetada, and presented a gift from the king of Spain as a token of the king's appreciation of the kindness

shown to the shipwrecked governor, Don Rodrigo. At the same time, the envoy mentioned the Spanish ship in which he had come and requested permission for it to sail along the coast of Japan to take soundings in an attempt to locate an island that was reputed to be near Japan and to be full of gold and silver. Although Iyeyasu granted this request, he was greatly disappointed because he could not get any reply to his proposal regarding trade; neither could he get Spanish mining engineers to come to Japan.⁷⁸

In 1612 the Spanish envoy was ready to return home. At that time the Catholic troubles in Japan were becoming increasingly serious. Moreover, almost all the advisors of Iyeyasu were Shinto, Buddhist, and Confucian scholars. As a result, Iyeyasu decided to frame and promulgate an anti-Christian law. Consequently, the reply to the letter of the governor of Nueva España which had been brought to Iyeyasu by the Spanish envoy contained the following statement:

"Japan is the nation of Buddha and of Shinto gods. She has a divine law of her own, by reverential adherence to which the rulers and the ruled have maintained a happy existence, the doctrines of loyalty and justice being always observed and practiced. The divine law of Japan is entirely different from that of Nueva España and Spain. Therefore neither Japan nor Spain can derive benefit or blessing by introducing and adopting the divine law of the other. Consequently, neither Spain nor Nueva España should contemplate the propagation of Christianity in Japan, just as Japan should not plan to propagate the teachings of Buddha in Spain and Nueva España. Nueva España and Japan should confine their attention solely to the development of trade. If trade ships cross the waters from each land to the other and engage only in buying and selling, the two nations will enjoy unbounded blessings and benefits. Trade ships from Nueva España will enjoy every privilege in the ports and harbors of Japan, and be free to engage in trade as best suits them."⁷⁹

This letter was prepared by the noted Buddhist priest, Sunden, who was one of Iyeyasu's advisors. Notwithstanding the unfavorable report made by the trade inspectors sent by Iyeyasu to Nueva España, Iyeyasu was persistent in attempting the opening of trade with that region. He therefore requested the governor of Nueva España to enter into trade relations with Japan and to abandon his idea of propagating Christianity there. But because Iyeyasu entirely disregarded the pledge that he had made in 1609, and again in 1610, by which he had promised to safeguard and protect Catholic priests and their religious work in Japan, the governor of Nueva España was greatly offended and strongly opposed the opening of the colony to trade with the Japanese.⁸⁰

Although Iyeyasu's plan to carry Japanese trade across the Pacific Ocean to America thus ended unsuccessfully, he was neither disappointed nor discouraged. In 1613 he enlisted the aid of Masamune Date, a powerful feudal lord in northeastern Japan, and formulated a plan to send an envoy in the name of Lord Date to Nueva España and to Spain for the purpose of concluding a treaty of commerce with the colony and, if possible, with the mother country also. Great preparations were made. On October 29, 1613, Hashikura (Shigura), the envoy of Lord Date, accompanied by a party consisting of one hundred and fifty men including the personal attendants of the envoy and of the traders—some authorities give an inclusive figure of one hundred and eighty—sailed from Tsuki-no-Ura (Bay), Japan. Sotelo, the Spanish priest, accompanied Hashikura as advisor and guide. The envoy and his party reached Acapulco on January 25, 1614.⁸¹ The governor of Nueva España received the Japanese envoy in grand style. Hashikura presented to the governor state papers containing the following account:

"Our government, realizing how earnestly our people desire to embrace Christianity, is planning to do all in its power to make this possible. Therefore, in order to welcome Catholic

priests in Nueva España, and to facilitate their coming to our State, we are now building a number of ships. Upon their completion, these ships will be sent from time to time to Nueva España, so that the priests may cross the water to Japan. Upon their arrival here, we shall build Christian churches and residences for them. We shall also provide everything necessary for their religious work. We are taking this course in order to prove that we have no intention of interfering with Christian work in our State. Whenever our ships sail to Nueva España to carry priests to Japan, they will be heavily loaded with Japanese products, with the expectation that on their return to Japan they will be loaded with products of Nueva España.”⁸²

When in 1612 Iyeyasu wrote to the governor of Nueva España, requesting that he open his country to Japanese trade and at the same time refrain from introducing Christianity into Japan, the governor was greatly offended and rejected the proposal. Therefore, a year later, Iyeyasu had Lord Date send an envoy to approach him as if the propagation of Christianity in Japan were his prime purpose, and trade only incidental. Sotelo, the advisor of the envoy, also presented to the governor a statement, which read as follows:

“In the years, now numbering approximately fourscore, since the introduction of Christianity into Japan, Christian priests have frequently met with serious opposition in their work. However, none of the feudal lords have ever expelled priests from their states, as they have realized that, should the religious workers be interfered with, they would lose the now profitable trade. Not only Lord Date, but even Iyeyasu himself, the ruler of Japan, has always received the priests of the Franciscan Order with great respect and consideration, because he believes that his desire to open trade with Nueva España will be accomplished through the medium of Christian workers. However, he has been greatly disappointed because no treaty of commerce has been concluded between Nueva España and Japan. If Nueva España sends a favorable reply to Iyeyasu and

promises to open Nueva España to trade with Japan, not only priests of the Franciscan Order, but those of other orders as well, will enjoy protection and prosperity in Japan.”⁸³

Before this envoy left Nueva España for Spain, seventy-eight members of the envoy's party had embraced Christianity and had been baptized in the cathedral of San Francisco, in Aca-pulco. In this way the envoy sought to show the governor how eager the Japanese were to embrace Christianity, so that the governor would favor trade with Japan. On May 8, 1614, the envoy and his party left Nueva España and crossed the continent to the Atlantic coast, from which on June 10 of the same year they sailed for Cuba aboard a Spanish ship. On August 7 they left Havana, and on October 5 reached Spain. They arrived at Madrid on December 20, after having spent two months resting in the native city of Sotelo, the priest who accompanied the envoy and his party as advisor and guide. It was on January 30, 1615, that the envoy, Hashikura, had audience with King Philip III. Hashikura then addressed the throne, saying that Lord Date, being a Christian, had an earnest desire that all his subjects should embrace Christianity, and therefore had instructed Hashikura to petition the Spanish throne that Spain send many priests to Japan so that through their teaching his subjects might be converted. After this, Hashikura delivered the message sent by Iyeyasu to the king, and stated that Iyeyasu had long desired to conclude a treaty of amity and trade with both Spain and Nueva España, and that he had instructed him (Hashikura) to avail himself of every opportunity to conclude such a treaty.⁸⁴ Hashikura then presented to the throne the state papers with which Iyeyasu had entrusted him. After the audience, Hashikura presented a draft of the treaty of commerce to the throne, asking that it might be used as a basis for negotiation. This document contained the following provisions:

“1. Because our State will never interfere with the noble religious work of the Catholic priests, and because we encourage

our people to embrace Christianity, priests of the Franciscan Order should cross the ocean to Japan. They would certainly be welcomed by us.

"2. In order to facilitate the coming of priests to Japan, newly built ships of ours will be sent annually to Nueva España. These ships will carry products of Japan to be exchanged for products of Nueva España.

"3. Spanish ships plying between the Philippines and Nueva España will be privileged to stop in Japan if they are in need of repair. Such ships will be welcomed by us, and repairs will be made promptly.

"4. If Japanese ships need additional seamen while in Spanish waters, or need repairs, the Spanish government will be expected to accommodate them.

"5. Any ship that comes from the Spanish dependencies to Japan will be allowed to engage in trade with Japan, and will be provided with anything it may need.

"6. Spanish subjects in Japan shall enjoy full privileges of residence, with extraterritorial rights."⁸⁵

In 1615, when Hashikura presented this document to the Spanish throne, the Anti-Christian Law had already been promulgated and enforced in Japan, and accounts of the persecution of Christians had been reported to Spain by priests in Japan. The Spanish government did not, therefore, trust either the statement made by Hashikura, the envoy of Lord Date, or the contents of the Japanese state paper which requested the sending of Christian priests from Spain to Japan. Moreover, the contradictory statements of Iyeyasu regarding his dealings with the Christian churches in Japan, as given in the state paper, made a very bad impression in Spain. Consequently, neither Spain nor Nueva España made any decision with regard to Hashikura's requests relating either to the sending of priests to Japan or to the trade proposals. The Spanish government replied to the state paper of Japan in a very indefinite manner, saying that Spain highly appreciated the friendly feel-

ing and good will shown by Japan, and that both Spain and Nueva España would act accordingly in their dealings with Japan. However, the Spanish government later decided that the existing trade between the Philippines and Japan might be continued, but that Japan should not be permitted to open new trade relations with either Nueva España or Spain.⁸⁶

On February 17, 1615, Hashikura was baptized at the San Francisco nunnery in Madrid, in the presence of many royal princesses and of several officers of high rank, and received the Christian name and title of Don Philip Francis. After having remained in Madrid for eight months, he and his party left Spain, on October 12, for Italy, going to Rome by way of Genoa. On October 29 they were officially received at Rome, and on November 3 they had an audience with Pope Paul V. Hashikura was honored with rights of citizenship in the City of Rome. In March, 1619, he and his party reached Nueva España, having returned by the same route which they had taken in coming, and on August 26, 1620, they were once more in Tsuki-no-Ura, the port from which they had sailed seven years before. They found that national conditions in Japan had undergone radical changes. Their native land was in the midst of the persecutions that had been begun in furtherance of the government's determination to stamp out Christianity. Consequently, all the members of the returning party who had embraced Christianity immediately renounced their faith for the sake of their personal safety. Their mission had ended in complete failure.

Although they had been received everywhere with pomp and magnificent display, as if they were representatives of some powerful kingdom in Asia—and indeed this was the most elaborate trade expedition, of ancient or modern times, that Japan has ever sent to an Occidental nation,⁸⁷—yet, after having spent seven years abroad, they returned home without having accomplished the work entrusted to them; that is, without having concluded treaties of commerce either with Nueva España or

with Spain. Yet this great trade expedition sent by Iyeyasu and Lord Date shows how eagerly in the early days of the seventeenth century Japan was seeking to establish commercial relations with America and even with Europe—because Iyeyasu cherished an ambition to make Japan the greatest economic and trade empire in the world.⁸⁸ He died in 1616, three years after the expedition had sailed from Japan.

In the early part of the seventeenth century, Spain, Portugal, England, and Holland—the four outstanding nations in Europe that were interested in Oriental trade—maintained commercial relations with Japan. All Japan was at that time open to free trade.⁸⁹ In 1547, four years after the discovery of Japan by the Portuguese, Fernão Mendes Pinto came to Japan and visited Tanegashima, Funai, Kagoshima, and other places in Kyushu, for religious and trade purposes. In 1549, Francisco Xavier, being greatly encouraged by the reports of Pinto, came to Kagoshima, where he started his religious work in Japan. In the early part of the second half of the sixteenth century, priests of the Jesuit Order and Portuguese traders established religious and trade centers. However, it was only after the Vatican officially recognized Japan as a trade and religious center assigned exclusively to Portugal by the Concordat of 1580 and by the Bull of 1585 that Portugal gained practically complete control of both trade and religious work in Japan.⁹⁰

It was in 1580 that Spanish traders came to Hirado in Kyushu, but nothing was accomplished by them in the way of trade or of religion. In 1594 the governor of the Philippines sent an envoy (Iliano) to Japan merely for political purposes. Although in the latter part of the sixteenth century the Spanish began to engage in both commercial and religious work in Japan, it was only after 1600, when King Philip III of Spain permitted Spanish priests to proceed to Japan under the protection of the Spanish flag,⁹¹ that Spanish missionaries began to engage in real religious activity. Nevertheless, priests of the Dominican and Franciscan orders in Spain prior to 1608 were unable

to obtain permission from the Vatican to engage in religious work in Japan. In 1609 the king of Spain granted to his subjects in Manila permission to engage in trade in both Japan and China. Hence it was in the early part of the seventeenth century that Spanish traders and priests began to enter upon trade and religious work in Japan, this work having long been monopolized by the Portuguese. Although as early as 1602 Iyeyasu had on various occasions permitted ships from Manila to enter and to anchor in Japanese harbors, yet it was only in 1608 that Iyeyasu officially granted trade privileges in Japan to the Philippines.

Toward the close of the sixteenth century, Holland determined to get a share of the trade in the Orient. On four different occasions—in 1594, 1595, 1596, and 1598—Holland sent trade expeditions thither. In April, 1600, the “*Liefde*,” one of the ships in the fleet of the fourth expedition, drifted down the coast of Oita in Kyushu with but twenty-four survivors aboard. Iyeyasu showed great interest in these newcomers from a European nation hitherto unknown to him. He sent for all of them to come to his capital, and in his interview with them he showed unusual kindness. Among the shipwrecked Europeans, Iyeyasu perceived that William Adams, an Englishman, and Jan Josten, a Dutchman, were men of striking character and attainments.⁹² He induced them to make their homes in Japan and to serve him as advisors.

In 1609 the ruler of Holland sent an envoy to express his appreciation of the kindness shown to his countrymen by Iyeyasu, and at the same time he made a request for trade privileges with Japan. The envoy, with his party, arrived at Hirado, Kyushu, and then proceeded to Sumpu, the residence capital of Iyeyasu. He presented a state paper and asked Iyeyasu to open Japan to Dutch trade. Under date of August 24, 1609, Iyeyasu gave the Dutch envoy the following written trade permit:

“The National Permit is hereby given to all ships from Holland upon their arrival in Japanese waters to enter and anchor

in the ports and harbors in all parts of Japan and to engage in trade. From this day Dutch ships shall be dealt with in strict accordance with this permit. The national transactions between Holland and Japan shall always be conducted with friendly feelings, showing good will.”⁸³

In 1564 a British ship entered a Japanese harbor, in Kyushu. But England made no serious attempt to gain trade privileges in Japan until the early part of the seventeenth century. At that time, William Adams, the British subject previously spoken of, was, as an advisor to Iyeyasu, a prominent and influential personage in Japan: in one of his letters home he said, “I pleased him [Iyeyasu] so that what I said he would not contradict.” Although Adams was highly respected and had great power in both domestic and foreign matters, he always longed for England and for his countrymen. He often wrote to his friends in England, trying to induce them to come to Japan and engage in foreign trade,⁸⁴ and his letters made a great impression upon them. Some time before he wrote, moreover, there had been a movement in England to open trade with Japan. In April, 1611, King James I had determined to send Captain John Saris to Japan as his envoy. Nevertheless, the envoy and his party did not actually start until January 14, 1613. On June 11 they arrived at Hirado, Kyushu; and went to Sumpu and to Yedo, where they had audience with Iyeyasu and his son Hidetada. They presented their official credentials, together with gifts sent by James I to Iyeyasu. The party was received with unprecedented courtesy and kindness.⁸⁵ The envoy presented the state paper and explained the official communication in detail. He asked Iyeyasu for trade concessions. Through the mediation of William Adams, Iyeyasu readily granted all the demands of England. The following commercial agreement was concluded between England and Japan:

“1. British ships having now completed their first voyage from England to Japan, every facility and convenience shall be given their traders engaging in trade in Japan. Taking into con-

sideration the fact that the British ships have to pursue a sea route of great length in coming to Japan, all sorts of taxes, including customs tariffs, shall be remitted. [By this arrangement, the right of free trade was granted to British traders.]

"2. British traders are privileged to land their goods and other cargo from their ships at their own convenience. All British ships are privileged to enter, to anchor, and to trade in the ports and harbors in all parts of Japan. When a British ship finds it impossible to sail further by reason of having been damaged by storm, it will be privileged to enter any Japanese harbor. [This means that Japan opened her entire country to British traders and trade ships.]

"3. In the event of the death of a British subject, no matter in what part of Japan it may occur, his property and all other belongings shall be safeguarded and delivered to his relatives.

"4. If a British subject commits a crime in Japan, he will be delivered to the chief British officers, who will mete out due punishment in accordance with the nature of the offense. [This means that British residents in Japan in the seventeenth century enjoyed extraterritorial rights.]"⁶⁶

This agreement between England and Japan was the first treaty into which Japan entered with any Occidental nation.

In the early part of the seventeenth century, traders from the two Catholic nations and the two Protestant ones, also, came from Europe to engage in trade in Japan. Spanish and Portuguese traders from the very beginning maintained close relations with the Catholic priests from their respective countries; the traders and priests coöperated as if trade and religion were inseparable. The Dutch and British traders, on the contrary, came to Japan solely for purposes of trade, without any intention of introducing Christianity; neither did Protestant ministers in these countries have any intention of coming to Japan to engage in missionary work. Hence, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Protestantism was entirely unknown to the Japanese. In those days in Japan, Christianity and Catholi-

cism were synonymous terms, and consequently it was long the conviction alike of the Japanese government and the people that those who were not Catholics were not Christians. Trade rivalry and a feeling of enmity existed not only between traders who came from the Catholic and the Protestant countries, but also between the Dutch and British traders, and between the Portuguese and Spanish traders, who were far from friendly toward each other. Moreover, priests of the Jesuit Order and those of the Franciscan and Dominican orders were not on the best of terms.⁹⁷ Thus did religious workers as well as traders from the Occidental nations accuse and blame each other instead of coöperating.

The cause of this trouble may be traced to the Dutch. With the hope of monopolizing the Japanese trade, the Dutch traders, backed by their government, on several occasions approached Iyeyasu and his government, advising and urging that the other European traders should be driven from Japan. The Dutch traders always tried to impress upon Iyeyasu that the Catholic priests in Japan had been sent there not for religious purposes, but as secret agents of their respective governments, with a view to the reducing of Japan to vassalage.

As already indicated, some decades prior to the coming of the Dutch traders to Japan, both Hideyoshi and Iyeyasu had become convinced that the teachings and doctrines of Christianity could not coexist with the national usages of Japan. They always looked upon the activities of the Catholic priests in Japan with great suspicion; and their suspicion was strengthened by the incident of the "San Felipe." In 1597 a Spanish ship of that name which had left Manila for Nueva España was stranded near Urado, Tosa District, and practically wrecked. Having received a report from the local government regarding this disaster, Hideyoshi sent his chief officer, Masuda, to Urado. Upon arriving there, Masuda decided, in accordance with the established usage of the time, to confiscate all the merchandise and other cargo of the "San Felipe." The captain of the ship

complained bitterly, but in vain. Thereupon, he showed a map of the world to Masuda and explained to him, by pointing out her territorial possessions in all parts of the world, that Spain was the greatest of nations, and then threatened Masuda, saying that if Japan dealt unkindly and unjustifiably with the subjects of this powerful Spanish kingdom, due punishment would be meted out to her. Masuda was greatly astonished at the vast dominion under the control of Spain. He asked the captain how the king of Spain had come to own and rule such extensive territory all over the world. The captain said in reply: "Our king has one set rule for successfully conquering a foreign country. If he wishes to reduce a nation to the condition of a vassal state, he first sends Catholic priests to convert the natives. When a great many natives have been converted, the king's army follows. Then, with the coöperation of the native converts, the troops of the king conquer the land and make it a vassal state of the king of Spain."⁶⁸ This statement of the captain, although a boast, actually portrayed historical practices in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under the Spanish flag. The "San Felipe" incident made a deep impression upon the Japanese and caused great harm to Christian missionary work in Japan.

With the coming of the Dutch traders in the seventeenth century, the Dutch and Spanish traders in Japan not only became trade rivals; they also nursed the national enmities that existed in Europe, regarding each other as enemies. The Spanish traders advised the Japanese not to associate with the Dutch traders and stated that the Dutch were a people who made piracy their profession. At the same time, the Dutch traders were warning the Japanese against Spanish intrigues, declaring that the Spanish were an exceedingly self-centered and aggressive people, whose king made it a practice to seize the territory of other nations and to deprive them of their independence. In course of time both the Spanish and Dutch governments began to take part in the rivalries of their respective traders

in Japan. Whenever a Spanish envoy came to Japan, he always requested that Iyeyasu and his government drive all the Dutch people out, not permitting a single Dutchman to remain. In 1610, when Sebastián Vizcaíno, the retired governor of the Philippines, had an interview with Iyeyasu, he made the following statement and request:

"The Dutch traders in Japan are, in fact, pirates. The Dutch people are both traitors to and national enemies of the King of Spain. The Great Ruler of Japan should not protect pirates and robbers. Therefore, all the Dutch traders in Japan should be immediately expelled."⁸⁸

On the other hand, whenever envoys from Holland came to Japan, they always warned Iyeyasu and his government of the dangerous intrigues and practices of Spain in the reduction of other nations to the status of vassals through the underhand activities of her religious workers. In 1611 Jacques Spex, a Dutch envoy, came to Japan and told Iyeyasu that the national practice of Spain and Portugal was to send Christian missionaries to a foreign country to convert the natives, and, after these priests had established Christian influence among the people, to send troops to conquer the nation with the coöperation of the Christian converts. In 1612 Hendrik Brouwer, a Dutch envoy, came to Japan and presented to Iyeyasu a document which contained a full account of how Spain and Portugal used the propagation of Christianity in foreign countries as a means of conquering them. In those days almost all the prominent advisors of Iyeyasu and men of power in his government were Buddhist, Shinto, or Confucian scholars. They came more and more under the influence of the Dutch traders and envoys, who warned them of the Spanish and Portuguese plots, and they finally came to believe that the Spanish and Portuguese priests in Japan were the secret agents of their respective kings.

It was at this time that a Japanese Catholic priest who had been expelled from the Church for having committed a series of misdemeanors came from Kyushu to Sumpu, the residence

capital of Iyeyasu, and explained to him the details of a "secret Christian plot" in Japan. He said that the Spanish priests in Japan were abundantly provided annually with gold, silver, and various kinds of precious goods by their ruler so that they might have money to enable them to gain special privileges in leasing land, building churches, and converting the natives. He then outlined how Spain had come to rule the Philippines, Nueva España, and other countries by first sending priests to convert the natives, and later, troops to conquer these countries. He said that the real purpose of the propagation of Christianity was to annex other countries to Spain. This information made a great impression upon Iyeyasu, the more so because he had already received similar warnings from the Dutch envoys and traders. Furthermore, he recollected the aggressive territorial encroachments of the Christian Church in Nagasaki, where it had established a church government independent of the Japanese government and had ruled the entire district, politically as well as religiously, and also the boastful statement of the Spanish captain of the "San Felipe" in which the Spaniard had outlined how the successful propagation of religion in foreign countries by Spanish priests was followed by conquest by the king's army.

Iyeyasu became more and more inclined to believe that the Christian priests from Spain and Portugal were serving their respective governments in order to reduce Japan to the condition of a vassal state.¹⁰⁰ He himself was a devoted Buddhist, and so was neither friendly to the Christian priests nor sympathetic to their religious endeavors. However, because of his strong conviction that trade with Spain and Portugal was inseparable from Christian religious activity in Japan, he tolerated Christianity and gave freedom and protection to the Christian priests.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, in 1610 the religious and trade conditions in Japan underwent radical changes. When Iyeyasu undertook to extend trade relations to Nueva España, notwithstanding the fact that such eminent priests as Sotelo and Muñoz

coöperated with him and made strenuous efforts to have Spain consent to Iyeyasu's plans for trade with America, no headway was made. At the same time, Japanese trade with non-Catholic nations, such as England and Holland, was carried on successfully. The trade with the districts in southern Asia and in the South Sea was also increasingly prosperous. Iyeyasu therefore realized that his toleration of Christianity did not have the expected results on Japanese trade, and that his plan to make Japan the great trade center of the Orient might be successful without the coöperation of Christian priests. He therefore changed his policy and attitude toward Christianity and its priests. His changed course may in part be accounted for by the fact that as early as the beginning of 1610 Spain's attempt to expand her territory through the influence of Christianity on the native converts had already gained ground.

William Adams, the sole Occidental advisor to Iyeyasu, frequently approached him and stated that the purpose of the Spanish priests in Japan was not to explain the way of salvation through Christ to the Japanese and thereby to save their souls, but rather to convert the Japanese to Christianity so that through their coöperation the king of Spain might conquer Japan. He said that the Spanish priests in Japan were merely duplicating what their predecessors had done in Peru, in Nueva España, and in other parts of America. Shozabura Goto, who had once been sent by Iyeyasu to Nueva España to inquire into trade conditions, and Sahei Hasagawa, the governor of Nagasaki, both of whom were trusted councilors of Iyeyasu, reported to him their investigations and findings with regard to conditions among the Christians, as well as with regard to prospects of trade with Japan.¹⁰² They stated that all the Christian converts in Japan were so devoted to the cause of Christianity that they would readily sacrifice their property, their family ties, and even life itself for the cause of their Savior. Therefore, if the Spanish and the Portuguese priests, who never knew how to respect the national traditions and laws or

even the Japanese government, should decide to utilize the blind faith of these Japanese converts for their own selfish purposes, they would be in a position to cause great harm to Japan, even threatening her national independence. In fact, those Christian priests were paving the way for their countries finally to conquer Japan. They further stated that, on the one hand, Japan had not realized any of the profit from trade that the Spanish and Portuguese traders as well as the Christian priests had promised to her if she should tolerate Christianity; on the other, Japan was benefiting by trading with such "non-Christian [non-Catholic] nations" as Holland and England.

In 1611 a Dutch war vessel overtook a Portuguese ship near the Cape of Good Hope. Upon making a thorough search of the ship, the Dutch found an important document disclosing a secret conspiracy of the Christians in Kyushu. The captain of the Dutch war vessel came to Hirado and presented the document to the Japanese government through Lord Matsuura, the ruler of Hirado. The document proved to be a petition presented to the Portuguese throne by Captain Moro, a Portuguese residing in Nagasaki. In his petition Captain Moro stated that all the Christian converts in Kyushu, with the coöperation of the Portuguese in Japan, and supported by some of the leaders in Japan, had formulated a plan to assassinate Iyeyasu and overthrow his government with the purpose of making Japan a Christian nation, and that therefore they had decided to petition the king of Portugal, asking that he send a large military force together with ships loaded with abundant military supplies and provisions.¹⁰⁸ This petition was supplemented by the names of many prominent Japanese officials who were working for the object stated.¹⁰⁴ Captain Moro was arrested, and upon being convicted was executed. A few years later, all the Japanese who were reputed to have been implicated in this plot were likewise arrested and executed.

In June, 1610, Vizcaíno, the Spanish envoy, came to Japan. On September 15 of the same year, he obtained permission

from Iyeyasu to sound the coasts of Japan for the purpose of locating an island reputed to have an abundance of gold and of silver. Under the personal supervision of this Spanish envoy, the northeastern coast of Japan, from Uraga to Sendai, was sounded. Later, the envoy chartered a fleet of ships and made a complete survey of the northeastern coast of the island of Honshu (the main island) and mapped the locations and sizes of all the important bays and harbors; several months were spent in completing this work. The Dutch and British traders took advantage of the opportunity to misrepresent the Spanish. Their representatives, assisted by William Adams and Jan Josten, the English and Dutch advisors of Iyeyasu, warned him of Spanish military ambitions and activities which might possibly culminate in an invasion of Japan. They stated that in Europe the sounding of coasts and the making of maps of harbors and ports of one country by the nationals of another was always regarded as the first movement toward military activity, and therefore was not permitted. They said further that Spain made it her traditional ambition to encroach upon and conquer other nations by employing Christian priests as her spies and agents, and that in fact Spain had employed both military strength and Christian influence in her conquest of the Philippines, of various districts in East India, and of various parts of America, and that because the coming of the priests was always a forerunner of Spanish invasion, Holland, Germany, and other European nations had already banished all Christian priests sent from Spain and Portugal.

This series of happenings, and the information regarding the priests and the activities of Spain and Portugal that was received by Iyeyasu in 1611 alone, caused him seriously to consider the expulsion of all the Christian priests in Japan and the extirpation of Christianity therein.¹⁰⁵ A few months later he came to a final decision, being prompted to it by the fact that two outstanding Japanese Christians had committed serious offenses. Harunobu Arima, a powerful feudal lord who was

always regarded as a typical Christian by Europeans as well as Japanese, plotted to poison and kill Hasegawa, the governor of Nagasaki, one of the men most trusted by Iyeyasu. Daihachi Okamoto, one of the influential men in Iyeyasu's government and an outstanding Christian, received a heavy bribe for the commission of forgery in the counterfeiting of a government document bearing the signature of Iyeyasu. Both these distinguished Christians were convicted. On March 21, 1612, Iyeyasu ordered both Lord Arima and Okamoto to be put to death; he had concluded that these two distinguished Japanese, who had held high and responsible positions, had committed grave crimes and had dared to disregard the law of the nation by reason of the fact that they were Christians. And on that same day he promulgated the Anti-Christian Law and put it in force.

But although Iyeyasu had decided upon the extermination of Christianity in Japan, he had not the slightest idea of closing Japan to traders from Christian nations. He planned to open the entire nation to traders from all parts of the world. From 1612 on, Iyeyasu pursued a policy which had been traditional from the time of Hideyoshi:

1. Because Christianity and the national independence of Japan could not coexist, Christianity in Japan should be eradicated. For this purpose Iyeyasu framed and promulgated an anti-Christian law more elaborate even than that of Hideyoshi.

2. Like Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu was fully convinced that Christianity and trade would be readily differentiated, and that therefore they should be dealt with separately and differently in strict accordance with the national policy of Japan.

3. Therefore, the Christian priests in Japan should all be driven out and their religious work completely undone. All the native Christians should be induced to renounce their faith or be put to death.

4. All trade ships should be welcomed and every possible facility afforded them so that Japan might become one of the great trade centers of the world.¹⁰⁸

CHAPTER II

The Law of Seclusion and Its Operation

IN 1600, WHEN IYEFYASU became the recognized ruling authority in Japan, he concluded that the uprooting of Christianity there would cause great damage to the trade development of the country. He therefore disregarded Hideyoshi's anti-Christian law and pursued a policy of toleration, dealing liberally with Christian priests from both Spain and Portugal. Consequently, during the succeeding period of twelve years Christianity in Japan gained a great ascendancy. In 1612, when Iyeyasu found it necessary to promulgate his own anti-Christian law, Christianity had spread throughout the nation. Such prominent feudal lords as Otomo, Omura, Arima, Takayama, and Naito made it known that they were devout Christians. The powerful and wealthy feudal lords Mayeda, Hosokawa, Nabeshima, Fukushima, and Tanaka were numbered among those who protected the Christians. Outstanding statesmen and trusted officers in Iyeyasu's government, such as Itakura and Honda, were sympathizers with the Christians. A number of pious Christians were found even among the bodyguard of Iyeyasu and of Hidetada, his son, and among the ladies-in-waiting in the palace of Iyeyasu in Sumpu.¹

With the promulgation of his anti-Christian law, Iyeyasu ordered that Christian churches and other Christian edifices should be destroyed. He arrested, exiled, or put to death more than two hundred notable Christians, including members of his bodyguard and some of the ladies-in-waiting in his palace. He sent trusted officers to various parts of Japan to suppress the Christian movement, and at the same time sent influential Buddhist priests to Kyushu and elsewhere for the purpose of persuading the Christians to renounce their faith.

With the progress of these anti-Christian activities, Iyeyasu

became more and more convinced of the power and dangerous influence of Christianity in Japan.² Some of the native converts, revering the Christian God and Savior, refused to acknowledge the authority of the ruler of Japan and of their feudal lords. They respected the Christian tenets, and ignored the very existence of both the government of Japan and the national traditions. They neither obeyed nor feared the laws of the nation. They welcomed death at the stake or by crucifixion, believing that shedding blood for their faith was the surest and shortest road to salvation. Whenever a Christian was executed in a public place, other Christians, though it meant risking arrest, crowded around the dying man and picked up pieces of his garments to be cherished as sacred relics. In fact, Japanese Christians learned not to fear fire, water, or the shedding of blood for the cause of their faith.

The anti-Christian law promulgated by Iyeyasu was thus unsuccessful. Moreover, its enforcement was not nation-wide, but was applied only in the cities, provinces, and districts that were under the direct control of Iyeyasu and his government. All the local feudal governments were privileged to use their own discretion; consequently, while some feudal lords who wished to buy the good will of Iyeyasu enforced the law in their provinces, others not only refrained from interfering with Christian workers in theirs, but often showed great sympathy with them, even going so far as to offer them refuge.

Moreover, the Spanish and Portuguese priests who had been driven away from Japan returned accompanied by others, all disguised as traders. They engaged in missionary work, making the Spanish and Portuguese settlements their headquarters. Hence, while Christians were being destroyed in some districts, new churches were being built elsewhere,³ and while in some places Christians were being arrested and either put to death or exiled, in others new converts were being made. After having enforced as well as he could his Anti-Christian Law of 1612 for about a year and a half, Iyeyasu found his efforts futile.

Because one reason for this failure was the fact that his legislation was not enforced on a nation-wide scale, he decided to promulgate a more strict and radical law. His aim was to make his new regulation nation-wide by enforcing it in all the provinces under the control of the feudal lords, as well as in his own provinces.⁴ On the night of the 22d day of the 12th month of the 18th year of the Keicho era (sometime in January, 1614, according to the Occidental calendar), Iyeyasu summoned a trusted Buddhist priest, Suden, to Yedo, his military capital, and instructed him to prepare a new anti-Christian law, with a preamble. Because this was a grave and urgent national problem, Suden spent the whole night in writing the preamble. He completed it by morning, and presented it to Iyeyasu for approval. The main content of it read as follows:

"Japan is the nation of Shinto Deities. It is also the land of Buddha. The Shinto Deities and Buddha are one and the same Divine Being [when viewed in accordance with the Buddhistic theory of incarnation]. Christianity has been introduced into our sacred land, which has long maintained a prosperous and happy existence, enjoying law and order. Christian people from lands far beyond the sea have not only sent ships to us for the purpose of engaging in trade with us, but also have introduced this evil teaching which opposes our sacred and divine laws. They have even dared to show their hand in our political affairs, thus confronting Japan with a great national crisis. The evil teaching from the Christian lands must be completely done away with, and no single inch of Japanese land left to it to revive upon. Japan, the land of the Shinto Deities and of Buddha, has always revered and prayed to those divinities. Its people have thereby learned to live upright and noble lives, discriminating between right and wrong, and between evil and worthy works. Christians, on the contrary, respect a man who committed crimes and was therefore prosecuted. They worship and revere this man, who was the enemy of both the people and the nation, as their 'Savior.' The religion thus founded should

certainly be called an evil teaching. This Being is the enemy of the Shinto Gods and of Buddha. We must promptly and rigorously drive from our land the persons who hold to this teaching. Otherwise, we shall suffer the divine punishment of Buddha and of the Shinto Deities.”⁵

The Anti-Christian Law of 1614, although framed by Iyeyasu, was promulgated in the name of Hidetada, his son, who succeeded Iyeyasu but was ruler of Japan in name only.⁶ Iyeyasu enforced this law from the time of its promulgation, punishing Christians in strict accordance with its provisions. Many of the local feudal governments showed a keen desire to cooperate; but some did not, and Iyeyasu found it necessary to deprive of lands, rank, and title, and send into exile, a few of the feudal lords, reputed to be staunch friends of the Christians, who had offered shelter to Christian refugees in their districts. Consequently, the Anti-Christian Law of 1614 was enforced on a nation-wide scale.

Within one month after the promulgation of the law, Iyeyasu instructed the governor of Kyoto to force all the foreign Christian priests in Kyoto and the surrounding districts to go to Nagasaki, where seven large ships were waiting to carry them to their respective homelands. Within eight months, Iyeyasu exiled Portuguese priests of the Jesuit Order to Macao, and Spanish priests of the Franciscan, Dominican, and Augustine orders, together with a number of Japanese Christians, to Manila, planning thus to clear Japan of all missionary workers and then to destroy all their converts. However, the Japanese Christians in the seventeenth century were unafraid of death, and died cheerfully as witnesses to their faith.⁷ Consequently, both persecution and punishment were futile. Both the law and the authority of the government were powerless against them.

How to maintain the dignity and even the very existence of the nation now became one of Iyeyasu's most serious problems. He pursued the course of seeking to impress upon the Christians the fact that death would not be their sole punishment,

but that they would be called upon, first, to suffer torture. He decreed cruel methods of punishment so that not only the Christians, but also the Japanese people in general, might know how those who became Christians must suffer. Some of the Christians who refused to renounce their faith were seized and their fingers were cut off; or the muscles of their arms and legs were removed, a large sign of the cross was branded upon their foreheads, and they were then liberated, to suffer lingering agony and finally death. Others, as soon as they were arrested, were thrown into bags made of rice straw, only their heads being left exposed, and were piled one above another on the roadside in the hot sun; and if, after several days of suffering, they still refused to renounce their faith, they were either beheaded or crucified. In some districts all the Christians who refused to renounce their faith were gathered in front of their church, government officials burned the edifice, and then made a circle of flame around the group of Christians, thus to kill them slowly by fire.

Such tortures and tribulations were merely the beginnings of the suffering of Christians in Japan. In fact, they were subjected to increasingly brutal tortures for nearly a quarter-century—until 1638, when Christianity was practically blotted out and the nation entered the Period of Absolute Seclusion.⁸ A modern Japanese historian has said that the destruction of Christianity in Japan in the seventeenth century did not shed any glory upon her history; rather, that the Christians who so bravely and cheerfully sacrificed their lives for the sake of their faith, and shed their blood like the water in the rivers and the sea, showed a spirit of sacrifice that became the pride of the Japanese race, shining like a bright light for all generations.⁹

In 1614, Iyeyasu was seventy-three years of age. As he was thus approaching the end of his life, Hideyori, who was but five years old when Hideyoshi, his father, entrusted him to Iyeyasu, had now grown into a brilliant young man of great promise. Iyeyasu feared that after his death Hideyori might claim

the ruling authority over Japan as his inheritance from Hideyoshi and rise against Hidetada, Iyeyasu's son, thereby overthrowing the Tokugawa shogunate, which Iyeyasu had founded. He concluded that it would be imperative for the sake both of his family and of his government to do away with Hideyori before he himself should die; and in October, 1614, he forced war upon him. Hideyori had his military headquarters in the Osaka castle which had been built by the great military genius Hideyoshi and had long been known as the largest and most impenetrable stronghold in Japan. In the Osaka castle, Hideyori accepted Iyeyasu's challenge and bravely defended himself. Because Hideyori had this strong position, and because the winter weather was very severe, Iyeyasu was unable to carry out his plans; he lost more than thirty thousand men in one month; and with the progress of the war he became more and more convinced that the Osaka castle could not be taken by force. He therefore made proposals of peace to Hideyori, who reluctantly accepted them. On December 22, 1614, a treaty of peace was signed. Two days afterward, Iyeyasu interpreted the terms of the treaty to suit himself. Moreover, on the grounds that Hideyori did not need any works of defense now that peace had been restored, Iyeyasu sent his fighting men to the Osaka castle and had them destroy all walls and fill up all moats and ditches, thus rendering it defenseless.

These deceitful and outrageous acts of Iyeyasu's brought about a second war. On April 28, 1615, Iyeyasu and his son Hidetada completed their military preparations, and on May 5 the actual military movements were begun. Because this second war was started before Hideyori had completed his military preparations, and also because his stronghold had been dismantled, he was doomed.¹⁰ The war lasted for three days only; on May 7, Hideyori surrendered. On the following day, Iyeyasu forced Hideyori and his mother, together with twenty-five personal attendants, to commit suicide. Thus Iyeyasu practically murdered Hideyori,¹¹ in spite of the fact that seventeen

years previously he had called all the gods and goddesses to witness and had given his pledge to Hideyoshi that he would tenderly raise his son, Hideyori, then five years old, and would loyally serve him as his ruler when he was grown, just as he had served Hideyoshi.

Hideyori had a son and a daughter, both of whom had escaped from the Osaka castle before it was taken. Iyeyasu made search for them. When they were captured, he strangled the daughter, who was but six years of age. He declared the son, who was seven years old, to be the offspring of the national enemy, Hideyori; he disgraced and tortured him, had him led through the main streets of the imperial capital to be jeered at by the populace, and then had him beheaded. Thus did Iyeyasu destroy the family of Hideyoshi, which he had recognized as the ruling family under which he himself and his family had enjoyed a safe and prosperous existence. And immediately after this, he sent a state paper to Korea bearing the information that he had done away with the family of Hideyoshi, which Korea had always regarded as a national enemy, and had thus avenged the king of Korea and his country.¹² In this way he induced Korea to renew friendly relations with Japan.

After Hideyoshi's death in 1598, his departed soul had been deified, a magnificent temple built, and the soul installed therein. In 1615, when war broke out in Osaka between Iyeyasu and Hideyori, the divine soul of Hideyoshi became an object of nation-wide reverence and worship. With the purpose of obliterating all possible sources of the influence of Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu ordered that this temple be destroyed. Later, the grave of Hideyoshi was dishonored even to the exposing of his bones: Iyeyasu did not hesitate thus to desecrate the body of this great man, although in Hideyoshi's lifetime he had pledged him loyalty and served him faithfully.

A historian has called Iyeyasu by the name of "Tanuki Oyaji," which means "a cunning, deceitful old man who is but a badger in human form."¹³ (In Japan, the badger and the fox are tradi-

tionally believed to be beasts of mystic power, which disguise themselves in many different forms for the purpose of deceiving human beings and leading them astray.) However, it is the general opinion among Japanese historians that Iyeyasu was one of the greatest men Japan ever had, that he was a person of rare constructive ability, endowed with great military and civil genius, and that he always aimed at dealing justly with others. Nevertheless, no historian can deny that Iyeyasu was extremely egocentric. In order to maintain the safe existence and prosperity of his family and his government, he respected no treaty or pledge, and even failed to pay due reverence to the imperial throne or to treat honorably the nation itself. Iyeyasu dealt with the family of Hideyoshi, and likewise with the Christians, in accordance with this policy.¹⁴ When he was preparing to destroy Hideyori, he feared that the Christians might take the side of the enemy. Historians believe that Iyeyasu promulgated the severe Anti-Christian Law of 1614 with the purpose of making the Christians in Japan impotent to render any material assistance to Hideyori.

Within ten months after the promulgation of the Anti-Christian Law—that is, in October, 1615—the war began at Osaka. All Christians there and in the surrounding districts, and others from far-off parts of Japan, were organized as soldiers under the Christian banner. They took the side of Hideyori and fought against Iyeyasu with the hope of regaining religious freedom in the event that the war should end in victory for Hideyori. Iyeyasu was offended and vowed vengeance.¹⁵ After the destruction of Osaka, Iyeyasu planned to take more radical and decisive steps for the extermination of Christianity in Japan. However, he died in April, 1616, within less than one year after the war.

Hidetada was appointed Sei-i Tai-shogun by the emperor in 1605. However, it was not until 1616—the year in which his father Iyeyasu died—that he actually began to rule Japan as shogun. With the rule of Hidetada, Japan entered upon a new


period in its dealings with both the Christians and the traders. Iyeyasu, as we have seen, had advocated free trade as a national policy¹⁶ and had invited foreign traders to come to Japan, and yet, in seeking to undo the missionary work of the foreigners, had failed to take into account how devoted even to the point of desperation were the Catholic priests who sought to Christianize Japan.¹⁷ Hidetada, during his eleven years as nominal ruler, had quietly watched the struggle of Iyeyasu in his ineffective efforts to combat the spread of Christianity. He concluded that Japan might be able to develop her trade without the coöperation of Christian priests, but that Christianity and the Christians in Japan could never be done away with unless strict limitations and regulations should first be imposed upon foreign trade and traders. Therefore, in August, 1616, four months after the death of Iyeyasu, when Hidetada came to rule Japan in person, he promulgated a law prohibiting trade ships from entering any harbors except those of Nagasaki and Hirado. The trade ships of Holland and England were not excepted.

Under date of August 8, 1616, Hidetada's government issued instructions to all the local feudal governments, part of which read as follows: "By reason of the foregoing, your government is hereby requested to send all the British ships that may henceforth touch any part of your coast either to Nagasaki or to Hirado, without permitting them to stay in your waters. Of course, British traders and British ships shall henceforth not be allowed to engage in trade in any part of your province. This instruction is hereby issued in compliance with the behest of our lord, the ruling shogun."¹⁸ In this way Hidetada repealed the treaty of 1613 and deprived Great Britain of the privileges granted to her thereby—the right to engage in free trade in any part of Japan, and the right of establishment of residence by her traders wherever they might choose. In the same year, Hidetada closed to European traders Yedo, Kyoto, Osaka, Sakai, and other large cities where they had been privileged to establish

residence. All, including the Dutch and British traders, were driven out of those cities, and were strictly prohibited from reëntering them for any purpose whatsoever.¹⁹ Thus Hidetada abandoned the traditional trade policy of Japan and adopted a radical policy which ultimately brought about the absolute seclusion of the nation.

Although, beginning in the autumn of 1616, Japan designated the two harbors of Nagasaki and Hirado as the only harbors that might be entered by foreign trade ships, with the purpose of preventing the smuggling of Catholic priests into Japan, yet, according to official records, in 1617, 1618, and even in 1619, Spanish and Portuguese priests succeeded in being smuggled into Japan disguised as traders. This habitual violation of the law by Christian priests caused Hidetada to harbor feelings of hate and enmity toward them. Naturally, he punished the offenders in more and more brutal ways. Not only were the smuggled priests, their assistants, and followers punished; but also any persons who showed friendly feelings toward them were either put to death by burning or exiled and all their property confiscated.

In 1620, Dutch traders in Japan presented a written statement to Hidetada advising that he should entirely discontinue trade and other relations with Manila and Macao, because so long as Japan maintained any relations with these two places she could not prevent the coming of Catholic priests in the guise of traders.²⁰ Hidetada fully realized that this was so. He therefore decided, first, to let the governor of the Philippines know how angry he was because the latter had permitted priests to come to Japan in violation of the national law, thus disregarding international courtesy and obligations; and therefore, in 1622, when the governor of the Philippines sent an envoy to Japan with a valuable gift to Hidetada, he neither permitted audience to the envoy nor accepted the gift. He drove the envoy and his party out, stating that an envoy from an unfriendly state should not be allowed to stay for even a moment. In the



IYEMITSU TOKUGAWA, THE THIRD SHOGUN
(1604-51)

following year, 1623, Hidetada retired from office on account of illness without taking any further measures against the Philipppines.

Iyemitsu succeeded Hidetada, his father, after having been appointed shogun by the emperor in the spring of 1623. When Iyemitsu became shogun, the anti-Christian law of Iyeyasu had already been in force for eleven years, but still the Portuguese and Spanish priests continued to come, and newly converted Japanese replaced the Christians who were exiled or killed. Iyemitsu was a man of great determination and severity. He decided that the final extermination of Christianity should not be delayed any longer, and to that end he issued many severe ordinances and regulations. It was in his time that the practice was begun by which all Christians who were arrested were compelled to trample upon the images of Christ and the Virgin Mary as evidence of the renunciation of their faith. Those who refused to do so were put to death.

Iyemitsu also took many radical steps in his diplomatic dealings.²¹ He began the real work of national seclusion by terminating relations with Spain. As is evidenced by historical facts, international relations between Japan and Spain, and more especially commercial relations, were originally more urgently sought by the former than by the latter. Japan had not only desired to engage in and develop trade with Spain and her dependencies; she had also been anxious to obtain knowledge of mining, navigation, and shipbuilding, and had requested Spain to send men skilled in these pursuits. However, to the great disappointment of Iyeyasu, instead of sending mining engineers and shipbuilders, Spain sent priests, and even engaged in suspicious activity by sounding the coasts of Japan. In fact, Spain had given Iyeyasu a stone instead of the bread for which he had asked.²² Furthermore, Spain steadfastly refused the request of Iyeyasu to conclude commercial treaties with Nueva España and with Spain directly. This made it impossible for Japan to extend her trade to Occidental countries.

Trade relations between Japan and the Philippines had been conducted in an unsatisfactory fashion from the very beginning. After Japan promulgated and enforced the anti-Christian laws, conditions grew steadily worse. When Iyemitsu came to rule Japan, he adopted a rigorous policy in dealing with the priests and traders who violated Japan's national law.²³

The governor of the Philippines began to fear the possibility of losing the trade with Japan because of the smuggling of Catholic priests, and decided to prohibit their sailing in order that thenceforth relations with Japan should be limited exclusively to trade. With the consent of the bishop of Manila, the governor of the Philippines sent Don Fernando de Ayala and Don Antonio de Arce to Japan as envoys, bearing state papers, together with valuable gifts for Iyemitsu. In the state papers the governor explained his new policy. In the spring of the same year, the envoys reached Japan and went to Yedo by way of Nagasaki for the purpose of seeking an audience with Iyemitsu. At that time, however, Iyemitsu had already decided to sever all relations with Spain; consequently, he instructed his representative to meet the envoys on the way and order them to return to Manila immediately, stating that the shogun, the ruler of Japan, would not grant an audience to envoys from a state in which the evil religion (Christianity) prevailed, and which habitually permitted its people to violate the laws of Japan. In 1624, when a Spanish fleet came to Japan, all the Spanish traders in Japan were ordered to embark upon their ships and to leave forever. In the same year, Japan prohibited her people from sailing to the Philippines to engage in trade. Thus the trade of Japan with the Philippines, which was generally known as "the Manila trade," was permanently abandoned.

Comprehending the seriousness of the situation in Japan, Spain sent an envoy with a party of three hundred men to Japan in March, 1624. This party reached Satsuma, Kyushu. The envoy requested permission to proceed immediately to Yedo, accompanied by about seventy of his men. Iyemitsu

thereupon instructed his governmental council to investigate the following points and to report to him: (1) Is not the kingdom of Spain the homeland of Christianity? (2) Has not Spain always planned to propagate Christianity in Japan? (3) Shall we grant an audience to the envoy from the kingdom of Spain, even after having promulgated our law that Christianity should be prohibited in our nation?²⁴

On the following day, March 25, 1624, the council reported its findings to Iyemitsu, stating that the kingdom of Spain had sent an envoy with the purpose of renewing relations. After having carefully studied the relations previously existing, the council had found that in the beginning Japan had granted the request of Spain that she might send her trade ships to Japan with the purpose of exchanging the special products of the two countries. But the Spanish people who had come to Japan, instead of engaging in trade, had made it their prime purpose to propagate their evil religion (Christianity), thereby undermining Japan's traditions and usages. Therefore Japan suppressed the evil teachings and terminated relations with Spain. Now that nation dared again to send an envoy, thus expressing its desire to renew relations. Undoubtedly this was for the purpose of carrying out the deceitful plots and intrigues of that nation. Japan should certainly neither receive the envoy nor accept the presents that he brought.

Acting upon the findings of his council, Iyemitsu directed his government to expel in disgrace the Spanish envoy and his party, with instructions to them never again to approach the coasts of Japan. During the three years ending in 1624, Japan maintained this policy in dealing with Spain, and finally convinced that nation of her intention to enforce the decision to terminate all trade and other relations between the two countries.²⁵

However, the first European nation that had to abandon trade with Japan was not Spain, but England. In fact, two months prior to the time when Japan drove out the Spanish

envoy and closed her ports against Spain, England had already instructed her traders to withdraw completely from Japanese trade. As previously indicated, it was in 1613, when William Adams was wielding great power in Japan as the advisor of Iyeyasu, that England established trade relations there. Despite the fact that England had been the very last nation to enter the trade field in Japan, yet by reason of Adams's influence she gained far greater residential and trade privileges than did any other European nation. During the three years from 1613 to 1616, England was the foreign nation most highly favored and privileged in Japan; but with the death of Iyeyasu in the latter year, Adams's power declined rapidly and the prosperity of the British traders took a downward course.²⁶ About that time, the competition between the Dutch and British traders became more and more acute. The Dutch traders had approached the shogunate government time and again with regard to the so-called Catholic intrigue, thus gaining the confidence and trust of the shogun. They now informed the government that James I, King of England, was a devout Catholic, and that therefore the nation he ruled should be dealt with in the same manner as Spain and Portugal. Consequently, in 1617, when Hidetada adopted the policy of closing all harbors except those of Nagasaki and Hirado, all the free-trade privileges which had been granted by Japan to England in the treaty of 1613 were cancelled, and English traders were instructed to engage in trade at the ports of Nagasaki and Hirado only. Two weeks later, they were ordered to trade at Hirado alone. After 1620, when Adams died, the British traders had no one to champion their cause, whereas the Dutch traders were rapidly winning the confidence of the shogunate government as its sole agents in spying upon the movements of the Catholic priests and the nations from which they had come. By reason of trade competition and the intrigues of the Dutch, the British traders were unable to conduct their trade with profit. In 1622 the British practically decided to abandon trade with Japan.²⁷ On Janu-

ary 3, 1624, a British fleet anchored at Hirado, its commander ordered all British traders there to close their places of business, and a few days later the fleet sailed with the English traders aboard. They left their business houses, warehouses, and estates in the custody of the local feudal government of the lord of Hirado.

Thus in 1624 both England and Spain abandoned their trade with Japan. However, their traders left Japan under entirely different circumstances, as has been shown; the English voluntarily gave up their trade, whereas the Spanish were expelled. Nevertheless, the English did not return to Japan to reestablish their trade, as was their privilege. England was the last of the European nations to enter the field of commerce with Japan, and the first to withdraw; she had carried on the trade for the brief period of ten years. Historians are agreed that the abandonment of trade with Japan by both England and Spain was mainly due to the intrigue and rivalry of the Dutch traders.²⁸ Encouraged by their success in driving out the English and Spanish traders from Japan, the Dutch then concentrated their efforts upon expelling the Portuguese traders, their sole remaining rivals. In consequence, the rivalry between the Dutch and Portuguese traders became more and more intense.

In the seventeenth century the trade rivalry and the unfriendly feeling between Holland and Portugal were not confined to Japan, but had spread to many parts of the Orient. Sometimes this feeling was so bitter as to result in open warfare. In 1622 a Dutch fleet consisting of seventeen small war vessels, manned by nine hundred Dutchmen assisted by about one thousand Japanese and Malaysians, invaded Macao, which was Portugal's emporium in the Orient. Although this invasion was unsuccessful, the fleet withdrew only after having caused great damage. In the middle of the first half of the seventeenth century, Iyemitsu had well-nigh exhausted his resources in his attempts to rid Japan of Christianity. The Dutch traders in Japan had put forth all their energy in an attempt to destroy

the trade of the Portuguese in Japan. These two undertakings brought about the seclusion of Japan in 1639.²⁹

In 1624, Iyemitsu had adopted radical measures and terminated Japan's relations with Spain and the Philippines, doing so in the belief that the complete separation of Japan from the Philippines constituted the only effective method of checking the smuggling of priests into Japan. Both the king of Spain and the governor of the Philippines had realized that the continued violation of the law promulgated in Japan might cause harm to trade and friendly relations. In 1623, the governor of the Philippines had issued an ordinance by which he strictly prohibited the departure of priests to Japan. The king of Spain also issued an edict prohibiting priests from going from the Philippines to Japan for a period of fifteen years, beginning in 1628. Although both the government at Madrid and that at Manila thus voluntarily coöperated with the Japanese government in preventing priests from being smuggled into Japan, yet, like Iyemitsu, both king and governor were powerless to prevent it.

In those days the priests in the Philippines were so eager to go to Japan to teach Christianity that no laws of Spain, the Philippines, or Japan were respected or feared by them. The more strict the laws became, the greater was the number of priests that went. Some of them sailed the hundreds of miles from Manila to Japan in small Chinese junks. Iyemitsu then concluded that Japan would only be able to check the coming of the priests by destroying their headquarters,³⁰ and so he planned to invade and occupy the Philippines. In 1630 he accepted a plan submitted by Matsukura, an eminent military leader, and instructed him to invade the Philippines; but Matsukura died and the expedition did not sail. Japan's real difficulty was her lack of large seagoing vessels. At this time, in order to prevent Japanese subjects from sailing from Japan to foreign countries and from coming under Christian influence, the Japanese government made it its policy to destroy all ships

of more than fifty tons displacement. Therefore, when Japan planned her second military expedition to the Philippines, she decided to charter some large Dutch ships. The Dutch traders in Japan offered to provide the Japanese government with a fleet of war vessels. In 1637 most of the military preparations were completed. Nevertheless, the expedition did not sail, because of a great Christian uprising in Kyushu. As the Dutch traders were always eager to render any possible service to the Japanese government, they offered this same fleet of war vessels for the bombardment of the Christian stronghold.²¹

Iyemitsu was powerless to restrict the movements of the Christian priests in Manila, though, to a degree, he controlled those of the priests in Macao. As early as 1623, almost immediately after he had begun to rule Japan, he made it a rule that the captains of ships coming from Macao should present complete lists of their passengers and crew, together with sworn statements that they had no priests aboard. If a priest disguised as a trader was discovered, the priest and his accomplices, together with all the men in the ship, including the captain and the officers, were put to death, and the ship and its cargo were burnt. Later, with the consent of the Portuguese government, Japanese officials were stationed at Macao to examine all the passengers on the ships sailing to Japan, so that persons of suspicious character might be prevented from going.

Although Spain began to take a conciliatory attitude toward Japan after Iyemitsu refused an audience to the Spanish envoy in 1623 and indicated that he wished to expel all Spanish subjects from Japan, the Spanish officials at Manila did not allow Japan to interfere with the movements of the Christian priests in the Philippines, as had the Portuguese government at Macao. Therefore, even after the Anti-Christian Law was put in force and the entrance of Christian priests into Japan was thus strictly prohibited, and even after the Spanish governments both at Madrid and at Manila had promised to prohibit priests from sailing, priests of the three orders, Dominican,

Franciscan, and Augustinian, vied with each other in setting forth for Japan. By taking this determined stand, the Christian priests at Manila practically challenged Japan and her laws.³² The persecution of Christians in Japan was therefore carried on in such inhuman and brutal ways as to cast reflection upon the national honor and dignity of Japan.

Sometimes, the backs of Christians were slashed open with dull knives, and boiling water was poured into these openings until the victims fainted. After they had been revived, the same treatment was repeated; and so on, until death brought relief. Sometimes, groups of Christians, after having been subjected to agonizing torture, were driven up to the top of a volcano, where they were thrown upon the slopes of the crater and rolled slowly down to the fire below. Again, after both the hands and the legs of the Christians had been slowly sawed off with dull bamboo saws, their bodies were rolled up and down hills until death came. Yet again, the fingers and toes of the Christians were chopped off, after which the hands and legs were tied together and exposed to snow or ice until the sufferers died of freezing. Sometimes these victims were piled into small boats, which drifted out to sea. The Christians of those days called Iyemitsu the "Nero of Japan." When these methods of persecution became known to the priests in Manila, they came to Japan in greater numbers, as if they wished to grasp the opportunity to die as Christian martyrs.³³ Finally, priests began to come from Rome, Lisbon, and Madrid, their sole desire being to engage in missionary work in Japan, though it meant certain death.

In 1631, the pope officially claimed Japan as a Christian land and instructed Viera, a noted priest, to go thither to reclaim that land, which was well-nigh lost to Christendom. At the time of his departure, the pope encouraged him by saying that if he should die while serving God he should feel it an honor, as he would then be numbered among the Christian martyrs. Viera had already been to Japan and had been successful in

propagating Christianity there. With the enforcement of the Anti-Christian Law, he had been arrested and expelled. It took him nearly two years to get there the second time. In 1633 Viera and his party of nine reached China after having encountered many difficulties. They entered Japan disguised as Chinese. After having successfully propagated Christianity in Japan for about a year, they were arrested, and all were burned at the stake on July 10, 1634.

These facts show that the Japanese government had determined to carry out its plan to exterminate Christianity. The government arrested and persecuted all Christian workers, while at the same time Christian priests managed in one way or another to get into Japan. Despite the fact that they were soon apprehended and killed, they were always successful in making conversions. The records show that during the period of twenty-one years ending in 1635 approximately 280,000 Christians were put to death. Although the records with regard to the number of Christian converts are fragmentary, yet it is said that in the year 1624 about 1160 were baptized, and in the year 1626, approximately 3100, and that all these Japanese swore that they were willing to die as Christian martyrs. Moreover, the number of these converts did not include the children who became Christians by virtue of the conversion of their parents. In fact, in the seventeenth century, in spite of the steady increase in the severity of the enforcement of the Anti-Christian Law and of the inhumanity and brutality in the persecution of the Christians, the number of Japanese converts steadily increased. This state of affairs caused Japan to realize that Christianity in Japan could not be rooted out unless the country were entirely isolated from the rest of the world.³⁴ Therefore, beginning in 1633, Iyemitsu promulgated a number of laws and ordinances which inclined more and more toward the ultimate seclusion of Japan. Nevertheless, he had no idea of closing Japan to the trade of the outside world prior to 1639, when he found that the Portuguese traders in Japan had

rendered material assistance to the Christian rebels in 1637-38. He then expelled all the Portuguese traders, thus terminating relations with Portugal, and strictly prohibited trade with the Portuguese.

The eradication of Christianity from Japan took fifty years—from 1589, when Hideyoshi promulgated the first anti-Christian law, to 1639, when Japan entered upon her Period of Absolute Seclusion. It had been the work of three shoguns. The extermination of Christianity and the national seclusion of Japan were, however, different problems. The former had a grave national purpose; the latter was but a by-product of the former. With the increasing difficulty of the work of exterminating Christianity, Japan unwittingly and unconsciously approached, step by step, the time when it became necessary to adopt the seclusion policy. It was during the Christian uprising of 1637-38 that Iyemitsu first realized the miraculous power of the Christians. At that time, a few tens of thousands of Christians united their fighting strength into a single unit and defied the great national army of Iyemitsu, fighting bravely and successfully for the cause of their religion. After this uprising, Iyemitsu, fearing the power of the Christians, concluded that the seclusion of Japan was the only way to free the country from Christianity and thereby to maintain the safe existence of the nation and the government.⁸⁵

Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu, Hidetada, and Iyemitsu, in turn ruling Japan, had each quite different plans and policies in dealing with the Christians and the traders. On the whole, Iyeyasu dealt more severely with the Christians than had Hideyoshi, Hidetada dealt more severely with them than had Iyeyasu, and Iyemitsu dealt with them more severely than had Hidetada. Hideyoshi did not look upon matters regarding the Christians and traders as the most serious national problems confronting Japan; he merely ordered that all Christian priests should be expelled within twenty days, and that all the Christians in Japan who should refuse to renounce their faith should be

either exiled or put to death. On the other hand, traders from Christian nations would be welcomed provided they kept their hands off religious matters. In the early part of his rule, Iyeyasu was fully convinced that foreign trade could not be successfully developed without the coöperation of Christian priests; he therefore tolerated Christianity, even going so far as to protect the priests. However, during the latter part of his rule, especially after 1612, he found it necessary to change his policy and decided that he must exterminate Christianity. During the last four years of his life, he dealt with the Christians more and more severely.³⁰ He was a man of great self-confidence and self-reliance. He never changed his policy regarding trade development, never even dreamed of closing the nation because of troubles with the Christians.

The rule of Hidetada constituted the transition period. He concluded that Christianity must be uprooted at any cost. At the same time, he realized that this could not be done without greatly sacrificing trade. He therefore expelled the Occidental traders and residents from the cities and towns of Japan, and abandoned the free coast-wide foreign trade. He left but two ports, Hirado and Nagasaki, open to trade with foreign countries. By strictly searching every foreign ship that entered either of these two harbors, he sought to prevent the smuggling of Christian priests into Japan. In this way, in 1616 Japan entered upon the preliminary stage of her national seclusion.

When Iyemitsu came to rule Japan, a new policy was adopted. In 1630, this shogun promulgated a law strictly prohibiting the Japanese from either importing or possessing books in Occidental languages. He took this step because he feared that the Japanese might come under Christian influence by the reading of Occidental books. As it was difficult to differentiate between books on Christianity and those on other subjects, Iyemitsu prohibited both the buying and the selling of all books in Occidental languages. As a result of this prohibition the Japanese were deprived of the opportunity to learn

Occidental sciences such as medicine, mathematics, astronomy, geography, and the military sciences. In 1633, Iyemitsu concluded that the work of exterminating the Christians could not be carried out effectively unless the Japanese should be secluded in Japan and prevented from sailing to foreign countries, in order that they might not come into contact with Christianity.³⁷ Therefore, on February 28, 1633, he promulgated a law which prohibited Japanese ships from sailing to foreign countries unless they were provided with special written permission issued by the advisors of the shogun. This law also prohibited the Japanese who resided in foreign countries from returning to Japan, under penalty of death. However, those Japanese who had been resident in foreign countries for less than five years might be allowed to reënter Japan, provided their reasons and explanations for having been detained in foreign countries were acceptable to the government. This law also provided that liberal rewards should be given to persons who informed the government of the whereabouts of Christian priests. With the enforcement of the Law of 1633, Japan entered the first stage of national seclusion.³⁸

Three years later, on May 19, 1636, Iyemitsu promulgated another law, which strictly prohibited all Japanese ships from sailing to foreign countries. All Japanese who planned to sail to foreign countries were to be put to death. Those who had at any time resided in foreign countries were to be put to death if they returned to Japan. Those who disregarded this law and lodged any Eurasians in their homes, and also those who communicated with Eurasians who had been expelled from Japan, should be put to death. The law also provided that liberal rewards should be given to persons informing the government of the whereabouts of Christian converts as well as of Christian priests. By the promulgation of this Law of 1636, the seclusion of the Japanese in their homeland was made complete. The Law of 1633 prohibited Japanese ships from sailing to foreign countries, and Japanese resident in foreign lands from return-

ing to Japan under certain conditions; the Law of 1636 made this provision absolute.

The ambitious plan of Iyeyasu for the national expansion of Japan through trade was thus completely abandoned.³⁹ The Japanese could no longer go to foreign countries for the purpose of trade, and the trading communities which had been established in foreign countries and had maintained a prosperous existence there were completely cut off from Japan.

When the laws of 1633 and 1636 were promulgated, Japan had many prosperous trade settlements in southern Asia and in the South Sea, of which the most important were Ayutia, near Bangkok, the capital of Siam; three settlements at Tourane, at Kang-nan, and at Faifo, in Annam; one settlement near Manila, in the Philippines; one near the river Mekong, north of Phnompenh, the capital of Cambodia; and one settlement each in Java, in Cochin China, and in Tong-King. The population of these settlements is unknown. However, modern historians have estimated that the population of Ayutia was about 8000, and that the Japanese settlement near Manila had a population of approximately 3000. After the enforcement of the Law of 1636, those groups of Japanese, numbering from several hundreds to many thousands, in the South Sea islands and the districts in southern Asia, became people without nationality or country of their own, and were deprived of the trade by which they had maintained their existence. In course of time, these settlements died out one by one, leaving only the memory of a once flourishing trade.⁴⁰

As a consequence of the laws of 1633 and 1636, making it impossible for the Japanese people to sail to foreign countries, the government ordered that all seagoing ships be destroyed. It was also made unlawful to own or build either three-masted ships or ships of more than fifty tons displacement. In 1636, when Iyemitsu promulgated the second law secluding the Japanese and completed the work of confining them within the bounds of their own country, Japan entered upon the second

stage of national seclusion. However, Iyemitsu did not have any idea of closing Japan to trade with foreign nations. The Portuguese, Dutch, and Chinese traders were permitted to engage in trade in Japan and to enjoy the same trade privileges and rights that Hidetada had granted them in 1616.⁴¹ Nevertheless, after having completely secluded the Japanese from the outside world, thus making it impossible for them to trade in foreign lands, Iyemitsu concluded that it would be too dangerous for the Japanese to associate with the Portuguese traders. Consequently, he decided to segregate completely the Portuguese living in Japan. For this purpose, he ordered the Japanese traders in Nagasaki to build an artificial island in the harbor there. The area of this island was less than 16,000 square yards. When completed, it was named *Deshima*, which means "Detached Island." In May, 1636, all the Portuguese in Japan moved to this island, having been strictly prohibited from maintaining their residences in any other part of Japan. Because so many Portuguese were unable to settle on so small an island, on October 22 of that same year the Portuguese traders and their families, including all children born to them by Japanese women, for whom there was no room on *Deshima*, were ordered to leave Japan for Macao, taking with them all their belongings. It is said that the total number of Portuguese thus exiled was two hundred and eighty-seven. The Portuguese who were allowed to stay in *Deshima* were completely segregated from the Japanese in Japan Proper. They were permitted to come from *Deshima* to Nagasaki but twice each year, this being at the times when the Portuguese trade ships entered Nagasaki Harbor and when they sailed away. Furthermore, the Portuguese traders were permitted to engage in trade with the Japanese once a year only, for a period of fifty days. Thus, from 1636 on, the residence of Portuguese traders in Japan was steadily approaching its end, which finally occurred in 1639.⁴²

Iyemitsu had adopted all possible ways and means to prevent the coming of Christian priests from the outside world, and to

make it impossible to make new converts. He had severed all relations with Spain; he had completely secluded the Japanese from the outside world; he had segregated the Portuguese traders on the island of Deshima; he had ordered his officials to make the most rigid inspection of all foreign ships that entered the ports of Nagasaki and Hirado, which were the only Japanese harbors that were open to foreign trade. But in spite of all his precautions and his unremitting efforts, he was unable to attain the desired results.

Christian priests continued to come; and they not only planned to make Japan Proper a Christian land, but aimed also at extending Christian influence throughout the entire chain of the Japanese islands. In 1629, according to official records, Christian priests entered Yezo, the northernmost of the islands, which was then known as the land of the Ainus and bears, and to which but very few Japanese dared to go. In 1632, eleven Spanish priests left Manila for China, where they divided their company into four groups, and the priests in each group sailed from China in separate Chinese junks and landed successfully in Japan. After they had engaged in Christian missionary work there for about a year, they were all arrested and put to death. In 1637, five Spanish priests sailed from Manila and managed to effect a landing on the Japanese coast.

These examples show how the Spanish priests, by making Manila their headquarters, managed to enter into Japan. Iyemitsu became more and more determined to carry out his original plan of invading and occupying the Philippine Islands with the purpose of completely wiping out that Christian base in the Orient. As has already been indicated, he began his preparations in 1636 for an extensive military campaign. He chartered a number of Dutch transports and war vessels. However, in 1637, when this military expedition was practically ready to undertake military action in the Philippines, it was abandoned because of the great Christian uprising that broke out in Shimabara, Kyushu, in October of that year.⁴³

Katsuiye Matsukura, the ruler of Shimabara, was the son of Shigemasa Matsukura, who had originated and planned the Philippine invasion with the hearty approval of Iyemitsu, but had died before this contemplated invasion could be begun. The new Lord Matsukura, like his father, was a noted persecutor of Christians. In order to gain the favor and good will of Iyemitsu, he devised such brutal and inhuman tortures as cannot be described in words. He ordered that all Christians in districts under his control should be put to death. And besides being the greatest enemy of the Christians, he was a tyrant. He levied taxes on all agricultural and industrial products, birth and burial taxes, and house taxes in accordance with the number of windows, shelves, and stoves. The people of Shimabara had been heavily taxed by the old lord of Matsukura when he was preparing for the invasion of the Philippines. The unbearable taxation for two generations caused them to lose all interest in life. In October, 1637, the Christians in Shimabara, who were facing certain death, were encouraged by the strong support of the suffering farmers, and rose against the government. At first, this was merely a local disturbance. Nevertheless, the troops sent by Lord Matsukura to suppress it were routed. Greatly encouraged by this success, all the Christians in the Amakusa and other districts joined with the Christians in Shimabara. They destroyed all the local offices and put to death the officials therein, wherever they went."

In those days, there was circulated a pamphlet entitled "A Divine Revelation," which was said to have been written by a priest who was exiled from Japan at the time the Anti-Christian Law of 1612 was put in force. It contained the statement: "When five years pass five times, all the dead trees shall bloom; crimson clouds shall shine brightly in the western sky, and a boy of divine power shall make his appearance. These things shall usher in a Christian revival in Japan." The year 1637 was the twenty-fifth year from 1612. As that year was extremely dry, the western sky was resplendent with bright crimson clouds

day after day. Although it was the middle of autumn, all the cherry and other flowering trees burst into bloom. Then a sixteen-year-old boy, named Shiro Masuda, came forward and performed, it was said, great miracles. The Christians in Shimabara concluded that Shiro was Christ in His second coming. They announced in the name of Shiro that the divine revelation was being fulfilled and therefore all Christians should gather under the Christian standard.⁴⁵ The Christians, together with the suffering farmers, promptly responded to this call, and thus the local uprising developed into widespread rebellion. Conditions became so serious that the local Matsukura government lost control of the situation. Moreover, the neighboring local military governments could not render any military assistance, because, according to the laws of that time, all local feudal governments were prohibited from engaging in military undertakings without being instructed to do so by the shogun. Consequently, if any feudal lord should render of his own accord any military assistance to a neighboring lord, no matter under what circumstances, his act would be regarded as rebellion against the shogun and his government.⁴⁶ The local Matsukura government was thus forced to remain on the defensive, and as the Christians were able to take a free hand, they extended their field of influence and power in all directions.

On November 8, 1637, after a delay of five weeks in going through many offices and bureaus, the report of the Shimabara uprising at last reached the ears of the shogun, who looked upon it as merely a local matter. Nevertheless, on the following day, November 9, the shogun Iyemitsu appointed Itakura, a young and brilliant military man of low rank, as commanding general and instructed him to proceed to Shimabara with an assistant, one Ishidani. Itakura was ordered to obtain military forces and supplies from the four feudal lords in the three provinces adjoining Shimabara. The Christian army, having heard that Iyemitsu's army was coming, hastily repaired the abandoned castle at Hara and occupied it. Then, with the six-

teen-year-old boy as their commander-in-chief, they prepared to give battle.

On November 28, Itakura, accompanied by Ishidani and his troops, reached Shimabara. He found that the Christian force was not merely a group of farmers 2000 or 3000 strong, as he had been informed when leaving Yedo, but that it comprised a strong fighting unit of more than 20,000 men, bound together by the inspiration of a mighty faith and by the will to throw off the shackles of oppression. Two weeks after his arrival, the armies of the four feudal lords began to reach Shimabara, and brought the strength of his army up to approximately 30,000 men. An attempt to storm the Christian stronghold was made. It ended in failure, with a great number of casualties on the side of the attackers. This defeat convinced Itakura that his ambitious plan to crush the Christian rebels by a single stroke was only a dream. In the early part of December, 1637, a few more attacks, all of which were unsuccessful, made him realize that he was confronted by a formidable enemy. In the middle of December, the four feudal lords upon whom military requisitions were made by order of Iyemitsu, arrived at Shimabara with all available men under their personal command, and at a military council held on December 18 it was decided to make a general attack. The battle lasted for a day and a half, covering the entire day of the 20th of December. The attacking forces were repeatedly repelled with great loss. The general attack ended in total failure.⁴⁷

After Itakura and Ishidani had been sent by Iyemitsu to suppress the Christian uprising at Shimabara, a series of reports which gave detailed accounts of the disturbance reached Yedo. The shogun Iyemitsu at last began to realize that the Christian trouble at Shimabara was not merely a farmers' revolt, but a military uprising of grave national consequence. On December 28, 1637, Iyemitsu appointed Nobutsuna Matsudaira, one of his trusted advisors, as his representative, and conferred upon him supreme military authority, and appointed, as mili-

tary inspector, Toda, the lord of Ogaki. He instructed these two men to levy troops and military requisitions upon all the feudal lords in Kyushu and, if need be, upon those in Shikoku.

Because these new arrangements were made a few weeks before the unsuccessful and disastrous attack of December 20, this step was not taken by Iyemitsu either for the purpose of censuring Itakura or from doubt of his military ability. However, by the military code of honor of those times, Itakura, the commanding general of Iyemitsu's army, who had heard of the coming of the new military commander with supreme authority, found himself in such a position as to necessitate either his storming and occupying the Christian stronghold, or dying on the field of battle with dignity and honor, before the arrival of Nobutsuna and of Toda. This dilemma caused him to undertake a second general attack, on January 1, 1638. The battle was bloody and desperate. The attacking army was driven back repeatedly. Toward the close of the day, when the fate of the battle was virtually settled, Itakura took a company of chosen men under his personal command and made a final assault. Because of their weariness after an entire day of battle, and because they had lost hope through repeated defeats, none of the other troops followed Itakura. At the very moment when he and his followers crossed the moat of the castle and were preparing to scale the castle walls, Itakura was killed. This second attack ended in disastrous failure with casualties of more than 4000, while the Christians maintained their defense with casualties of fewer than 100.

The newly appointed supreme military commander, Nobutsuna, and the military inspector, Toda, left Yedo on December 3 with 5000 men. Because of the lack of facilities for transportation both on land and sea, they were unable to reach Shimabara until January 3, 1638, two days after the death of Itakura. In response to the demand of Nobutsuna, the feudal lords in Kyushu promptly sent their troops. The army under the command of Nobutsuna then numbered more than 100,000. It was

steadily augmented as the feudal lords in Kyushu brought all their available fighting men, and as the feudal lords in Shikoku met their military requisitions. The fighting strength of Nobutsuna's army and also that of the Christian forces in the Hara castle have been variously estimated, the former having been said to be between 100,000 and 260,000, and the latter from 20,000 to 40,000. Historians are of the opinion that the government army under the command of Nobutsuna was at least 125,000 strong. As to the Christian forces, the total population of Shimabara and the surrounding districts, which were under the complete control of the Christian rebels, was about 51,000, consisting of 26,000 males and 25,000 females. As approximately 60 per cent of this population found refuge in the Christian stronghold, the total number of Christians in the Hara castle was approximately 30,000. However, because they took with them their entire families, including the women and children, together with men of advanced age, the real fighting strength of the Christian troops cannot be estimated at more than 20,000. Nobutsuna thus had nearly six or seven times the number of fighting men under his command as were in the Christian stronghold. These fighting men were either veterans of wars or men who made fighting their profession, whereas most of those in the Christian stronghold were farmers who had no military training. However, they were firmly united in the belief that they were fighting under the command of Shiro—Christ in His second coming.⁴⁸

After having carefully studied the military situation and having learned of the military experiences and disasters of the previous general attacks conducted before his arrival, Nobutsuna decided that the Christian stronghold at Hara could not be taken by sheer military power, and that starvation of the Christians was the only possible solution of the problem. Having arrived at this decision, he found no use for an army of such size. He therefore ordered his troops to surround the Hara castle many lines deep and to wait until the people in the castle were

on the verge of starvation. Despite the fact that the Christian army was composed of farmers, it was inspired with a high military spirit. The immense government army of professional military men was sadly lacking in the same spirit. Moreover, they were in continual fear that the Christians in the stronghold might at any time sally out and make a sudden attack. Therefore, with the purpose of encouraging his military men, and also that of weakening the spirit of the Christian troops, Nobutsuna requested the Dutch traders at Hirado to send their war vessels and bombard Hara from the sea. The Dutch cheerfully and promptly responded to this request.⁴⁰

The Hara stronghold was an old, abandoned castle that had been hastily repaired by the Christians in the brief space of ten days. It had not been stocked with ammunition or with food in any considerable quantities, because the Christian uprising had taken place spontaneously. Moreover, the fighting men and their women and children had to be fed. Therefore, after the fighting had continued for three months, both food and ammunition were practically exhausted. In January, 1638, even the fighting men received only half-rations. In the middle of that month, Nobutsuna sent a note to the Christians in the stronghold advising that they make peace. He stated that they had been in the old stronghold for a long time and had dared oppose the government army, and that if they had anything of which to complain, the government stood ready to listen and to make adjustments. However, they must first come out from the stronghold and return to their homes to engage in farming, the work of their forefathers. As the government was informed of their condition, it stood ready to provide 2000 *koku* of rice to meet the emergency. Furthermore, the occupants of the stronghold would be exempt from all land and other taxes until they should have regained means of self-maintenance. The Christians promptly rejected this proposal by saying, "We, Christians, have long been subjected to unjustifiable and inhumane treatment. We have now taken up arms in accordance with

divine revelations and guidance. We are not fighting for territorial gain or selfish ambition. We, Christians, must either gain religious freedom or die as Christian martyrs. Therefore we shall not accept the terms of peace offered by you so long as you do not guarantee us freedom of religion. We will not give up this war of defense which we have undertaken in accordance with divine instructions, as this would be tantamount to deserting our Lord and Savior.'

Toward the end of January, because of the unbearable suffering from ever-increasing starvation, a few Christian farmers occasionally stole out of the Christian stronghold by climbing down the wall, and went in search of food. In the early dawn of February 16, 1638, a farmer was caught while hunting food. By subjecting him to severe inquiry, the following information regarding conditions in the Hara castle was obtained:

1. As all the firewood had been used up, the fences and even the fixtures of the castle buildings were torn down and used as fuel for heating and cooking.

2. In the early part of February, when all the rice was gone and the provisions nearly exhausted, a handful of half-cooked, soaked beans and barley was given to each person as a daily ration.

3. As the ammunition had been used up, the firearms could no longer be of use.⁵⁰

This information, together with reports obtained from various other sources, assured Nobutsuna that his plan of starving out the Christians had been successful. On February 27, 1638, he ordered that the castle should be stormed. The battle lasted for two days. On February 28, fire was applied to many parts of the castle. All the Christians, men and women, old and young, including children and infants, were either killed or burned to death. However, the men in the attacking party were not entirely heartless. Many of them showed pity for the weak and helpless children. They picked up the little ones and told them that they would save them if they would renounce Chris-

tianity. The Christian children replied, "If you pity me, put an end to my life, which I, being a Christian, cannot do." Thus even the small ones showed an invincible Christian spirit. The number of Christians in the stronghold was approximately 20,000. They all died cheerfully and willingly, rejoicing because their earthly suffering had at last come to an end.⁵¹ According to official records, the supreme commanding general, Nobutsuna, counted 8135 casualties in his army during the two days of fighting in the reduction of the Christian stronghold.

Militarily, the Shimabara rebellion was but a small local affair; it was the task of the Tokugawa shogunate either to suppress 20,000 armed farmers or to destroy them. However, when viewed as an episode in Japanese history, it was one of the greatest of national events. It was because of this uprising at Shimabara that Japan came definitely to adopt the policy of national seclusion, as well as that of the extermination of Christianity.

Prior to the Shimabara rebellion, national seclusion and the extermination of the Christians were the two most important national problems confronting the country. In the beginning, with the increasing seriousness of the Christian problem, Iyemitsu unwittingly framed and promulgated a number of laws that had a distinct tendency toward national seclusion. In 1637 the number of Christians who had survived the brutal and inhuman persecution of fifty years ranged from 280,000 to 300,000. Had these Christians united and risen against the government, they would have brought serious consequences upon both the government and the nation. However, during the preceding half-century the shogunate government had successfully isolated all the Christian centers. Moreover, in those days all the feudal lords became meek and submissive, pledging loyalty to the shogun and evincing great willingness and readiness to coöperate with him in uprooting Christianity. Therefore, in 1637-38, while the Christian rebellion was raging at Shimabara, the Christians in one district could not unite in action with those in other districts. Even the Christians at Naga-

saki, which was within easy reach of Shimabara, remained quiet without making any attempt to render material assistance to their fellow Christians by sending either provisions or ammunition. They were unable even to make any sympathetic movement. During the conflict, Iyemitsu stationed his troops, numbering some 40,000, at Nagasaki by way of precaution. Historians frequently express surprise that the Christian uprising did not take place some fifteen years earlier, before the Tokugawa shogunate had gained such a hold upon the nation. Whether successful or not, the Christians would have been able to engage in a nation-wide movement with the possible coöperation of some strong Christian feudal lords, who then still maintained their power. Although the Shimabara Christian uprising had thus ended as a local disturbance, yet the power of such a small number of Christians, acting, as they believed, under divine inspiration, caused Iyemitsu to realize and to fear the miraculous strength the Christians might show. From actual experience Iyemitsu had come to know that his military skill and strength would be of no avail against the Christians when they were fighting inspired by religious zeal. He therefore concluded that if the Christians remained in Japan and coöperated with the Christians in the outside world in an action against the Japanese government, the very existence of Japan would be threatened. Consequently, for the preservation and safety of the nation he decided that Japan should be completely isolated from the outside world, and not a single Christian be permitted to remain. Thus did the idea of national seclusion, which originally was adopted tentatively for the purpose of exterminating Christianity in Japan, become in 1639 the fundamental policy of the nation. It was decided that the policy of seclusion could not be maintained effectively unless all the Christians in Japan should be exterminated. It was also decided that the extermination of Christianity in Japan could not be accomplished unless Japan should be completely isolated from the outside world. During a period of more than

two hundred years Japan adhered strictly to these two policies as the golden rules of the nation. She thus enjoyed the longest period of peace ever known by any nation in the world.⁵²

After the suppression of the Christian uprising at Shimabara, Iyemitsu not only prohibited the people from embracing Christianity, and arrested and persecuted those who were Christians; he also made a law forcing all Japanese to give evidence that they were not Christians. For this purpose, he added to his government a Department of Religion and placed under its control all religious affairs in Japan. In September, 1638, seven months after the suppression of the Christian uprising, a law was promulgated in the name of the Department of Religion which provided that all Japanese subjects should coöperate with the government in the arrest of Christians throughout all Japan. In this law rewards were promised to persons giving information leading to the arrest of Christian priests and converts (of the rank of Father, 200 pieces of silver; of the rank of Brother, 100 pieces of silver; and for common converts, from 30 to 50 pieces of silver according to their respective social standings). At the same time, the government decreed that Buddhism was the only religion in Japan. All Japanese were then ordered to become Buddhists, thus proving that they were not Christians. No matter what the reason might be, a person was classified as a Christian and persecuted accordingly if he refused to embrace Buddhism. All Japanese were forced to join one or another of the Buddhist churches and their family records and movements were registered therein. Thereafter anyone going on a journey, seeking employment, or working as a farm laborer had to possess a religious certificate issued by the Buddhist church to which he belonged, showing that he was a member of the church in good standing. Without such a certificate he could get neither lodging nor work. All local feudal governments were required to take a religious census once a year. The heads of families in Japan had to make written, sworn statements every other year to the effect that, according to care-

ful investigation, all members and employees of the family were Buddhists, and that if in the future it should be suspected that any of them showed a tendency toward Christianity, this would be promptly reported to the government. All these census returns and sworn statements were kept on file in the Department of Religion. In this way Japan was transformed into a vast police station, and all Japanese were made to serve either as detectives or as policemen. It was therefore practically impos-

TABLE 1
REWARDS FOR ARREST OF CHRISTIANS

	Year 1638 Pieces of silver	Year 1654 Pieces of silver	Year 1674 Pieces of silver
Father.....	200	300	500
Brother.....	100	200	300
Convert.....	30-50	50	100

sible for Christians to maintain their existence in Japan. With the gradual decrease in the number of Christians in Japan, the work of seeking out their whereabouts became increasingly difficult. Therefore, the government increased the amount of the respective rewards. As table 1st shows, the reward for the arrest of a Christian of the rank of Father was raised to 500 pieces of silver.

Because those who had renounced Christianity frequently embraced the faith again, the government promised in 1682 to give a reward of 300 pieces of silver for information leading to the detection of those who thus broke their pledges and again became Christians. At the same time, when the government made this new regulation, it no longer permitted Christians to gain immunity by renouncing their faith.

From that time on, both Christians and others who refused to trample on the images of Christ and of the Virgin Mary, and who were therefore regarded as Christians, were put to death without being allowed immunity by renouncing their faith, as had previously been the custom.

During the Shotoku era (1711-15), and during the Kyoho era (1716-35), the remaining Christians in Japan were almost all run down and persecuted. Therefore, during these periods the principal work of the Department of Religion was almost exclusively confined to arranging the annual religious census returns and the biennial sworn statements of the heads of families regarding the religious beliefs of their households. According to historical records, it has been reasonably estimated that during the period of three-quarters of a century beginning in 1639 when the Christian uprising was suppressed, as many as 280,000 Christians were arrested and put to death.⁵⁴

In 1638, a few months after the suppression of the Christian uprising, all the Portuguese traders were ordered to leave their segregated district at Deshima, not a single Portuguese being permitted to remain in Japan. This step was taken on the grounds that the Portuguese had rendered material assistance to the Christian rebels in Shimabara. The Portuguese thus expelled were warned that any attempt to reënter Japan would be punished by death. This national decree, however, was not carried out effectively until the following year (1639), when the exclusion law was promulgated. Trade and all other relations between Japan and Portugal were thus terminated ninety-six years after the Portuguese first came to Japan in 1543. In 1639, all Englishmen and Dutchmen in Hirado and in Nagasaki who had no trade connections, sixty-four in all, were exiled to Java aboard a Dutch ship.⁵⁵

On July 5, 1639, the shogunate government promulgated a law which strictly prohibited *galeota* ships from entering any waterway of Japan. (The term, *galeota* ships, meant ships from foreign nations. However, the special application of this law was to Portuguese and Spanish ships.) This law provided that any *galeota* ship which dared to enter Japanese waters should be destroyed and all men aboard beheaded. In the preamble, the government explained why this law had been promulgated, giving three reasons. They were the following.

1. Despite the fact that the national prohibition of Christianity has been and still is a well-known policy in Japan, the *galeota* ships in the past have made it possible for Christian priests to be smuggled into Japan and to engage in religious work.

2. Those ships have made it possible for the priests thus smuggled in to maintain their existence and to continue their religious work in Japan by supplying them secretly with provisions and all other necessities.

3. Those ships and the men aboard have made it possible for the Christians to rise against our government and thereby to cause the government to take military action against the Christians.⁵⁶

On the very day that this law was promulgated, the shogunate government issued an ordinance instructing all feudal lords to enforce it locally in the event that any suspicious-looking ship should enter the waterways of the provinces under their control. Their local officials were to take prompt action and make careful investigations concerning all persons on board and keep a record of their findings. The captain of the ship should be instructed to sail immediately for Nagasaki so that the representative of the shogun at that port might take the proper measures. Under no circumstances should the captain of the ship be allowed to land his men. By this ordinance, the shogunate government reserved the destruction of *galeota* ships and the beheading of all men aboard as the special prerogative of the shogun, and did not permit the feudal lords to take independent action.⁵⁷

When the Portuguese traders who had been expelled from Japan returned to Macao and informed their countrymen of their experiences at Deshima, their reports could scarcely be believed. It seemed incredible to the Portuguese that Japan should so suddenly and arbitrarily terminate the trade and other relations with Portugal which had lasted for nearly one hundred years, without giving any substantial reasons except

to say that they suspected Portuguese traders of having rendered material assistance to the Christian rebels at Shimabara. At any rate, the local Portuguese government at Macao took the matter very seriously, because the discontinuance of trade with Japan represented an appreciable economic loss. In those days, the trade in silk between Japan and China was monopolized by the Portuguese at Macao, the prosperity of Macao being largely dependent upon it. Therefore, it was decided to send an envoy to Japan bearing a petition for the renewal of trade relations. One Pacheco, a man of eminence in Macao, requested that he be sent as envoy. On July 6, 1640, Pacheco and his party reached Nagasaki. When informed of their arrival, Iyemitsu sent two representatives with instructions to enforce the Law of 1639. On July 21 of the same year, the Portuguese ship and its entire cargo were destroyed by fire. The conflagration was witnessed by all the Portuguese, numbering seventy-four, who had come on the ship. Immediately after the destruction of the vessel, sixty-one of the Portuguese, including the envoy and his party, together with all the ship's officers, were beheaded. The remaining thirteen, including the ship's physician, were sent back to Macao in a small boat, with instructions to inform the officials there of how rigorously the Japanese enforced their Law of 1639, and to advise that there should be no repetition of their daring act.

The Portuguese in Macao could not reconcile themselves to the situation. They still desired a chance to approach Japan with regard to the trade problem. The opportunity soon presented itself. In December, 1640, Portugal declared its independence from Spain, and King John IV ascended the Portuguese throne. When this news reached Macao, the Portuguese residing there immediately sent an envoy to their home country, extending their congratulations, and at the same time they petitioned the king to send an envoy for the purpose of reestablishing trade relations with Japan. In response to this urgent request, in 1647 King John IV sent Don Gonzalo de Siqueira

as his envoy to Japan. The envoy and his party, escorted by two war vessels, arrived at Nagasaki on July 16 of the same year. The shogun, Iyemitsu, considered their arrival an important national event. He ordered the feudal lords in Kyushu to mass their troops, numbering 50,000, and to bring their war vessels, numbering 582, to Nagasaki for the purpose of defending the nation. The Portuguese envoy presented a document in which it was stated that Portugal had once been a state dependent upon Spain, and that it was during this period that Portugal had had trade difficulties and other troubles with Japan; but Portugal had now gained her independence and had entered upon a new national régime, and therefore was now sending an envoy to Japan with instructions to inform Japan of the national independence of Portugal and of the accession of the king, and at the same time to request Japan to grant a renewal of trade privileges. Inouye and Yamazaki, whom Iyemitsu had sent to Nagasaki as his representatives, conveyed the decision of the shogun in answer to the request of the Portuguese envoy.

The request was rejected on the grounds that for a number of years after Christianity had been prohibited in Japan, Portugal and Spain, together with their dependencies, had made it possible for Catholic priests to enter Japan and to propagate the prohibited religion therein, thus causing great national difficulties which ended with the Christian uprising, and furthermore that Japan had indisputable evidence that those Christian nations were planning to reduce Japan to the condition of a vassal state, just as they had done with other nations, by using Christian influence instrumentally and abusively. Japan had therefore strictly prohibited ships and men from those Christian nations from entering Japanese waters, under penalty of death. However, although the Portuguese envoy and his party entered the harbor of Nagasaki in apparent violation of this law, yet the death penalty was not meted out to them because they came to Japan merely for the purpose of reporting the accession of their new king. Through this envoy, Portugal ex-

pressed her desire to establish amicable and friendly relations with Japan. Nevertheless, Japan had neither inclination nor obligation to enter into relations of any kind with Christian nations which could not present evidence to convince Japanese authorities that they would not allow their subjects to engage in Christian missionary work in Japan. The very fact that Portugal was a Christian nation would be cause enough for Japan to prevent Portuguese ships and people from entering Japanese waters. Consequently, no matter what sort of proposal Portugal might make to Japan, the latter would not take it under consideration. The Portuguese ship with the envoy and his party aboard must sail speedily out of Japanese waters.

Iyemitsu's treatment of the envoy from Portugal who came to Japan in 1647 was markedly different from his treatment of the Portuguese envoy from Macao in 1640. He took this attitude because the former had come representing the throne whereas the latter had been sent merely by a colony. Perhaps the real reason for this attitude was that the envoy of 1647 came with a strong military backing. At any rate, Iyemitsu refused to accept the gifts from the Portuguese throne; he rejected the requests of the king of Portugal; and he ordered the Portuguese ships to sail out of Japanese waters. On September 4, 1647, the Portuguese ships left the harbor of Nagasaki. National relations between Japan and Portugal thus definitely came to an end 104 years after the Portuguese had first introduced firearms into Japan in 1543.⁸⁸

In 1673 the English ship "Return" anchored in the harbor of Nagasaki. A man, reputed to be an envoy from England, who was aboard this ship, presented a copy of the trade license issued by Japan which the British traders had returned to the Japanese government in 1623-24 when they voluntarily abandoned their trading posts and left Hirado. This man requested the renewal of trade privileges with Japan. When this request reached the shogunate government at Yedo, it was rejected on the grounds that the English also were undesirables.

In 1662, King Charles II of England had married the Princess Catherine of the royal family of Portugal, and by reason of this marriage the English and Portuguese royal families were Christians. Japan would not grant trade privileges to such a nation as England, which was ruled by a king of the Catholic faith. The "Return," after having remained in the harbor of Nagasaki for about a month, sailed away on August 28, 1673, without either making further demands or being molested. This attempt by England for the renewal of trade with Japan was the last approach of any Occidental nation to Japan during the Period of Seclusion.⁵⁹

The Dutch and Chinese traders were still permitted to carry on their business; but they were so completely isolated from the Japanese that their presence was not contrary to Japan's fundamental policy. There were many reasons why Japan allowed the Dutch traders to retain their trade rights in Japan. The following are the most important:

1. The Dutch traders responded promptly to the request of the shogunate government to send their war vessels to bombard the Christian stronghold in 1638. This was done just one year before Japan entered upon the Period of Seclusion. Therefore, the meritorious service of the Dutch had to be recognized.

2. Japan believed that the Dutch were not Christians. The Dutch traders also professed to the shogunate government and to the Japanese people that they were not Christians.

3. Although Japan shut her doors against the outside world, the shogunate government nevertheless desired information on what was stirring elsewhere, especially the activities of Christian nations. She therefore sought a reliable agent for this service. Because, ever since the coming of the Dutch traders in 1609, they and their government had practically served as secret agents of Japan in reporting all so-called intrigues and plots of Christian nations and of Christian priests living in Japan, the shogunate government naturally regarded the Dutch as ideal agents; and consequently, the Dutch traders and their country

were employed as the "eyes and ears" of Japan with regard to Europe and Europeans.


The Dutch traders were permitted to remain in Japan under the following conditions. Their ships were to be allowed to enter the harbor of Nagasaki once a year. Upon reaching port, the captains of these ships were required to proceed immediately to Yedo to report to the shogun and his advisors on the religious, social, political, and military events in Europe.

The Dutch traders and their government were especially held responsible for information on the activities and plans of Christian nations which were in any way related to Japan. The Dutch ships were not allowed to bring to Japan any publications or other things that had any connection with Christianity. If they should be found to have any connection with the smuggling into Japan of any Christian priest, or if they should fail to report to the Japanese government the approach of ships of other nations with Christian priests aboard, the Dutch traders would be deprived of trade privileges and of the right of residence in Japan. This regulation was strictly enforced. In 1647, when the envoy from the throne of Portugal came to Nagasaki escorted by two Portuguese war vessels, the Dutch traders failed to make a previous report to the shogunate government. Because of this the government decided to deprive the Dutch of their trade privileges and to expel them from Japan. However, after repeated petitions from the traders, and also because the Dutch were able to give acceptable explanations, they were allowed to resume their trade in 1649, after it had been suspended for two years.⁶⁰

In those days the shogunate government was very cautious and suspicious, in fact nervous and fearful, with regard to persons coming to Japan from the outside world. As previously indicated, even the Japanese who had established residence in foreign lands were prohibited from reëntering Japan, under penalty of death. Consequently, no matter what confidence the shogunate government had in the Dutch, freedom of residence

in Japan was not accorded them. All Dutch traders in Japan were segregated, and compelled to reside exclusively on the small artificial island of Deshima in the harbor of Nagasaki. On it were sixty-five small wooden buildings, which were used as residences, offices, interpreters' quarters, guardhouses, and warehouses. When Deshima was made the segregated district for the Dutch traders, Japan imposed incomparably more strict and severe laws and regulations upon the Dutch traders than she had upon the Portuguese traders. This course was taken by the Tokugawa shogunate not because the Dutch traders were regarded as being more dangerous and untrustworthy than the Portuguese, but because of the changes in the policy of Japan.

The Dutch traders in Deshima were treated much as prisoners. Although the government of The Netherlands and the local Dutch government in India repeatedly protested to the shogunate government for more humane treatment of the traders, the shogunate government each time refused to comply with their demands, and stated that the Dutch traders must submit unconditionally to the laws and regulations of Japan or abandon their trade. The island of Deshima was surrounded by high wooden fences. Several yards distant from the shore, high wooden pillars were set up in the water, and under no circumstances were ships allowed to sail beyond the bounds marked by these poles. Deshima was connected by a long, narrow stone bridge with the city of Nagasaki. At both ends of this bridge guardhouses were erected, and the guards stationed therein never permitted the Dutch to cross. With the exception of licensed prostitutes and Buddhist priests from the Koyasan monastery, no Japanese were allowed to visit Deshima. The Dutch traders and men from the ships of Holland were privileged to enter Deshima only after they had trampled on the images of Christ and the Virgin Mary as evidence of the fact that they were not Christians. The Dutch who resided in Deshima were allowed to cross the bridge and to visit the city of Nagasaki only once a year—on New Year's Day and the six days



(藏所氏和忠平松爵子) 圖之敷屋陀蘭阿島出崎長

THE ISLAND
The Dutch trade settlement

OF DESHIMA
in the harbor of Nagasaki

following. And before entering the city, they were required to trample on the images of Christ and the Virgin Mary as proof that they had not embraced Christianity. A refusal to do so would mean either death or expulsion from Japan. This practice of trampling on the image of Christ was continued even after the reopening of Japan. In 1857, three years after Perry's historic visit, the practice was abandoned by reason of a strong protest from the Dutch government.²¹

It is an undeniable historical fact that the continuous violation of the laws of Japan by the Catholic priests in being smuggled into Japan and their engaging in religious work there caused Japan to close her doors against the outside world. Nevertheless, it is also true that the coming of the Dutch traders in the early part of the seventeenth century, and their firm determination to drive out other Occidental traders and thereby to monopolize trade, was one of the principal causes of Japan's entering upon the Period of Seclusion. In 1609, upon coming to Japan, the Dutch traders almost immediately started their work of attempting to gain a monopoly of trade. They took advantage of Japan's suspicion regarding the motives of Christian priests and her fear of possible plots by Christian nations which might endanger her independence. The Dutch traders, in coöperation with their home government in Europe, presented evidence to the shogunate government of asserted intrigues and schemes by Christian nations, and by Christian priests and Japanese converts, thereby gaining the confidence and trust of the shogun and his advisors.

The plan of the Dutch traders worked very successfully. In 1622 they finally succeeded in inducing Japan to terminate her relations with Spain. In 1622-24 Spanish traders were driven away from Japan, all trade and other relations between Japan and Spain and her dependencies having been completely terminated. At the same time the Dutch traders represented to Japan that England was a nation inseparably connected with Christian (Catholic) nations and that therefore she should be

treated as a Christian (Catholic) state. Because of this representation Japan deprived England of all the special rights previously granted. Finally, in 1623-24, English traders, finding it impossible to compete with the Dutch traders, closed their trade quarters at Hirado and permanently abandoned trade in Japan. After having thus driven the Spanish and the English traders out of Japan, the Dutch traders concentrated all their energies on the Portuguese. Taking advantage of the fact that they were the self-appointed national agents of Japan in spying out and reporting the movements of Christian nations, the Dutch traders represented the Portuguese traders and their country in the worst possible light, with the purpose of bringing about complications between Japan and Portugal. Finally, in 1638-39, all Portuguese traders were expelled from Japan. Thereupon, Japan entered upon her Period of Seclusion.⁶²

In 1639 the Dutch successfully achieved an objective for which they had been working for thirty years. After they had thus succeeded in driving away from Japan all other European traders, they gained their long-coveted monopoly. Nevertheless, their seeming success proved to be the beginning of the downfall of Dutch trade in Japan. After Japan had adopted the policy of seclusion, the Dutch, as we have seen, were deprived of freedom of residence in Japan, and were forced to live in Deshima practically as prisoners. Moreover, because of economic conditions, the Tokugawa shogunate year after year placed more stringent restrictions on trade and reduced the trade quota of Holland from time to time, until Dutch trade in Japan practically ceased. In the beginning, although Japan had imposed strict regulations upon the Dutch with regard both to their residence in Japan and to their association with the Japanese, yet no restrictions had been made upon trade; the Dutch could bring any number of trade ships to Japan and undertake trade to any extent, provided that all trade transactions were made exclusively in the harbor of Nagasaki. After Japan entered upon her seclusion period, trade conditions underwent

radical changes. Both the Dutch and the Chinese traders were importers of merchandise, while Japan had practically nothing to export except gold, silver, and copper; hence, the foreign trade which had once been a source of Japan's national wealth brought about economic difficulties in Japan because her specie and precious metals were steadily being drained from the country. In the early part of the eighteenth century, Japan discovered that the amount of gold and silver in the nation had been reduced respectively to three-fourths and to one-fourth of their former amounts. The amount of copper was reduced so much that Japan felt keenly its shortage for national uses. Furthermore, the silver and gold mines in Japan having been practically worked out, their output could not fill the gap.

Within a half-century after national seclusion was begun, the Tokugawa shogunate had already realized the seriousness of this situation. Consequently, in 1685 Japan enforced trade regulations with the purpose of checking the export of gold, silver, and copper from the country. The number of Dutch ships that might enter Japanese ports each year was first restricted to nine, then to eight, and finally to seven. The entry of Chinese junks was restricted to eighty, whereas during the time of prosperity the annual entries of Chinese junks had numbered as many as two hundred. Because this trade regulation did not bring the expected results, in 1700 the annual entry of Dutch ships was reduced from seven to five, and that of Chinese junks from eighty to seventy. The shogunate government also fixed the maximum amount of gold, silver, and copper to be exported to Holland and to China. Japan thus sought to control her one-sided trade by reducing the number of Dutch and Chinese ships that might enter the harbor of Nagasaki, and by limiting the quantity of precious metals that might be exported; but the draining of precious metals from Japan continued. Therefore, in 1715 the number of Dutch ships permitted to enter was reduced from five to two a year, and the number of Chinese junks from seventy to thirty. Moreover, an embargo was placed on

gold. A reduction was also made on the maximum amount of silver and of copper that might be exported. These regulations were the death blow to both the Dutch and the Chinese trade.

During the Kansei era (1789-1800), the annual entry of Dutch ships was reduced to but one. During the Bunka era (1805-17) the Dutch trade was practically in its last stage. There were several years in which no Dutch ship entered the harbor of Nagasaki. Consequently the Dutch traders and the government of Holland no longer regarded trade with Japan as a monopoly; there was practically no trade to monopolize. Therefore, in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Russia, England, and the United States were making unsuccessful attempts to reopen Japan, the king of Holland wrote several personal letters to the shogun, advising that Japan should realize the changed conditions in the world and reopen her country to the trade of all Occidental nations. The Dutch, who had succeeded in driving away all other Occidental traders from Japan in the seventeenth century in order to monopolize trade, advised Japan in the nineteenth century, after their trade had vanished, to reopen her doors and to invite Occidental traders from all countries to send their ships to her shores, so that they themselves might eventually enjoy a share of the trade thus newly created.⁶³

The period of 215 years beginning in 1639, when Japan promulgated her third and last seclusion law, and ending in 1854, when Japan was reopened by the United States, is known in Japan as the Period of Absolute Seclusion. During this time, Japan enjoyed an unusual period of peace. It was then that the typical traits and characteristics of the Japanese were developed, in consequence of which Japan accomplished many marvelous achievements which seemed to represent a reaction from her long period of nearly dormant national life. At the time Japan was reopened, however, she found that in many things she was two hundred years behind the rest of the world. She also discovered that districts outside of Japan in which she had

formerly had either trade or settlements had come under the control of other nations, leaving no room for her to expand in. Thus were the Japanese blocked in all directions.⁶⁴ If history should read using the word "if," possible historical events that did not take place might be interestingly contemplated. If either Hideyoshi at the time of his continental campaign in Asia, or the Confederate government in America at the time of the Civil War, had possessed naval power of fighting strength, or if Napoleon had had a navy that could have controlled European waters, the history of the world would have been different. If Japan had not entered into seclusion in the seventeenth century, but had maintained the policy of Iyeyasu, neither the population question nor the immigration question with which Japan is vexed would now be troubling her.⁶⁵ Her national expansion would then have been an accomplished fact. Prior to the seclusion period, Japan formulated three plans for invading and occupying the Philippines, but after everything was in readiness the attempt was abandoned in 1638 because of the seclusion policy. Before Formosa became a Chinese possession, Japan had made two attempts to occupy it. Finally, in the middle of the seventeenth century, Koxinga (Cheng-kung Chu), who was born in Japan of a Chinese father and a Japanese mother, drove the Dutch out of Formosa and made himself sole master of the island. For three generations (those of Koxinga, his son, and his grandson) this family was the ruling power in Formosa. While Koxinga was fighting against the Manchu army in China, because of his blood connection with the Japanese he sent envoys to Japan a number of times asking that military assistance be sent both to Formosa and to China so that the Manchus might be driven out of China and the Ming dynasty restored to power. However, because of the seclusion policy, Japan refused to engage in any military efforts beyond her own borders.

Prior to the seclusion period, Japan had established numerous settlements and colonies of one kind or another, including

trading cities and towns in Java, the Philippines, Siam, Annam, Cochin China, and several other places in southern Asia, as well as in the South Sea islands. After having entered into seclusion, Japan not only abandoned these settlements and colonies; she practically destroyed them by strictly prohibiting the Japanese there from returning to Japan, under penalty of death. Russia, in one of the provisions of the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905), ceded fishery rights in Russian waters to Japan, apparently so as to permit Japanese subjects to enjoy the same fishing rights and privileges as were accorded to Russian subjects; in fact, this was merely a recognition of rights inherited by the Japanese from their forefathers. From time immemorial, the Japanese had engaged in fishing in those northern waters. Therefore, had Japan not adopted the policy of seclusion, but had permitted her people to make settlements outside of Japan Proper, the Japanese might have established colonies along the coast of Siberia, thus making the Sea of Japan a Japanese lake. The domain of Japan might then have been extended down the coast of Asia, beginning at Kamchatka in the north and running south to the Philippines, Borneo, Java, and Sumatra. There was also the possibility that Japan might have established settlements in Lower California more than a century before the United States of America became an independent nation.⁸⁹

The first appearance of the Cossacks in Kamchatka and the subsequent occupation of that peninsula by Russia (1697-99), and the establishment of British supremacy by Hastings in India (1774-84) were each accomplished in three-quarters of a century, and in the century and a half after Japan had abandoned her power in Asiatic waters and confined her people within her own boundaries. Japan had been feared in Asiatic waters for approximately two hundred years, beginning in the early part of the fifteenth century when Japanese pirates had ravaged and controlled the coasts of China and Korea. In fact, Japan had thus exercised control over Asiatic waters more than

a century before modern European nations had sought to establish authority in Asia. Therefore, the rise of Japan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as the great power in Asiatic waters, a rise which might have been comparable to that of

TABLE 2
FLUCTUATION OF POPULATION IN THE SECLUSION PERIOD

Years	Population	Intervals of time, years	Years	Population	Intervals of time, years
1726.....	26,549,000	..	1798.....	25,471,000	6
1732.....	26,922,000	6	1804.....	25,518,000	6
1744.....	26,153,000	12	1816.....	25,622,000	12
1750.....	25,918,000	6	1828.....	27,201,000	12
1756.....	26,062,000	6	1834.....	27,064,000	6
1792.....	24,891,000	36	1846.....	26,907,000	12

Great Britain in European waters, would have been an accomplished historical fact if Japan had not secluded herself in 1639.⁶⁷

During the entire seclusion period lasting 215 years, Japan maintained an unnatural and artificial existence. In the first

TABLE 3
FLUCTUATION OF POPULATION IN MODERN JAPAN

Years	Population	Intervals of time, years	Years	Population	Intervals of time, years
1872.....	33,110,000	..	1912.....	52,522,000	5
1877.....	34,625,000	5	1916.....	55,637,000	4
1882.....	36,700,000	5	1921.....	58,697,000	5
1892.....	41,089,000	10	1925.....	62,044,000	4
1902.....	46,041,000	10	1930.....	66,892,000	5
1907.....	48,819,000	5	1932.....	68,865,000	2

place, she strictly prohibited her people from migrating to foreign countries. In the second place, because it thus became impossible for Japan to obtain food supplies from the world outside, she made it her policy to have her population and her food production well balanced. On this account, her popula-

tion was kept almost stationary for a period of 215 years, the average being about 26,000,000. This was made possible by the practice of birth control, and fortuitously by a series of famines brought on by crop shortages. Table 2⁶⁸ shows the rise and fall in the population during the seclusion period.

The condition of the population of Japan during the seclusion period may be compared with the natural increase in the population of modern Japan as shown in table 3.

With the adoption of the policy of national seclusion in 1639, the traditional policy of Japan regarding national expansion either through trade or by military conquest was abandoned. At the same time, population and emigration questions were shelved. With the rise of New Japan in 1868, the artificial policy of Old Japan was wholly abandoned. The population then began to increase rapidly, as if it were reacting against the suppression of the growth of population during the long seclusion period. With the increasing seriousness of the emigration and population problems, the Japanese in the twentieth century are becoming more and more cognizant of the fact that their forefathers of the seventeenth century bequeathed to them a problem of national expansion.⁶⁹

CHAPTER III

The Triumph of the Shogun: The Seclusion and Segregation of the Imperial Throne and the Imperial Court

TOWARD THE CLOSE of the fifteenth century the Dark Age of Japan reached its lowest depth. The Ashikaga shogunate had practically lost its ruling power. All the feudal lords had declared their independence. Many new military families had risen and waged war against the old feudal families. Petty warfare raged in all parts, one family encroaching on the territory of another. Most of the Buddhist communities became armed camps. The priests devoted themselves to military strife, neglecting religious piety. With the rebellion of the feudal lords, tribute from the local feudal governments ceased to flow into the coffers of the shogunate. Shoguns were frequently either driven away or assassinated. Sometimes, even the whereabouts of the shogun was unknown. Because the imperial court was financially provided for by the shogunate government, its decline directly affected the emperor, his court, and the court nobles. When, in 1500, Gotsuchi-Mikado, the 102d emperor, died, the imperial court had no funds with which to bury him; neither was the shogun able to make any provision. The court nobles therefore solicited money from rich feudal lords and from Buddhist communities. After about six weeks, they had finally gathered enough money to bury the dead emperor. The 103d emperor, Gokashiwara, was unable to observe his coronation celebration for twenty-one years, when at last a rich Buddhist priest offered his life savings for that purpose. When this emperor died, five years later, and the 104th emperor, Gonara, succeeded to the throne, the imperial court requested 100,300 *hiki* (about \$250) from the shogun to cover the expense of the

imperial funeral and of the imperial accession. By strenuous efforts, the shogunate government was able to raise just one-half the sum requested. Because year after year no provision was made for them, most of the court nobles had left Kyoto, the imperial capital, for provincial districts where they might find generous feudal lords who would open their homes to them. The imperial palace, having long been left without repair, decayed and fell into ruins, and the emperor had no longer a proper house in which to live. Lacking other income, he was forced to maintain his family by selling autographed poems composed by himself.¹

In the early part of the sixteenth century, all the political, religious, social, civil, military, and financial centers and institutions in Japan were in a sorry state. The sanctity of the imperial throne and the inviolability of the person of the emperor survived the national degeneration, but, because poverty was so widespread, the people were unable to do anything for the throne except to show sympathy, devotion, and reverence. Consequently, any military leader who might render any service, whether personal or financial, to the emperor and his court, was looked up to by the people as one who would act in their behalf and who therefore could be both trusted and depended upon. By the middle of the sixteenth century, Japan had passed through the most critical period of the Dark Age. The severe and destructive winter of the national existence was gradually giving way to the springtime of a future of promise and prosperity. The work of national unification was then begun, centering upon the throne.²

In 1543, the Portuguese introduced firearms into Japan, and the rapid adoption of these Western military weapons caused radical changes in warfare. Owing to the use of firearms, the numerical strength of troops became a deciding factor in battle, replacing individual skill in the use of the old weapons and personal bravery in single combat. The new methods of fighting and the consequent changes in military tactics made it

impossible for small fighting units to maintain an independent existence.³ These were destroyed or reduced to dependence upon neighboring lords who had a greater number of men under their command and who also had firearms at their disposal. This state of affairs in Japan in the middle of the sixteenth century had two outstanding results: (1) larger and stronger military units replaced the small fighting units, of which there had been several hundred; and (2) the new military families replaced the old feudal families, which were either destroyed or reduced to impotence.⁴

Almost all the newly risen families were of obscure origin. Moreover, the military barons were self-made, without the recognition of emperor or shogun; they were elements that had come into existence solely by reason of their fighting strength. In order to gain national standing and recognition, they were loyal to the throne; and, as they believed that the best way to insure their family prosperity and position was to gain imperial backing, they rivaled each other in rendering service to the throne. Hence, new military families, such as those of Nobunaga and of his father, of Iyeyasu, of Mori, and of others in the various provincial districts, showed their reverence and loyalty to the throne either by sending copper coins to the imperial court at Kyoto or by repairing the national temple of the Sun Goddess (the imperial ancestress) at Ise.

In the second half of the sixteenth century, after the fighting units in Japan had been concentrated in the hands of smaller and stronger military families, the heads of these families vied with one another in being first to reach Kyoto, the imperial capital, with the purpose of effecting national unification in the name of the emperor. Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu were the most successful in this ambitious undertaking. Placing themselves at the imperial disposal, they gained the trust and confidence of the throne. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was a common belief that the surest way to rise to power was to approach the throne and to engage

in some national enterprise for the benefit of the emperor.⁵ In pursuance of this policy, Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu effected national unification, one succeeding another. In the seventeenth century, peace was completely restored in Japan and Iyeyasu succeeded in organizing the Tokugawa shogunate government. Upon the completion of this achievement, Iyeyasu carefully studied conditions in Japan and investigated the causes of the unrest then obtaining. He concluded that for the sake of a safe and prosperous existence of his newly founded government, the imperial throne and its influence must be completely isolated from the national life of Japan. The emperor, under such an arrangement, would not have relations with powerful military families and could not use them to serve the throne for imperial aggrandizement with the objective of regaining the ruling authority from the Tokugawa shogunate. An ambitious military lord would not be able to approach the throne to gain imperial confidence and trust, thereby leading a rebellion against the shogunate.

It is the consensus of historians that Iyeyasu was exceedingly egocentric. He did not found the Tokugawa shogunate for the purpose of giving a good administration to Japan, but rather used Japan for the foundation of his government. From Iyeyasu's standpoint the Tokugawa shogunate did not exist for Japan; Japan existed for the Tokugawa shogunate.⁶ His policy in dealing with the throne, the feudal lords, and foreign nations was based wholly upon his egocentric doctrine. After having founded the shogunate, by reason of increasing difficulties and complications Iyeyasu began to be more and more acutely aware of the deeply rooted traditional influence and power of the throne over the people, as well as the nation-wide reverence for the throne, and to fear these forces. He also feared the Christian nations and their dominating power over Christian converts. Consequently, he concluded that for the safety of the Tokugawa shogunate the imperial throne, as well as the influence of foreign nations, must be eliminated from the national

life of Japan. As a result, the policy of secluding Japan from the world, and of holding off foreign nations from the Japanese, and the policy of the seclusion of the imperial throne from the national life of Japan, as well as of the emperor from his subjects, were adopted and enforced. Nevertheless, in dealing with the throne Iyeyasu avoided that exercise of dictatorial power which he used in dealing with foreign nations. He cleverly utilized the sacred national traditions regarding the imperial throne and the divinity of the emperor. He showed the highest reverence for the throne, and at the same time he elevated the throne to such a height that the emperor and the people could not approach each other.⁷

In order to make the seclusion of the throne and of the imperial court absolute and effective, the following regulations were strictly enforced:

On the grounds that the emperor was too sacred and too holy to expose himself to the sight of the people, the ruling emperor was confined to the imperial palace. The strict observance of this regulation denied the emperor even an opportunity to step outside of the palace grounds. Not only the ruling emperor, but also the retired emperors, were requested to remain thus withdrawn from public view. During the Tokugawa rule of 264 years, three emperors, after their abdication, were each allowed, once only, to go outside the palace grounds for the purpose of visiting Buddhist temples or Shinto shrines. As time progressed, this rule was made more strict. The shogun stationed within the palace grounds, under the name of "The Imperial Guard," trusted military men whose duty it was to spy on and to report every movement of the emperor and of his family, and whose prime function was to lock at night all the doors leading to the sleeping quarters of the emperor. Consequently, the imperial palace was like a prison.

The Tokugawa shogunate revered and respected the throne in strict accordance with the sacred national traditions. The shogun elevated the emperor and his court so high above hu-

man affairs that it was impossible for the people to approach and understand the affairs of the court, which were as far beyond them as heaven itself. In fact, throughout the Tokugawa period only a small number of court nobles had access to the court and attended the emperor in person; in those days, indeed, the court nobles were known to the people by the name of *Kumo-no-Uye Bito* (which means "The Class of People Who Reside Exclusively in the Clouds, High in Heaven"). But no matter how great was the respect shown to the imperial court, in actuality the emperor and his family were prisoners in the imperial palace at Kyoto.⁸

For the maintenance of the imperial court, Iyeyasu and the shoguns that succeeded him set aside certain districts, the revenues from which approximated 120,000 *koku* of rice annually (one *koku* equals five bushels). These annual revenues were used exclusively for the expenditures of the imperial court, of the imperial family, of the retired emperors and their families, of the imperial families of collateral lines, and of all the court nobles. However, these districts were not placed under the direct control of the emperor in the same way that provinces and districts were assigned to feudal lords who were authorized to exercise complete ruling authority; they were placed under the rule of the military governor of the city of Kyoto, who was an appointee of the shogun, and the revenue was distributed by the governor's office. Thus, the emperor had not an inch of land to control nor a single subject to rule. He did not have a penny nor a bushel of rice to dispose of in accordance with his own judgment. Iyeyasu carefully segregated the throne and the imperial court from all the feudal lords and other military families. In the first place, all the districts and provinces surrounding Kyoto, the imperial capital, were allotted to the military leaders who had been retainers of Iyeyasu and later had been raised to the rank of feudal lords. In the second place, because Iyeyasu thus placed all the districts surrounding Kyoto under the control of the special military families that had pledged loy-

alty and allegiance to the Tokugawa shogunate, it was impossible for other feudal lords to approach the imperial court. Although all the feudal lords were permitted to travel through the province of Yamashiro, in which the imperial capital was situated, they were strictly forbidden either to enter Kyoto or to pass through its suburbs. Violators of this regulation were dealt with as offenders against the highest propriety. Thus, under no circumstances were the feudal lords allowed to visit the imperial court or to have any communication with it.⁹

In Article I of the Code of the Imperial Household, Iyeyasu defined the duties and responsibilities of the emperor as being exclusively to learn how to compose poems that would be contributions to the national literature and to study Japanese poetry as a fine art. By this provision, the emperor was in effect prohibited from taking any interest in history, economics, political science, and other subjects relating to governmental and national affairs. Iyeyasu imposed this restriction upon the emperor in order to prevent him from taking such an interest in national affairs as might arouse in him a desire to regain the ruling authority.

In short, Iyeyasu cleverly deprived the throne of all ruling power. He induced the throne to delegate to the shogun all authority in civil, military, diplomatic, judicial, financial, social, and religious matters. The shogun was thereby able to conduct national affairs as the sole ruler of Japan, with responsibility to none. The feudal lords were privileged to maintain autonomous local governments in their respective districts and provinces; but they were held responsible to the shogun. They had no connection whatever with the throne or the imperial court.¹⁰

The sole privilege reserved to the throne was authority to confer official titles and ranks; but even this reservation of power was merely nominal. The shogun always decided which feudal lords should receive certain of the official ranks and titles of the imperial court. Upon receipt of the decision of the shogun, the court had to issue regular official appointments in the

name of the emperor. When the emperor, on rare occasions, desired to advance the rank of certain feudal lords, he was able to do so only after obtaining the consent of the shogun.¹¹ The feudal lords thus appointed to offices in the imperial court were not required to serve the throne, because these offices were purely nominal, no active functions whatsoever being attached to them. Because of the rigorous enforcement of the seclusion of the throne and the court, all feudal lords who were holders of offices at court were not only forbidden to approach the throne, but were not even permitted to enter Kyoto, the imperial capital.

Iyeyasu was always careful to prevent the imperial family from gaining any power. He made it a rule that no imperial family of collateral lineage should be created without the shogun's initiative. This ruling made it impossible for the emperor to create new branch families, no matter how many imperial princes there might be. Iyeyasu also made it a rule that the court nobles should enter into marriage exclusively with persons of their own class. This ruling made it impossible for imperial princes and princesses to marry into families of court nobles. Consequently, during the Tokugawa shogunate of 264 years, with the sole exception of the heir apparent to the throne, all the imperial princes and princesses had to enter Buddhist monasteries or nunneries. Their heads were shaved and they became priests and nuns, thus being forced to remain unmarried for life. This ruling was strictly observed up to the time of the imperial restoration in the middle of the nineteenth century. Under the Tokugawa rule, the imperial throne and court were secluded from the national life and from the people of Japan, in much the same way as Japan and the Japanese were shut off from foreign nations and from foreigners.¹²

CHAPTER IV

The Domination of the Shogun Over the Feudal Lords

DURING THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD, the feudal lords were divided into three classes: the Tozama, the Shimpan (Gokamon), and the Fudai. The Tozama were the feudal lords with whom Iyeyasu had served under Hideyoshi and who, after the Battle of Sekigahara, had pledged allegiance to Iyeyasu and had subsequently become subordinates of the shogun and of the Tokugawa shogunate. During the rule of Iyeyasu and of Hidetada, the powerful Tozama feudal lords, because of their former relationships and associations, were regarded by the shogun as allies rather than as subjects of the Tokugawa. At the same time, their movements were watched suspiciously. As will be shown later, the imperial restoration was accomplished in the second half of the nineteenth century because at that time the Tokugawa shogunate had become powerless to enforce the provisions of the Military Constitution, thus making it possible for a few powerful Tozama feudal lords to rise against the Tokugawa on behalf of the throne.

The Shimpan were the feudal lords whose families had been created by Iyeyasu and other shoguns. Their founders were exclusively either Iyeyasu's sons or their descendants. By reason of their blood connection, close relations existed between the Shimpan feudal lords and the shogunate family. In the event of the termination of the shogunate line, the successor to the shogun was always selected from among the feudal lords of the Shimpan class.

The Fudai were the feudal lords who had formerly been retainers of the Tokugawa family and who, with the rise of Iyeyasu, had been elevated to their new rank. Because of this connection, the relation of ruler and subject always obtained

between the shogun and the Fudai feudal lords. The leading officials of the shogunate government were appointed almost exclusively from among the Fudai.

Although the actual number of the feudal lords of these three classes never amounted to three hundred, historians generally state that there were "three hundred feudal lords."¹

Approximately one-third of the total area of Japan, including the districts and provinces in which there were large cities and prosperous harbors, as well as all the important strategic military locations, and the gold and silver mines, were placed under the direct control of the shogun. The remaining two-thirds of the area of Japan was distributed among the "three hundred feudal lords," with the right of inheritance by their respective descendants. The revenues of the shogun from the provinces under his control were estimated to be about 8,000,000 *koku* of rice annually.² The revenues of the Tozama feudal lords ranged from 10,000 to 1,000,000 *koku*; those of the Shimpan, branch families included, from 20,000 to approximately 700,000;³ and those of the Fudai, from 10,000 to about 250,000.

Military families having an annual revenue of 10,000 or more *koku* held the rank of feudal lord. Those with a revenue of 10,000 or less, down to 100 *koku* of rice, were classed either as *hatamoto* (bodyguards of the shogun) or as *samurai* (retainers of feudal lords). The shogun maintained a bodyguard 80,000 strong, and each member of it was required to have a number of retainers in keeping with his rank and standing. Consequently, the shogun's bodyguard on a war footing was increased to an army of great fighting strength.

In the first year of the Genwa era (1615), after the destruction of the Toyotomi family at Osaka, Iyeyasu required a general limitation of armaments. The shogun was to maintain the original strength of his bodyguard of 80,000, but all the feudal lords were to reduce their fighting strength to the minimum permissible for defensive purposes. All feudal lords, according to their respective ranks and standings, were allowed to main-

tain a certain strength of infantry, cavalry, and armament. The number of their firearms, bows, and spears, together with military banners, was definitely fixed. Castles and strongholds were ordered to be destroyed, only one residence castle being allowed in each province. Although every feudal lord who controlled more than one province had the right to maintain a castle in each province as his residence and government site, yet few were permitted to fortify them. Even those who were privileged to reside in their castles were strictly prohibited from either improving or strengthening them. When repairs were needed, the work could only be done after the matter had been reported to the shogun with a complete description of what was necessary, and the consent of the shogun had been obtained. Violation of this ruling was regarded as an act of rebellion against the shogun, and usually the guilty lord was exiled and his family destroyed.⁴

Throughout the Tokugawa rule of 264 years, the feudal lords enjoyed almost complete autonomy in ruling their respective provinces and districts. Neither the shogun nor his government interfered in local administration. At the same time, the feudal lords as individuals had to render unquestioning obedience to the shogun, pledging loyalty and allegiance to him. Moreover, they had to conduct the affairs of their respective local governments in strict accordance with the provisions of the *Buke-Hodo* ("Military Constitution") that was framed and promulgated by Iyeyasu. Furthermore, *Joi* ("The Word and Desire of the Shogun") was law to them. In fact, as far as personal and family affairs were concerned, they were the helpless slaves of the shogun, just as the people in the districts and provinces were theirs.

The shogun and his government judged arbitrarily the conduct of the feudal lords and their observance of due relations with the shogun, as well as their fulfillment of the provisions of the Military Constitution.⁵ If violation of the *Buke-Hodo* was even so much as suspected, or if the shogun came into possession of circumstantial evidence of guilt, the feudal lords

were punished without even the form of a trial—were exiled or put to death, their families and local governments destroyed, and all their estates and property confiscated.

In dealing with the feudal lords, the shogun did not differentiate among them or take into consideration whether they were of the Tozama, the Shimpan, or the Fudai class. The destruction of feudal families was not a rare occurrence under the Tokugawa rule: the second shogun, Hidetada, destroyed thirty-three feudal families; and under the rule of the third shogun, Iyemitsu, thirty-five feudal lords met a similar fate. Among the destroyed were men of prominence, as for example, Tadateru and Tadanaga. Tadateru was the sixth son of Iyeyasu and the younger brother of the second shogun by the same mother. Six years after the death of Iyeyasu, the second shogun exiled this younger brother on the grounds of unbecoming conduct, and confiscated his estate, which yielded annually 600,000 *koku* of rice. Iyemitsu likewise put to death his only brother, Tadanaga, on grounds of ungentlemanly conduct and lack of brotherly devotion, and confiscated the two provinces that had been under Tadanaga's control. Lord Honda, who had been the most trusted advisor of Iyeyasu, and who had contributed largely to the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate, was exiled seven years after the death of Iyeyasu. The charge against him was that he was increasing his military strength without the knowledge of the shogun. None of these men had a trial. Thus, the most preëminent feudal lords of the Fudai class, and the most distinguished and powerful lords of the Shimpan class, including two brothers of ruling shoguns, were not spared when they came under the suspicion of the Tokugawa shogunate.⁶ In fact, because the rulers of the Tokugawa were absolute and supreme authorities, and because, in accordance with the principles of Iyeyasu, the founder of the shogunate government, it was their duty to maintain the safe existence of the shogunate, every person and thing that might conflict with this fundamental ruling they unhesitatingly eliminated and destroyed.⁷

When Iyeyasu organized the Tokugawa shogunate, he planned that the shogun should have absolute ruling authority, with responsibility to none: thus he was to be the source of all national power. His dealings with the throne, with the feudal lords, and with Japan as a nation were based entirely upon this policy of self-aggrandizement. He cared for nothing but the interests of his own family. Consequently, at the beginning of his rule he regarded men of power and influence as neither friends nor enemies; he merely employed them as contributors and providers of the necessary material to facilitate the carrying out of his ambitions. After he had completed the organization of the Tokugawa shogunate, his chief problem was how to prevent possible rivalry by the throne, the feudal lords, and other sources of power that had contributed to the founding of his government. He solved this problem, first, by completely isolating Japan from the throne and from foreign nations, which he feared as most dangerous, thereby making it impossible for the feudal lords either to approach or to be approached by them; and, second, by segregating from one another all the "three hundred feudal lords," thus making it impossible for them to form alliances against the shogunate. Throughout the entire period of the Tokugawa rule, the feudal lords were forced to look upon one another as enemies. This made communication between any two feudal states well-nigh impossible, just as if a state of war had existed between them. Therefore, upon the completion of the work of seclusion, Japan was entirely isolated from the world outside, and hundreds of segregated and isolated states were created within Japan.⁸

When, in July, 1615, Iyeyasu framed the *Buke-Hodo* (Military Constitution), he and his son, Hidetada, summoned all the feudal lords to appear before them to receive from their hands copies of the newly framed regulations. It then became the established practice for each succeeding shogun, upon being appointed by the emperor, to summon all the feudal lords and to deliver the *Buke-Hodo* to them in person. Although the

Buke-Hodo distributed by the different shoguns were dissimilar in wording and in minor features, they were practically the same in content as the one originally framed by Iyeyasu. By its provisions the relations between the shogun and the feudal lords, and between the shogunate government and the local feudal governments, were defined. In a sense, this constitution may be regarded as the law of the segregation and seclusion of the feudal lords.⁹

The Military Constitution promulgated by Iyeyasu consisted of thirteen articles. It covered subjects concerning civil and military work, interstate affairs between feudal lords, the obligations of feudal lords in attendance at the shogun's court, the economic, household, and personal affairs of the feudal lords, and the system of making appointments of civil and military officers by the feudal lords.

Each article contained a brief outline of the subjects concerned, all detail being omitted. This made it possible for the shogun to make arbitrary definitions and applications and thus be in a position to make charges of any sort against the feudal lords. Therefore, although the Military Constitution was seemingly a simple and harmless set of regulations, it proved to be a very effective instrument in the hands of the shogun. For example, he made any charge to suit himself out of Articles, 2, 10, 11, and 12, which stated, respectively: "Indulgence in drinking and in personal pleasure-seeking should be avoided"; "The material for clothing should be sensibly selected"; "Riding in sedan chairs or in carts should be allowed to military men of certain rank and standing only"; "Economy and frugality should be constantly observed." Some feudal lords were charged with unfitness to be rulers of feudal states because of unbecoming behavior.¹⁰ Others were charged with living extravagantly, even to the point of rivaling the shogun and thereby failing to show him due respect and reverence. In consequence of their offenses on such charges arbitrarily brought by the shogun, the feudal lords were sometimes advised to retire from public life

or to transfer their estates to far-away country districts; sometimes a part or the whole of the districts under their control was confiscated; and a few feudal lords were put to death, their families and local feudal governments also being destroyed.

After having declared the limitation of armaments, thereby depriving the feudal lords of their power as independent fighting units, Iyeyasu made provisions in the Military Constitution to put teeth into this regulation. By Articles 2 and 4 he demanded that the feudal lords should not afford refuge to military offenders, and that they should promptly expel any of their retainers who were found to have been connected with any rebellious or riotous movement. Article 1 required that all the feudal lords, both great and small, should take a serious interest in both civil and military affairs and devote themselves to the study of military science and literary works, but that they should bear in mind the fact that because military weapons were infernal and murderous instruments, their use should be avoided whenever possible; thus, while the feudal lords were required to take equal interest in civil and in military affairs, they were at the same time warned not to take undue interest in military matters, and in this way the shogun reserved the right to punish feudal lords who were too devoted to things military. Article 6 required that the feudal lords should destroy all their strongholds and fortified military stations, only lords of certain standing being permitted to retain their residence castles. As indicated before, it was further provided that under no circumstances should a new building for military purposes be erected. Even the repair of a residence castle could be undertaken only after permission had been obtained from the shogun. In this article also, the feudal lords were warned that an extensive wall for military defense would cause great harm and injury to the states and that deep moats and military ditches would foster the fighting spirit. The shogun frequently made arbitrary charges and judgments based upon these two articles. The feudal lords were thus frequently accused of show-

ing a daring military attitude toward the shogun by having violated the provisions of the Military Constitution.¹¹

All feudal lords were required to maintain their family residences at Yedo, the military capital of the shogun. It was also required that their wives, their children, and all their family dependants must reside in Yedo. The lords themselves were required to divide their time by spending one year at Yedo with their families, at the same time attending the shogun's court regularly, and to spend the following year in their respective districts attending to the administrative work of their local feudal governments. In this way all the feudal lords were prevented from settling permanently in any one place, and much of their time and money was spent in journeying to and fro. Also, they were separated for a year at a time from their families in Yedo and from their retainers in their home provinces, and by this arrangement the shogun was able to keep all the members of feudal families as hostages for the good behavior of the respective feudal lords.

The shogun and the feudal lords had provinces and districts under independent and separate control. Both shogun and feudal lords maintained their governmental and family expenses and provided for all the military men and their families in their service out of the income from their provinces, and thus were financially independent. The feudal lords did not have to send any tribute to the shogun or to his government. However, the shogun carefully watched their financial strength, and when the accumulation of wealth by certain feudal lords was reported to him, he might request voluntary assistance (goodwill service) from them in the building of highways, the dredging of rivers or harbors, or the building of residence castles for newly ennobled Shimpan feudal lords. A leading policy of Iyeyasu's—and it was maintained by succeeding shoguns—was to prevent the accumulation of wealth by the feudal lords. The two most essential duties to be rendered to the shogun by the feudal lords were to perform voluntary assistance in industrial

or engineering undertakings at the request of the shogun, and to render military service at the command of the shogun by taking the troops under their personal direction and joining the shogun's army in time of war.¹²

To give a good administration to the nation or to advance the national standing of Japan in the world was not the ambition and purpose of the Tokugawa shogunate: the safe existence and the self-protection of the Tokugawa family was its fundamental purpose. Because the shogunate government had been founded by taking the Tokugawa as the sole unit, Iyeyasu neither trusted nor depended upon any of the feudal lords.¹³ He looked upon feudal lords of all three classes as opponents of his family who in one way or another were planning to elevate their families at the expense of the Tokugawa. Although the shogun feared and suspected the Tozama feudal lords most of all, yet at the same time he always watched the movements of the Fudai feudal lords and even those of the Shimpan feudal families which were founded by his brothers and sons. Iyeyasu and his son, Hidetada, were always suspecting their vassals and preparing for military struggles with some of them.

In organization, the Tokugawa shogunate was the supreme dominating power, administratively and militarily; hence, Iyeyasu did not fear to go to war with any feudal lord, no matter how powerful. He was fully convinced that with his bodyguard of 80,000 men he could dominate the situation and win decisive victories, provided he had to cope with only one feudal lord at a time. What he feared was the formation of an alliance against him. One of the measures he took to prevent this was to allot provinces and districts to feudal lords in such a way as to create conflicting interests. On the whole, the Shimpan and the Fudai feudal lords were so placed geographically that they might jointly oppose the Tozama feudal lords. At the same time, he selected two adjoining states, the boundaries of which were complicated and indefinite, and allotted them to two of the Tozama feudal lords who were unfriendly, thus en-

couraging them to disputes and disagreements. By the employment of this same policy, Iyeyasu planned to make the Fudai dispute continuously with the Shimpan. He finally allotted several districts adjoining the provinces of the Fudai feudal lords to powerful military families that belonged to the shogun's bodyguard, and had them control the Fudai feudal lords, backed by the influence of the shogun. Furthermore, he selected numerous districts having strategical importance and reserved them as part of the shogun's hereditary estate. These were scattered throughout Japan in the vicinity of the provinces of the most powerful feudal lords, and each was placed under personal representatives of the shogun, whose duty it was to rule the people therein as well as to watch the movements of the feudal lords. By reason of this arrangement, Iyeyasu was successful in segregating the feudal lords, and making it possible for the shogun to be well-informed with regard to their movements.³⁴

In order to make the segregation of the feudal lords yet more effective, Iyeyasu embodied certain provisions in the Military Constitution. In Article 5 it was provided that the feudal lords should have men who were resident in the respective provinces and districts serve in their local feudal governments, thus eliminating the introduction of men from other provinces. By this arrangement, Iyeyasu aimed to prevent the forming of alliances. In Article 7 it was provided that the feudal lords should be required to keep a close watch on the neighboring feudal states, and to report promptly to the shogun all new activities and organizations. By means of this provision the shogun made all feudal lords serve as his spies. At the same time, he secretly stationed spies of his own in the provinces and districts of the feudal lords. By comparing the reports made by his spies with those sent by the feudal lords, he was able to judge of the sincerity of the lords, and at the same time be well informed about conditions in the feudal states. By Article 8 the feudal lords were strictly prohibited from entering into marriage rela-

tions with members of other feudal families without the full approval of the shogun. Through this arrangement the shogun prevented the lords from forming alliances among themselves.

Moreover, as has been noted earlier, the feudal lords were instructed not to render any military assistance to their neighbors, no matter how urgent or serious the situation might be. Obedience to this regulation caused an unexpected difficulty. In 1637, when the Christian uprising at Shimabara was still a local affair, Lord Matsukura, finding that he was not able to cope with it alone, asked neighboring feudal lords to render military assistance. They all refused promptly, saying that if they sent assistance to his state, his castle might be made safe against the Christian forces, but they would be violating the provisions of the Military Constitution, and the shogun might punish them, even to the destruction of their military families. It took more than a month for Matsukura to communicate with the shogunate government at Yedo and receive instructions authorizing military assistance from neighboring feudal lords, and this month enabled the Christians to gain headway and establish themselves at Hara castle.

By the strict enforcement of this provision, Iyeyasu and the succeeding shoguns compelled all the feudal lords to lessen their military strength and required them to use their military power solely for the policing of their respective provinces and districts. In this way, throughout the Tokugawa period, the feudal lords were unable to maintain military strength sufficient to permit of their taking effective action unless they should cooperate with the shogun's army. By means of this arrangement the shogun was successful in separating the feudal lords from one another, so far as their military power was concerned.¹⁵

When Hideyoshi organized the military government, he asked the emperor to appoint him as *Kampaku* (Chief Advisor to the Throne, as well as Prime Minister) instead of appointing him shogun. He always served the emperor as one of the court officials maintaining close associations with the other court no-

bles. He also made all the feudal lords follow his example. During the time of Hideyoshi, the imperial government and the military government as well as the local feudal governments were closely connected and amicably related. In theory, the emperor was the sole ruler of Japan, while Hideyoshi and the other feudal lords were men who took charge of military work on his behalf.

After the Tokugawa shogunate government had been founded in the seventeenth century, Iyeyasu ruled Japan with the title of shogun. Upon establishing his government, Iyeyasu interfered in every possible way with the relations between the emperor and the feudal lords. Although during the first year or two after the foundation of his government, Iyeyasu permitted the feudal lords to send letters of New Year's greeting to the throne, he soon made it a rule that the feudal lords should not send any communications to the emperor or his court. Finally, Iyeyasu not only strictly prohibited the attendance of the feudal lords at the imperial court; he would not allow them to enter the city of Kyoto, or to pass through it. In course of time, moreover, even for a feudal lord to lodge in a city near the imperial capital, such as Fushimi, was considered a grave offense against the shogun. In fact, throughout the Tokugawa period Kyoto, the imperial capital, was completely secluded from the feudal lords.¹⁸


Although the Tokugawa shogunate was founded on the most unnatural and artificial basis, yet it succeeded in ruling Japan for a period of 264 years. The Tokugawa remained in power for so long a period, not because they gave a good administration to the nation, but because the shogunate skillfully framed and enforced the laws of seclusion and segregation of the throne, of the feudal lords, and of Japan itself from foreign nations. In 1867 the shogun surrendered all ruling authority to the throne, thus making it possible for Japan to rise as a new nation under the personal rule of the emperor. The downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate was not brought about by reason of ruinous

administration, but because of changed domestic and world conditions in which the shogun could no longer maintain the segregation and seclusion laws of his forefathers.¹⁷

The first difficulty that confronted the shogun and his government was to maintain the seclusion of the throne. No matter how cautious and clever Iyeyasu was in handling affairs of state, he had to recognize the national tradition of the occupation of the throne by the emperor. He also had to recognize the national tradition according to which the shogun must be appointed by the emperor. Therefore, the shogun was a subject of the emperor. Both legally and politically the emperor was superior to the shogun. However, after the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate by Iyeyasu, whenever the shogunate government and the imperial court came into conflict, the emperor was always forced to bow to the will of the shogun. Moreover, the imperial court had to maintain its existence with the annual allowance provided by the shogun. In this way the relations between the emperor and the shogun were most abnormal. The Tokugawa shogunate was founded upon the "Golden Rule" of Japan: that men of lower rank owed unquestioning obedience to those of higher rank. According to this, the shogun exercised absolute ruling authority over the feudal lords, and they in turn exercised absolute authority over the samurai. The shogun was the only man in Japan who violated this "Golden Rule": he did not recognize the absolute ruling authority of the emperor. It was Mitsukuni, a grandson of Iyeyasu and head of one of the three outstanding Shimpan feudal families, who became dissatisfied with this disloyal and illogical political arrangement. Protesting that although he was obliged to pledge allegiance to the shogun, yet, as a Japanese, he was a loyal subject of the throne,¹⁸ he advocated that every Japanese should revere the throne and recognize the emperor as the supreme authority in Japan.

In the eighteenth century, at the time of the great national renaissance, the relative positions of the emperor and the sho-

gun became increasingly clear. Reverence to the throne then became a nation-wide demand. In 1755, Takenouchi, a great classical and Shinto scholar, became greatly dissatisfied with the existing political relations between emperor and shogun. He protested that although the emperor was the most noble and supreme personage in Japan, the masses knew only how to respect the shogun and did not even know of the existence of the emperor. This unfortunate and unaccountable national condition had come about because, for generation after generation, the emperor and the court nobles were prevented from engaging in intellectual pursuits. Had the emperor and his court nobles taken an interest in humane studies, the masses would naturally have turned toward the emperor and longed for his personal rule, and the shogun would then have been able to take no course except to surrender the ruling authority to the throne. Thus Takenouchi boldly outlined a plan for the imperial restoration. The court nobles were greatly impressed by the personality and views of Takenouchi. He was soon surrounded by young court nobles, who under his guidance eagerly studied the Shinto classics and the history of Japan. The emperor himself began to take a keen interest in classics and history. In 1758 the shogun became alarmed by this new development in the imperial capital, and ordered the military governor of Kyoto to arrest Takenouchi and his followers and exile them from Kyoto. The young court nobles who had been disciples of Takenouchi were severely punished, on the grounds that they had induced the emperor to take an unwise course. The court nobles who held conservative ideas were then requested to reorganize the imperial court. They were especially instructed by the shogun to keep the Shinto classics and books on the national history entirely away from the throne, so that the emperor might not have access to them. Although the subversive movement in Kyoto was checked before it developed a crisis, yet from that time on, reverence to the throne and loyalty to the nation gradually gained ground.²⁸



YOSHINOBU, THE SIXTEENTH AND LAST SHOGUN
(1837-1913)

As the seclusion of the imperial throne became more and more difficult for the shogun to maintain, the policy of shutting off Japan from foreign nations became increasingly difficult because of the steady advances of Russia from the north. As early as 1700 a venturesome Japanese fisherman came into contact with the Russians in Kamchatka and its surrounding waters. In May, 1739, Russian ships appeared near the coast of the Awa district, which was within one hundred miles of Yedo, the military capital of the shogun. In 1785, as a result of an official investigation by the shogunate government, it was found that the Russians had established their settlements on Urup, Etorofu, and other islands in the Kuriles. In May, 1792, a Russian ship came to Nemuro in Yezo and asked for trade privileges. Two months later, Russia sent an envoy to Yezo, whom the representatives of the shogun interviewed at Matsumaye in Yezo. In 1804 Russia sent an envoy and his party to Nagasaki in accordance with the agreement of 1792. Russia made an official demand that Japan should be reopened to trade. Thus did Russia make an attempt to reopen Japan exactly half a century before Commodore Perry succeeded. In 1853 Perry came to Uraga with a squadron of four war vessels and demanded that Japan be reopened. In the same year the Russian envoy, Putiatin, came to Nagasaki with a squadron of four war vessels and made a like demand. Immediately after Japan had thus been threatened by the United States and by Russia in the same year, the shogun repealed the law limiting armaments,²⁰ and the feudal lords were requested to increase their fighting strength to their full financial ability.

In 1854 the law requiring the seclusion of Japan from foreign nations was abandoned in consequence of the conclusion of the treaty of good will and friendship with the United States of America. In 1862 the shogun allowed the feudal lords to abandon their family residences at the military capital of the shogun and to take their families back to their respective provincial districts. In the same year the Mori and Shimazu, two

of the outstanding feudal families of the Tozama class, entirely disregarded the provisions of the Military Constitution and stationed their troops at Kyoto, the imperial capital. Four months later, the Yamanouchi, another powerful feudal family of the Tozama class, stationed its troops in Kyoto as an imperial guard in compliance with the imperial request. Thus did these three Tozama feudal lords practically start the work of the imperial restoration. In 1862 the segregation and seclusion of the feudal lords came to an end.²¹ In January, 1864, Iyemochi, the fourteenth shogun, went to the imperial court and laid before the throne the plan known as "The Eighteen Articles Regarding Reverence to the Throne and to the Imperial Court." According to the provisions of these "Eighteen Articles," the shogun promised that all feudal lords should be instructed to present themselves at the imperial court immediately upon succeeding to the headship of their family lines, and that they should also present themselves at court when receiving imperial appointments to official positions and ranks. The shogun also promised that he would refrain from interfering with the entrance of the feudal lords into the imperial capital with the privilege of visiting the imperial court. Moreover, he promised that he would thenceforth make provision for the emperor, making it possible for the latter to take outings from the imperial palace about twice a year, once in the spring and once in the autumn, so that he might familiarize himself with conditions outside his walls. The shogun stated that thenceforth he would make provision for the sons and daughters of the ruling emperor, so that it would not be necessary for them to enter Buddhist monasteries and nunneries to become priests or nuns, as had been the established usage. Thus by 1864 the practice of secluding the throne and the imperial family and court was abandoned.²² In 1867, thirteen years after the repeal of the law requiring the seclusion of Japan from foreign nations, five years after the abandonment of the practice of the segregation of the feudal lords, and three years after the abandonment of the practice of

the seclusion of the throne and the imperial court, the fifteenth shogun, Yoshinobu, finding his position untenable, surrendered all ruling authority to the throne, and requested that the Emperor Meiji rule the empire in person. Thus did the Tokugawa shogunate come to an end after having ruled Japan for a period of 264 years.²³ At the same time, feudalism (the dual form of government) came to an end and the people were again placed under the direct rule of the emperor, after the throne had been deprived of the ruling authority for 675 years.

CHAPTER V

The National Transformation and the Great Literary and Classical Renaissance

IN 607, IN THE REIGN of the Empress Suiko, Japan, for the first time in her history, sent a national envoy to the imperial court of Sui, thus entering into direct relations with China. From that time on, she sent her young men in ever-increasing numbers to be educated in schools and colleges in China. In the second half of the seventh century, in the reign of Tenchi, the thirty-eighth emperor, Japan adopted Chinese laws and codes and introduced the Chinese school system.¹ In the eighth century, a national college and provincial schools were established; and in the ninth, a number of private schools. In the second half of the ninth century, especially after Japan had discontinued relations with China, the literature and art of Japan began to develop independently of China.² Japan then entered into her golden age of literature and classics. At the same time, the Fujiwara political monopoly was originated. It brought about, by reason of its maladministration, a period of national suffering of approximately two hundred and fifty years. In the second half of the twelfth century, Japan entered upon a period of militarism. With the subsequent completion of the feudal government, in the thirteenth century, the arts of war predominated. Colleges and schools were abandoned and closed, one after another. In the fourteenth century, with the founding of the Ashikaga shogunate, Japan entered upon a period of war which finally brought about the "Dark Age." During the Ashikaga period of 236 years, ending in 1574, the Ashikaga school in eastern Japan was the only educational institution in the country.³ Though it was called a school, it was nothing but a library which contained a fair collection of books on Chinese literature, history, and classics. It was provided with study

rooms and sleeping quarters. Its sole purpose was to make it possible for Buddhist priests and other men of intellectual inclinations to pursue their studies. During the Oda and Toyotomi periods, although peace was restored and national unification effected, profound ignorance nevertheless prevailed among both the ruled and the ruling classes.

In 1603, the Tokugawa shogunate was founded. Its founder, Iyeyasu, was strongly inclined to turn the national tendency from the long-predominating military spirit to literary pursuits, in order that lasting peace and prosperity might be attained through cultural development. In the first year of the Genwa era (Genna era), 1615, with the annihilation of the Toyotomi family at Osaka, the future of the Tokugawa shogunate was assured. Iyeyasu was then recognized as the supreme authority in Japan. He announced the *Genwa Yenbu*⁴ ("Policy of the Suppression of Militarism in the Genwa Era"). He then enforced throughout Japan a limitation of armaments.

In Article 1 of the Military Constitution which was promulgated in 1615, Iyeyasu stipulated that all military lords should place equal weight upon military and literary pursuits, as their safe and prosperous existence was wholly dependent upon successful attainments in both these fields; nevertheless, he ordered all the feudal lords to destroy their strongholds and fortresses, and allowed them to retain only residence castles or mansions that had certain military facilities. Feudal lords who showed marked interest in military matters by improving their fighting power were dealt with as traitors.

After the national unification had been accomplished and peace and order established, the Tokugawa shogunate made it a fundamental policy to divert people of all classes from military to literary undertakings.⁵ Iyeyasu himself took the initiative, setting an example by searching out and collecting standard Chinese and Japanese literary and historical works that had been scattered about during the period of war. He started this work as early as 1599. By 1614, his archives contained all the

necessary documents and valuable historical and classical texts; and he ordered that some of the more important texts be reprinted for public distribution. The three outstanding Shimpan feudal lords—of Owari, of Kishu, and of Mito,—who were the three favorite sons of Iyeyasu, followed the example set by their father. They invited noted scholars to their respective provinces, where they established schools. Other powerful feudal lords pursued a similar course by establishing schools and providing educational facilities for their people.⁶

All scholars who were versed in the Japanese classics always fostered in their work an admiration for the Tokugawa rule, and loyalty to it. However, the organization of the Tokugawa shogunate and the ruling authority of the shogun were exceptions to the principles expounded in the national classics and historical texts of Japan. To owe unquestioning obedience to persons in the next superior order was the "Golden Rule" of the Tokugawa. The practice of it by everyone inferior to the shogun made possible his exercise of absolute authority. He himself, however, disregarded his relation of obedience to the emperor. He was thus the only person in Japan who violated the rule; but because of the ignorance generally obtaining, and because Iyeyasu defined the standing of the emperor to suit himself and his government, the political and social relations between emperor and shogun were not clear, and neither the people of the ruling class nor of the ruled were aware of the violation. The national classics and the historical texts expounded the divine virtue and the supreme imperial authority of the ruling emperors, and praised and admired the glorious imperial rules of the past; and taught, moreover, that the shogun was a subject of the emperor. Nevertheless, the shogunate government rendered all possible assistance and protection to men of scholarly attainments; and men of literary inclination urged yet further research in the national classics and historical works without foreseeing the possible outcome.⁷

The policies and transactions of Iyeyasu in dealing with the

throne and the imperial court are variously interpreted. It is said by some that he held the throne in highest reverence; by others, that he looked down upon the emperor and his court, slighting them in all possible ways. These are partial and prejudiced views. Iyeyasu and his government did not regard the throne and the imperial court as a single unit. He dealt with the emperor in a way that took into consideration the national sentiment which would be aroused by his treatment of the throne and its possible effects upon the Tokugawa. Iyeyasu feared, on the one hand, that if the shogun and his government should render adoration and respect to the throne, the emperor might become the center of reverence and influence in Japan; on the other hand, if the emperor should be subjected to oppression by the shogun, the sympathy of the nation might be turned toward the emperor. Iyeyasu therefore devised the plan of imperial segregation and seclusion. He ranked the emperor as a divine being and apparently paid the highest reverence to him. He elevated the imperial court so high above the human world that the people might not approach it because it was so sacred. He then deprived the emperor of all ruling authority as well as of all rights and privileges, and of all duties and obligations to the people. Thus were the throne and the imperial court completely segregated from all national affairs and governmental undertakings. Iyeyasu then caused the people to believe that the personal interests and affairs of the emperor were not to be humanly comprehended.

It is somewhat of a historical mystery that a man like Iyeyasu, who had both caution and foresight, failed to see that encouragement of literary pursuits might lead to a great national renaissance, and that in turn the renaissance might bring about a movement for loyalty to the throne. In fact, the *Genwa Yenbu* doctrine made it impossible for the shogun to maintain the policy of imperial segregation.⁸ The termination of segregation brought about the imperial restoration in 1868.

The national renaissance was not the sole cause of the move-

ment for loyalty to the throne and for the imperial restoration. Nevertheless, because of the renaissance, the people realized that the political and social relations between emperor and shogun were those of ruler and subject; also, that the benefits of the practice of the "Golden Rule" should extend to the throne; and hence the national renaissance in the eighteenth century was a vital national force, without a comprehensive knowledge of which the development of the movement for loyalty to the throne and its subsequent ending in the imperial restoration of 1868 cannot be properly traced.⁹

In the second half of the sixteenth century, when the period of war had come to an end and national unification had been effected, Japan had begun to turn her attention to affairs abroad. From that time on, the national energy and activities had been given over entirely to trade abroad, and to trade with foreigners who came to Japan for that purpose. These great trade undertakings were suppressed and abandoned with the rise of the Tokugawa shogunate. All national activities were forcibly retained within the confines of the small island empire. It was natural, then, in view of political and social conditions, for the Japanese to turn their attention and energy toward cultural and literary pursuits. At this very time, Iyeyasu promulgated his *Genwa Yenbu* doctrine ("Doctrine of the Suppression of Militarism"). In order to awaken and further literary and other cultural undertakings, he adopted four measures:

- (1) To establish schools and libraries.
- (2) To encourage and protect men of intellectual attainments, and to appoint some of them to government positions.
- (3) To collect books, documents, and manuscripts.
- (4) To print books in order to facilitate education.¹⁰

As early as 1601, Iyeyasu founded a school at Fushimi, a suburb of Kyoto. In 1602, a library with good working facilities that contained numerous works in Chinese classics, history, and philosophy, as well as standard works, was established in the Yedo castle. In 1630, a college was founded at Yedo and a temple

was built in honor of Confucius. Iyeyasu had ever-increasing success in gathering books on various subjects, and ordered that some of the rare ones be duplicated by making copies of the originals. In those days, Japan possessed large quantities of metallic movable type, which Hideyoshi's invading army had obtained in Korea in the sixteenth century and had brought to Japan as a war prize. Iyeyasu had hundreds of thousands of movable wooden types made after the Korean models. Later, he also had a great quantity made from copper. After he had thus provided for printing facilities, numerous standard Chinese and Japanese books were reprinted. As in the Renaissance in Europe, type played an important part in the renaissance in Japan.²¹

All the feudal lords, especially those of the powerful Shimpan and Tozama classes, vied with one another in assisting noted scholars and in establishing schools. These undertakings in literary and cultural pursuits had a marked effect on Japan. In the second half of the seventeenth century there was already a great number of scholars who were rendering valuable service in the uplifting of the nation. Even at the present time the following²² are still respected and revered in memory as men of outstanding scholarly attainments:

Keisai Asami (1652-1711)	Shunsai Hayashi (1618-1680)
Jinsai Ito (1627-1705)	Kei-Chu (1660-1701)
Junan Kinoshita (1622-1698)	Kigin Kitamura (1624-1705)
Hanzan Kumazawa (1619-1691)	Toju Nakaye (1608-1658)
Yekken Kaibara (1636-1714)	Kenzan Nonaka (1615-1663)
Mitsukuni Tokugawa (1628-1700)	Soko Yamaga (1622-1685)
Ansai Yamasaki (1618-1682)	Tadatari Yoshikawa (1616-1694)

In the middle of the seventeenth century, in consequence of faithful adherence to the *Genwa Yenbu* doctrine of Iyeyasu, the Tokugawa shogunate placed great stress upon the study of the Chinese classics and literature. The entire nation devoted itself to the study of the ethico-political teachings of Confucius,

of Chinese history and laws, and of Chinese philosophy, disregarding Japanese works entirely. Because the Japanese scholars of those days were ardent admirers of things Chinese, and because the shogunate government encouraged respect and reverence for the philosophy of the Sung period, the scholars of the Sung school were regarded as representatives of the shogunate government and were therefore able to exercise arbitrary power in the intellectual world. Intellectual freedom became generally sought after. As a result, in the second half of the seventeenth century, ancient and medieval schools of Chinese philosophy were studied intensively.

Moreover, the study of Shinto texts and of the national classics and the history of Japan was revived.¹³ With the advance of intellectual pursuits, the Japanese became more and more philosophically inclined. The study of Shinto was undertaken, by some, with emphasis upon its ethical and philosophical aspects. Japan then entered upon the period of the Shinto revival, as well as that of the national renaissance. Shinto was originally a semireligious teaching in Japan. The divine souls of the emperors, the empresses, and the imperial princes, whose lives were inseparably connected with the founding and development of the empire, and the souls of the statesmen and soldiers who had rendered distinguished service to the throne and to the nation, were worshiped as Shinto gods and goddesses. Consequently, Shintoism became—as it still is—a national teaching closely connected with the throne and the imperial family.

In 1639, when Christianity was exterminated in Japan and the people were prohibited from embracing that "evil religion" under penalty of death, the shogunate government found it necessary that the people should be devoted to one particular religion as evidence that they were not Christians. But Shintoism was not selected.

In those days, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism were the three great teachings in Japan. Contrary to its development in China and Korea, Confucianism in Japan did not develop

any other teaching than the ethico-political system as originally expounded by Confucius. Consequently, Confucianism was not regarded as a religion. By reason of its long connection with the throne and the imperial family, the shogunate government feared that if Shintoism should be recognized as the national religion, and all Japanese thereby forced to embrace it, the imperial influence and power over the people would be greatly augmented.¹⁴ Iyemitsu, the third shogun, therefore announced that Buddhism was the only religion that was recognized by the nation. He caused all classes of people, both ruling and ruled, to join one or another of the Buddhist sects and thereby to seek Buddhist salvation. He not only refused to recognize Shintoism as a religion, but even declined to acknowledge it as an independent teaching; he made it subordinate to Buddhism. In those days, indeed, when a Shinto priest died, he was buried in accordance with Buddhist rites, and with Buddhist priests officiating.

Shintoism, which had been thus despised because of its connection with the throne during the early part of the seventeenth century, became one of the essential studies in the latter half of the century, thereby even threatening the security of the shogunate. That is, before and after the Genroku era (1688–1704), when the great national renaissance was at its peak, many distinguished scholars laid a foundation for the revival of the study of the national classics, of national history, and of Shintoism. Through the study of national classics, the Japanese learned of the glory and splendor of their nation under the imperial rule in the past. From the study of national history, they learned of the rise and fall of many ruling families and, at the same time, began to appreciate that the sacredness of the imperial throne and of the imperial family had made it possible for the emperors to continue to reign without being affected by national disturbances and changes in the ruling power. Naturally, they began to understand the relative positions of the emperor, the shogun, and the feudal lords. Through the study of

Shintoism, the Japanese became convinced that they were subjects of the throne both politically and spiritually. Thus, in consequence of the national renaissance, the movement for loyalty to the throne was revived.¹⁵

When Iyemitsu ruled Japan, in the seventeenth century, the Tokugawa shogunate attained its greatest authority. The Military Constitution and all the laws and practices of seclusion and segregation were in perfect working order. The isolation of the emperor and his court and their segregation from human affairs, as well as the alienation of the people from the throne, became complete. The belief that the emperor, the imperial families, and the court nobles were a class of beings who maintained their existence high up in the clouds of heaven was generally accepted. Naturally, the existence of the emperor in the human world was a fact practically unrecognized by the people. In consequence, it was generally believed that the practices of loyalty and patriotism which are exercised exclusively toward human beings should not be rendered to the emperor, who lived in heaven.¹⁶ With the steady augmentation of the strength and authority of the Tokugawa shogunate, and the decline of the emperor's power, the existence of the shogun was emphasized in every feature of the national life. People of all classes vied with one another in doing reverence to him and in serving his government. Some of the government historians even went so far as to rewrite the history of Japan to suit the purposes of the shogun. In the histories that they wrote, it was stated that the founder of the imperial family was a royal prince of China who had fled to Japan, and that his descendants had founded the Japanese empire. In denoting Iyeyasu, the term *Shinkun* or *Tai Shinkun* was used, which means "The Great Lord of Divine Power and Origin." In this way, historians of the Tokugawa government asserted that Iyeyasu was the incarnation of a god who appeared in Japan in order to restore peace and to save the people, thereby making Japan the most prosperous and glorious nation in the world. Likewise, the shogun was

known by the term *Tenka Sama*, which means "The Only Supreme Lord Who Possesses Absolute Ruling Authority under Heaven."¹⁷ While the national affairs of Japan were thus being conducted so gloriously and satisfactorily, from the standpoint of the Tokugawa shogunate, in consequence of the *Genwa Yenbu* doctrine, Japan entered into the period of the great national renaissance. Some of the men of intellectual ability gradually came to comprehend that the national condition in which a military family ruled the empire, setting aside the emperor, was both abnormal and contrary to the fundamental principles of the national organization.

With this change in the thought and beliefs of Japan, in the second half of the seventeenth century, the ancient practice of reverence for the throne and loyalty to it was gradually revived.¹⁸ A scholar, Yamasaki (1618-82), eminent in Chinese classics and philosophy, wrote a book in which he protested against the statements made by Tokugawa historians in their works; he emphasized the belief that Japan was the divine nation, founded by imperial ancestors of divine origin, and that she therefore had national doctrines and practices originated by the imperial ancestors and handed down to their descendants, these doctrines and practices being entirely independent of those in China. Later, Yamasaki expounded the Shinto traditional teachings with emphasis upon their ethical and philosophical aspects. He thus laid the foundations of the Shinto revival of a later century, on the one hand, while on the other he aimed at impressing upon his fellow scholars that Japan should be ruled by the emperor in person. Another scholar, Asami, pursued a similar course. Although, in accordance with the practice of the time, Asami had to recognize the ruling authority of the shogun, he was always reluctant to have Japan under the military rule of the Tokugawa shogunate. Asami therefore stayed away from Yedo, the military capital. He also continually refused to serve any of the feudal lords, on the grounds that lordship had been granted them by the Tokugawa

without the knowledge of the emperor. Asami wrote a book entitled *Seiken Igen* in which he gave a full account of statesmen and military men who had been distinguished for their patriotism and loyalty, thereby emphasizing that the duty of the people was to be loyal to the throne and to cultivate a spirit of patriotism. His sole aim was to interest his fellow scholars in the task of inculcating these virtues in the people.¹⁹

Mitsukuni Tokugawa (1628–1700), one of the most notable men in Japan in the seventeenth century, was a man of great scholarly attainments, especially in Japanese classics and history, and of noble principles and sound judgment. Despite the fact that he was a grandson of Iyeyasu, and second lord of the Mito, which was one of the three distinguished Shimpan feudal families, he deeply lamented that the imperial power and the imperial court were steadily receding into obscurity, in striking contrast with the advance of the Tokugawa shogunate. He concluded that the policy of the shogunate which estranged the people from the throne and caused them to refrain from doing reverence to the emperor and giving him their loyalty was contrary to the sacred national traditions as well as to the fundamental principles upon which the Empire of Japan had been founded. In order to awaken a national consciousness among the people, he erected a monument on the spot where Masashige Kusunoki had died for the cause of the throne in the fourteenth century. This monument bears the following inscription: "In memory of Masashige Kusunoki, great patriot and loyal subject of the Emperor, who died nobly for the cause of the throne." The Kusunoki family was noted for its loyal and patriotic service to the Emperor Godaigo. During the half-century beginning in 1334, when the emperor temporarily effected the imperial restoration, Masashige and his brother and sons fought bravely for the cause of the throne until their family was exterminated. Since the time of Mitsukuni, this Kusunoki monument has been an object of inspiration and an incitement to patriotism and loyalty to the throne.²⁰

Mitsukuni concluded that the most essential and effective piece of work necessary for the correction of the national policy and for the guidance of the nation would be to give the people a reliable history of Japan. In 1657 he established in his local feudal government a Bureau of History, in which several noted scholars were appointed to membership. They were sent to all parts of Japan to gather historical documents and other material. It is said that Mitsukuni set aside approximately one-third of the annual revenue from his province for this undertaking. The history thus prepared is entitled *Dai Nihon-Shi* ("The History of Great Japan"). It consists of about three hundred volumes. Although the most essential part of it was finished within the lifetime of Mitsukuni, yet the *Dai Nihon-Shi* was not completed until the latter part of the nineteenth century, thus requiring nearly two hundred years to write. It was the most elaborate work of scholarship ever produced in Japan. The throne and the imperial rule are its center of interest. All the historical events and personal acts of statesmen and soldiers, as well as their contributions to the throne and the nation, were verified by documentary evidence. Mitsukuni and his staff showed remarkably clear, bold, and unbiased judgment. They pointed out the right and the wrong, the loyalty and disloyalty of all men who had been connected historically in one way or another with the growth of the nation and with the welfare of the throne. Mitsukuni also compiled a work of one hundred and fifty volumes in which all the imperial rites and court ceremonials, for a period of approximately one thousand years, were classified and described in detail. This work was written with the purpose of illustrating how the throne and the imperial court were inseparably connected with human affairs and interests. He also compiled a work of thirty volumes in which all standard national poems and pieces of literature that praised and expressed admiration for the imperial virtues and the imperial rule were embodied. This work was prepared for the purpose of showing how the emperor and the people were

closely related, by the throne's loving protection of the people, and the people's reverent loyalty to the emperor.²¹

The fact that Mitsukuni, through his historical, literary, and other works, inspired the people to revere the throne is evidenced by the imperial eulogy given Mitsukuni by the Emperor Meiji. In November, 1900, two hundred years after the death of Mitsukuni, and thirty-two years after the imperial restoration, Meiji, the 122d emperor, and founder of New Japan, passed through Hidachi, the home province of Mitsukuni. As the emperor was deeply impressed by the loyalty and patriotism of Mitsukuni, he issued an imperial edict addressed to his departed soul. This edict eulogized Mitsukuni as follows:

"You, Mitsukuni, early in your life were greatly grieved because of the rapid decline of the Imperial Power and the increasing obscurity of the Throne. You also feared the possible consequences of the growth of the arbitrary attitude of the Ruling Military Family. You therefore endeavored, first of all, to clarify the moral and political relations of individuals to one another, taking the Throne as the center of reverence. You succeeded in turning the national tendencies into right and just channels. By means of historical and literary works, you severely criticized the men of yore for their actions relative to the Throne and to the Nation. You thereby made the men of your time differentiate between right and wrong and also between loyalty and disloyalty. You praised and upheld the men who held to the right and loyal cause and you inflicted moral punishment upon those men who were disloyal and selfish. You thus taught the men of your generation to lead upright and loyal lives. You proved to be the originator of the movement for reverence and loyalty to the Throne, thus making of yourself a wise forerunner of the Imperial Restoration of 1868. I am now in your province of Hidachi. Being greatly impressed and gratified by your creditable accomplishments in the cause of the Throne, I hereby confer the rank of Sho Ichi-I²² upon your departed soul."²³

Although the Tokugawa shogunate was founded in 1603, it was not until the rule of Iyemitsu, the third shogun, that the organization of the shogunate was completed as had been originally planned by Iyeyasu; specifically, not until 1632, when Iyemitsu made all the Tozama feudal lords recognize the shogun's arbitrary and absolute ruling power. Iyemitsu died in 1651. He was the ablest ruler among all the fifteen Tokugawa shoguns. He exercised absolute authority and demanded unquestioning obedience from people of all classes. Nevertheless, he ruled wisely and well and the nation enjoyed peace and prosperity.²⁴

Yamasaki, Mitsukuni, and Asami, the forerunners of the imperial restoration, entered upon their activities in the latter part of the seventeenth century, when the people were well satisfied and a change from the Tokugawa administration was not even dreamed of. The three scholars, though they upheld the imperial cause, bore no malice toward the shogun, and neither opposed nor criticized the administration and policies of the shogunate. In fact, they recognized the "Golden Rule" of the Tokugawa. At the same time, they were convinced that the benefits of this rule should be extended to the throne. Yet they were not aggressive in advocating their principles, but appealed in a scholarly and quiet way to intellectual men; by means of their historical and literary works they clarified the concept of national organization, together with the relations of all the individuals to one another, taking the throne as the center of ruling authority in the nation. They concluded that although the emperors were both holy and sacred in their persons, yet, as national histories bore evidence, the maintenance of their existence as if they were in heaven, far away from human affairs, had not been the imperial practice in previous times.

Yamasaki, Mitsukuni, and Asami were not revolutionaries; they were expounders of ancient national practices. They were not agitators; they were original thinkers. The author of an original thought often exercises a more far-reaching and more

effective influence upon the national life of his country than does a conqueror in many battles. So it was with Yamasaki and Mitsukuni of Japan in the latter part of the seventeenth century.

Ansai Yamasaki was a man of great scholarly attainments, but neither a statesman possessing genius nor yet a man of constructive ability. He was a deep thinker, full of energy and power.²⁵ He was also bold and fearless in expounding and advocating his beliefs. However, when he turned his thoughts toward the proper national organization of Japan and the exaltation of the throne, he probably did not expect to find so many ardent adherents for his cause, nor to be regarded later as one of the promoters of the imperial restoration—as he was regarded after his death.

The national renaissance was started exclusively by a profound but one-sided study of Chinese classics and philosophy, combined with a great admiration for things Chinese. But with intellectual and cultural advance, men of scholarly attainments became more inclined toward nationalism; and so, in the second half of the seventeenth century, when Yamasaki, Mitsukuni, and Asami became prominent in their efforts in support of exaltation of the throne, such men as Sorai and his followers, who had revered and admired China as the great cultural center of the world, and who had looked down upon their own country (Japan) as a barbarous state in the Eastern Sea, gradually lost ground. Although even after the rise of this new national tendency Chinese classics and other literary works were studied, the purpose of this study was merely to bring about individual and national benefits. At the same time, the national classics and histories, and the Shinto texts, were studied with more interest. With the progress of research in national history and the classics, the origin and organization of the Empire of Japan, as well as loyalty to the throne and the moral relations of individuals to one another, become more clearly understood. As a matter of course, men of intellectual attain-

ments gradually came to realize that the dual form of government, by which the emperor was placed outside of national affairs, was both abnormal and contrary to the fundamental principles of the traditional national organization of Japan.²⁶

This new national tendency developed as a result of political theory and not by reason of dissatisfaction with the rule of the shogun. Although Mitsukuni was the most powerful and influential of the three who favored the restoration of power to the emperor, he fully recognized the ruling authority of the shogun and rendered unquestioning obedience to him. It is therefore hard to decide whether Mitsukuni was a pro-emperor or a pro-shogun man. The point of his emphasis was that the practice of the "Golden Rule" should not terminate with the shogun, but should extend to the throne. Mitsukuni, in his history and his other works, aimed at convincing his fellow men that reverence should be paid to the throne. Yamasaki, in *Kasui Shinto*, which he originated, attempted to propagate reverence for the throne. In *Seiken Igen*, Asami (1652-1711) emphasized this also, as well as patriotism. Yet all these works were merely an outcome of scholarly research. The three scholars announced their findings fearlessly and uprightly after years of painstaking labor, without criticism of the administration and policies of the shogun. Their attitude was sincere and straightforward; their work was done quite independently of politics, and they did not foster any ambitions for self-aggrandizement. Therefore, the shogunate government had no grounds for interfering with their undertaking. As a matter of fact, Mitsukuni presented his history and other works both to the throne and to the shogun, and received approval and appreciation from each. But although these publications were apparently of no political importance, they had a marked effect upon the national life and the attitude of the people.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, that is, half a century after the deaths of Yamasaki, Mitsukuni, and Asami, their works were becoming more and more influential.²⁷ At that

time, Shikibu Takenouchi (1712-67), Daiji Yamagata (1725-67), and Umon Fujii (1720-67) became the champions of the throne. They did not devote themselves to writing books to expound their doctrines, as the three champions of the seventeenth century had done; they actually started working for the cause of the throne. Thus was the movement for the imperial restoration begun.²⁸

Shikibu Takenouchi was a man of principle and of magnetic power. Though he was well versed in both Shintoism and Confucianism, he was an educator rather than a scholar. In 1728, while he was still a mere youth, he went to Kyoto and made his home there. Yamasaki and Asami were then no longer living; but he was greatly influenced by their followers and disciples. He was greatly inspired by the Suika Shinto doctrines originated by Yamasaki, and he also admired and valued the teachings in patriotism and loyalty expounded by Asami in his work, *Seiken Igen*. Takenouchi read a great many books that had connection with the doctrines of Yamasaki and Asami. He naturally became inspired with loyalty and reverence for the throne, and deeply lamented the decline and obscurity of the imperial authority. While in Kyoto, Takenouchi made his home with Tokudaiji, who, though young, was an eminent court official. He became acquainted with young and ambitious court nobles. He preached to them on Suika Shinto, using as his text the *Chronicles of Japan*, the sacred Shinto books published in the seventh century. He also discussed patriotism and loyalty, basing his lectures on Asami's *Seiken Igen*.²⁹

Takenouchi was the first "imperialist" and nationalist who actually started to work against the policies and administration of the Tokugawa shogunate and openly advocated the imperial restoration. In this respect, the Takenouchi movement is regarded historically as one of the most important national events of the Tokugawa rule. Although based upon the teachings of Yamasaki and Asami, the doctrine developed by Takenouchi was practically his own. It was centered around the relation of

sovereign and subject, and reverent loyalty to the throne. Judging by his demonstrations and discourses, Takenouchi made it his ultimate purpose to eliminate the shogun and his government and thereby to effect the imperial restoration. He stated emphatically that the emperor was the direct lineal descendant of the Sun Goddess and possessed of divine virtue and of a supreme authority which set him distinctly apart from human beings. He came into this world with the destiny of ruling the nation in person; and hence it was that under the old imperial rule Japan had enjoyed a peaceful and happy existence, its ethical relations being admirably maintained, and the people well provided with food, clothing, and housing. People had deemed it a privilege to render reverence and loyalty to the throne, and to evince a readiness to serve the throne even to fighting against their parents, their brothers, and their sons, should these fail to render unquestioning obedience to the emperor. Because every individual was born into the world of his forebears, who, generation after generation, had enjoyed the benefits of the imperial rule and of its protection, which had made it possible for the family to maintain its continuous existence, therefore in the old days no individual had considered that his body and soul, any more than his possessions, even to a single sheet of paper or a piece of wood, were his own, but that they were things under the imperial control and were at the disposal of the throne. No other nation in the world could duplicate the organization and traditions of imperial Japan, where the throne was always occupied by an emperor of one and the same dynasty, who was the linear descendant of the Sun Goddess, and who gave a most glorious and righteous rule, and whom not only human beings but even the animals, the birds, the trees, and the plants revered as their sovereign, their father, and the source of blessings.

Basing his teachings upon the Suika Shinto of Yamasaki, and the loyalty and patriotism advocated by Asami in his book, Takenouchi developed and expounded nationalism and patriot-

ism as centered upon the throne.³⁰ Takenouchi continually referred to the "days of yore" when emperor and people were harmoniously and inseparably related, and when the empire had enjoyed a glorious existence. He lamented the conditions that existed in his time, saying that because of the national degeneration the mass of the people knew only of the shogun and did not even know that they were ruled by the emperor. In fact, the majority of them did not even know of the existence of the emperor. Japan had come to this lamentable condition because the emperor and the court nobles had long been prevented from acquiring intellectual and cultural training, and because they had been deprived thereby of all opportunity to cultivate the virtues necessary for the ruling of the empire; and hence the most essential thing to be done was that the emperor and the court nobles should devote themselves to learning and to the cultivation of virtue so that the emperor might become the center of national reverence and reliance. He said that the imperial restoration would then be accomplished automatically and peaceably. He further said that success gained through military force was always temporary, as it was sure to be lost in another struggle, and therefore that military undertakings in the imperial cause should be avoided.

Takenouchi then presented his plan in detail, stating that if the emperor and the eminent officials in his court, such as the Supreme Advisor to the Throne and the state ministers, should complete their education and practice the five standard human virtues—benevolence, propriety, righteousness, wisdom, and truth—and if affection and filial piety between parents and children, protection and loyalty between sovereign and subjects, peace and order between elder and younger, initiative by the husband and coöperation by the wife, and trust and confidence between friends might be thereby maintained, individual and social relations would be ideal and the mass of the people would praise the imperial virtue and would express their desire for the personal rule of the emperor. Under such circumstances

the shogun would voluntarily surrender his ruling authority to the throne. Then the imperial restoration might be peaceably accomplished through the grace of Heaven and the divine souls of the departed emperors.

Takenouchi's sole ambition was to work for the cause in a just and upright way and to leave the consequences to the will of Heaven.³¹ He soon became a center of respect and admiration, and wielded great influence over people of various classes. The most ardent disciples of his doctrine were to be found among the young court nobles who were the personal attendants of the emperor and who therefore enjoyed the trust and confidence of the throne.

Momozono, the 116th emperor, was then the ruling sovereign of Japan. He had ascended the throne when he was scarcely six years of age. This emperor was a man of remarkable personality. He was very ambitious and took an interest in everything, showing genius and ability in many ways. While he was still a mere boy, he determined to gain learning so that he might fit himself to be an able successor to his forefathers. He was but fourteen years old when he heard of the Suika Shinto, originated by Yamasaki. He instructed his personal attendants to investigate its teachings and report their findings to the throne. He was but sixteen when Takenouchi became an eminent figure in Kyoto and he had an opportunity to learn the latter's doctrine. At first, he studied secretly the *Chronicles of Japan* (the old Shinto sacred books, generally known as the *Shinsho*) as reference texts to Takenouchi's doctrine, as well as to the Suika Shinto teachings. He then entered into discussion with his personal court attendants who were Takenouchi's ardent disciples. It soon became an open secret in the imperial court that the emperor was interested in the new teachings.³² This departure from tradition on the part of the emperor—in taking up the study of history and of the sacred books, with commentaries that made reference to the ruling of the nation—alarmed court nobles of high rank and conservative ideas. They feared

that this new attitude might be troublesome to the shogunate government; and they concluded, especially the Supreme Advisor to the Throne, that the trouble should be ended before it could develop further, and that therefore Takenouchi should be done away with. So, in the name of the Supreme Advisor to the Throne, the matter was presented to the office of the military governor of Kyoto. He was asked to punish Takenouchi because he had been exercising undue influence upon young court nobles and had made them dissatisfied with the relations between the imperial court and the shogunate government. On December 22, 1756, Takenouchi was arrested. After an investigation lasting three days, the military governor of Kyoto released him for lack of evidence that either his association with the court nobles, or his teachings and doctrines, constituted any crime against throne or shogun.³³ As Takenouchi's residence at Kyoto was not prohibited, he was able to carry on his teachings without interference.

After the release of Takenouchi on December 25, the activities of young court nobles and their relations to Takenouchi underwent radical changes.³⁴ They no longer kept secret the fact that they were his disciples. Karasumaru, Tokudaiji, and others of the young court nobles who enjoyed the confidence and trust of the throne declared their faith in his doctrine. At his suggestion, they brought texts in Japanese and Chinese history before the throne and interpreted them. The emperor became so deeply interested in this kind of study that he began to take a part in the discussions. In 1757 they selected the *Shiki*, a standard history of China, as the text to be studied. The young and ambitious court nobles thus actually started the work of cultural and ethical training. They enthusiastically believed that the long-hoped-for opportunity for the imperial restoration had come. Greatly encouraged by this unexpected opening, Takenouchi gave a series of lectures to them on special subjects selected from standard Chinese and Japanese histories, from the *Shinto Books of Divinity*, from *Seiken Igen*, and from

the *Four Books* and the *Five Classics*.³⁵ In his lectures, he carefully refrained from criticizing the policies and administration of the Tokugawa shogunate, and from commenting upon the attitude and personality of the shogun.³⁶ Nevertheless, he not only gave explanations of conditions in ancient times as recorded in the texts, but also compared with them the helpless situation of the throne and of the imperial court in his time. He also discussed at length the causes and effects of peace and of war, together with the rise and fall of ruling families. He thus aroused in his hearers a longing for the imperial rule of yore, and fostered a desire for the imperial restoration.³⁷ Upon returning to the imperial court, those court nobles presented to the throne their carefully taken lecture notes, and sometimes they inquired of Takenouchi which were the best books to read and what was the best method of study. At other times, Takenouchi prepared syllabi of his doctrines and also of standard works, which he presented to the court nobles in order that they might use the material in their discussions before the throne.³⁸ Takenouchi, who had no recognized rank or title, might not present himself before the throne, but the emperor could learn of the doctrines and plans of Takenouchi as if he were his disciple, by making arrangements through the court nobles. The emperor thereby came to admire and to value the personality and attainments of Takenouchi.

The rapid changes in conditions around the throne alarmed Konoye, Ichijo, Kujo, and other elderly court nobles of high official rank.³⁹ They gained the strong support of the empress mother of the ruling emperor. They severely upbraided and censured the young court nobles who had taken advantage of the imperial trust in advocating the doctrines of Takenouchi. They even pleaded with the emperor and urged him to discontinue his studies in Japanese and Chinese history, especially in the *Shinsho*. By reason of the strong pressure thus brought upon him, the emperor reluctantly agreed.⁴⁰ Although Konoye and other elderly court nobles strongly urged him to discon-

tinue his studies, Tokudaiji and others of the younger court nobles approached the throne and appealed to him to reconsider. Finally, the emperor again took up his study of the *Shinsho*.⁴¹ The Supreme Advisor to the Throne, Konoye, then found it necessary to have a series of imperial audiences in order to impress upon the emperor how serious might be the consequences of his study of the *Shinsho*. But there were good reasons why the emperor took so great an interest in this study: it was the national history of ancient Japan; it stressed especially the origin and development of Shinto and the founding of Japan, together with the rise of the Japanese race, and the glorious rule of the ancient emperors of divine virtue (indeed, it was for this reason called the *Shinsho*, the "Sacred Book of Divinity").⁴²

In the summer of 1757, when it became known that the emperor had begun to take an interest in the *Shinsho*, certain court officials voiced objections, saying that because Iyeyasu had stipulated in the Imperial Household Law that the emperor should devote himself exclusively to the study of national poems and their composition, the study of the *Shinsho* by the emperor was contrary to the established traditional regulations of the imperial household.⁴³ Thereupon, a brilliant young court noble named Karasumaru expressed his views, saying that the art of national poetry was a divine teaching which had originated in the divine period and had been handed down to the present generation, and that, therefore, no national poem could be composed without a knowledge of the *Shinsho*. Consequently, the emperor should study the *Shinsho* first of all, before studying the art of national poetry or anything else.⁴⁴ The Emperor Momonozo approved this reasoning and acted upon the advice of Karasumaru. Hence, before the Supreme Advisor to the Throne requested an imperial audience in order to discuss the matter of the study of the *Shinsho*, the emperor had already taken a keen interest in that particular work, because in it he found how the nation had been organized and ruled, as well as other things which he should know.⁴⁵ As a con-

sequence, he refused to comply with the request made repeatedly by the Supreme Advisor to the Throne during the imperial audiences, which lasted for several days.

On one occasion, the emperor said, "The *Shinsho* is the only book in which we can learn of the founding, of the development, and of the method of ruling of our Empire. We, as the Ruler of Japan, should acquaint ourselves with the facts contained therein."⁴⁶ At another time, the emperor said that because the fundamental principles upon which the Empire of Japan had been founded, as well as other matters of importance that a ruler should know, could not be obtained except through the study of the *Shinsho*, the Supreme Advisor to the Throne should join him in the study of that ancient work.⁴⁷ Thus the emperor not only refused to give up his study, but actually requested his advisor to acquaint himself with the contents of that particular work.⁴⁸ At another time, when the empress mother wrote to the emperor expressing strong objections to his studying the *Shinsho*, the emperor replied by a personal letter in which he first expressed regret that he was unable to comply with her request, and then explained the reason why he was unwilling to discontinue his study of the work, saying, "I am the Ruler of Japan. Therefore, for me to study *Shinsho* is not only the proper thing; it is an essential duty."⁴⁹

Because the emperor persisted in continuing his study of the *Shinsho*, and because the empress mother and the elderly court nobles found it impossible to persuade him to turn his attention to something else, they decided that the best thing to do was to compel Takenouchi to absent himself from the imperial capital for two or three years. Since this plan likewise ended in failure, they decided to take radical steps: to remove all the young court nobles from the vicinity of the throne and to ask the coöperation of the shogunate government in arresting and punishing Takenouchi. By their plan, Takenouchi was to be punished as a political agitator,⁵⁰ and the young court nobles, including Tokudaiji, Okimachi, Sanjo, Karasumaru,

and others, all active workers around the throne, were to be severely punished on the grounds that they were disciples of Takenouchi and that they propagated his doctrines as well as those of Suika Shinto. The target at which the Supreme Advisor to the Throne and others of the elderly court nobles really aimed was not only the suppression and persecution of Takenouchi, but also the removal from the presence of the emperor of all the young court nobles with radical ideas who enjoyed his trust and confidence. Although the persecution of Takenouchi and the affairs connected therewith proved to be the first chapter in the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate, it should be remembered that they were begun by a court feud between the nobles of conservative tendencies and those holding more radical beliefs, and not by the arbitrary and unjustifiable interference of the shogunate government.⁵¹

In consequence of the investigation of the activities of Takenouchi and of his subsequent release in December, 1756, his doctrines and himself became well known to the shogunate government. The military government at Kyoto was reluctant to renew the trial of Takenouchi when approached by the imperial court.⁵² In fact, while the Supreme Advisor to the Throne and other court nobles of high official rank were actively concerned in this matter, the military governor of Kyoto was passive. He was forced to take up the case of Takenouchi only because the persecution was requested in the name of the throne. It seems rather strange and unaccountable that the imperial court requested the shogunate government to punish one who was devoting his energy to the elevation of the imperial cause and devising plans for the imperial restoration;⁵³ but there is an explanation.

Now, it is historically true that in the middle of the eighteenth century high court officials were very conservative, meek, and spiritless, accepting the arbitrary and highhanded policy of the shogun as a matter of course. They were therefore satisfied with existing conditions, and with the relations between

the throne and the shogun as established by the Tokugawa shogunate. They were even convinced that the dual form of government by which the shogun was the absolute ruler of the Empire was the best and safest arrangement for the throne.⁵⁴ Consequently, they not only failed to note the obscurity and gradual decline of the power of the throne, but they evinced no ambition for the imperial restoration. In fact, they believed that those who were working for the imperial cause were disturbers of the peace and order of the nation, and that they should be disposed of for the sake of the safety and welfare of the throne.⁵⁵ At the same time, as a result of the national renaissance, most of the young court nobles were wide awake and hence dissatisfied with existing conditions. They demanded loyalty and reverence for the throne.

Hence it came about that in the middle of the eighteenth century, when Takenouchi became prominent in Kyoto and advocated a plan for the imperial restoration, two conflicting elements existed in the imperial court. Takenouchi became the victim of the conservative court nobles and was exiled from Kyoto, so that the young court nobles would become powerless. The military governor of Kyoto likewise became a tool of the conservatives. His office had been instrumental in enabling them to carry out their plans.

In the summer of 1758, Konoye, Supreme Advisor to the Throne, and other prominent court nobles of conservative tendencies held a series of conferences. They finally decided that in order to make the emperor abandon his study of the *Shinsho* and renounce his faith in the Suika Shinto, Takenouchi should be punished; consequently, they set to preparing a letter of complaint and accusation against Takenouchi.⁵⁶ However, in 1756, only two years before, the military governor of Kyoto had thoroughly investigated Takenouchi's case at the instance of the imperial court and had exonerated him from all the charges brought against him; after that, the shogunate government had kept its hands off the matter. As a consequence, Konoye and

other conservative court nobles had great difficulty in gathering evidence and material against Takenouchi; but by basing their findings chiefly upon rumors and imaginings of their own creating, they finally succeeded in drafting the statement to be used as a letter of complaint.⁵⁷ It said:

"1. Shikibu Takenouchi came to Kyoto from his home at a distant place some thirty years ago. He became a dependent of the Tokudaiji family. He gradually gained in knowledge of religious and cultural works. Finally he came to be known as a scholar versed in Shintoism and in Confucianism. Gradually, his master, Tokudaiji, who was Chief Councilor of State in the imperial court, came under his influence. Tokudaiji in turn transmitted Takenouchi's teachings to his fellow councilors, Kuge and Nishi-Doin. All these court nobles constituted a center for the propagation of Takenouchi's teachings, thus making it possible for Takenouchi to gain hundreds of followers.⁵⁸

"2. Takenouchi gave a series of lectures on subjects selected from *Shinsho*, *Seiken Igen*, *Hoken Taiki*, and from the *Four Books* and the *Five Classics* as a means of advocating his teachings with regard to imperial restoration and nationalism.⁵⁹

"3. Takenouchi, on all possible occasions, advocated that the emperor should be revered as the supreme and most highly respected of all human beings.⁶⁰ It was the policy of Takenouchi to hold the emperor as the highest individual. Thus indirectly he caused the people to regard the shogun as a secondary personage.⁶¹

"4. Takenouchi frequently stated in his discourses that, because of the domination of the military government, the masses knew only of the shogun and were ignorant of the existence of the emperor. He said, however, that the emperor and the court nobles were partly responsible for this situation, because they had neglected to pursue cultural and intellectual attainments, and that therefore if the emperor, his advisor, and the court nobles of high rank should devote themselves to learning, thereby attaining virtue, the people would naturally rely and

depend upon the throne. In that event, the shogun would voluntarily return the ruling authority to the throne. Thus the emperor would again rule the empire in person.⁶²

"5. In the secret conference held at a place called Sanbongi, Takenouchi, in the presence of the young court nobles, repeatedly deplored conditions in Japan. He stated repeatedly that the people knew only of the existence of the shogun and knew nothing of the existence of the emperor. He thus caused the court nobles to desire the return of the imperial rule.⁶³

"6. Takenouchi frequently took military books as texts in his discourses with the young court nobles. He thus created in them military ambitions, so that some of them even began to taken an interest in weapons and the military art.⁶⁴

"7. Despite the fact that in the second year of the Bunji era (1186), when the Emperor Gotoba appointed Yoritomo as military ruler of the sixty-six provinces of Japan, the present dual form of government originated, and from that time to the present years of Tokugawa rule, the emperor on the throne has entrusted the ruling authority in Japan to the shogun, generation after generation, asking him to rule the empire in behalf of the throne, Takenouchi interpreted this scheme of military rule as though the shogun had usurped the imperial authority, thus bringing shame and disgrace to the throne.⁶⁵

"8. Takenouchi upbraided the court nobles, stating that they were receiving annual allowances from the shogun, thus making themselves dependent upon him, despite the fact that the court nobles received their annual allowances from the shogun in accordance with an imperial command, and not because of the arrangement made unofficially between the court nobles and the shogun.⁶⁶

"9. Takenouchi induced the young court nobles who were personal attendants of the throne and who were his disciples to organize a faction for the purpose of taking rebellious action against the shogun.⁶⁷

"10. Takenouchi presented specially prepared lectures and

syllabi of his doctrines to the throne through the hands of the court nobles who were his disciples. He thus made it possible to lay his teachings before the emperor.⁷⁶⁸

In June, 1758, Konoye, the Supreme Advisor to the Throne, presented himself before the emperor and orally delivered the main substance of the letter of complaint and accusation against Takenouchi,⁶⁹ indicating that the young court nobles who were connected with Takenouchi should be punished for the sake of the maintenance of the time-honored happy relations between the throne and the shogun.⁷⁰ After this interview, the letter of complaint was sent to the military governor of Kyoto, with the request that Takenouchi should immediately be examined and prosecuted. Acting upon this request, on June 28, 1758, the military governor summoned Takenouchi to his office.⁷¹ After a brief investigation, he was permitted to return home; but during the succeeding four weeks, ending on July 23, he was summoned and examined as many as twenty times. On the day of his last examination, Takenouchi was kept in custody at the house of detention of the military government. A record of the entire proceedings was then sent to the imperial court by the military governor.

Greatly encouraged by this prospect of having the coöperation of the shogunate government, Konoye, Kujo, Ichiji, and Takasu, the four court nobles of supreme rank, met at the official residence of the Supreme Advisor to the Throne and decided to take radical steps to clear the air about the throne by removing and punishing all the young court nobles who were connected with Takenouchi, and also by making it impossible for the emperor to continue his studies in Suika Shinto and in Takenouchi's teachings.⁷² Konoye declared emphatically that severe punishment should be inflicted upon Tokudaiji and other young court nobles who enjoyed the imperial trust and confidence, and who made it possible for the emperor to continue in his studies. He said further that these nobles had been so poisonously misled by the personal influence and the teachings

of Takenouchi that they had practically lost their consciences and had reduced themselves to being slavish admirers of Takenouchi.⁷³ He pointed out also that they had been bold enough even to approach the emperor with the teachings of Takenouchi, and thus to lead the imperial mind astray. He concluded by saying that this grave offense against both Heavenly and human laws could not be overlooked. The four court nobles put their findings into written form so that they might be presented to the throne in the hope that imperial sanction might be obtained for the punishment of the young court nobles serving the throne. The substance of this document read as follows:

“For several years past, the young court nobles who are personal attendants to the throne have become disciples of Shikibu Takenouchi. They have made themselves subject to wrong and misleading teachings. Because of their unbecoming acts and wild undertakings, various rumors of a serious nature have recently been circulated in the imperial court. It is generally believed that these young court nobles have organized a faction with the purpose of rising rebelliously against the shogun.⁷⁴ Rebellion is a grave undertaking, and therefore a faction of fewer than thirty men would not be able to accomplish anything serious in a few years, no matter how earnest they might be in their attempt. Nevertheless, these young court nobles may be able to take advantage of the imperial trust and confidence that they have so long enjoyed, to cause great trouble to the throne. At any rate, they have long disregarded the authority and even the very existence of the Supreme Advisor to the Throne and of the other court nobles of supreme rank. They have been engaging in most outrageous and dangerous undertakings. Taking the foregoing facts into consideration, we hereby appeal to the throne to issue an imperial command that severe punishment be inflicted upon them.”

Konoye, together with three other court nobles of high rank, spent the entire night of July 23 in framing and editing this

document.⁷⁵ On the following morning, they presented it to the empress mother for her approval. Then they presented themselves before the throne and delivered it. They asked for the imperial sanction so that the young court nobles around the throne who were disciples of Takenouchi and who were causing difficulties should be punished in the name of the throne.⁷⁶ The emperor refused to give his sanction. A long and heated discussion ensued between the emperor and the four court nobles. The emperor held to unwavering confidence in the young court nobles thus accused. He persistently refused to give his sanction. At the same time, Konoye and the other three court nobles showed great determination in their attempts to remove the young men. They finally sought to dictate to the emperor and to make him issue an imperial edict sanctioning the punishment. The audience with the emperor ended abruptly when the emperor retired from the throne room after having told the four nobles that the entire matter should be referred to their consciences.⁷⁷ Thereupon, the Supreme Advisor to the Throne and the other three, taking it for granted that they might exercise their own judgment in this matter, arrested the young court nobles and punished them as had been originally planned in the name of the emperor. Eight young nobles, including Tokudaiji, Okimachi-Sanjo, and Karasumaru, were deprived of their official titles and ranks. They were ordered to confine themselves to their own residences for life.⁷⁸ Each of these eight was placed in the custody of his family, with the condition that his head should be shaved and that he should live the humble life of a Buddhist priest, being confined to a single room. Communication with the outside world was to be cut off, even interviews with members of his own family being prohibited. Twelve other young court nobles around the throne were also deprived of their official rank and titles, and of the right to present themselves in the imperial palace. Thus all the disciples who had been connected with Takenouchi in one way or another were punished. The imperial court was thus purged of

all possible influences and materials that had any relation to the teachings of Takenouchi and the Suika Shinto.⁷⁹

The young court nobles (twenty in all) were punished in a most unusual and arbitrary way.⁸⁰ Under the Tokugawa rule, it was an established practice that when the imperial court found it necessary to punish court nobles, the entire procedure must be presented to the shogun through the office of the military governor of Kyoto before final action could be taken. Then the nobles were punished only after the approval of the shogun and the imperial sanction had been obtained. Konoye, the Supreme Advisor to the Throne, in coöperation with the three other prominent court nobles, inflicted severe punishment upon the twenty without the knowledge of the shogun, and in fact without the imperial sanction.⁸¹ Hence, after the matter had apparently been settled, the military governor of Kyoto protested. Konoye thereupon arranged to have an interview with him at the imperial palace, for the purpose of explaining the entire situation.⁸² The explanation was in substance as follows:

1. Tokudaiji and other young court nobles of radical ideas always maintained that the Empire of Japan could never be ruled satisfactorily unless national affairs were conducted in strict accordance with the doctrines and teachings of Takenouchi.

2. These young court nobles always styled themselves as loyal and sincere subjects of the throne. They looked down upon all other court nobles as being men of no principle, and of an untrustworthy and vicious nature.

3. On all possible occasions, they slandered and misrepresented to the emperor the Supreme Advisor to the Throne and the court officials of high rank. They thus hoped to cause these officials to lose the imperial confidence and eventually to find it necessary to resign from their offices.

4. They organized a secret faction with the purpose of rebelling against the shogun.⁸³

Konoye then emphatically declared that those young court nobles had acted so dangerously that prompt measures had become necessary, and therefore that due punishment had been inflicted upon them although the matter had been carried out without being put through the regular channels. After some hours had been spent in further discussion, the military governor of Kyoto concluded that, although the course taken by Konoye and the others was in violation of established regulations, it did not particularly concern the dignity and interests of the shogun and his government.⁸⁴ The governor therefore accepted the explanation with good grace and withdrew his protest. Thus, although Konoye punished the young court nobles of radical tendencies on the grounds that they were followers and admirers of Takenouchi, this irregular and arbitrary matter was settled without entailing grave consequences.⁸⁵

Because Takenouchi was neither a court noble nor a man in the service of the court, he was outside of the court's jurisdiction. To punish him, Konoye and the other conservative nobles had to depend entirely upon the shogunate government, even though the imperial court had taken the initiative. The military governor of Kyoto, who represented the shogun, had no inclination to punish Takenouchi, nor did he have any evidence in substantiation of the charges made. Consequently, he at first repeatedly refused to take up the case.⁸⁶ But, of course, upon being pressed by the imperial court, he was obliged to act. He therefore instructed three military judges to summon Takenouchi and to subject him to cross-examination. Takenouchi's house was searched, and the members of his family and the people of the neighborhood were summoned and questioned concerning his movements, associates, and everyday life.⁸⁷ All the makers and sellers of weapons were summoned and asked whether they had ever had any dealings with Takenouchi and with the court nobles who were his disciples. Although the office of the military governor at Kyoto thus proceeded in strict accordance with the request and warning of

the imperial court, and no evidence against the accused man was found, nevertheless, because the charges were so serious, the military governor decided to arrest and hold both Takenouchi and his son.⁸⁸ He had dealt with the accused man leniently, showing clemency and courtesy.⁸⁹ Although it was the practice of the military court in those days to extort confessions from accused persons by torture, Takenouchi was not tortured, even after he had made repeated denials of all the charges against him.

This trial of Takenouchi was a most unusual one. The military government and its court had absolutely no evidence against him, nor any witnesses to subpoena.⁹⁰ The letter of complaint prepared by Konoye and other court nobles was the sole document upon the basis of which Takenouchi was to be examined and tried. Furthermore, this letter was most unreliable, as it was a mere compilation of rumors and fancies concocted by Konoye and other court nobles of conservative tendencies. The entire court proceedings consisted of questions and answers exchanged between the military judges and Takenouchi. The judges based their questions upon the statements made in the letter of complaint. Takenouchi was keen and quick in his answers; and his intellectual and scholarly attainments far exceeded those of the trial judges. He denied all accusations, and explained matters from his own standpoint, showing why and how the charges were both erroneous and groundless; and as he replied to one question after another, he brought the entire situation under review. Because Konoye and the other court nobles who were the authors of the letter of complaint, and who were therefore the real accusers, were not allowed to be present in the trial court, out of the need of maintaining their dignity and rank, there was no way of refuting Takenouchi's statements of denial.⁹¹ Furthermore, certain statements in the letter of complaint were written in so complicated and ambiguous a way that questions formed therefrom by the judges frequently failed to make points clear. Takenouchi thereupon

turned the tables upon them and requested that they answer the questions that he should make out of the jumble presented to him. Because the judges were unfamiliar with the affair, they could give no explanations, and thus were embarrassed.

Once, even though the matter which was touched upon was grave, Takenouchi was keen enough to explain it. The *Seiken Igen* written by Asami was, in the time of Takenouchi, the book most noted for its splendid advocacy of imperial rule and its condemnation of the military usurpation.⁹² This book also emphatically urged the Japanese to be loyal to the throne and to be true to national principles. It was an undeniable fact that Takenouchi gave a series of lectures on various subjects selected from the *Seiken Igen* and explained the founding and early national organization of Japan, together with the moral relationships and duties of subjects to their sovereign. He thereby emphatically advocated nationalism and the imperial power, thus anticipating the imperial restoration.⁹³ But the military judges in the trial court referred to the statements in the letter of complaint and accused Takenouchi of having used the *Seiken Igen* as a military text in his class of young court nobles, thus leading them to take an interest in military science. This erroneous accusation made it possible for Takenouchi to deny the charge successfully, despite the fact that he had used the *Seiken Igen* as a text.

From the time of his arrest, on July 24, 1758, Takenouchi was summoned frequently before the court during a period of more than four months, ending November 27, on which date the trial was virtually concluded. Because the trial was conducted without material evidence of any value and was based only on the letter of complaint, which was made up of rumors and fancies, the same questions and answers were exchanged repeatedly between the judges and Takenouchi without any real result.⁹⁴ The judges and Takenouchi alike suffered greatly from the tedium.⁹⁵ On the last day that Takenouchi was present in court, the judges handed him a written statement.

“Shikibu Takenouchi, forty-eight years of age: Throughout the court proceedings of four months, we, the three judges, conjointly examined and questioned you repeatedly with regard to whether you guided and directed the court nobles who were personal attendants to the throne in their studies of military science and in the art of swordsmanship. On each occasion, you have denied these charges, stating: ‘To the best of my memory, I have never given instruction in military science to the court nobles in question.’ Hereupon, we three judges have again questioned you: ‘Have you ever given those court nobles any instruction in military matters?’ You have repeatedly denied the accusation that you made critical remarks with regard to existing relations between the throne and the shogun. Hereupon, we three judges have ask you again whether you ever made such daring remarks with regard to the relations obtaining between the imperial court and the shogunate government. We hereby instruct you to reply to these two questions in writing, with the full understanding that you may be subjected to severer methods of trial if you persist in your denials.”

Takenouchi thereupon gave the following sworn written statement:

“I, Shikibu Takenouchi, hereby present my sworn statement to the effect that I have replied nothing but the truth to all the questions asked me by you, the three honorable judges, throughout the entire period of the trial. No matter in what way I shall be examined and no matter by what methods I shall be subjected to further trial, I have no other reply to make than I have already made to you, the three honorable judges.

“[Signed] SHIKIBU TAKENOUCHI.”⁹⁸

Takenouchi expected to be tortured; but the military court did not go so far. The military governor probably instructed the judges to put the essential parts of the trial into written form so that the outcome might be forwarded to Konoye, the Supreme Advisor to the Throne, in accordance with whose request the case had been prosecuted.

Although Takenouchi was held in the house of detention for the following six months, he was not summoned even once before the court.⁹⁷ Finally, on May 6, 1759, he was instructed to present himself before it, and the following sentence was pronounced upon him:

"Our court has found that you, Shikibu Takenouchi, have given to several court nobles who were personal attendants to the throne, instruction in Shinto, taking the *Shinsho* as a text, thereby disregarding established usage. In the imperial court there are certain families who have specialized in the Shinto teachings, and it is only from these that the court nobles should learn Shinto. Hence you should have declined to teach Shinto even though you were repeatedly requested by the nobles in question to instruct them. Instead of this, you have given them a series of lectures on subjects selected from the *Shinsho*. You have acknowledged the fact that you have lectured and discoursed upon the Confucian classics. In the study of that subject, the *Four Books* and the *Five Classics* and other Confucian works should have been used exclusively as texts; but, according to the findings of the court, you have used in your discourses the *Seiken Igen* and other books of that sort. Moreover, at the time when the nobles in question held a conference at Sanbongi, you attended that jovial meeting and discoursed on various subjects. Because such relations existed between you and the court nobles, wild rumors were circulated regarding the interest taken by them in military weapons and books, and in other military study. The court nobles who were serving the throne and who had been your disciples have suffered severe punishment because of their connection with you. In conclusion, this court has decided that your teachings were, on the whole, wrong, misleading, and injurious. You, Shikibu Takenouchi, are hereby exiled from the following provinces: Musashi, Yamashiro, Yamato, Settsu, together with other provinces, nineteen in all, as well as from all districts along the Tokaido and the Kisoji-Suji [the two chief national highways]."⁹⁸

This sentence meant that Takenouchi was deprived of the right of residence in Kyoto (the imperial capital), Yedo (the military capital), Osaka (the great commercial and financial center), and other important cities.

At the same time, the court summoned Kazuye, the son of Takenouchi, who was but fifteen years of age, and pronounced sentence upon him as follows:

"This court has neither found nor been informed of suspicious and wrongful behavior on your part. Nevertheless, you must have been well acquainted with the daily life and conduct of Shikibu, your father, especially with regard to his connections with the court nobles who were personal attendants to the throne. You are still quite young; yet you, who have been instructed in the teachings of Confucius and have thereby learned of the relations of parents and children, should have approached your father and protested confidentially against his wrongdoing. You have failed to perform this duty, and Shikibu, your father, has thereby been punished by being exiled from various provinces. This court, therefore, hereby deprives you of the right of residence in Kyoto, the imperial capital."⁹⁹

The pronouncement of this sentence concluded the case against Takenouchi and his son.¹⁰⁰

Takenouchi was more of a philosopher than a scholar;¹⁰¹ for those days, indeed, he was a political philosopher of utopian ideas. He taught that great revolutionary changes in national political organization could not be accomplished by an appeal to arms, but might be brought about through the high virtuous and intellectual attainments of persons who could rightfully lay claim to ruling power. He warned his followers against being too radical and hasty. He insisted that time was an essential element in success; and although he planned and hoped for the imperial restoration, he did not even dream of bringing about the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate by military force. Nevertheless, his doctrines were based upon the political theory that the dual form of government was abnormal and

contrary to the fundamental principles of the national organization of Japan. He prophesied that the imperial restoration would come, and he urged that it should be accomplished without bloodshed, in a quiet and orderly manner.

No matter what policy he pursued, Takenouchi was the man who originated and demonstrated the possibility of the imperial restoration and of the abolition of military rule. Therefore, in the middle of the eighteenth century, when the Tokugawa shogunate was exercising absolute ruling power, the government should not have overlooked the fact that he was an advocate of a political movement that was dangerous to it. In the course of his long trial, no matter how cleverly and eloquently Takenouchi defended himself and defined his teachings, the three judges should have discovered the fundamental principles of his doctrine and should have become convinced that Takenouchi was planning a serious political movement. Nevertheless, in all his long trial, which lasted for more than a year, they failed to find substantiation of any of the charges against him. They virtually released him by subjecting him to nominal punishment. These generous dealings with Takenouchi by the military government were due either to the fact that the judges, from ignorance and lack of intelligence, permitted him to take advantage of every situation and made it possible for him to trifle with the law, or to the fact that they sympathized with Takenouchi, who was peacefully devoting himself to the causes of right and justice.¹⁰² Perhaps the judges' lenience may be accounted for by the fact that, in the time in which Takenouchi lived, the masses knew nothing of the abnormality of the dual form of government and looked upon the arbitrary rule of the shogun as a matter of course. Moreover, the nation as a whole was satisfied with the rule of the Tokugawa; and the Tokugawa wisely made it a policy to keep its hands off certain affairs in which the interests of the throne and of the shogun were involved, so that the government might not be brought unwittingly into trouble from too close a public scrutiny of

its affairs. This, probably, is why the military government was, in the beginning, reluctant to take up Takenouchi's case.

Some historians believe that Takenouchi was tried because of the conflict between the imperial court and the shogunate government.¹⁰³ They also state erroneously that the shogunate government misused its authority and tried Takenouchi in order to check the further development of his plan regarding the imperial restoration. Recent historical research has made clear that Takenouchi's case was brought by the court nobles of supreme rank who feared that the young court nobles who were disciples of Takenouchi might abuse the imperial confidence and thus gain control of the imperial court; and, in forestalling this, the Supreme Advisor to the Throne punished Takenouchi by using the shogunate government as the instrument to achieve his purpose.

In the winter of 1766, seven years after the trial of Takenouchi in Kyoto, Yamagata and his associate Fujii were arrested in Yedo, the military capital, on a charge of planning rebellion against the shogun with the purpose of restoring the ruling authority to the throne. Upon the supposition that Takenouchi was possibly connected with this plot, he also was arrested.

Like Takenouchi, Yamagata was an admirer of Yamasaki, the founder of Suika Shinto.¹⁰⁴ When Takenouchi and Yamagata were born, three generations had intervened between them and the time of Yamasaki, Mitsukuni, and Asami. The Japanese as a whole were still thoroughly obedient to the rule of the Tokugawa. The new tendency toward the throne and in opposition to the shogun was a mere undercurrent among a certain class of intellectuals. Takenouchi and Yamagata took a bold stand as forerunners in the movement for imperial restoration, which was accomplished in the second half of the nineteenth century, exactly one hundred years after their deaths.¹⁰⁵


Although Takenouchi and Yamagata lived in different parts of Japan, and were therefore unknown to each other, they made independent studies of the dual form of government with ref-

erence to the fundamental principles of the national organization of Japan, and came to similar conclusions. Both were dissatisfied to have Japan under the absolute rule of the shogun while a ruling emperor was on the throne.¹⁰⁶ Each arrived separately at the conclusion that the ruling authority should be restored to the throne and that the Empire of Japan should thereby be placed under the personal rule of the emperor. However, their plans for the imperial restoration were entirely different. Takenouchi did not plan to adjust conditions and to remove existing wrongs immediately, but rather to make the throne and the imperial court the center of national respect and power, as they had been in the time of the ancient imperial rule. According to his conception, if the ruling emperor and his court officials pursued intellectual and cultural studies, thus cultivating their personalities and virtues, and showing their fitness to rule the empire, the people would then rely upon them and become desirous of being under the direct rule of the throne.¹⁰⁷ Under these circumstances, the shogun would voluntarily surrender the ruling authority. Thus, Takenouchi refrained entirely from opposing or even criticizing the rule of the shogun and of his government; he merely formulated a plan by means of which they would automatically cease to exist. Yamagata, on the contrary, strongly advocated that wrongs done by men must be corrected by those who committed them,¹⁰⁸ and placed emphasis upon a revolutionary transformation, to be effected by military force. He was convinced that the destruction of the Tokugawa shogunate would be essential to the accomplishment of the imperial restoration.

Yamagata had spent the earlier years of his life in Kyoto, where he received his education. In 1762, he established himself in Yedo, the military capital, and soon was recognized as a man of unusual intellectual and literary attainments. As he was well versed in the Japanese and Chinese classics, in the Confucian ethicopolitical system, in history, in law, in military science, and in the science of astrology, he was surrounded by

men of various sorts—young and ambitious samurai, military students, Buddhist and Shinto priests, and the retainers of feudal lords of various ranks being numbered among his disciples. He gave a series of lectures on current topics, and on political and historical subjects, in which he severely criticized and opposed the rule of the Tokugawa shogunate, as well as the abnormal relationship between the throne and the shogun.

In striking contrast to Takenouchi, who always discoursed with his disciples in an orderly and philosophical way, Yamagata was radical in both his teachings and his principles.¹⁰⁹ He always made the Tokugawa shogunate the object of his attacks, and explained the need of imperial restoration. In the earlier part of his life, he wrote a book entitled *Ryushi Shinron* ("The New National Views by Ryushi" [pseud.]), in which he set forth why and how the shogunate government had come into existence and why and how the imperial restoration would remedy the national evils. In the *Ryushi Shinron*, Yamagata first explained how Japan had come to have a dual form of government.¹¹⁰ He stated that after having enjoyed a glorious imperial rule for more than a thousand years, Japan had entered upon a military period, and that with the gradual rise of military power the imperial authority was transferred from the throne to military men who came into control of both national and imperial affairs. These soldiers acted in so highhanded and independent a manner as even to decide which of the princes should become emperor and to force the ruling emperor to abdicate. With the ever-increasing ascendancy of the military power, the soldiers practically usurped the imperial authority and made themselves rulers with absolute power, generation after generation, though the throne, which was occupied for centuries by members of the imperial family, was too holy and too sacred to be occupied by any other than a prince of the imperial blood, and so was untouched by military men. Thus, the imperial government and the shogunate government existed side by side. For hundreds of years the military men thus held



DAIJI YAMAGATA

(1725-67)

Militant advocate of the imperial restoration

their supremacy, force always being in power. The strong rose and the weak fell. The nation was plunged into a bloody and barbarous state of existence. Although in course of time the national affairs became more or less settled, the emperor became increasingly helpless. Like a great white dragon that had lost its power to control storms and clouds and had to endure the insults of small fish, the emperor on the throne was forced to subject himself to rules imposed upon him by the military men.¹¹¹ The emperor was thus forced to endure a sort of prison life by reason of the Tokugawa's practice of imperial segregation and seclusion.

Yet, no matter how low the emperor was reduced, the sacred throne, the imperial laws and codes, and the magnanimous methods of ruling of the sage emperors of old had survived this arbitrary and arrogant military rule of hundreds of years. It was a matter of great regret that a man who would sympathize with the people, and who would undertake to work for the cause of righteousness and justice, had not yet appeared and made it possible for the nation to witness once again the glory of the imperial rule. Yamagata thus expressed his expectation of the imperial restoration. He then explained why he opposed the dual form of government, saying that it was both a human and a natural law that there should be but one ruling power in any one organization; therefore there were not two suns to shine in the heavens, and likewise there should not be two sovereigns to be served by the people of one nation.¹¹² Consequently, no loyal subject would seek any ruler other than the lord whom he served; neither would a woman of chastity seek favor from any man except her husband. It was only in degenerate nations that there was dual form in either individual or national life. Proper relations between ruler and subjects, and between individuals, were impossible in nations having dual standards. The people, both high and low, were not satisfied with the situations in which they were placed. Greed and selfishness controlled both national and individual affairs; men

of ambition struggled to elevate themselves at the expense of others. Loyalty, patriotism, sincerity, and straightforwardness were becoming things of the past. The laws, ordinances, and regulations were unreliable, as they were changed time and again to suit the convenience of the men in power.

Yamagata then explained how an ideal form of government might be organized. He said that a government of real working power should be organized upon a civil basis, and that military affairs should be regarded as one of the functions of government just the same as were justice and domestic and foreign affairs, the emperor always being the ruler of supreme authority. In the imperial days of old, when military service had not yet become the heritage of certain families, men of military genius and experience had always attended to affairs of war in compliance with the imperial request.¹¹³ After their deaths, they were not succeeded by their sons, as was the present custom, but by men of military ability and genius of the rising generation. Because, in this way, the best and most able military men always served in the imperial army, the barbarian tribes had been conquered and rebellions suppressed, and in those imperial days the people had enjoyed peace as well as a glorious administration.

After the nation had entered into the period of the dual form of government, the shogun had become the sole ruler.¹¹⁴ The shogunate government was a military institution both in name and in form. Nevertheless, in its actual workings it was neither a military nor a civil government. Because of the long-continued national life of luxury and ease, the military leaders began to neglect and finally to lose their military prowess, thus becoming unfit to command troops. The fighting men, likewise, became unfit to constitute the rank and file of the army. They did not even know how to advance or to retreat in accordance with military regulations, because they had no training. On the whole, the officers and fighting men had neither fighting strength nor spirit. These military men attended to the civil

affairs of the shogunate government, but as they were military men, and that by inheritance only, they possessed neither ambition nor ability to render meritorious service in civil affairs.

Yamagata pointed out the evils and weaknesses of the shogunate government. As a remedy, he proposed the restoration of the imperial rule which had been maintained for more than a thousand years prior to the twelfth century, when Japan had entered upon the period of the dual form of government; and thus he became, in the view of the Tokugawa shogunate, a dangerous political reformer.¹⁵⁵ He pointed out in his book the political corruption and abuses then prevalent, together with the degenerate practices of the Tokugawa rule. He concluded that the subversion of the Tokugawa shogunate was both inevitable and essential. He further said that with the increase of arrogance and of the arbitrary power of the shogun, both the government and the nation had become increasingly degenerate and corrupt. Both the ruling and the ruled had become more and more self-seeking. They swarmed to the places where benefits might be obtained. They shunned places where hardship and difficulties were to be encountered. They did not perform noble service in the causes of their lords. Flatterers were favored; slanderers readily found ways to approach men in power. Money and treasure always controlled every condition and affair. Bribery became a nation-wide practice in both government and individual affairs. Consequently, the thousand and one good acts of a poor man could not cope with a single crime committed by a rich man. (Specifically, the reference is to bribes given by rich men to corrupt government officials.) Official positions were not open to men of education and personal attainments, but to those who bribed most skillfully.¹⁵⁶ Therefore the gateways of the residences of officers who were favorites of the shogun constituted market places for bribe-givers. The bribe-givers used up all their wealth and property in gaining the offices that they sought. They did not seek official positions for the purpose of serving the government well,

but in order that they in turn might become bribe-takers from seekers of minor offices. In this way, all offices in the shogunate government, both high and low, were actually put up for sale. Men who were sincere and straightforward, no matter what genius and education they might possess, could not get official positions. Neither did they seek government positions, because their consciences did not permit of their associating with the corrupt officials who served in the shogunate. They kept out of national affairs, thus leaving control of the government in the hands of self-centered, greedy, and unscrupulous men.

Nearly a century and a half had passed since the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate. Because of the long period of peace and of ease and enjoyment of life, military simplicity and frugality had given place to luxurious and extravagant living; and in course of time the people began to suffer because high living had a high cost. The changed condition of the nation made it impossible for the people of all classes, including the feudal lords, the samurai, government officers, and even the farmers and artisans, to maintain themselves upon their revenues, incomes, and official emoluments. In the widespread financial suffering, the traders were the sole exception. Because of the ever-increasing profits consequent upon trade prosperity, they became richer and richer. A few merchants possessed the bulk of the national wealth.¹¹⁷ From them alone might all Japanese, including the feudal lords and high government officials, borrow money. This rise of the merchants as the money lords of the nation made of them a new power, so that they, who had constituted the lowest class, came to control people of all classes. The "Golden Rule" of the Tokugawa was thus being steadily undermined. Government officials spent day after day in discussing plans for the relief of the national situation; but they found no other method than the exaction of a land tax, and thus brought further suffering upon the farmers, upon whom the very existence of the nation was dependent. Sometimes these officials were controlled by the merchants and were obliged to

frame laws under their dictation. The nation had long suffered from this maladministration. Because bribery was a common practice, the officials led scandalous lives; flatterers and slanderers were able freely to approach men in power. Thus did officials, both high and low, lose their standing and dignity.

Yamagata concluded the last chapter of his *Ryushi Shinron* by saying that if, in that time of maladministration and of national degeneration, a man of heroism and ambition should take up the cause of justice and induce his followers to be willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of righteousness, loyal and faithful men of valor would readily coöperate with him.¹¹⁸ The movement would then soon become a nation-wide undertaking and suffering people would flock to this righteous army like those who were thirsty to a newly found spring, and would show a readiness to fight with all their might. The army that would thus come into existence for the loyal and patriotic cause would have no enemy to stand in its way.

Thus Yamagata outlined how and why the Tokugawa shogunate should be overthrown.¹¹⁹ The publication of such a book in the middle of the eighteenth century, when the shogunate was still in full control, was both daring and desperate. Nevertheless, because the book was written in the archaic Chinese classical language, it reached but a limited number of people. For the same reason also, the book did not attract the immediate attention of the government. However, in addition to his writings, Yamagata gave a series of lectures and discourses to his followers on the subject-matter of the book, in a more detailed and emphatic way. He described the military strength and equipment of the most noted strongholds of the shogunate government, and set forth the possibilities of storming them. Fujii, his associate, even went so far as to formulate a plan for seizing the Yedo castle, which was the residence of the shogun. This, he said, could be done if the castle were set on fire on a windy day. Yamagata and Fujii were naturally listed in the government's "black book." Nevertheless, their prosecution was not

originated by the shogunate. Under peculiar circumstances, they were betrayed by some of Yamagata's disciples.

A man named Yoshida was chief minister in the local feudal government of the Oda family. He was trusted and depended upon by Oda, his lord, who was a brilliant young man with a thirst for learning. Yoshida became associated with Yamagata, especially because of his knowledge of cultural and intellectual subjects; and he decided to ask Yamagata to become the personal advisor of his master, Lord Oda.¹²¹ When this plan became known, rivals of Yoshida made strong objections, and in the Oda household itself it was seriously debated whether Yamagata, under suspicion by the Tokugawa shogunate, should become the advisor of the young lord. The development of so grave a problem in the Oda family with regard to Yamagata, together with the constant increase in Yamagata's outspoken statements with regard to the shogun and his government, caused some of his disciples to fear that the shogunate would soon exercise its authority by arresting and persecuting him and his followers.¹²² In consequence, some halfhearted disciples of Yamagata held a secret conference and concluded to report the entire matter to the shogunate government, so that they themselves might be granted immunity.¹²³

On December 18, 1766, Momoi and Sato, disciples of Yamagata, together with a physician and a Buddhist priest, who were connected in one way or another with Yamagata and Fujii, presented themselves at the office of the governor of Yedo, and accused both Yamagata and Fujii in a most exaggerated way, saying that they were planning a rebellion against the shogun with the purpose of restoring the ruling authority of the throne and that they not only had a great number of followers, but also a number of court nobles at Kyoto and even certain military men in the service of the shogun among their accomplices.¹²⁴

The shogunate government was astonished at learning of this plot. Unlike the military government of Kyoto in the case of Takenouchi in 1758, the shogunate government at Yedo took

prompt action. On December 21, three days after the accusation was made, Yamagata and Fujii were arrested.¹²⁵ Yamagata, who had fully expected this accusation and was prepared for it, accepted his fate in a self-composed and dignified manner. His house was searched, but nothing that smacked of rebellion was found. Nevertheless, because the petition of complaint that had been presented by Momoi, Sato, and others contained so highly colored a description, and because Yamagata had always been surrounded by numbers of disciples and friends, the shogunate government arrested almost every person who was supposed to have been either directly or indirectly connected with Yamagata.¹²⁶ Takenouchi was among those arrested.

The trial of Yamagata lasted for nearly eight months, his arrest having taken place on December 21, 1766, and his sentence being pronounced on August 21, 1767.¹²⁷ Unlike the trial of Takenouchi, the court procedure of the trials of Yamagata and of Fujii was not made public. There is, therefore, practically no documentary material regarding it; but it seems that the court gave them a fair trial.¹²⁸ They were not subjected to torture or to any other sort of maltreatment. Nevertheless, they fully expected capital punishment, whatever they might say, and therefore answered all questions without reservation. The substance of the sentences pronounced upon Yamagata, Fujii, and Takenouchi uncovered the real nature of the so-called rebellion, together with the findings of the military court of the shogunate government. The essence of the sentence pronounced upon Yamagata was as follows:

(1) Yamagata has made it his profession to teach military science. While teaching, he often discoursed with his disciples upon how men of their time should conduct themselves on the field of battle, and how they should thereby gain military distinction and rise in the world. In this way, he made it his policy to train his disciples in associating themselves with military disturbances, and to cause them both to crave and to welcome nation-wide war.

(2) Yamagata frequently referred in his lectures to the military equipment and fortification of the castles and strongholds that were under the direct control of the shogun.

(3) Yamagata discussed and explained, by principles of astrology, the positions and movements of certain stars, and declared that the heavens had given warning of a great national disturbance.

(4) Yamagata daringly criticized the shogun's dealings with the throne, saying that the emperor was a prisoner under the dictation of the shogun.

(5) While lecturing on military subjects, Yamagata said that the strongholds under the control of the shogun, such as that at Kofu, could be readily attacked and stormed.

Although the military court did not find Yamagata guilty of having planned rebellion, it found that through his teachings and discourses he had committed the offense of *lèse majesté* and that therefore the death sentence should be pronounced upon him.¹²⁹

The sentence that was pronounced upon Fujii was, in part, as follows:

"This military court has found neither evidence nor material to convict you of being the man who actually planned a rebellion against the shogun. However, you placed absolute reliance upon and confidence in Yamagata. You expounded what you had learned from him and propagated Yamagata's teachings, adding your own interpretations. You frequently discoursed with your fellows concerning the military art and actual methods of fighting in the field. Finally, you even dared to state that the residence castle of the shogun at Yedo could be attacked and stormed, provided certain methods of fighting should be adopted. You thus daringly committed a grave offense against the shogun. In consequence you are sentenced to die on the cross."¹³⁰

Takenouchi, who had been exiled in May, 1759, from Kyoto and other places, had made his home, in the eight years follow-

ing, with a Shinto priest in the Province of Ise. On March 8, 1767, he was taken into custody because there was a suspicion that he was connected with Yamagata.¹²¹ He was sent immediately to Yedo, where he was tried, and where he proved that he was an entire stranger to both Yamagata and Fujii. Nevertheless, for technical reasons, he was punished. His sentence read in part as follows:

"The government has ordered that you be arrested because you have been accused of having been connected with the rebellious plot of Yamagata and Fujii. Our investigation proves that neither Yamagata nor Fujii has committed any rebellious acts against the shogun. As for you, the military court has good reason to accept your explanation that not only were you unacquainted with these two men, but that indeed you had not even heard of their offense. However, despite the fact that, in 1759, you were deprived of the right of residence in Kyoto, the imperial capital, you have since visited that city once or twice. You say that you committed this offense because of a misconception of the ruling, and that you thought you might make brief sojourns to Kyoto even though you had been deprived of the right of residence there. For this offense, you are hereby sentenced to exile on the Island of Hachijo for life."¹²²

On August 21, 1767, the death sentence was pronounced upon Yamagata, and on the following day he was beheaded. Fujii died in prison before the court had made a final decision; nevertheless, on the same August 21 sentence was pronounced upon his dead body, that it be crucified.¹²³ The execution was done at the government execution grounds, which were called Suzugamori, and the body was left hanging on the cross for a week. On November 20, Takenouchi was taken in a small boat to Hachijo Island, where he was to be exiled for life. He died on December 5, before reaching his destination.¹²⁴ Thus did Takenouchi, Yamagata, and Fujii, the three outstanding "imperialists" and nationalists of the eighteenth century in Japan, die within a space of five months, in 1767.

Momoi and Sato, who had been disciples of Yamagata, and two other men who had been associated with both Yamagata and Fujii, fully expected that because of the information that they had given voluntarily, by reason of which Yamagata and Fujii had been arrested and punished, they would not only be granted immunity, but would even be liberally rewarded, as the established custom was. But contrary to their expectations, all four were summoned to appear in court and were severely punished.¹³⁵ The essence of the sentence pronounced upon them was as follows:

(1) Basing their findings upon uncertain information mixed with their own fancies, Momoi, Sato, and others prepared a report accusing Yamagata and Fujii, together with their disciples and followers, of conspiring against the shogunate government.

(2) These men either willfully or mistakenly reported to the government that some of the court nobles and military men in the service of the shogun, who had no connection with either Yamagata or Fujii, and besides, several persons who were entirely unknown to either Yamagata or Fujii, were among the conspirators.

(3) Had Momoi, Sato, Miyazawa, and Reiso, the four accusers, acted faithfully and sincerely with the purpose of rendering service to the government, they should have reported everything to the government, both truth and falsehood, without expressing their own opinions.

(4) These four men, however, instead of pursuing this course, created a grave case partly out of their own imaginations and partly from information of uncertain origin. They reported these findings to the government, adding that rebellion was contemplated. They took this daring, outrageous step without regard to the dignity of the government.

(5) Because of their erroneous and false report, a number of innocent men were arrested and were compelled to suffer hardship in prison.

(6) For the serious offense that they thus committed, they

should all be sentenced to suffer capital punishment. Nevertheless, because they gave the information which led to the conviction and execution of Yamagata and Fujii on charges of *lèse majesté*, the death sentence of these four men is commuted. They are to be exposed to the public for three days on the highway, after which they shall be exiled for life to separate, distant islands.¹³⁶

The case of Takenouchi, in 1759, and that of Yamagata and Fujii, in 1767, are known in history as the "Horeki affair" and the "Meiwa affair" because they took place respectively in the Horeki and in the Meiwa era.¹³⁷ The Horeki affair took place in Kyoto, the imperial capital. The center of operations of the Meiwa affair was Yedo, the military capital. Takenouchi, Yamagata, and Fujii, as we have seen, advocated the imperial restoration in order to place Japan under the personal rule of the emperor. However, their undertakings had neither military nor financial backing.¹³⁸ Furthermore, Takenouchi worked for the imperial restoration only, and insisted that the throne and the imperial court should fit themselves to rule Japan so that the shogunate government might automatically come to an end; and hence the Horeki affair was concerned solely with the interests of the throne, and had no direct connection with the Tokugawa shogunate.¹³⁹ In this national undertaking it was proposed that the imperial rule should be restored, but the problem of how the shogunate government might be destroyed was not touched upon. In contrast to Takenouchi, both Yamagata and Fujii planned the downfall of the shogunate, in the belief that unless this should first be accomplished, the imperial restoration could never be brought about; and hence the Meiwa affair was an undertaking against the shogun and had no direct connection with the imperial court.¹⁴⁰ In this respect, the Meiwa affair has been regarded as the event of greatest importance during the Tokugawa rule, as it was the first open movement for the overthrow of the shogunate.

The Tokugawa shogunate in the eighteenth century had such

confidence and reliance in itself as to believe that its rule was so firmly founded that the authority of the shogun could neither be questioned nor seriously criticized by any individual or organization.¹⁴⁴ The shogunate government therefore made it a policy either to disregard the case, or not to deal seriously with it, even though certain persons had plotted rebellion against the shogun. This "Hands-Off National Rebellion Policy" was adopted by the shogunate government because, according to its conception, the shoguns were too dignified to acknowledge that their subjects had actually dared to rebel against them.¹⁴² Therefore, in the Horeki affair, the military government of Kyoto (representing the shogun) repeatedly declined to take up the case against Takenouchi until it was forced to take action under the pressure of Konoye, the Supreme Advisor to the Throne.¹⁴³ In the Meiwa affair, even after Yamagata and Fujii had been found to have planned the overthrow of the shogunate government, the military court of the shogun announced that they had not committed acts of rebellion.¹⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the death sentence was pronounced upon them for the commission of the offense of *lèse majesté* against the shogun.

Takenouchi, Yamagata, and Fujii were the most noteworthy men in Japan of the eighteenth century. Their ideas with regard to the imperial restoration and the subversion of the Tokugawa shogunate were far in advance of ideas obtaining at the time in which they lived. Because the shogunate government still exercised full ruling authority, they were prosecuted. Moreover, their efforts apparently failed to bring about any effect upon the national life. Their appearance, nevertheless, was a consequence of a great national renaissance.¹⁴⁵ In their time a strong undercurrent in favor of the imperial restoration and for the subversion of the shogunate already existed. Historians agree that the events in the Horeki and Meiwa eras foretold the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate just as a few fallen leaves indicate the coming of autumn. Hence it may be said that Takenouchi, Yamagata, and Fujii in the middle of the

eighteenth century took the initiative in the cause of the imperial restoration, thus writing the first chapter of the history of the downfall of the Tokugawa.¹⁴⁶

During the period of the great national renaissance which had its beginning near the end of the seventeenth century, Yamasaki, Mitsukuni, and Asami, the three imperialists, first raised voices of reverence for the throne and loyalty to the emperor. In the middle of the eighteenth century, Takenouchi, Yamagata, and Fujii actually planned for and advocated the imperial restoration and the downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate.¹⁴⁷ Toward the close of the eighteenth century, Shi-Hei Rin (Hayashi) (1738-93), Hikokuro Takayama (1747-93), and Kunpei Gamou (1768-1813) made their appearance as successors of Takenouchi, Yamagata, and Fujii.¹⁴⁸ They nobly advocated and worked for the cause of the imperial restoration.¹⁴⁹ In their time the advance of Russia toward Japan from the north became increasingly apparent. How to maintain the national seclusion and how to maintain the seclusion and segregation of the throne were problems that became more and more grave and difficult, until they were problems which the Tokugawa shogunate had desperately to face.¹⁵⁰

CHAPTER VI

The Absolute Ruling Authority of the Shogun and Its Arbitrary Methods

THE BATTLE OF SEKIGAHARA was as decisive in the history of Japan as the Battle of Waterloo in the history of Europe. It was fought in the year 1600. In consequence of this battle, Japan entered upon a new period of her history, and military rule emerged in concrete form. The chief result of the battle was the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate.¹ However, the Battle of Sekigahara was not fought by the army of Iyeyasu alone against the opposing army. It was neither a battle between the pro-Iyeyasu and the anti-Iyeyasu forces, nor a struggle between the armies of the Toyotomi Fudai feudal lords of the military faction and of the Toyotomi Fudai feudal lords of the civil faction. It was a conflict of the combined armies of the pro-Iyeyasu and the Toyotomi Fudai feudal lords of the military faction against those of the anti-Iyeyasu and of the Toyotomi Fudai feudal lords of the civil faction. While Hideyoshi was yet living, there had already existed bitter feelings of enmity between the civil and the military factions.² With his death and the loss of the ruling authority over these factions, they came into open conflict.

The Battle of Sekigahara was actually a battle between the east and west in Japan.³ The eastern army consisted of the forces under the control of Iyeyasu and his son, Hidetada, together with the forces under the command of pro-Iyeyasu feudal lords and of the Toyotomi Fudai feudal lords of the military faction; the western army, of the forces under the command of anti-Iyeyasu feudal lords and of the Toyotomi Fudai feudal lords of the civil faction. After the death of Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu was the sole surviving one of the three great men of the sixteenth century. The other two, Nobunaga and Hideyoshi,

had founded the third and the fourth military governments, respectively, as if to prepare the way for Iyeyasu to follow in their footsteps and to become the founder of the fifth military government. Despite the fact that Iyeyasu was a man of outstanding military ability and personal attainments, he was not then in a financial or a military position to dictate to military lords who had been his colleagues under the rule of Hideyoshi.

TABLE 4
NAMES AND INCOMES OF LEADING FEUDAL LORDS

Name	Revenue (<i>koku</i> of rice)	Name	Revenue (<i>koku</i> of rice)
1. Iyeyasu and his son, Hidetada (Tokugawa)	2,557,000	11. The Hori	300,000
2. The Mori	1,205,000	12. The Kato	250,000
3. The Uyesugi	1,200,000	13. The Mogami	240,000
4. The Mayeda	835,000	14. The Chosokabe	222,000
5. The Date	580,000	15. The Asano	218,000
6. The Ukida	574,000	16. The Noto Mayeda	215,000
7. The Shimazu	555,000	17. The Masuda	200,000
8. The Satake	545,700	18. The Fukushima	200,000
9. The Kobayakawa	522,500	19. The Miyabe	200,000
10. The Nabeshima	357,000	20. The Konishi	200,000
		21. The Ishida	194,000

At the time of the Battle of Sekigahara, there were 214 feudal lords whose revenues ranged from 10,000 to 2,557,000 *koku* of rice;⁴ their combined revenue was 18,723,000 *koku*. Of the 214 lords, twenty were known as great feudal lords, their revenue ranging from 200,000 to 2,557,000 *koku* of rice. Table 4 gives the names and incomes⁵ of the first twenty-one of the powerful feudal lords.

Of these twenty-one feudal lords, the fighting power of the Tokugawa (Iyeyasu), of the Mayeda, of the Date, of the Nabeshima, and of the seven leading Toyotomi Fudai feudal lords of military factions, constituted the main fighting force of the eastern army. The western army consisted mainly of the military men under the command of the Ukida, the Shimazu, the Satake, the Chosokabe, the Konishi, and the Ishida; although

the Mori and the Uyesugi joined this army, they were not able actually to engage in battle. Each army had approximately 100,000 men.⁶ The eastern army, which had slightly less numerical strength than the western, was under the personal command of Iyeyasu; and the western army had no commander of military experience to equal his.⁷ It sadly lacked both order and military unity. Yet the battle was bitterly and desperately contested. The western army fought bravely, and successfully until a wily plan of Iyeyasu's was effectively carried out.⁸ In the midst of the battle, when its outcome hung in the balance but seemed to be slightly in favor of the western army, Lord Kobayakawa, whom Iyeyasu had bought out and whom he caused to join the eastern army, and who during the battle was encamped with the western forces on a high hill commanding the field, made a sudden onrush with several thousand men and attacked the western army from the rear. This treacherous act of Kobayakawa's brought victory to the eastern army under the command of Iyeyasu.⁹

Although the battle lasted but a day, it brought about radical changes in the national affairs of Japan. In fact, as a result of this battle, the feudal lords in the western army practically made a gift to Iyeyasu of all the ruling authority and military power that Hideyoshi had possessed at the time of his death. After the battle, the ruling power of Iyeyasu and of his family, the Tokugawa, was definitely established. Yet, because the battle was won in consequence of the solid support of the seven Toyotomi Fudai feudal lords of the military factions,¹⁰ and also of the powerful feudal lords created by Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu, after having gained the victory, had to maintain loyalty to the Toyotomi family.¹¹ Consequently, immediately after the victorious battle, Iyeyasu renewed his pledge that he had made to Hideyoshi at the latter's deathbed, and announced that he would be a faithful guardian of Hideyori,¹² to whom, when he should attain maturity, he would give his granddaughter as a bride. This official announcement by Iyeyasu greatly pleased

the feudal lords who were friendly to the Toyotomi. They promised to recognize Iyeyasu as their own master as well as that of the nation. After the Battle of Sekigahara, the relative standings of the Toyotomi and Tokugawa families became more and more delicate and complicated.¹³ While Iyeyasu and the Tokugawa family were recognized as the ruling power in Japan, at the same time all the feudal lords and court nobles regarded the Toyotomi as a ruling family of the same standing as that of the Tokugawa because Hideyori, the son of Hideyoshi, was its head. The throne regarded these two families as being of the same rank.¹⁴

In February, 1603, Goyozei, the 106th emperor of Japan, appointed Iyeyasu as shogun and as *Udaijin* ("State Minister of the Right").¹⁵ In April, two months later, Hideyori was appointed *Naidaijin* ("State Minister of the Imperial Seal"—that is, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal).¹⁶ At that time, Iyeyasu was sixty-two years old and Hideyori was a mere boy of eleven. This remarkable situation—in which Iyeyasu, who was an old statesman of ability and experience, and Hideyori, who was a mere boy, were appointed by the throne as state ministers of practically equal standing—is plain evidence that even after the Battle of Sekigahara the dead Hideyoshi still had influence and power in the imperial court as well as throughout all Japan. The throne indicated further that Hideyori would soon be appointed *Kampaku* ("Supreme Advisor to the Throne"), the highest office in the imperial court,¹⁷ and the same to which Hideyoshi had been appointed when at the height of his power. In 1605, because of his old age, Iyeyasu resigned as shogun and as *Udaijin*. In April of the same year, the emperor promoted Hideyori from *Naidaijin* to *Udaijin*.¹⁸ He appointed Hidetada, the son of Iyeyasu, as shogun and as *Naidaijin*. At that time, Hidetada was twenty-seven years of age, and Hideyori thirteen. The Tokugawa and the Toyotomi were regarded as the two great ruling families by the throne and by all the court nobles and the feudal lords.¹⁹ The indications were that the Toyotomi

would rule Japan as the highest civil power, and that the Tokugawa would rule Japan as the highest military power. This situation convinced Iyeyasu that as two suns did not shine in the heavens, neither should two ruling families control the affairs of Japan at the same time. He concluded that if the Toyotomi family should be permitted to maintain its existence, the Tokugawa family could neither control all the feudal lords nor develop the power of the family to its fullest extent.²⁰ Furthermore, he feared that after his death, when the ruling power of Hidetada and of succeeding shoguns should become weaker, some of the powerful feudal lords who had been created by Hideyoshi, and who had therefore been friendly to the Toyotomi, might rise against the Tokugawa and restore the ruling authority to the Toyotomi family. Consequently, Iyeyasu decided that, for the sake of the safe and prosperous existence of the Tokugawa, the Toyotomi family should be destroyed.²¹ Prior to 1614 all such powerful feudal lords as the Mayeda, Ikeda, Kato, and the two Asano families, which were friendly to the Toyotomi, and whose revenues ranged from 1,000,000 to 400,000 *koku* of rice, had died out one after another.²² Some historians believed that Iyeyasu poisoned them. In 1615 Iyeyasu was seventy-four years of age, and, fully realizing that his death was not far off, he forced war upon Hideyori at Osaka.²³ Hideyori was killed and the Toyotomi family was annihilated. Thus did Iyeyasu rid himself of the widow and infant son entrusted to his guardianship by his lord, Hideyoshi. In this way he usurped the power of the Toyotomi family—equaling the most treacherous usurpation in China upon a change of dynasty there.²⁴

Because of their former association as colleagues under the rule of Hideyoshi, and because of their coöperation prior to the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate, Iyeyasu and Hidetada could not exercise their respective ruling authorities over the Tozama feudal lords, even after they came to rule Japan as the first and second shoguns.

Whenever powerful Tozama feudal lords made their biennial entries into Yedo, Iyeyasu and Hidetada always went out to the suburbs of the military capital to receive them and bid them welcome; and again, to bid them good-bye when they were making their biennial return to their home provinces. During their stay at Yedo, Iyeyasu and Hidetada frequently entertained the Tozama feudal lords at the Yedo castle in most friendly and courteous ways. They dealt with them as both associates and allies of the Tokugawa family. Throughout their rule the relation of ruler and subjects was not observed between the shogun and the Tozama feudal lords, although that relation was strictly maintained between the shogun and the Fudai feudal lords. However, when Iyemitsu, the grandson of Iyeyasu, became the third shogun, the Tokugawa shogunate had already existed for more than a third of a century and its ruling authority had been fully recognized throughout Japan.²⁵ Furthermore, the practice of the seclusion and segregation of both the throne and the feudal lords was strictly enforced and observed. Most of the powerful Tozama feudal lords who had served Hideyoshi as the colleague of Iyeyasu and Hidetada, and who had rendered valuable military assistance to Iyeyasu at the time of the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate, were dead. The new Tozama feudal lords, who succeeded either their grandfathers or their fathers, thought of how to maintain the safe and prosperous existence of their families rather than how to seek family glory and due regard from the shogun. On the whole, at the time of Iyemitsu, the feudal lords had lost their fighting spirit and power, and desired only to live peaceful and luxurious lives. Iyemitsu, a man of great ambition and determination, believed that the time was ripe for the completion of the work that Iyeyasu had originated and planned.

In 1631, Hidetada, the second shogun, was taken seriously ill. Iyemitsu, who had been nominally the third shogun since 1623, then ruled Japan in person. Upon coming into power, he decided to convince all the feudal lords that the shogun should

be a ruler with absolute authority who could command unquestioning obedience from them all.²⁸ In 1632, in order to carry out his plan, Iyemitsu exiled Kato,²⁹ the lord of the province of Higo, and Tadanaga,³⁰ the lord of the province of Suruga. Their provinces and their family estates were confiscated, and the local feudal governments under their control were destroyed. These things were done without preferment of charges or trial; the two lords were simply informed that the shogun was displeased with them because they had acted suspiciously, which was contrary to the provisions of the Military Constitution. Neither the historians of that time nor those of the present have been able to shed any light on the nature of the offenses they had committed.³¹ Because Tadanaga was the only brother of the third shogun and therefore the most distinguished feudal lord, and because Kato was the son of one of the seven Toyotomi feudal lords of the military faction and therefore the preëminent Tozama feudal lord, this arbitrary act of Iyemitsu's surprised and shocked the other feudal lords. But none of them so much as dared to show sympathy for the unlucky ones.³²

Prior to the destruction of Kato and Tadanaga, the lord of Honda had been exiled and his provinces and family estate confiscated.³³ Lord Honda had been the most powerful and influential Fudai feudal lord. He and his father were highly trusted by Iyeyasu, who followed their plans and advice to some degree in the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate. By thus destroying these three feudal families, which typically represented the Tozama, the Shimpan, and the Fudai classes of feudal lords, Iyemitsu aimed at convincing all the feudal lords of the three following points:

1. The shogun had sole authority in defining and interpreting the provisions of the Military Constitution and of putting them into operation, with responsibility to none.
2. The shogun's will and words were law to all feudal lords.
3. The shogun would not discriminate among the Tozama, the Shimpan, and the Fudai feudal lords, nor would he show

any special consideration. The shogun would demand unquestioning obedience from them all.³²

In 1632, immediately after the death of the second shogun, Iyemitsu summoned the three classes of feudal lords to the Yedo castle. He then addressed especially the Tozama feudal lords, saying: "My grandfather [Iyeyasu, the first shogun] and my father [Hidetada, the second shogun] were colleagues of the Tozama feudal lords of the present generation or of their fathers or grandfathers. My grandfather and my father fought side by side with those Tozama feudal lords on the field of battle, the victorious outcome of which contributed largely to the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate. It was also because of the military service thus rendered by the Tozama feudal lords that my grandfather and my father received imperial appointments as shoguns. Because of these connections, the first shogun and the second shogun always paid due regard to the Tozama feudal lords and did not rank them as subjects. However, I, Iyemitsu, have neither such connection with the Tozama feudal lords, nor obligation to them. I was born to be a shogun. From infancy, I was destined to be the ruler over all the feudal lords as well as over the entire nation within the boundaries of the sea. Consequently, with the beginning of the first year of my rule, I shall deal with all the Tozama feudal lords as I deal with the Fudai feudal lords, maintaining the strict relation of ruler and subjects." Iyemitsu concluded his address by saying: "I, nevertheless, shall not impose this new ruling upon the Tozama feudal lords. I shall leave the entire affair to their judgment. They will be privileged to return to their respective home provinces and districts, where they may stay for a year in order to think about their condition and to decide whether to meet the shogun on the field of battle to show their military superiority or whether they will peacefully submit to him, recognizing him as their ruler of supreme and absolute authority."³³

Upon learning of this announcement by Iyemitsu, Masamune Date, who was the sole survivor of those Tozama feudal

lords who had served Hideyoshi as a colleague of Iyeyasu and of Hidetada, came forward and said, "We, all the feudal lords of the Tozama, of the Shimpan, and of the Fudai classes have enjoyed a happy and prosperous existence under the admirable administration of three generations of the Tokugawa rule. If there be any feudal lord who fails to appreciate this gracious rule of the shogun, our Lord Iyemitsu will not need to take punitive military action against him. I, Masamune, shall be ready to take military steps with the consent of the shogun, and I shall inflict severe punishment upon such an ungrateful and disloyal feudal family."⁸⁴

The feudal lords readily approved of the sentiment and attitude of the lord of Date. They pledged allegiance and unquestioning obedience to the shogunate government. Because the relation of ruler and subjects was fully established between the shogun and the Tozama feudal lords, just as it had been between the shogun and the Fudai feudal lords, the traditional usage established by Iyeyasu, by which the shogun had gone out to the suburbs of Yedo to welcome and to bid farewell to the Tozama feudal lords, was discontinued.⁸⁵ At the same time, the requirements laid upon the feudal lords with regard to their family residences and their personal presence in Yedo were made more stringent. Iyemitsu divided all the feudal lords into two main sections. Those in eastern Japan were required, with their families, to stay in Yedo for a year and to attend the shogun's court, while throughout the same year the feudal lords in western Japan were required to remain in their home provinces to attend to the administrative work of their local governments while their families stayed in Yedo; and vice versa. By this arrangement the shogun not only kept the families of all the feudal lords permanently in Yedo, but also managed to keep one-half of the feudal lords there.⁸⁶ Moreover, the feudal lords might neither enter Yedo nor return to their home provinces without his consent; and thus he might retain a certain feudal lord either in Yedo or in his home province for any length of time

he might desire. In short, the feudal lords could not arrange either their family or their provincial affairs to please themselves, as their personal movements were always controlled by the shogun.

The throne, however, was a problem to the shogun. In 1625, in order to make the position of the shogun more secure, a new agreement was entered into between the imperial court and the shogunate government, by one of the provisions of which a son or a brother of the ruling emperor was required to reside continuously in Yedo. It was his duty to take charge, in the capacity of chief priest, of the Buddhist temple of the shogun's family and of the Nikko Temple that had been built in honor of Iyeyasu. This step was taken not only for the purpose of keeping the imperial prince as a hostage, but, in case of war, of having this imperial prince claim the throne, so that there would thus be two emperors, one in eastern Japan and the other in western Japan,³⁷ so that any military dispute between Kyoto and Yedo might resolve itself into an imperial war instead of the shogun's fighting against the throne as a national enemy.

According to the dual system of government throughout the feudal period, it was the right of the emperor to appoint the shogun. No matter how absolute its power might be, the Tokugawa shogunate could not create a shogun. It was the prerogative of the emperor only to confer the title; but the emperor was forced to appoint as shogun the head of the Tokugawa family. Furthermore, after the imperial appointment had been made, the emperor could neither remove the shogun nor request his resignation. As for the ruling emperor, he could not even select his successor. The heir apparent to the throne was always chosen from among the imperial sons by the emperor, but with the consent of the shogun. After the heir apparent had been decided upon, the emperor had to send all the other imperial princes and princesses to Buddhist monasteries or nunneries, where they became Buddhist priests and nuns.³⁸ When the emperor and shogun disagreed about any of the affairs of

the imperial court, the emperor had either to bow to the will of the shogun or abdicate the throne. Even if there was no particular dispute between emperor and shogun, the emperor was sometimes forced to abdicate on the demand of the shogun. In short, during the Tokugawa rule the position of emperor was far less secure than was that of shogun.³⁹

It was during the early part of the rule of the third shogun, Iyemitsu, that the organization of the Tokugawa shogunate was completed as it had been planned by Iyeyasu. The Tokugawa shogunate then became a strongly centralized government, militarily, politically, judicially, and financially. No one in Japan could oppose or even criticize its rulings. The shogun was a ruler with despotic and absolute authority.⁴⁰ No one in the shogunate government dared oppose him. The advisors, the councilors, and other officials of high rank were merely the shogun's secretaries. Even the chief advisor of the shogun, who had once been so highly trusted as to be made military regent, was dismissed upon the mere whim of the shogun. When the shogun abused his authority, there was no means of checking him, no matter how long his arbitrary and merciless rule might last. Both government and nation were helpless. The people had to wait patiently until the death of the shogun brought relief from their sufferings and hardships.⁴¹

During the Tokugawa rule of 264 years, there were rulers such as Iyemitsu, the third shogun, and Yoshimune, the eighth shogun, who by their brilliant and successful administrations elevated the nation intellectually and increased its prosperity industrially. They are known as rulers who infused new life into the nation. There were also such rulers as Iyenobu, the sixth shogun, and Yoshinobu, the fifteenth and last shogun, who, though placed in most delicate situations, were able to solve national problems in most noble and admirable ways. On the other hand, there were such shoguns as Tsunayoshi, the fifth shogun, and Iyenari, the eleventh shogun, whose rules were so arbitrary that they could scarcely be duplicated either

in Japan or in any other nation. Tsunayoshi ruled Japan for a period of twenty-nine years, ending in 1709. During the last twenty-two years of his power, Tsunayoshi ruled Japan as if he were an official whose duty it was to look after the welfare and prosperity of dogs and other animals, and to punish human beings who failed to pay due regard to animals.⁴² During all these twenty-two years the people dared not complain. They could only whisper among themselves that the shogun was but a "Dog Shogun." In fact, Tsunayoshi is known as the "Dog Shogun." The fact that the Japanese of the early eighteenth century endured such government proves that the Tokugawa administration of two and one-half centuries helped to create certain typical Japanese traits and characteristics.⁴³ It is by reason of this heritage that present-day Japanese sometimes act in a manner baffling to Occidentals, who as a consequence consider that the Japanese cannot be judged by Occidental standards of thought and action. The history of the national life of Japan during the seclusion period supplies a key to many of the puzzles presented by Japan today.

In May, 1682, Tokumatsu, the only son of Tsunayoshi, died. During the five years that followed, no child was born to the shogun. As he was past forty years of age, Tsunayoshi feared that the direct line of Iyeyasu might end with himself, and he was much worried. He therefore asked Ryuko, a Buddhist priest who was greatly revered by both Tsunayoshi and his mother, how he might become the father of a son. Ryuko replied that a person who had violated any Buddhist commandment, especially by wantonly taking the lives of living things in a previous existence, was destined to die without a successor, and that to this rule the shogun was no exception;⁴⁴ but that the shogun might, nevertheless, be relieved of this Buddhist punishment if he should expiate the wrong committed during his previous existence by saving the lives of living things in the present world. Ryuko then advised that the shogun should promulgate a law by the provisions of which the people should be strictly

prohibited from taking the lives of living things, and that they should show great kindness to all domestic animals, birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. Ryuko further said that because Tsunayoshi had been born in the cycle year of the dog, he should make special provisions for the welfare of dogs of all kinds.

Here we must hark back a little. Hidetada, the second shogun, had two sons, Iyemitsu and Tadanaga. Both Hidetada and his wife showed great fondness for the younger son, Tadanaga, and had practically decided to make him the next shogun. But Lady Kasuga, Iyemitsu's wet nurse, grieved greatly over the fate of Iyemitsu and bravely protested and fought for his birthright. Finally, she presented the entire matter to Iyeyasu.⁴⁵ The latter, after serious consideration, instructed Hidetada to make Iyemitsu the heir of the Tokugawa family with the right to succeed him (Hidetada) as shogun. After Iyemitsu had become the third shogun, he therefore respected and honored Lady Kasuga as if she were his own mother, and requested that she establish her residence in the Yedo castle. He frequently visited her—and became acquainted, and presently intimate, with Keisho, a kitchen maid in Lady Kasuga's household, who was the daughter of a poor vegetable dealer in Kyoto.⁴⁶ Keisho soon began to visit a Buddhist temple and pray to Buddha for a child. When she found that she was going to be a mother, she asked the chief priest in the temple whether her child would be male or female. The priest said that she would bear a male child who would become the greatest man in Japan and who might possibly rule the nation.⁴⁷ A male child, indeed, was born. He was named Tsunayoshi. However, because of the lowliness of his mother's birth, Tsunayoshi was a neglected child in the shogun's household. His mother often reminded him that he was a son of the shogun, and urged that he should have noble ideals and aims, and that he should devote himself to cultural attainments; and her pleas cannot have been entirely disregarded.

In May, 1680, the fourth shogun was dying, and he had no

son to succeed him. Tsunayoshi was his only surviving brother; yet because of Keisho's lowly birth he was disregarded. The advisors and other men of prominence were on the point of deciding to invite an imperial prince from Kyoto and ask him to become the fifth shogun as successor to Iyetsuna, when a Fudai feudal lord named Hotta offered strong opposition, protesting that the existence of Tsunayoshi, brother of the dying shogun and direct lineal descendant of Iyeyasu, should not be disregarded.⁴⁸ Hotta, with the ready support of the Shimpan and the Fudai feudal lords, went to the sick chamber of the dying shogun and presented the entire matter to him.⁴⁹ Iyetsuna readily agreed that his brother should be his successor; and Tsunayoshi, who was then Shimpan feudal lord of Tatebayashi, was at once sent for.

Three months after the death of Iyetsuna, the fourth shogun, the emperor appointed Tsunayoshi as the fifth shogun. When Tsunayoshi thus became ruler of Japan, Keisho, his mother, rejoiced. She told him of his birth, and of the prediction made by the Buddhist priest, Ryoken (Sonyu). Tsunayoshi thereupon said that the priest was a man of divine insight and that he must be sought out and honored. The shogun and his mother requested that Ryoken become the chief priest of Chisoku Temple (*Goji-in*) in Yedo; but because of his advanced age, we are told, Ryoken declined and recommended Ryuko, a disciple of his, who was a young and brilliant priest. At any rate, Ryoken and Ryuko established their residence at Chisoku-in, and, after the death of Ryoken, Ryuko became a person of great influence. Most of the personal and family affairs of the shogun were decided only after consultation with Ryuko.⁵⁰

When Tokumatsu, the heir of this shogun, died, the shogun feared that, like his predecessor, he might die without a successor, the direct line of Iyeyasu thus terminating with him. Keisho, his mother, naturally recollected that Tsunayoshi had been born to her in answer to her prayers to Buddha, and that before the birth of Tsunayoshi, the Buddhist priest had pre-

dicted that he would be shogun. Hence she earnestly implored Tsunayoshi to seek the divine assistance of Ryuko and to act in strict accordance therewith.⁵² The superstitious devotion and blind faith of this innocent woman in Buddhism and in a Buddhist priest brought about the greatest national calamity that either Japan or any other nation has ever endured. The prevention of cruelty to animals and the love and protection of living things is a humane and admirable practice, but the laws promulgated by Tsunayoshi with regard to domestic and wild animals as well as other living creatures were both humane and inhuman. In fact, by enforcing these laws, Tsunayoshi made it possible for dogs and other ferocious animals to attack, bite, and even devour human beings. The laws thus enforced by Tsunayoshi for twenty-two years proved his devotion to animals and his cruelty to human beings.⁵³ Nevertheless, because of the organization of the Tokugawa shogunate, no government official could take any steps to remedy matters. The entire nation had simply to await the death of Tsunayoshi.⁵³

On January 28, 1687, Tsunayoshi promulgated his first law with regard to animals. It said, among other things: "The fact that persons who keep horses, cows, and other domestic animals maintain the practice of abandoning old and weak or sick animals before they die is known to us. Our lord, the shogun, is greatly grieved because such crimes and sins are committed by his subjects. Such merciless and cruel practices are hereby forbidden. All offenders will be severely punished. Your government earnestly requests that you report offenders to the authorities. If persons who have assisted in the commission of such crimes shall report the names of offenders, they will not only be exculpated; they will also be liberally rewarded."⁵⁴

A few days after the promulgation of this law, two dead cats were found in a well under the charge of the bureau of the shogun's cuisine. Thereupon, Amano, the chief of the bureau, was arrested and exiled for life to a distant island, and his two sons were sent to a sort of reform school.⁵⁵ The charge preferred

against Amano was that he had not taken kindly care of these domestic animals, and had thus failed to respect the law of the shogun.

After the promulgation of this law with regard to domestic animals, a number of ordinances and regulations regarding dogs were issued. People were ordered to treat their dogs as members of their families. They were also required to report to the government the births, illnesses, and deaths of their dogs. However, instead of taking this law seriously, the people regarded it as somewhat of a joke. On February 21, 1687, a new law regarding dogs was promulgated.⁵⁶ The shogun deeply regretted that his gracious order regarding dogs had not been duly respected by the people. Therefore, all owners of dogs were required to give full descriptions of their dogs, stating the color, sex, size, and age of each dog. These reports were to be sent to the government. If a dog should go astray and its whereabouts be unknown, the owner and his friends should organize search parties to find it. Should they fail to find the dog, the matter should be reported to the government. If a strange dog should appear in a neighborhood, its finder must take good care of it. He should also try to find the owner of the dog, and should report the matter to the government.

The following record shows how many laws regarding domestic animals and other living creatures were promulgated in the year 1687 alone, and how many government officials were punished for failure to observe them. It is unnecessary to say that thousands of the common people were exiled or imprisoned for like failures.⁵⁷

January 28, 1687, the law regarding domestic animals was promulgated.

February 4, the chief of the bureau of the shogun's cuisine was exiled and his family estate confiscated because of the accidental deaths of two cats.

February 21, the law regarding the family records of dogs was promulgated.

February 24, the shogun refused to receive his advisors and councilors because the laws with regard to domestic animals had not been rigidly enforced.

February 27, the law prohibiting the keeping of fishes, chickens, turtles, and other living creatures for food purposes was promulgated.

March 21, the law prohibiting the keeping of birds in cages, and the keeping of fish in garden ponds, was promulgated.

April 10, Izumi, an official, killed a barking dog. His estate was confiscated and he was exiled for life to a distant island.

April 11, many farmers in the village of Oda conjointly threw some sick horses into a pond. A government ordinance was then issued that the crime committed was so serious as to merit capital punishment, but by special favor the offenders would be exiled only. However, similar offenses would thenceforth bring capital punishment.

April 28, a number of petty officials under the charge of Mizuno, Chief of the Middle Gate Station, threw stones at some doves that were sitting on the roof of the gate. These officers were suspended from duty.

June 26, the law for the punishment of persons who were found to be teasing domestic animals in the streets was promulgated.

June 26, a son of a samurai in the service of Lord Akita killed a swallow with an arrow from a blowgun, in order to use the bird for medicine. Both he and his father were beheaded. Lord Akita was not punished, because he promptly reported the matter to the authorities.

July 20, the law punishing drivers of wagons and other vehicles who hurt dogs while driving was promulgated.

November 10, the law punishing persons who ill-treated or hurt any living thing was promulgated.

December 23, the law punishing persons who drove old and sick horses away was made more stringent. The authorities were thereby permitted to behead such offenders.⁵⁸

For nearly a quarter-century, Tsunayoshi devoted himself almost entirely to the showing of mercy and kindness to animals and other living creatures, and mercilessly punished persons who did not care for animals in the ways he desired. He maintained his proanimal and antihuman policy as long as he

lived. On October 23, 1708, three months before his death, he promulgated a law detailing how mercy and sympathy should be shown to riding and driving horses when they became old and sick. On October 27, 1708, he exiled four members of his bodyguard because it was reported that they had been cruel to animals.⁶⁰ On the same date, three other members of his bodyguard were discharged because they had treated their horses unkindly. On November 9, 1708, just a month and a half before his death, he promulgated a law prohibiting the killing of dogs stricken with rabies, by the provisions of which offenders were to be severely punished. A noted historian of that time describes how Tsunayoshi made the laws relating to animals more severe and enforced them as if he enjoyed punishing offenders.⁶¹ In his book, this historian states that vicious dogs might not be whipped, not even when they bit people; and under no circumstances were men permitted to kill them. All the officials in the government who were privileged to present themselves before Tsunayoshi were strictly prohibited from eating any kind of meat, including chicken and other fowls, and even fish and eggs. The people were required to love and protect all living things, including insects. Poisonous snakes were not to be killed, even though the lives of human beings were endangered. Men were advised to show great willingness to be bitten by lice, fleas, and mosquitoes.

In those days, it was not uncommon for men who had wounded dogs to be beheaded. Those who had killed dogs were beheaded and their heads were exposed to the public view, as if they had been traitors to the nation.⁶² If a dog were taken ill, its owner and his neighbors should gather around it and care for it as best they might. Of course they had to send for a "dog doctor" immediately. So-called dog doctors multiplied exceedingly, and became very prosperous.

When puppies were born, not only the members of the family that owned the dog, but all the neighbors as well, were required to take care of the mother dog and her litter until the

government official to whom the births were reported had come and made his inspection.⁸² The owner of the dog was not only required to make prompt report of the births; he had also to report from time to time the physical condition and growth of the puppies. If any of them died, the owner, after having had the dead puppies inspected by the proper official, was required to bury them with ceremony.

Official documents show what steps had to be taken by the owner of a dog when puppies were born. An example from among many reads as follows:

"On the 18th day of May, the white female dog which our family has raised gave birth to two white puppies. Of this birth, I have already reported to the government on May 20th. Several days ago, one of these puppies began to act oddly. I promptly sent for Gorobey, a dog doctor, and asked him to diagnose the case and give the necessary medical treatment. While under the charge of this doctor, the puppy became worse. Unfortunately, it died this morning. I hereby pledge my honor that the said puppy had never sustained any bodily injury, and that it died from natural causes. This report is presented to your office by me and I stand ready to present myself at your office and to answer any questions whatever with regard to this puppy.

"[Dated] July 3d in the Ninth Year of the Genroku Era.

"[Signed] SHIBUYE SHOUN-JI, owner of the dog.

GOROBEY, dog doctor.

"I, Tenshin-Ji, being an actual witness of this happening, hereby testify that the statements of Shibuye Shoun-Ji are correct.

"[Signed] ASABU TENSIN-JI [Official seal]"⁸³

Another document presents a typical case.

"Shoyemon, the tenant in a cottage that I own, has reported to me that this morning about six o'clock he heard the barking of a dog and the cries of puppies under the floor of the cottage. I, Ibey, the owner of the cottage, accompanied by three officers of the 'Five-Family Government,' together with a dog

doctor, went to Shoyemon's cottage. After having removed some of the floor boards, we found that a white and yellow dog had given birth to two puppies. I am giving herewith a complete description of this event.

"One white and yellow mother dog. Two good-sized female puppies, one of which was black and white and the other pure black. The mother and the two puppies are well and strong. After having made careful inquiries of all the people in the neighborhood, we cannot find the owner of the mother dog.

"[Dated] October 20th in the Second Year of the Kuan-Yei Era.

"[Seal] IBEY, owner of the cottage.

"SHOYEMON [Seal]. ICHIBEY [Seal]. SHOSUKE [Seal]

Three officials of the Five-Family Government.

"KOYEMON [Seal]. SOTARO [Seal]"⁶⁴

Inspectors.

These official reports may seem ludicrous and hardly credible; yet innumerable documents of the kind are to be found in the Tokugawa archives. They were not comical to the Japanese of that day. The people had to take everything seriously and gravely. Any slight deviation from the provisions of the animal laws might bring the death penalty. In August, 1693, a merchant who was returning to his home late at night was attacked by barking dogs. In defending himself, he hurt one of the dogs. His neighbor reported the matter to the government. The merchant was arrested and beheaded, and the person who made the report received a thirty-dollar reward. In October, 1704, when one of the shogun's bodyguard, accompanied by his retainer, was returning home from the shogun's palace, he was set upon by a pack of dogs.⁶⁵ The retainer, in seeking to protect his master, accidentally killed one of them. The member of the bodyguard was exiled to a distant island and the retainer was beheaded. On May 29, 1705, Tsunayoshi suspended Matsuda, his trusted chamberlain, confined him to his house, and forbade all communication from the outside.

Matsuda suffered this severe punishment because a member of his family had not taken care of an old, sick horse which had been wandering in the vicinity of his residence. These examples are but a few among thousands of similar punishments suffered by the people year after year.

On March 20, 1707, Tsunayoshi promulgated a law which prohibited the burying of dead dogs and of other animals without their first being inspected by government officials, who had to certify that they had died natural deaths. On August 11 of the same year, the selling and buying of fishes and fowls of every kind was prohibited, and petty officers were appointed whose duty was to spy upon violators of this law. According to the records, a number of government officials were commanded to commit *harakiri* (self-destruction) because they had fished as a pastime.

It is difficult to conceive of the degree to which the Japanese under the rule of Tsunayoshi suffered by reason of his tyranny, which, nevertheless, was prompted by humane motives. The people not only did not oppose his policy; they even showed a readiness to comply with his desires. Consequently, in those days, whenever families of the ruling class and those of high social standing employed either men or women, they always required of them a written pledge, duly sworn to, as follows:

"I hereby promise that neither I nor any member of my family will ever eat fowl, fish, shellfish, or even eggs. I also promise that under no circumstances will either myself or any member of my family kill fleas, mosquitoes, flies, or any other insects or worms."¹⁰⁶

In consequence of the enforcement of these animal laws for nearly a decade, even the birds and animals knew they were safe. Large flocks of sparrows and crows destroyed the standing crops. Wolves and boars frequently came in large numbers to the farming districts, where they destroyed standing grain, corn, and other products. They even endangered human life. The farmers were allowed to drive them away only by beating

drums, tom-toms, and the like, or, rarely, by firing blank cartridges. However, they were strictly forbidden to kill or hurt any of the birds, wolves, or boars.⁶⁷

Japanese dogs are very prolific. They breed twice a year, giving birth each time to from two to six puppies. Hence, in Tsunayoshi's time, in consequence of the enforcement of the dog laws, a male and a female dog might become the progenitors of a family of dogs which within two years might number one hundred members. Within a few years after the promulgation of the dog laws, a tremendous increase in dogs was noticed. The military capital, Yedo, was full of stray dogs. In order to house these dogs properly, the shogun set aside a large tract of 50,000 square yards in the Okubo district, a suburb of Yedo,⁶⁸ and ordered that a number of dog shelters be built thereon, where stray dogs might be gathered, cared for, and fed. Because this tract was soon filled, in September of the following year (1695) an additional dog settlement was established, at a place called Nakano, near Yedo. The area of this new tract was 320,000 square yards. Later, two others were established. Thus were four large dog settlements maintained under the direct control of the shogunate government. A governor of the dog settlements was appointed; under him four dog mayors, several dog doctors, and hundreds of petty officials served. Thousands of stray dogs were gathered daily and brought to these government dog settlements in the suburbs of Yedo. According to official records, the total number of dogs received in these settlements during the first two years (May 25, 1695, to April 25, 1697) was 40,748. It is said that within less than a year thereafter there were more than 100,000. According to the official report for the first year, made by the governor of the dog settlements under date of December 25, 1695, 16,500 bushels of rice, 10 large barrels of bayo beans, and 10 large sacks of dried sardines were consumed daily by the dogs. Several cords of firewood were used daily in the cooking of this food.

On January 10, 1709, Tsunayoshi died, at the age of sixty-

three years. Notwithstanding his great desire and efforts to have a son to succeed him as shogun, he died without an heir. But he did not lament that his prayers to Buddha were unanswered. He did not regret having framed and enforced animal laws. His dying request was this:

"The national laws and codes may be changed and modified to meet the changing conditions of the nation. However, because all the laws regarding dogs and all other living creatures have been prepared and promulgated by me in strict accordance with divine and human doctrines, they should be adhered to after my death without modification, from generation to generation."⁶⁹

In January, 1709, Iyenobu, the Shimpan feudal lord of Kofu, who was a nephew of Tsunayoshi, succeeded to the headship of the Tokugawa, and was thereupon appointed by the emperor as the sixth shogun. Immediately upon his succession, Iyenobu repealed all the animal laws, saying that although it had been the dying request of the former shogun that they should continue to be observed, yet, because of these laws, many hundreds of thousands of people had been mercilessly punished, most to them having been put to death, and unless the laws were promptly repealed there would be no way by which the people might be relieved from their sufferings.⁷⁰ At the same time, he caused careful investigation to be made of the cases of all persons who had been arrested for violations of the animal laws, and who were being detained in prisons in Yedo and in near-by districts. The total number released by him was 9500.

Some historians say that Tsunayoshi was a man of despotic and arbitrary nature, with semi-insane tendencies. Others emphasize that he was a man of great intellectual and literary attainments. He was especially noted for his scholarly knowledge of the Chinese classics. He was also the first shogun to deal with the throne and the imperial court with respect and reverence.⁷¹ He provided for the imperial family more liberally than had his predecessors, so that the emperor and the members of his

family might enjoy a more comfortable life. Tsunayoshi also sent men of scholarly ability to various parts of Japan and had them search for the burial places of various former emperors so that due reverence might be shown them. But no historian can deny that Tsunayoshi was a shogun for men for the first six years that he was in power, and a shogun for dogs for the remaining twenty-two years. It cannot be denied that during these twenty-two years he acted as if he had come into this world for the sole purpose of serving dogs and other creatures, rather than human beings. He showed affection, mercy, and sympathy to the dogs in all possible ways; he ignored and even denied to human beings the rights and privileges that were their due. Consequently he has been well named the "Dog Shogun." Tsunayoshi was the only shogun whose death caused nation-wide rejoicing.⁷³ The people congratulated each other, saying that thenceforth they would be dealt with as beings superior to dogs.

In September, 1786, Iyeharu, the tenth shogun, died without a son to succeed him. Iyenari, the Shimpan feudal lord of Hitotsubashi, was then announced as head of the Tokugawa. In March, 1787, Iyenari was appointed by Kokaku, the 118th emperor, as the eleventh shogun. Iyenari ruled Japan for the fifty years ending in 1837. Of the fifteen Tokugawa shoguns, he ruled the longest and enjoyed the most extravagant and luxurious life. The eleventh shogun was not so despotic and arbitrary a ruler as the fifth shogun had been, but both Iyenari⁷⁴ and Tsunayoshi were notorious for their loose morals. Besides his legal wife, Iyenari had many concubines. Those recorded in history alone number forty. The women's quarters in the shogun's palace constituted the most disorderly part of the Yedo castle. Out of jealousy and rivalry, the women favorites of the shogun quarreled continuously. Some were killed. Others died in a hunger strike. About sixty sons and daughters were born to Iyenari⁷⁴ by these women. Unlike Tsunayoshi, who sought in vain to get a son, Iyenari had to struggle to provide for the ever-increasing number of his sons and daughters. As we have noted

previously, when an emperor had many children, there was only one way for him to dispose of them. With the exception of that one of the imperial princes who was selected to be heir apparent to the throne, all the princes and princesses had to be sent to Buddhist monasteries or nunneries to become priests and nuns.⁷⁵ But Iyenari never condescended to make any of his children lead religious lives and thus to refrain from having families of their own.

He realized, of course, that it would be impossible for the shogunate family to provide for all his children in a way to permit of their becoming Shimpan feudal lords, and therefore he devised a different plan for their welfare. He first carefully investigated the family conditions of all the powerful feudal lords. He then requested some of the feudal lords who had sons to have their respective heirs marry his daughters; he further requested other feudal lords who had no heirs to adopt some of his sons and make them their respective successors. In this way, Iyenari schemed to make his sons and daughters either the male successors or the wives of the heirs of powerful feudal lords.⁷⁶ By this arrangement, he succeeded in providing homes for his children, and at the same time placed powerful feudal lords under the control of the shogun. Throughout the period of nearly three hundred years of the Tokugawa rule, most of the shoguns exercised their arbitrary and despotic power just as Tsunayoshi and Iyenari did, in order to advance their own interests as well as those of the Tokugawa family and of the shogunate. However, none of the feudal lords could take any other course than to acquiesce in the desires of the shogun, as unquestioning obedience to the shogun was required of them all.

The complete organization of the Tokugawa shogunate took three generations, ending in the rule of Iyemitsu, the third shogun.⁷⁷ The seclusion and segregation laws, as well as the military constitutions⁷⁸ of the Tokugawa, were well provided with teeth. By reason of his bodyguard, then about 80,000 strong, his financial strength, and the control of all strategic geographical

locations throughout Japan, the shogun was in a position to dictate to all the feudal lords. After having eliminated all sources and elements of national disturbance, and after having deprived the feudal lords of their military power, the shogun granted autonomy to all feudal lords and to others in ruling authority. Consequently the local feudal governments, the village governments, and the five-family governments were free to administer their local affairs as they wished, without direction, dictation, or interference from the shogunate government. However, in all relations between the higher and the lower units of government, and in the individual relations between men of higher and of lower standing, the higher had absolute authority over the lower and demanded of them unquestioning obedience. Therefore, each unit of government and each individual was in a dual position, being a helpless slave to the higher and at the same time a master with absolute authority over the lower.⁷⁹ The word of the shogun was law to the feudal lords. The words of the feudal lords were law to the samurai. The words of the samurai were law to the people of the common class. Interstate affairs between the shogunate government, the local feudal governments, the village governments, and the five-family governments were similarly conducted. The Tokugawa shogunate was a political institution in which the principles of military despotism and of autonomy were peculiarly blended.

Although each individual had to submit to a higher authority to whom he owed unquestioning obedience, yet he was never wholly reduced to being a submissive and spiritless individual, because he realized that he, in turn, was master of others. In fact, throughout the Tokugawa rule each individual owed slavish obedience to those of a higher order so that he might establish his claim of absolute authority over those below him. Hence the political and ethical code in Japan required that if a lord was not as righteous and noble as a lord should be, his subjects should nevertheless always be loyal and faithful to

him; and if parents were not as kind and affectionate to their children as parents should be, the children still owed them filial affection and obedience.⁵⁰ This code emphasized that a feudal lord should render unquestioning obedience to the will and desires of the shogun whether the latter were right or wrong, just or unjust. A feudal lord might demand unquestioning obedience from his subjects. Unless children rendered unreserved obedience to their parents, they, after having grown up, had no claim to obedience from their own children. Thus the rendering of submission to others was essential to the gaining of submission from others. Throughout the Tokugawa period, therefore, unquestioning obedience was readily and cheerfully rendered by people of every class, in order that they in turn might receive unquestioning obedience from those next below. The Tokugawa shogunate was one of the strongest and most powerful political institutions of its kind in the history of the world. It had remarkable functions and facilities. Yet it was so peculiar that many of the happenings during that period seem mythical.

Certain traits and characteristics of the Japanese of the present day are quite puzzling to Occidentals. Such phenomena as the "human bullets" of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) and the "human dynamite" in the military struggle at Shanghai (1932) should not be lightly passed over as a suicidal mania into which the Japanese plunge in the event of war, as is frequently assumed by Occidentals. The loyalty and patriotism of the Japanese can hardly be comprehended from an Occidental viewpoint. The Japanese have traits and characteristics that they have inherited from their forefathers, who gained them during the Tokugawa rule of 264 years. The life and thought of modern Japan cannot be comprehended without a knowledge of conditions during the Tokugawa rule.

During the period of fifty years, ending in 1837, when Japan was under the rule of Iyenari, the eleventh shogun, the Tokugawa shogunate was at the height of its power; thereafter it

took a downward course.⁸¹ The advance of Russia toward northern Japan, and her demands for trade privileges, threatened the seclusion policy of Japan. The arbitrary and determined opposition of Iyenari to the imperial desires aroused national sympathy for the throne, thus threatening the policy of imperial seclusion.⁸² And thus, in the most prosperous period of the rule of the Tokugawa, the shogunate government began to lose its security.

CHAPTER VII

The Approach of Russia to Japan from the North and Japan's Reaction

ON MAY 25* IN THE FOURTH YEAR of the Genbun era (1739), a foreign ship appeared off the coast of Nagasa County in the Province of Awa. The men aboard the ship effected a landing and gave a few silver coins to a Japanese named Ichiyemon.¹ Three days later, the same vessel touched the coast of Ojika County in the Province of Mutsu, and again men from the ship gave silver coins to a Japanese—a farmer, whose name was Heizaburo. Both Ichiyemon and Heizaburo reported the matter to the government and handed over to officials the silver coins. The coast guard at Shimoda in Kamo County in the Province of Izu reported to the government that on May 28* a foreign ship had sailed along the coast, and that the chief officer of the guard, together with several men, had boarded the coast-guard vessel and gone out to meet it.² Although the foreign ship had sailed away with great speed, thus making it impossible for the coast-guard vessel to approach it within one hundred yards' distance, yet the following particulars had been noted: (1) the ship was approximately one hundred feet in length; (2) it was painted black; and (3) about thirty men were aboard it.³

This daring approach of a foreign ship to the coast of Japan was the first since Japan had entered upon the period of national seclusion. The shogunate government, naturally, was concerned, and desirous of finding out the nationality of the ship and of the men aboard. It therefore forwarded to Nagasaki the silver coins given to Ichiyemon and Heizaburo by the strangers, with instructions to the local government to obtain all possible information about them from the Dutch traders in Deshima;⁴ and presently an official report brought the informa-

* An asterisk indicates that the dates are in the Japanese lunar calendar.

tion that the coins were of the national currency of Russia, a rising nation which was steadily extending its domain over both Europe and Asia. This was the first time that the Tokugawa shogunate was made aware of the existence of Russia.

Alarmed by this episode and determined to forestall any possible recurrences, the shogunate government in June, 1739, about a month after the coming of the Russian ship to the coast of Japan, issued the following instructions to all officers of the coast guard:

"Our government has been informed that in May of this year a foreign ship boldly appeared off our coast near Awa, Mutsu, and other provinces. You are hereby instructed that, if any foreign ship henceforth appears off our coast and lands men, your officers are to arrest and detain them and make a report to our government. If the ship and the men aboard escape, your officers are not required to pursue it by sending out a coast-guard vessel. However, it will be advisable, if possible, for you to arrest a man or two from the ship so that we may be able to inform ourselves of the nationality of the ship and of its purpose in coming."

While Japan was enjoying, in strict seclusion, happy dreams of peace and prosperity, believing that she could control the seas surrounding her and enforce respect of her seclusion law, conditions in the world outside were undergoing radical changes.⁶ Occidental powers began to take a keen interest in the Orient, and their spheres of influence approached nearer and nearer to Japan. The most prominent of the nations that threatened Japan's seclusion were Russia, from the north, England, from the west, and the United States, from the east.⁷ No matter how strictly Japan adhered to her seclusion policy, conditions in the outside world were such that contact with one or another, if not all three, of these nations, was sooner or later inevitable. Had not the successful functioning of the seclusion law for more than a century made Japan positive of her ability to order her existence as she willed, she would have realized much

sooner that with Russia—and later with England, and with the United States, as they came to her shores—she was not dealing with a nation that would submit to the restrictions under which The Netherlands had maintained trade in Japan during the seclusion period. It was inconceivable that any one of these three nations would have tolerated for its subjects the conditions under which Dutch traders were forced to live in Deshima.⁸

In the eighteenth century, England had succeeded Spain and Portugal in leadership of empire and had become the unrivaled sea power of the world. She had established herself in India, and was ambitious to extend her influence throughout the Far East. Her successful approach to China and Japan was but a question of time. The gradual rise of the United States of America after she had gained her independence, and her ever-increasing interests and influence on the Pacific Coast, made her contact with Japan inevitable. As for Russia, she first completed her occupancy of the northeastern part of Asia and then gained control of the waters of the Bering Sea.⁹ A desire to open Japan to trade was thus aroused in Russia also.

Which of these three nations would first approach and succeed in reopening Japan, was a vital problem in the Orient.¹⁰ The nation that surprised and awakened Japan from her long sleep was neither England nor the United States, as is generally believed, but Russia.¹¹ Japan gradually came to realize the seriousness of the situation and the impossibility of longer maintaining seclusion. For a period of nearly a century and a half, beginning in the Tenmei era (1781–88), that is, not long after the first contacts of the Japanese and Russians, and ending in the Meiji era (1868–1912), Russia was regarded as a menace to Japan. Throughout this long period, Japan planned and conducted her national affairs and her defensive measures with Russia in mind. Russia was always regarded as a nation that threatened the very existence of Japan.¹² In fact, Russia and the Russians were a nightmare to both the government and the people of Japan; the ever-increasing advance of Russia in the

Far East was a source of apprehension and unrest among Japanese of all classes. This national fear reached its climax in 1904, in the reign of the Emperor Meiji. Although it practically came to an end with the successful termination of the war with Russia in 1905, yet even at the present time the fear of propagation of Communism in Japan is acting both directly and indirectly in the minds of leading Japanese, creating for them a Russian menace to Japan in a new form.¹³

As early as the latter part of the eighteenth century, the question of how Japan should deal with Russia was being discussed by Japanese intellectuals. In the Tenmei era (1781-88), Heisuke Kudo wrote a book entitled *Kamusatsuka-Ki* ("An Account of Kamchatka"), in which he said that the district then known as "Northern Tartary" (Siberia) had become a part of Russia's domain, and urged that Japan should thoroughly acquaint herself with existing conditions in that quarter.¹⁴ She could permit herself to disregard entirely that vast district when it was inhabited only by barbarian tribes, who were as ignorant and lacking in intelligence as were the Ainu in Yezo; but now that Siberia had become an integral part of so great a nation as Russia, Japan ought to show serious concern over Russia's activities there. Although Russia, of all nations, was the one most dangerous to Japan and most feared by her, Japanese men of affairs—even those who were closely connected with national and military affairs—were ignorant of the actual conditions in that country.

While Japan maintained her hands-off policy beyond her borders, without knowing anything of the situation in the outer world, the Russians approached the Japanese in all possible ways in an effort to gain their confidence. They even studied the Japanese language.¹⁵ They sailed along the coasts of Japan, investigating and acquainting themselves with the condition of the country. This was not a time for Japan to conduct her national affairs in a half-conscious way. The essential things to be done were, first, to complete the national defense, and sec-

ond, to prevent the "smuggling trade." However, all things considered, no policy could be sounder and more effective than to reopen the country and enter on a national scale into trade relations with foreign lands. Should Japan engage in trade with other nations, she would have an opportunity to learn the customs, manners, and conditions of the nations with which she traded.¹⁶

Thus, as early as the eighteenth century, some three-quarters of a century before Japan was forced by the United States of America to reopen her doors, Kudo foresaw that the establishment of trade relations with Russia and with other nations was not only inevitable, but that it would be the best way for Japan to learn something of the world outside, and thereby to prepare herself to meet the Russian advance from the north. Of the three Occidental powers that were gradually approaching Japan from three different directions, the United States of America, being at that time but a newly founded nation, was not in a position to center her national energy upon the reopening of Japan.¹⁷ England, after her request of 1673 for the renewal of her trade privileges had been denied, had made no serious efforts to reopen Japan, probably owing to the course of affairs in Europe.

On the other hand, Russia freed herself from the Mongol-Tartar yoke in 1480.¹⁸ By reason of her geographical proximity, as well as because firm organization was lacking among the Asiatic tribes in Siberia, she began, in the last two decades of the sixteenth century, to extend her rule eastward. In 1639, the Russians had reached the Sea of Okhotsk. They were checked in their attempt to control the Amur by the Emperor Kang-Hsi of China and in 1689 were forced to sign the Treaty of Nerchinsk. Prevented thus from turning south, the Russian advance turned northeast into Kamchatka early in the eighteenth century. The chief motive of this remarkable expansion was commerce—the lucrative local trade in furs, and trade in the Far East in general.¹⁹ When the expansion had progressed

far beyond the food-producing regions of European Russia, the problem of supplying a region such as eastern Siberia, and especially Kamchatka, with grain and other food to counteract scurvy, became a problem of serious proportions. At first, the Russians had to reach Kamchatka by sea from Okhotsk, because the land route from Yakutsk was difficult and dangerous. Then, as they were making sure that they could establish themselves in these regions permanently, the search for sources of food (other than meat) led them to desire trade with Japan, China, and other countries. Ultimately, after Alaska was added to the Russian Empire, this same food problem led the Russians to California and to the Hawaiian Islands.²⁰

It is evident from Japanese accounts that the Japanese regarded the Russian occupation of Siberia as something the Russians had no right to undertake.²¹ When, early in the eighteenth century, active exploration was undertaken by the Russians in the region of Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japanese were confronted with the problem at first hand. In 1706, Vasili Kolesov ordered his servingmen from Kamchatka to pacify the natives on the Kurile Islands and to collect a tribute in furs from them. The advance was actually taken up in 1711, and the two nearest islands were occupied and others to the south were explored.

While this was going on, Peter the Great became interested, through academicians whom he met on his journey to western Europe, in an expedition to determine whether Asia and North America were united by land. Small success had attended the efforts of Ivan Evreinov in 1720 to explore the seas washing the shores of Kamchatka. Accordingly, Peter the Great decided in 1725 to send out an expedition under Captain Vitus Bering. It got under way in 1728. Bering headed another expedition in 1741.

Although only the public instructions for these expeditions have been published, it is known that there were also secret instructions. From the materials available, it is evident that

Bering was not only to find out "the relation between Asia and America" and to increase geographical knowledge thereby, but also to reach the Amur River by land and sea and to open Japan to trade. In Bering's proposal for a second expedition, written in 1731, there is the following passage: "It would not be without advantage to find a sea route from the Kamchatka or Okhota River to the Amur or Japan, since it is known that these regions are inhabited."²²

The problem of exploring Japanese waters and of establishing trade routes to Japan, which Bering had proposed, was undertaken by Lieutenant Martin Spanberg.²³ In 1735, Spanberg went overland to eastern Siberia. Upon his arrival at Okhotsk, he immediately started to build ships for the purpose of exploring the coasts of Japan. On June 18 (O.S.), 1738, a fleet of three ships, the "Arkhangel Mikhail," the "Nadezhda," and the "St. Gabriel," left the Sea of Okhotsk under the command of Spanberg, assisted by Walton and Schelting.²⁴ These ships sailed southward along the Kurile Archipelago.

On August 3 (O.S.), when the fleet was approaching Urup Island, it was overtaken by a great storm, and this was followed by a dense fog. Because of these hardships and the shortage of provisions, the plan to reach Japan was given up temporarily, and the fleet returned to the Bolshaia River, on the western coast of Kamchatka.²⁵

In the winter of 1738-39, Spanberg built an additional ship. On May 22 (O.S.), 1739, after having completed further extensive preparations, the fleet, which then consisted of four ships under the command of Spanberg, left Bol'sheretsk. All four ships reached the northernmost island (Paramusir) of the Kuriles, whence they took a southeastern course.²⁶ On June 14 (O.S.), the fleet was overtaken by a heavy storm. The "St. Gabriel," in charge of Walton, was separated from the fleet. Spanberg took the remaining three ships southward until he reached latitude 39° N, from whence he was able to observe the coast of Japan at a great distance.²⁷ Steering toward the coast, on June

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18 (O.S.) he succeeded in reaching a Japanese port and in anchoring his ships in the harbor. On land, he saw several villages backed by well-wooded mountain ranges. Later, two Japanese sailing vessels approached the Russian fleet, but they did not come within two hundred feet of it; Spanberg signaled to them to come on, but they did not respond. Believing it useless to remain longer in one place, he ordered his ships to get under weigh. On June 20 (O.S.), while further exploring the Japanese coast, he saw a great number of Japanese sailing vessels near by.²⁸ On the 22d his fleet reached latitude $38^{\circ} 25'$ N. It then cast anchor. Two Japanese fishing boats, laden with fish, rice, tobacco, and other commodities, approached the Russian ships, thus indicating their desire to trade. Later, a great number of small Japanese boats gathered around the Russian fleet and watched the men on board. One day a large Japanese ship, carrying a number of officers and many men, approached. Spanberg invited four of the Japanese officers, who were apparently of high rank, to enter his cabin. After having given them refreshments and wine, he showed them a globe of the world and a marine chart. The Japanese officers readily recognized their country and located many of their islands and ports, calling them "Nippon," "Matsumaye," "Sado," "Tsugaru," and so on.²⁹ In the afternoon, the same fishing boats again approached the Russian fleet, this time carrying several kinds of commodities, and engaged in trade.

Spanberg felt certain that his fleet had actually reached Japan, and that he had accomplished the work entrusted to him by the Russian government—to discover the water route between Kamchatka and Japan, and to define the main geographical features of Japan. He thereupon ordered his fleet to hoist anchor and sail for home. On July 3 (O.S.) he came across a large island in latitude $43^{\circ} 15'$ N, where he took on a supply of fresh water. Later he found that this island was one of the Kuriles. For several days he cruised among the Kuriles, locating and naming many of the larger islands of the archipelago,

and these he entered on the marine chart.³⁰ On August 15 (O.S.), 1739, all three ships of his fleet returned safely to Kamchatka. Because Spanberg's description of Japan contains many errors, some scholars have been of the opinion that he cruised along the coast of Korea, mistaking it for the coast of Japan.

The "St. Gabriel," which had been separated from the fleet on June 14 (O.S.), 1739, on account of the great storm, kept on its southward course.³¹ This ship was under the command of Walton. On June 16th it reached latitude 38° 17' N, where the coast of Japan Proper could be seen at a distance. It sailed southward, keeping the Japanese coast in view. On June 17 a number of large Japanese vessels, sailing in various directions, were observed. By closely following one of the largest of these Japanese ships, the "St. Gabriel" reached waters from which a large village could be seen. Walton anchored his ship opposite the village. That same afternoon, men from a Japanese ship visited his ship. Their attitude was very friendly. When this Japanese ship was about to return to the coast, Walton sent with them two of his petty officers with instructions to obtain a supply of fresh water. The Japanese in the village received these Russians in a kindly fashion, not only supplying them with water, but also treating them to refreshments and wine.³² A short time after the petty officers had returned to their ship, more than a hundred small Japanese ships gathered around the Russian ship and watched its movements closely. They continued to come in ever-increasing numbers, practically surrounding the Russian ship. Finally Walton began to fear possible trouble. He therefore ordered his men to hoist anchor and to sail out of Japanese waters.

On June 22 (O.S.) the "St. Gabriel" again approached the Japanese coast in search of a port in which to anchor. Walton saw a Japanese sailing vessel approaching his ship. He had his men display a large empty water bucket, bottom up, to let the Japanese know that the ship was in need of water. The Japanese, readily understanding, promptly returned to land and

came back with a liberal supply of fresh water. At the same time, they handed a written document to Walton; but neither he nor any of his men could read it.³³ A little later, another Japanese ship, with armed men aboard, sailed toward the "St. Gabriel." Fearing possible trouble, Walton promptly ordered his men to sail out of Japanese waters. As summer was rapidly approaching, the men in the Russian ship suffered intensely from the increasing heat, and therefore, on June 24 (O.S.), with the purpose of getting a supply of water, the "St. Gabriel" again anchored near the Japanese coast, and Walton sent the under-constable of the ship and the ship's physician ashore. They were unable to get any water, but they brought back with them some oranges and medicinal herbs. After having explored various parts of the coast and entered his findings on the marine chart, Walton decided to sail home. On July 23 (O.S.), 1739, the "St. Gabriel" reached the estuary of the Bolshaia River, after having waited in vain until August 7 for the rest of the fleet.³⁴ Walton sailed through the Sea of Okhotsk and landed at the city of the same name. There he reported to the Russian authorities the results of his explorations in Japanese waters. He also presented to them the marine chart which he had prepared.

Because of numerous errors in both the report and the chart, it has been questioned whether the expedition really reached Japan. The content of Spanberg's report agrees fairly well with the description of his visit in Japanese waters to be found in such Japanese books as *Hokkai Uhaku Ki* ("Records of Black Vessels That Appeared in the Northern Seas"), *Hokuhen Tanji* ("Affairs in Northern Districts Consequent upon Explorations and Research"), *Henyo Bunkai Zuko* ("Study of the Northern Districts and Their Boundaries, Together with Their Maps"), *Genbun-Seisetsu Zatsuroku* ("Various Records Regarding Prevailing Accepted Accounts During the Genbun Era, 1736-40"), all of which were published in the latter part of the eighteenth century.³⁵ According to the descriptions in these books, on May 23,* 1739, in the waters off the coast at Hitawashi village,

in the Province of Mutsu, two large black ships made their appearance. These ships stayed for more than a day and sailed away on the 24th. Two days later the fleet was increased by an additional ship, thus making three, and entered the waters off the coast of Isomura (village) and anchored there. On May 28 all three of the ships sailed northward and anchored off the coast of Miishi promontory in the Province of Mutsu. In almost the same way as Spanberg stated in his report, the Japanese book entitled *Genbun-Seisetsu Zatsuroku* describes how Japanese fishing boats had approached the Russian fleet and engaged in trade by exchanging fish, tobacco, and other commodities for Russian articles. The fact that Spanberg had shown a globe of the world and a marine chart to the Japanese officers who visited the Russian ship is mentioned in this book.

Every time that Spanberg had approached the Japanese coast, he had shown great caution and had made the stay of his fleet as brief as possible, thus avoiding possible trouble with the Japanese.⁸⁶ Although in those days some local Japanese officials and residents probably showed friendly feelings toward foreigners, yet both the central and local Japanese governments adhered strictly to the policy of national seclusion. Therefore, when foreign ships were reported as appearing in Japanese waters along the coast of the Province of Mutsu on May 26, 1739, the lord of that province ordered the chief officer of the county to go at once to the coast with sixty fighting men. On May 27 the preparations for sending firearms and ammunition, and additional troops as well, were completed. But Spanberg had foreseen this possibility and had already sailed away.

All three entries of the "St. Gabriel" into Japanese waters under the command of Walton are recorded in the official reports of the local governments. Moreover, these events are mentioned in some of the Japanese publications of those days. According to a statement in the *Genbun-Seisetsu Zatsuroku*, on May 25, 1739, a foreign ship appeared off the coast of Amatsu village, Nagusa County, Awa Province.⁸⁷ (It was here that Wal-

ton ordered a number of his men to make a landing in order to obtain a supply of fresh water.) Two men, named Tarobei and Manyemon, responded promptly to the request of foreigners from the ships. They gathered a number of others and set them to drawing water from near-by wells. While waiting for the water, the foreigners asked for vegetables, and in return for them they gave silver coins. After the foreigners had left the village, the matter was reported to the local feudal government by Tarobei. Thereupon the chief officers sent several ships after the foreign vessel; but before the Japanese could approach them, the foreign ships had sailed away, and because they departed speedily the Japanese ships could not overtake them.

According to the report of Lieutenant Walton, several Japanese had visited the "St. Gabriel" and had been well received; indeed, they had engaged in trade with the Russians aboard, exchanging commodities with them. Nevertheless, when the local Japanese made an official report, they merely stated that on a certain date a foreign ship had appeared off the coast, and that some of the men aboard had landed and had given silver coins to some of the villagers.³⁸ Because they feared punishment by the government, they did not mention their visit to the Russian ship, and the fact that they had both engaged in trade and supplied fresh water to the ship.

After having sailed out of the waters along the coast of the Amatsu village, the "St. Gabriel" took a southwesterly course. On May 28,* 1739, a foreign ship appeared off the coast of Shimoda, Izu Province, and explored the waters along the coast. The chief officer at Shimoda ordered his men to go aboard and hand the ship's captain a written statement requesting him to leave Japanese waters at once. This incident corresponds exactly to a statement made in Walton's official report, in which he said that the Japanese had sent a note to the ship but that neither he nor the other men on the ship could read it.

It is interesting to note that the official report made by Spanberg, and especially the reports made by Walton, agree in

almost every detail with the account given in the official reports and in other Japanese documents. These facts prove that in the first half of the eighteenth century Russian ships for the first time in the Period of Seclusion approached the Japanese coast.

After having returned to Okhotsk, August 29 (O.S.), 1739, Spanberg reported to Bering that if the fleet for the exploration of Japanese waters had not encountered a storm in the Kurile Archipelago and if his ships and Walton's ship had not been separated, all the northern islands of the Kuriles might have been conquered and occupied.³⁹ After spending the winter of 1739 at Yakutsk, Spanberg went to St. Petersburg and made a detailed report of his explorations. On April 15 (O.S.), 1740, he returned to Okhotsk by way of Yakutsk, and in Okhotsk, in accordance with the instructions of his government, he began to make preparations for a third expedition to Japan. On May 23, 1742, his fleet of four vessels sailed from Kamchatka to Japanese waters.⁴⁰ On June 30, when the fleet reached latitude 39° 35' N and was approaching Japan, Spanberg held a conference with his staff and decided to sail back to the Sea of Okhotsk. The reason why the exploration of Japan was thus abandoned is not clear. It is believed that an outbreak of illness among the crew and the unseaworthiness of the "St. Ivan," which was under the personal command of Spanberg, were the chief causes. The ships then took different courses: some of them cruised among the various islands of the Kuriles; others explored the coast of Sakhalin and even the districts along the estuary of the Amur River. On August 26 (O.S.), 1742, all returned to the Sea of Okhotsk. This third exploration thus ended in failure, as none of the ships had succeeded in reaching the Japanese coast.⁴¹

However, the failure of the Spanberg undertaking had no effect upon the policy of Russia in the Far East, especially with regard to Japan. In those days, the exploration of the North Pacific Ocean was practically completed. Russian exploration and advance in the territory under the control of China had to be abandoned because of the determined opposition of the

Manchu emperors in China. Therefore, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Russia concentrated her undertakings in the Far East upon Japan, using Siberia as her base.⁴² The teaching of the Japanese language was encouraged, so that Russians might be prepared for relations with Japan. The Russian aggression in the Kuriles was successful, all the northern islands as far south as Urup being conquered and occupied.⁴³ Russia next extended her power, in 1766, over Etorofu, the largest of the Kuriles; and, taking this island as a base, began an advance upon the island of Yezo, which is just north of Honshu, the main island of Japan. Russia thus threatened the northern border of Japan, and Japan became alarmed.

Because of her long seclusion, Japan was not only ignorant of conditions in the outside world, but did not even know the exact boundaries of her own national territory.⁴⁴ Yezo (now called Hokkaido), the second largest in the chain of Japanese islands, was not regarded in the eighteenth century, nor even in the early part of the nineteenth, as an integral part of the Empire of Japan. In those days the Japanese government dealt with happenings in Yezo as events beyond the borders of the nation. Since that time, however, it has been highly developed and has become a source of wealth to Japan. It is now considered a part of Japan Proper.

Most historians, scholars, and statesmen classified Yezo as a foreign state. Mitsukuni Tokugawa (1638-1700) in his *History of Great Japan*⁴⁵ ranked Yezo, Korea, and China as foreign nations. Riken Nakai (1733-1817), a historian and scholar, and Rin Shihei (Shihei Hayashi) (1738-93), a noted nationalist and statesman, in their documents and writings always mentioned Yezo as a foreign nation.⁴⁶ Hence, in the latter part of the eighteenth century—that is, three-quarters of a century before Japan was reopened by the United States of America—the Japanese had already realized the seriousness of their relations with Russia and were convinced that Russia was a great and dangerous nation, that she was approaching Japan from the north,

that Russia's undertakings in the Far East constituted a grave menace to Japan, and that the national defenses of Japan Proper should be greatly strengthened.⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the problem of how to deal with Russia sorely troubled Japanese statesmen. They held widely varying views, and the plans they proposed revealed their deplorable ignorance of the conditions of the times.

Riken Nakai, a noted historian and one of the great thinkers of eighteenth-century Japan, stated emphatically that the possibility of having a border closely adjoining that of so aggressive and dangerous a nation as Russia meant certain danger.⁴⁸ The point of his contention that Japan must keep herself free from contact with Russia was accentuated by the fact that Russia had already made a southward advance in the direction of Japan, thus bringing the two countries into uncomfortably close proximity. He then advocated a plan whereby Japan might keep free from Russia. He set forth how Yezo, a large island (of 30,000 square miles), was a land that from time immemorial had never had a ruling lord; neither had it ever been a dependency of any nation. Yezo had long been a desolate waste. It was exceedingly mountainous and was inhabited by wild native tribes who shared it with wild beasts and dangerous reptiles. Taking advantage of this wild condition of Yezo, Japan should make it her policy to let Yezo remain in this barbaric state as it had been for centuries, and to keep this large deserted territory as a permanent buffer between Japan and Russia. Russia could then find no way to approach Japan, since in all other directions Japan was surrounded by extensive and deep seas, and to the north, Yezo, an abandoned land, approximately a "thousand miles" [*sic!*] in length, would be impossible for the Russians to cross. Nevertheless, if Japan should take an interest in Yezo by sending a number of Japanese there to develop the land and to educate the barbarous natives, thus transforming it into a habitable place, Japan would not only become a close neighbor of Russia, but she would also make it possible

for the Russians to carry their advance into Yezo and eventually to make of Yezo a road to Japan Proper, thus prospering their military ambitions. He argued that a barren and abandoned Yezo would hold no attraction for Russia at all.⁴⁹ His plan, which was based on his own arbitrary conclusions, entirely overlooked the historical factors involved in the occupation and mastery of Siberia by Russia.

It had been Russia's policy to make inroads into barren, unoccupied lands. It was thus that she had conquered Siberia, Kamchatka, and the northern islands of the Kuriles. Therefore, Seiyō Habuto (1730-80), a contemporary of Nakai, emphatically declared that Yezo must be occupied and put under control before the arrival of the Russians.⁵⁰ The Russians had already conquered northeastern Asia, including Kamchatka. Then they had extended their power as far as Urup of the Kuriles. Notwithstanding that all these lands had originally been barren and unproductive, the Russians had encroached upon one territory after another and had promptly established themselves as undisputed masters therein. Consequently, if Russia were not blocked in her advance, it would only be a question of time before she would extend her advance into Yezo. Should Russia encroach upon and finally annex the whole of Yezo, Japan and Russia would become neighboring nations, separated only by a narrow strip of water, thirty to forty miles in width. In such an eventuality, the very existence of Japan Proper would be endangered. Therefore, no matter how difficult the work might be, and no matter how great a financial burden Japan would have to bear, Yezo should be occupied and strongly fortified, the national administration of Japan being extended over Yezo and its inhabitants.

Heisuke Kudo (1738-1800), like Habuto, argued forcibly that Yezo should be occupied and developed before the expansion of Russia into that vast territory should be accomplished. He noted that, during the century just past, Russia had consistently extended her domain in northeastern Asia, and that

she had explored the northern waters and taken notes on the geographical features of Japan. In consequence, Japan should prepare to stave off Russian aggression. Kudo then outlined what should be done: (1) the defensive works both in Japan Proper and in Yezo should be greatly strengthened; (2) the national wealth should be increased; and (3) Japan should acquaint herself with Russian policy and Russia's national customs, as well as with the individual inclinations of her people, so that Japan might adopt effective means in her dealings with Russia.⁵¹ Kudo said further that, above all, Yezo must be occupied and developed by Japan; especially should the gold mines, for the abundance of which Yezo was noted, be made productive. This accomplished, Japan should of her own accord open her nation to trade with Russia. If Japan should thus enter into relations with Russia, the internal condition of the latter country and the desires of her people might be properly understood. Moreover, Japan's national wealth might be increased by trading the agricultural products of the newly developed land of Yezo for those of Russia, as well as by the output of its gold mines. This would make it possible for Japan to build elaborate national fortifications. On the other hand, if Japan should abandon Yezo and leave that large island undeveloped, the Russians would be in a position to make Kamchatka their base and to extend their advance into Yezo. Should Russia thus be allowed to take a free hand, the time would not be far off when Japan would see Yezo entirely beyond her control. Japan would then realize that national regret would not remedy the situation.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Tokugawa shogunate was financially bankrupt and had lost its fighting spirit, and Japan was thus utterly impotent to reject a demand to reopen her doors to Occidentals should it be made—as in fact it was, by the United States, in 1853. In the later days of the national seclusion, however, when the abandonment of the long-held policy was only a question of time, a reactionary

movement originated as a strong undercurrent among young nationalists. Such men as Shoin and Sanai advocated national expansion on the Asiatic continent and the founding of Greater Japan, or the conclusion of an alliance with some Occidental power, thereby elevating the national and military standing of Japan and making it possible for her to rise as a world power. Shoin Yoshida⁵² (1830-59) insisted that Japan should first of all firmly establish her power on the islands of Yezo and Sakhalin, and then undertake the conquest of Kamchatka as well as the domination of the Sea of Okhotsk. Japan was to demand that the kingdoms of Liu Chiu and Korea should respect their ancient relations with Japan and humbly and loyally submit themselves to be tributary to her. Then the conquest of Manchuria was to give Japan a national base for the conquest of the continent. Thereafter, she should turn southward and continue her military conquest by means of the occupation of Formosa, of the Philippines, and of the surrounding islands both large and small.⁵³ Almost immediately after Perry reopened Japan in 1854, Shoin thus planned and outlined the national expansion of Japan on the Asiatic continent and along the coast.

Sanai Hashimoto (1834-59), a contemporary of Shoin, appreciated that England and Russia were the two dominant Occidental powers in the Orient, and that because of their conflicting interests in Asia they had long been rivals, and he concluded that Japan should have a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with one of them. He thereupon carefully studied the foreign policies, and acts of expansion, of England and Russia in China. Because of the geographical proximity of Russia, he strongly advocated the conclusion of a Russo-Japanese alliance.⁵⁴ Sanai thus first stated one of the great problems of Japanese foreign policy, namely, whether Japan should make an alliance with Great Britain or with Russia. This problem was definitely solved a half-century after his death, when, in January, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was concluded,⁵⁵

opening the road for the national expansion of Japan on the Asiatic continent.

The Tokugawa shogunate, which had long regarded Shoin, Sanai, and other leading nationalists as dangerous agitators and violators of the national laws, beheaded them all in 1859 on the charge of having committed grave national crimes.⁵⁶ This was five years after the United States had reopened Japan to the world. Shoin was then twenty-nine years of age, and Sanai twenty-five. Although they died young, both Shoin and Sanai were eminent scholars and statesmen. Both, but especially Shoin, were surrounded by admirers, followers, and disciples, most of whom became the founders of the New Japan. Shoin is today deified and revered as the creator and father of Greater Japan.⁵⁷ Shoin and Sanai were far ahead of their time. In their plans they outlined the national expansion and aggrandizement of Japan, and revealed the possible rise of Japan as a world power.

Although Sugita, Hirayama, and Honda were not men with the ability of Shoin and Sanai, they proved to be well versed in national affairs, because they kept in touch with the world. Therefore, in their plans, they made known to the people how Japan might maintain a glorious existence. They also worked out certain details regarding national policy in both military and diplomatic affairs.

Genpaku Sugita (1733-1817) was a noted physician, learned in Chinese classics and history. He was also one of the very few Japanese who had mastered the Dutch language and was acquainted in some measure with the affairs of Occidental nations. Being seriously impressed with the steady increase of danger from Russia, Sugita announced that there were but two courses that Japan might take in dealing with her: (1) Japan might go to war with Russia in the hope that she might destroy the Russian military forces on both land and sea; and (2) she might grant trade privileges to Russia, thereby gaining her good will and establishing friendly relations with her.⁵⁸

Inquiring into the question whether Japan was prepared to go to war with a foreign nation, Sugita stated that because of the long-continued period of peace and prosperity, all the feudal lords and other military men had become victims of easy and luxurious living and had fallen into licentious practices.⁵⁰ The shogun's bodyguard, as well as the samurai in the service of the feudal lords, had lost their military strength. If Japan, in the face of such military degeneration, should engage in war with so powerful a nation as Russia, especially noted for her military training and experience, the outcome would be disastrous. Therefore, just as the Emperor Kang-Hsi of China had granted trade privileges to Russia and had thereby checked her military aggression, Japan should likewise permit Russia to trade with Japan, because she was so persistent as to resort even to military threats. Should Japan take this step, Russia would be well satisfied. After Japan should temporarily have established friendly trade relations with Russia, she might then undertake the reorganization of her army and strengthen her national defenses. Within a quarter-century, Japan would be in a position to defend her national honor and dignity, should Russia make unjustifiable demands or endanger Japan by her ever-increasing advance. Although Sugita thus advocated trade with Russia, the opening of Japan to the outside world was not his purpose; his real aim was to gain, by any means possible, time to reorganize the military power of Japan and especially to instill into the fighting men a military spirit.

In 1807, Kozo Hirayama (1758-1828), a contemporary of Sugita, strenuously opposed this plan.⁵¹ He argued that the Russian advance must be met and crushed by military strength and that the ruling power of Japan should be established in Yezo. Nevertheless, like Sugita, Hirayama fully realized the impotence of Japan, and therefore outlined a plan of organizing a new army. He said that Japan should no longer depend upon the effeminate samurai and other professional military men. He said further that the government should gather all the

brigands, robber bands, and pirates, who were known to be bloodthirsty and always ready to fight, and give them military training. Upon the completion of this reorganization, Hirayama would himself go to Yezo with the new army, to destroy the Russians who had already encroached upon the eastern part of the island. He said, also, that these steps should be taken promptly, because if Russia should be allowed to complete her occupation of Yezo and should satisfy the greedy desires of the natives dwelling therein by giving them both goods and money, thus making them happy to become Russian subjects, Yezo would be placed wholly beyond the influence and control of Japan. He further said that if Japan should grant trading privileges to Russia because the latter's request was backed by military threats, all the other Occidental nations would look down upon Japan, and would make similar military threats and demands. If the shogun were forced to open Japan to all Occidental nations because his government could not cope with them militarily, the feudal lords would no longer show due reverence to the shogun, but would take action of their own free will, independent of the shogunate government. Japan would then be confronted with both foreign and domestic troubles. Therefore, to check the Russian advance and to inflict due punishment upon the Russians was a vital undertaking for Japan. For this purpose the new national army should be organized in accordance with the plan as outlined. Should the military leadership be entrusted to Hirayama, he would first of all go to Yezo to wage war and defeat the Russians. After having accomplished this, he would gibbet the arrogant chiefs of the Russian forces in order to impress the natives in Yezo, and also the Russians, with the national dignity and power of Japan. He would then carry his victories farther north and deprive Russia of the land she had already occupied, with a view to extending the ruling power of Japan over Kamchatka.

Hirayama typified in this plan the hazy views of the Japanese during the Seclusion Period. In those days there were not a few

Japanese who, like Nakai and Hirayama, could not see beyond their own arbitrary conclusions, and who therefore were unable to weigh the possibilities against the impossibilities of success. Even statesmen and scholars, who were noted for their ability to think, were no exceptions.

Toshiaki (Rimei) Honda (1744-1821) and Rin Shihei were regarded in those days as men of unusual foresight and were reputed to be well versed in both domestic and foreign affairs.⁶¹ Their intellectual attainments and their comprehension of national policy were far in advance of those of most men of their time. Nevertheless, their knowledge of Occidental civilization and affairs had been gained either from the Dutch traders in Nagasaki or from books in the Dutch language, their use of which was very limited. The plan for the future development of Japan was formulated and based upon either imaginary or unreliable information given by so-called explorers. Rin Shihei, as well as Honda, both of whom were regarded as leaders of the nationalists of their time, advocated that Japan should occupy Yezo and establish her ruling power there before the Russians should come and gain control over both the land and its people. Both these nationalists definitely planned the absorption of Yezo by Japan. However, in so planning, they were arbitrary in their judgments and set themselves up as authorities on the basis of erroneous information to the effect that Yezo was the greatest treasure land in the world. They assumed that Yezo was filled with rich deposits of gold, silver, and copper, and that certain districts in that island, ranging from thirty to sixty miles in greatest dimension, were thickly covered with alluvial gold.⁶² They even believed that, when the heavy north-west wind blew, both the seashores and the sea were covered with gold dust, thus changing the entire region for hundreds of miles into a golden yellow color. They thus took it for granted that Japan would become the richest nation in the world, provided she could gain control of the Island of Yezo. They said that it was a well-known fact that the Muscovite government

in Europe had long been contemplating the extension of its ruling power over Kamchatka, and over the northern waters to Yezo. However, all the native tribes in Yezo were attracted to Japan and showed a readiness to adopt Japanese manners and customs. Therefore, should the Japanese go to that island, showing great kindness to the natives and teaching them how to respect and be guided by the laws of Japan, Yezo would readily become an integral part of Japan. The inexhaustible output of gold and silver in Yezo would make Japan financially independent. Once Yezo was developed and strong defensive works built thereon, the administrative power of Japan would be extended from Yezo to Sakhalin. Ultimately, the national glory and honor of Japan would be respected by the inhabitants of the islands of the north.

Honda further devised a plan for transforming and developing Japan into the best and greatest nation in the world: he proposed that the national capital of the Empire should be removed to the southern part of Kamchatka at about latitude 51° N, and that a strongly fortified military city should be established on the island of Sakhalin at about latitude 46° or 47° N, thus placing Kamchatka and Sakhalin in the center of Japan's political and military control.⁶⁸ The entire domain of the empire, extending from Kamchatka in the north to the southern extremity of the chain of islands of the Japanese Archipelago, would be known by the name of "Great Japan," and the original domain of Japan as the "Homeland of Japan." All the civil and military officials were to be selected and appointed from among men of genius, high attainments, and personal virtue, their birth and their family rank being disregarded. All the Russians who had established themselves in those territories prior to the Japanese occupation were to be permitted to maintain a safe and prosperous existence provided they abided by the laws of Japan and endeavored to be respectful and peaceful subjects of Japan. In this way, Japan should make it her national policy to refrain from differen-

tiating between the Japanese and the people of the conquered nations. While thus planning to make Japan the greatest of world empires, Honda made no inquiry with regard to either the financial or the military strength of Japan. Because at that time there was a rumor of the death of the Empress Catherine II of Russia, Honda argued that the death of this great ruler and possible subsequent trouble in Russia would afford a splendid opportunity for Japan to wage war successfully against the Russians in the Far East.⁶⁴ Under such circumstances it would be possible for Japan to conquer all the Russian territory in the northern waters, including Kamchatka. Honda placed sole reliance upon the so-called inexhaustible output of the gold, silver, and copper mines in Yezo, and in the adjoining islands, with which to cover the costs of the conquest.⁶⁵ As for geographical features, Honda's ideas were purely imaginative. This is proved by the fact that Honda believed that the climatic features of certain districts might be determined by their latitude. He said that the newly contemplated national capital of Greater Japan might be established in Kamchatka at approximately latitude 51° N, and that a strongly fortified national military city might be built on the island of Sakhalin at about latitude 46° or 47° N, because the latitude of these two cities would be the same as the latitudes of London and Paris. In climate and geographical situation, the two proposed new cities would therefore enjoy every advantage and prosperity which was enjoyed by London and Paris.

In fact, both Honda and Rin Shihei were hopelessly enamored of the audacious and aggressive undertakings of Occidental nations.⁶⁶ Moreover, their knowledge of world affairs was limited and their investigations were lacking in accuracy. However, both these men, Honda in particular, may rightfully be credited as the first Japanese to outline how a greater Japan might be begun. The Japanese of their time, as well as those of future generations, were greatly inspired by their plan, notwithstanding that it was impractical.

The shogunate government made it part of definite national policy to defend Japan against Russia and check Russian aggression from the north. For this purpose, the government, first of all, placed the entire island of Yezo under the direct control of the shogun by 1807.⁸⁷ Moreover, explorers were sent to the island of Sakhalin and to the Kuriles with the hope of establishing the ruling power of Japan in the southern part of Sakhalin and in Etorofu, the largest island in the Kuriles.

For a period of more than one hundred and fifty years, beginning in the middle of the eighteenth century, Russia and the Russians were regarded as a menace by Japan. Nevertheless, the Japanese did not consider the situation hopeless. In fact, in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the approach of Russia from the north greatly stimulated the Japanese. To maintain the honor and glory of Japan—a nation that had never been successfully invaded and had never lost an inch of land—greatly inspired the Japanese. This stimulation and inspiration made it possible for them to check the Russian advance. In those days in the early period of the new Japan, when she was threatened in this way, there were men like Nakai who strongly advocated that Japan abandon Yezo with the hope that Russia and Japan might not be immediate neighbors; but the national ambition was to place Yezo under the control of Japan and to check the inroads of Russia in that great island. During the half-century following, Japan, though without any diplomatic or military relations with Russia, nevertheless appears to have convinced Russia that Yezo was an integral part of Japan.

The first official Russian expedition to Japan was placed under the nominal charge of young Adam Kirillovich Laxman, son of the Finnish naturalist Kirill (Erik) Laxman, who also went along in an advisory capacity.⁸⁸ The purpose of the venture was to establish permanent trade relations with Japan. The return of two Japanese sailors who had been shipwrecked in Russian waters was to provide the grounds for the contact.

On September 13 (O.S.), 1792, Laxman's brigantine "Ekater-

ina" left Okhotsk. On October 9 (O.S.), 1792 (6th day of the 9th month, 4th year, of the Kansei era), the ship cast anchor in the harbor of Nemuro, on the northeastern part of the island of Yezo. Here Laxman was greeted by the Japanese. He presented a state paper and requested trade privileges for Russia. While awaiting the answer of the higher authorities, the local government granted him permission to build barracks on shore for his men. Inasmuch as this was the first time that a foreign nation had demanded the reopening of Japan for trade, the shogunate government looked upon it as a grave national affair. On June 4 (O.S.), 1793, Laxman's boat was allowed to proceed to Hakodate. The government sent two noted men, Ishikawa and Murakami, to Matsumaye, in Yezo, and thither the envoy Laxman and his party were invited for an interview. They were received very courteously, but the Russian state paper was returned without reply. At the same time, the Russian envoy was informed that Nagasaki was the only place in Japan where trade and other foreign intercourse might be conducted. The envoy was then provided with an official certificate permitting him to enter the harbor of Nagasaki. While at Hakodate, Laxman received gifts from the Japanese.

Because of unsettled political conditions in the Western world, no expedition was sent the following year. In fact it was not until 1803 that Russia decided to capitalize on the privilege gained by Laxman—the pass for one Russian vessel to enter Nagasaki Harbor. Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, a man actively engaged in affairs of the Russian-American Company, was named the Russian ambassador plenipotentiary whose task was to be that of opening trade relations between Russia and Japan. Captain Ivan Feodorovich Krusenstern was entrusted with the naval command of the expedition.⁶⁹

In September in the first year of the Bunka era (1804), Russia's second envoy came to Nagasaki and presented the official certificate which had been given to Laxman in 1793, and requested trade privileges. The shogunate government thereupon

sent a national representative to Nagasaki, who, by means of various pretexts, delayed and prolonged the negotiations. The Japanese objected to a Russian embassy, pointing out that Laxman had been granted the right to conduct negotiations only for the establishment of trade relations. After six months of useless discussion, the Russian request for trade privileges was definitely withdrawn, and the Rezanov expedition left Nagasaki Harbor on April 18 (O.S.), 1805.

Rezanov, still intent on arranging trade relations with Japan, conceived the plan of terrorizing the Japanese into submitting to his demands. He ordered Lieutenant Khvostov and Midshipman Davydov to make a series of raids on Karafuto, Etorofu, and Urup.⁷⁰

In 1806, and again in 1807, Lieutenant Khvostov and Midshipman Davydov, in accordance with Rezanov's instructions, set out in two newly built vessels, "Iunona" and "Avos," and raided the Japanese settlements on the shores of those islands, seizing supplies, setting fire to dwellings, and in general terrorizing the population. It may be significant that many Japanese historians, in writing of the Russo-Japanese War, begin their accounts with references to these terroristic raids.

In May of the eighth year of the Bunka era (1811), Captain V. M. Golovnin, commander of the Russian sloop "Diana," arrived in the Kurile waters with his party. The purpose of the expedition was to survey the Kurile Islands and the Manchurian coast.

On one occasion, because of lack of water and provisions, Golovnin anchored off the island of Kunashiri, where Japan had stationed a coast guard of considerable strength. Japanese sentiment against Russia had been aroused by the ill-advised raids of Khvostov and Davydov. The Japanese coast guard, therefore, decided upon revenge by capturing Golovnin, after having first lured him ashore. Acting in accordance with their plan, the Japanese guard showed apparent kindness to the Russians and, promising them supplies, persuaded Golovnin and

a party of seven, including two officers and an Ainu interpreter, to come ashore. No sooner had the Russians set foot on Japanese soil than they found themselves surrounded by the guard and taken prisoner.

Golovnin and his entire party were sent to Hakodate and later were imprisoned in Matsumaye, where they were severely dealt with. The men were placed in two cages which were kept in a closely guarded barn. Realizing that there was no opportunity of being released, Golovnin and the six Russians broke jail in the spring of 1812 and proceeded to the coast, where they unsuccessfully sought a boat. A few days later they were again recaptured by the Japanese. During the second period of his imprisonment, Golovnin became acquainted with several bright young Japanese to whom he taught the Russian language in exchange for lessons in Japanese. This training later enabled Japan to transact national affairs with Russia without recourse to the Dutch.

As soon as the seizure of Captain Golovnin and his companions had become known aboard the "Diana," the ship's second in command, Captain P. F. Rikord, took measures to release his companions. All attempts, however, including an exchange of artillery fire with the Japanese fortress, proved futile. The Japanese refused to release the prisoners.

Rikord returned to Okhotsk for instructions. The following year, the sloop "Diana" once more set out for Japanese waters. This time Rikord, reinforced by the small brig "Zotik," adopted a different policy. In August, 1812, his expedition, carrying aboard the "Diana" six shipwrecked Japanese sailors who had been rescued previously off the Kamchatka coast, sailed from Okhotsk. Anchoring in Kunashiri, the Russians attempted to negotiate an exchange of their comrades for the six Japanese. The Japanese official declined the proposal and pretended that Golovnin and the other Russians had already been put to death. The Japanese aboard the Russian ship were put ashore, nevertheless. In the meantime, Rikord had captured Takataya

Kahei, a noted Japanese trader and explorer, and, holding him prisoner, the Russian captain induced his captive to effect the release of Golovnin and the other Russians. After long and complicated negotiations, on October 7 (O.S.), 1813, Golovnin and his companions were liberated. Three days later they left Hakodate, and returned to St. Petersburg in July, 1814. Immediately on his return, Golovnin wrote his renowned two-volume work entitled *Narrative of My Captivity in Japan*. The book was translated into Japanese in 1825. It is of interest to note that its author predicted the rise of Japan to power some hundred years in advance of the fact, and said that the Japanese were alert and active and did not hesitate to abandon their old usages and traditions and to adopt the best things of other nations; and therefore that, if Japan should at some time come under the rule of a great person such as Peter the Great, that nation might, in a remarkably short time, rise as the supreme power in the Orient.⁷¹

For a period of almost forty years after the Golovnin incident the Russians made no further attempt to establish trade relations with Japan. It was not until 1852 that the head of the Russian-American Company ordered the ship "Kniaz' Men'shikov" under Lindenberg to sail from Novoarkhangel'sk for the Japanese port of Shimoda on the island of Honshu. The ship, commanded by Lindenberg, carried several Japanese sailors who had been shipwrecked in Russian waters. The purpose of this trip was once more to establish trade relations with Japan, and the return of the shipwrecked sailors was again to provide the occasion for the contact. On May 29 (O.S.) the ship left Alaskan waters.⁷²

On July 26 (O.S.), 1852, Lindenberg cast anchor in the harbor of Shimoda. Crowds of native Japanese began at once to flock aboard: they were anxious to see everything on the ship before the government should forbid their visiting the foreign vessel. The local governor himself came aboard and accepted copies of the letters which Lindenberg had brought with him.

The governor sincerely thanked the Russian captain for bringing the shipwrecked sailors to Japan, but refused to let them go ashore until he might receive orders to do so from higher officials at Yedo.

Despite the friendliness he had shown toward the Russians, the governor ordered sentry boats to surround the visiting vessel, and gave them instructions to let no one ashore. On the following day he returned aboard the "Kniaz' Men'shikov" in order to question the Japanese concerning their stay in Russia—specifically, about the details of their shipwreck, the treatment accorded them by the Russians, the food they had been given, and so on. To Lindenberg's request for permission to go ashore, the governor replied that such permission could be obtained only from the Yedo authorities.

The relations between the Russians and the Japanese, though quite friendly at first, grew worse with the progress of time. The Japanese were apparently quite alarmed at the sudden arrival of the foreign ship.

By August 2 (O.S.), 1852, a high official had arrived from Yedo with an order from the authorities refusing the shipwrecked Japanese the right to disembark. The Russians were ordered to leave Japanese shores immediately. Lindenberg argued in behalf of his Japanese charges, but the officials remained unyielding. After leaving Shimoda, the Russian vessel nevertheless stopped near a maritime settlement, and there put the Japanese ashore. At this time, Admiral Putiatin's squadron was on its way to Japan.

In October, 1852, Russia sent Admiral Efimii Vasilievich Putiatin as her third envoy to Japan. On August 10 (O.S.), 1853, Putiatin's squadron of four vessels anchored in the outer harbor of Nagasaki.²³ The Japanese, who had been warned by the Dutch of the approaching Russian embassy, became quite alarmed. Putiatin, through his tact, courtesy, and diplomacy, soon began, however, to gain the confidence of the Japanese officials. Despite the tendency in Japan to regard Russia as a

hostile power, the governor of Nagasaki agreed to accept the official document brought by him. For four days, from September 5 through September 8 (O.S.), Putiatin and the Japanese argued over details of the coming ceremony, and on September 9 (O.S.), a month after their arrival, the official reception took place. Putiatin presented the letter of Chancellor Count Nesselrode in which Russia demanded (1) that the Russo-Japanese frontier be delimited, and (2) that one or two Japanese ports be opened to Russian trade.

As to the boundary lines, the document stated that on the island of Etorofu in the Kuriles a number of Russians and Japanese maintained their habitations, and that therefore the boundary line between the Japanese and the Russian possessions should be clearly defined. As to Sakhalin, in its southern part only a few Japanese maintained their habitations. However, a number of natives lived there. Russia therefore requested Japan to transfer the sole ruling power over Sakhalin to her on condition that the Japanese residing there might enjoy the same rights and privileges as Russian subjects. Thus, in the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia not only regarded the sovereign power of Japan in Yezo as an undisputed fact, the same as that of Russia in Siberia and in her other territorial possessions, but she also recognized that Japan had certain rights on the island of Sakhalin and in the Kuriles.

Hesitant about granting Russia special privileges in Japan and at the same time wishing to avoid any possibility of armed conflict, the authorities tried to draw the negotiations out as long as possible, hoping thus to discourage the Russians. On October 7 (O.S.), 1853, they notified Putiatin of the death of the shogun. They pointed out that this untimely happening would necessitate an indefinite delay in the answer from Yedo to the Russian letter. The Russians waited for a month and decided that nothing should be lost if they were to sail to Shanghai, where they might pick up some information about the state of affairs in Europe. On November 11 (O.S.) the squadron left



ADMIRAL EFIMII VASILIEVICH PUTIATIN

(1803–83)

Negotiator of the first Russo-Japanese treaty

Nagasaki for this reason. Putiatin returned to Nagasaki toward the end of December. The local authorities informed the Russians that no answer had been delivered from Yedo, and on January 24 (O.S.), 1854, after a wait of another month, Putiatin's squadron weighed anchor and set its course for the Liu Chiu Islands and Manila. Upon his return to Siberian waters, Putiatin transferred himself to the "Diana" and, leaving the other vessels behind, set out for Japanese shores again. On October 9 (O.S.), 1854, the "Diana" reached Hakodate. Local authorities informed him that Yedo had not yet prepared its answer. Putiatin therefore decided to pursue a more aggressive course. On October 24 (O.S.), the Russian frigate appeared near Osaka. Japanese boats at once blocked the entrance into the harbor. Putiatin demanded that the negotiations be resumed, and was instructed to go to Shimoda, where he was promised that Japanese plenipotentiaries would meet him. The Russians complied and on November 22 (O.S.) anchored off Shimoda Harbor. On December 8 (O.S.) the negotiations were resumed.

In the course of these negotiations a disaster which befell the Russians seems to have furthered a feeling of good will between the Russians and the Japanese. On December 14 (O.S.), 1854, there occurred a terrific earthquake followed by a tidal wave. The Russian ship suffered damage necessitating immediate repairs. No sooner had these been completed than a heavy storm on January 2 (O.S.), 1855, wrecked the "Diana." Her crew was barely saved, Japanese villagers playing no small part in their rescue. The Japanese government officials and natives alike did everything they could to aid the Russians. Timber was given to the shipwrecked crew, and local craftsmen assisted them in the building of new ships in which the Russians might return to Siberia.

As a token of appreciation of Japanese sympathy and hospitality, the Russians presented to their hosts one of the newly built vessels. In this way Russia's supposed plan for the domination of Japan was abandoned. At the same time, Russia took

advantage of the weakened condition and the grave national troubles of China under the Manchu rule. She began to encroach upon the Amur district and upon other territorial possessions of China. Japan, with her rebirth in consequence of the imperial restoration in 1869, began to extend her ruling power to the Asiatic continent through the Liu Chiu Islands and Korea. Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Russia's eastward expansion and the resumption of Japan's westward expansion constituted two increasingly dangerous elements in East Asia. The climax was reached in 1904 when Japan and Russia entered into a war for supremacy in the Far East.

In the meanwhile the interrupted negotiations had been resumed, and on December 21 of the first year of the Ansei era (January 26 [O.S.], 1855), the terms of the treaty were agreed upon and it was signed at Shimoda (Choraku-Ji, a Buddhist temple in Anezaki village) by Kawaji and Tsutsui, representatives of the shogunate government, and by Putiatin, representative of the Russian government. This is known as the "Treaty of Shimoda," with reference to the place where it was signed. The outstanding features of this treaty were the settlements and agreements regarding the boundary and possession of the Kuriles and of Sakhalin. With regard to the Kuriles, the entire island of Etorufu was recognized as a possession of Japan, while Urup was given to Russia. The boundary line between Russia and Japan was agreed to be somewhere in the waters between these two islands. It was also agreed that all the remaining islands of the Kuriles that lay northward of Urup were in the possession of Russia.

With regard to Sakhalin, the Japanese representative held that the districts where the Japanese or the Ainus had established residence prior to 1852 should belong to Japan. Because it was impossible to establish this claim, he later changed his demand that the southern half of Sakhalin, taking latitude 50° N as the boundary, should be recognized as Japanese terri-

tory. The Russian representative strongly opposed this demand of Japan. After a lengthy discussion, it was agreed, as one of the provisions of Article II, that Sakhalin should remain under the joint occupation of Japan and Russia without establishment of any boundary. All the interests and affairs of the island in connection with Japan and Russia and their respective subjects should be conducted in accordance with established practices.

All privileges granted and all concessions made to Russia in accordance with the provisions of this treaty were practically the same as those that Japan had granted and made to the United States and to England the preceding year.⁷⁴

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

- ¹ Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nippon Kokumin-Shi* (History of the Japanese People in Modern Times), vol. 14, p. 4.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 5. Ihara, *Tokugawa Jidai Tsushi* (A Comprehensive History of the Tokugawa Period), pp. 197-98.
- ³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. iii.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. iv.
- ⁵ Hagino, *Nippon-Shi Kowa* (Lectures on Japanese History), pp. 802, 805.
- ⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 3.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 198.
- ⁸ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 633.
- ⁹ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 639-40. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 11.
- ¹⁰ Okuma, *Kaikoku Taisei-Shi* (The Reopening of Japan and the National Tendencies), pp. 57, 59. Aoki, *Dai-Nippon Rekishi Shusei* (A Comprehensive History of Great Japan), vol. 2, pp. 1008-09. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 624. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
- ¹¹ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 625.
- ¹² Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 60. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 625.
- ¹³ Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 61.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 68. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 204.
- ¹⁶ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-06. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 625-26. Omori, *Dai-Nippon Zenshi* (A Complete History of Great Japan), vol. 2, p. 743. Japan, Department of Foreign Affairs, Archives, *Gaiko Shiko* (Records of Relations with Foreign Nations), pp. 576-77.
- ¹⁷ Waseda University, *Dai-Nippon Jidai-Shi* (History of Great Japan, Period by Period), vol. 8, pp. 153-54. Tanaka, *Oda Jidai-Shi* (History of Japan During the Oda Period), p. 212. Ariga, *Dai Nippon-Rekishi* (An Unabridged History of Japan), vol. 2, pp. 439-40.
- ¹⁸ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, p. 502. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
- ¹⁹ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 625.
- ²⁰ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 1010-11. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 625-26.
- ²¹ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 630.
- ²² Kuroita, *Kokushi no Kenkyu* (Research in the National History of Japan), p. 681. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, pp. 496-99. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 577. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 1019.
- ²³ Omori, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 746.
- ²⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 142. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 541-42. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, pp. 80-82. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi* (History of Japan in Reverse Order), vol. 6, pp. 30-31. Tanaka, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
- ²⁵ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 301-02.
- ²⁶ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 615-16. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 204, 206. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 1018-19. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 304-05.
- ²⁷ Tanaka, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-15. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 626. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 96, 103. Omori, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 745. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 575.
- ²⁸ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, p. 230.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 231.
- ³⁰ Tanaka, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
- ³¹ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 332. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 251-52. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 205. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, pp. 502-03.
- ³² Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 628. Tanaka, *To-yotomi Jidai-Shi* (History of Japan During the Toyotomi Period), p. 117. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 1021. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 537-38. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 577-78.
- ³³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 346-48.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 350, 352, 366-68.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 400. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 110-11. Tanaka, *Toyotomi Jidai-Shi*, p. 112.
- ³⁶ Fan Hua, *Chinting Hou-Han Shu* (History of the Later Han Dynasty,

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- ³⁸ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 77-78, 418-19. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 10, pp. 300, 309.
- ³⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 345.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 345-46.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 363-66.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 356-57.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 319-23, 400. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 333.
- ⁴² Tanaka, *Toyotomi Jidai-Shi*, p. 115. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 110, 112-14. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-09. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 168-70, 348, 400.
- ⁴³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 370, 371-75; vol. 14, p. 7.
- ⁴⁴ Omori, *Dai-Nippon Zenshi*, vol. 2, pp. 748-49. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 348, 368, 376-77, 383-93. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 682. Tanaka, *Toyotomi Jidai-Shi*, p. 114. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, pp. 502-03. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-15. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 578-79.
- ⁴⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 394. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, p. 504. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
- ⁴⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 368-69.
- ⁴⁷ Kaempfer, *The History of Japan* (in the translation by J. G. Scheuchzer; English edition of 1728), vol. 2, p. 159.
- ⁴⁸ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 356. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 629-30. Tanaka, *Toyotomi Jidai-Shi*, p. 117. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, p. 504. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 117. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 578. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, pp. 396-97.
- ⁴⁹ Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 581-83.
- ⁵⁰ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 640-41. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, p. 504. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 630-31, 640.
- ⁵¹ Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-16. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
- ⁵² Ito, *Dai-Nippon Minzoku-Shi* (History of the Race of Great Japan), pp. 683-84. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 704. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 633-34. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 185-86.
- ⁵³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 257; vol. 14, pp. 6-8.
- ⁵⁴ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 633-34. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 34-36. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 190.
- ⁵⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 199. Tsuji, *Kaigai Kotsu Shiwa*, pp. 467-68. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 514.
- ⁵⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 201. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 6, p. 126.
- ⁵⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 200-01. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 249.
- ⁵⁸ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 126-27. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 516-17. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 469-70.
- ⁵⁹ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 36-37. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 518-19. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 201-03. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 471-72.
- ⁶⁰ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 221-23. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 473.
- ⁶¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 223-24.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 222-23.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 225-27.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 231. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 634.
- ⁶⁵ Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 6, pp. 137-39. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 634. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 242, 250-51, 253-54.
- ⁶⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 242-43, 245-47.
- ⁶⁷ The Kingdom of Liu Chiu maintained its national existence by pledging allegiance to both China and Japan for a period of approximately two hundred years, ending in the latter part of the nineteenth

century when Japan annexed this small kingdom and made it an integral part of the Japanese Empire.

⁶⁸ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 537-41.

⁶⁹ The diplomatic and commercial relations between China and Japan remained unchanged for a period of approximately two hundred years, ending in the latter part of the nineteenth century when a treaty of amity and commerce was concluded between the two nations.

⁷⁰ Ito, *op. cit.*, p. 684. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 370-76. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-84. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 633-34. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 179, 638.

⁷¹ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-18. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 631-39. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 7-8.

⁷² Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 583-84. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-12. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 9, 11.

⁷³ Fujita, *Bunmei Tozen-Shi* (History of Civilization in Its Advance Toward the East), p. 125. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 584. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 403-04. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 6, p. 120. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 497. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 272-74; vol. 14, pp. 143-44.

⁷⁴ The number of Christian converts in Japan in 1613 was variously estimated at from one to two millions. This large number of converts bore testimony to the successful work of the Christian priests during the period of sixty-four years beginning in 1549. The total population of Japan in 1613 was much less than 20,000,000. Therefore, at that time from 5 to 10 per cent of the population of Japan had been Christianized. Almost immediately after the imperial restoration in 1868, Christianity was reintroduced into Japan. The religious census taken in 1931 showed that there were 41,000,000 Buddhists, 16,772,123 Shintoists,

178,215 Protestants, and 100,841 Catholics (*The Osaka Daily News*, December 30, 1934). This shows that approximately 70 per cent of the population of Japan at the present time are Buddhists, 27 per cent are Shintoists, and one-half of 1 per cent are Christians. (In 1931, the total population of Japan Proper was 60,000,000.) Thus, Christian workers in present-day Japan have been able to convert but one-half of 1 per cent of the population of Japan during the sixty-three years that they have engaged in evangelical work in that country. The marked difference in the success of Christian workers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and of those in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is to be accounted for largely by the marked differences between the conditions obtaining in Japan in those periods.

⁷⁵ Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 215. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 497-98. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 635-36. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 275, 277-78.

⁷⁶ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 402-03. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 6, pp. 97-98. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-16. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 635-36. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 287-89.

⁷⁷ Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-18. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 290, 292, 297-98.

⁷⁸ Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-23. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 500-01. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-94, 300-03.

⁷⁹ Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-31. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 294-96; vol. 14, pp. 205-07.

⁸⁰ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 404-05. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 503. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 296-97; vol. 14, pp. 207-08.

⁸¹ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 504-06. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-41. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 28-32.

⁸² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 35-36.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

- ⁸⁴ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 506-08. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 38-43.
- ⁸⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 58-61.
- ⁸⁶ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 508-09. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 591-92.
- ⁸⁷ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-11. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 75, 93-94.
- ⁸⁸ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 511-12. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 592-93. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 94-95, 98-99.
- ⁸⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 6-7.
- ⁹⁰ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 161. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 14.
- ⁹¹ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 163. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 14-16.
- ⁹² Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 632. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 167. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-48. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 261-66.
- ⁹³ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 634-35. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-69. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 513. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-54. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 307-10.
- ⁹⁴ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 515. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 330. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 156.
- ⁹⁵ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 635. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 516-17. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 156-59. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 331, 339-43.
- ⁹⁶ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-72. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 519. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 346-47. Cf. E. M. Satow (ed.), *The Voyage of Captain John Saris to Japan, 1613* (London, Hakluyt, 1890), pp. 137-39.
- ⁹⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 10, pp. 21-22; vol. 13, pp. 186-88, 259-60; vol. 14, pp. 7, 11, 18-19, 205.
- ⁹⁸ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 427. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 210. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-39. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 10, pp. 20-21.
- ⁹⁹ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 604-05. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 253. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 283; vol. 14, p. 19.
- ¹⁰⁰ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 602. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 253. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 105-06.
- ¹⁰¹ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 222. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 12-13.
- ¹⁰² Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 603. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 115, 130-31.
- ¹⁰³ Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 606-07. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 585. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 639-40. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 220. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 607-08. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-46.
- ¹⁰⁴ Some historians not only question the genuineness of this document, but even regard the whole account of the affair as mere fiction.
- ¹⁰⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 301-03, 317-18; vol. 14, pp. 88-89, 112, 131-32. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 584. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 219. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 605.
- ¹⁰⁶ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 640. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 218. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 601-02, 605-07. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 585. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 260-61; vol. 14, pp. 11, 106-09, 116, 206-07, 244, 246.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

- ¹ Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nippon Kokumin-Shi*, vol. 14, pp. 6-7, 163-72. Tsuji, *Kaigai Kotsu Shiwa*, p. 606. Okuma, *Kaikoku Taisei-Shi*, p. 266. Ihara, *To-kugawa Jidai Tsushi*, p. 221.
- ² Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 585-86. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 116, 244.
- ³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 130, 134, 245. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-59, 262. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 613.
- ⁴ Kuroita, *Kokushi no Kenkyu*, p. 746. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 222. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 613. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 143.
- ⁵ Aoki, *Dai-Nippon Rekishi Shusei*, vol. 3, pp. 424-26. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-65. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 614-15. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 117-24.
- ⁶ This law is erroneously known as the "Anti-Christian Law of 1613." It was promulgated in the latter part of December in the 18th year of the Keicho era. Although that year corresponds in a general way to the year 1613, yet December of the 18th year of the Keicho era (lunar calendar) corresponds to January, 1614, in the Gregorian calendar.
- ⁷ Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 587. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 443. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-67. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 656. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 124.
- ⁸ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 426. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 587-88. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 266. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 615. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 128-29, 304.
- ⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 142.
- ¹⁰ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 733-34, 736-38. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 155. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 12, pp. 327, 332, 358-59, 364-66, 375-78, 382, 423.
- ¹¹ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 19-20. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 12, pp. 425, 433, 511-12, 515-16.
- ¹² Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 519. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 473.
- ¹³ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 1220-22. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 612.
- ¹⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 208.
- ¹⁵ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 444. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-70. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 522, 617-18.
- ¹⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 210. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 524.
- ¹⁷ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 446. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 225-26. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 619. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 170.
- ¹⁸ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 524. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 211-12.
- ¹⁹ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 444-45. Hagino, *Nippon-Shi Kowa*, p. 640. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 619-20. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 272, 274-75.
- ²⁰ Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
- ²¹ Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 593. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 241. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 620. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
- ²² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 257.
- ²³ Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 592. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 277-78.
- ²⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 260-61.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 261-62.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 211, 219. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-64.
- ²⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 212, 213-15, 217-18, 219. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-71, 176-77.
- ²⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 222, 227. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 178.
- ²⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 263.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 263, 265-67. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 277.
- ³¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 258-59, 267. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 460-61. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 541-42, 621. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 293-94.
- ³² Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-77. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 266-67.

- ³³ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 446-47, 460. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 226. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-80. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 301, 311, 313-16, 318.
- ³⁴ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 447-48. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 266, 317.
- ³⁵ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 643. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. iv, 6, 279, 287, 290, 458.
- ³⁶ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 379. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 8, 9, 205, 207, 208, 281, 301.
- ³⁷ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 221. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 640. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 211-12.
- ³⁸ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 448-49, 497. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 228, 230-31, 236. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 593. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 622-23. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-83. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 283-86.
- ³⁹ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 450-51. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-33. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 623-24. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 288-90.
- ⁴⁰ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 582, 585-88, 590, 596, 598-99. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 188, 471-500.
- ⁴¹ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 452. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 236. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 449.
- ⁴² Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 452, 482. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 641. Ariga, *Dai Nippon-Rekishi*, vol. 2, p. 613. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 285. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 594. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. i, 268-69, 291.
- ⁴³ Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 592. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 265-66.
- ⁴⁴ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 641. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 747. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 259-60, 336, 339-40, 341, 347-48.
- ⁴⁵ Waseda University, *Dai-Nippon Jidai-Shi*, vol. 9, pp. 389, 390. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 462. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 344-45, 357.
- ⁴⁶ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 463. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 392, 409. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 351-52, 356. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 748.
- ⁴⁷ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 472. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 748. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 395. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 359, 364-66, 367-68, 371, 373-75, 377.
- ⁴⁸ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 397-98, 400-02, 403. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 366, 370, 381, 383, 392, 395-96, 432. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 468-69. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 614. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 595.
- ⁴⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 393, 397, 400, 407-08, 417, 431, 438.
- ⁵⁰ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 406. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 474-76. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 413, 431-32.
- ⁵¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 440.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 323-25, 330, 333, 451. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 424, 479. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 643-44.
- ⁵³ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 481-82, 496-97. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 617-18. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 584. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-38, 242-43. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 6, p. 119. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, p. 453.
- ⁵⁴ Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 598, 600. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 222, 241. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 619. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 120-23.
- ⁵⁵ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 115. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 643. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 749-50. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 411. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 233. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 596.
- ⁵⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 465, 468-69, 471.
- ⁵⁷ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 114. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 479-80. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 454, 456-57. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 289. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 625-28.
- ⁵⁸ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 118. Japan:

- Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 596. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-91, 293. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 270-72, 274-79. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 412. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 643. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 481.
- ⁵⁹ Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-22. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 543-46.
- ⁶⁰ Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 289, 303. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 750. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, pp. 595, 599. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 617. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 413. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 507-08.
- ⁶¹ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 750. Japan: Department of Foreign Affairs, *Gaiko Shiko*, p. 597. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 506. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 616-17. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 235, 241. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 116-17. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-02. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. 460-63, 466-68, 469.
- ⁶² Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 644.
- ⁶³ Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-28. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 629-31. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 690-91. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 676-80. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 235, 426. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 10, pp. 174-79.
- ⁶⁴ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 635, 638-39. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. ii, iv-vi, 2.
- ⁶⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. i-ii, 554. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 629.
- ⁶⁶ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 537-42, 582-99. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. v, 513-42.
- ⁶⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 14, pp. v, 554-55. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 610, 622. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 399. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 636.
- ⁶⁸ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 633-34. Birth control was practiced by abortion brought about by massage.
- ⁶⁹ *Kokumin Nenkan* (The People's Year Book), 1921, pp. 46-47; 1929, p. 44; 1931, p. 40. *Jiji Nenkan* (Jiji Year Book), 1930, p. 95; 1935, p. 83.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

- ¹ Kuroita, *Kokushi no Kenkyu*, pp. 558, 560-62. Ariga, *Dai-Nippon Rekishi*, vol. 2, pp. 394, 396-97. Takakuwa, *Nippon Tsushi* (A Comprehensive History of Japan), pp. 668-70. Aoki, *Dai-Nippon Rekishi Shusei*, vol. 2, pp. 848-49, 854-56. Kokushi Kenkyu-Kai (Research Association of the National History of Japan), *Ashikaga Jugodai-Shi* (History of the Ashikaga Period During the Rule of the Fifteen Shoguns), pp. 274, 310, 316-17. Hagino, *Nippon-Shi Kowa*, pp. 505-07.
- ² Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 687. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 552-53. Kokushi Kenkyu-Kai (Research Association of the National History of Japan), *op. cit.*, pp. 328-29. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 527.
- ³ Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 6, pp. 266, 278.
- ⁴ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 552.
- ⁵ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 1032. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 552, 566, 582. Kokushi Kenkyu-Kai (Research Association of the National History of Japan), *op. cit.*, pp. 329-30. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 527, 530. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, p. 47.
- ⁶ Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 832. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 804. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 133; vol. 15, pp. ii-iv.
- ⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. vi-vii.
- ⁸ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 805. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. 83-84; vol. 25, p. 488.
- ⁹ Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 627, 629. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 802-03, 804.
- ¹⁰ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 324. Waseda University, *Dai-Nippon Jidai-Shi*, vol. 9, pp. 120-21. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 627. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 99, 136, 142, 144, 156-57; vol. 14, pp. 208-09.
- ¹¹ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 801-02. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 122-23.
- ¹² Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 805-06. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 325. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 124. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 147-48.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

- ¹ Takakuwa, *Nippon Tsushi*, pp. 800-01. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 6, pp. 49, 53. Aoki, *Dai-Nippon Rekishi Shusei*, vol. 3, pp. 270-72. Hagino, *Nippon-Shi Kowa*, p. 614. Ihara, *Tokugawa Jidai Tsushi*, pp. 248, 341. Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nippon Kokumin-Shi*, vol. 13, p. 121.
- ² Although the revenue from the districts and provinces under the direct control of the shogun was generally estimated to be 8,000,000 *koku* of rice annually, yet if the output of the gold and silver mines, together with the special taxes levied on the large cities and on the national harbors, be added, the annual revenue of the shogun was far greater than 8,000,000 *koku*. The revenue from the districts and the provinces allotted to the imperial court, the imperial family, branches, and all the families of the court nobles approximated 120,000 *koku* of rice. Therefore, the income of the shogunate government was about seventy times that of the imperial government. Furthermore, its annual revenue was no larger than that of the local feudal governments under the control of the feudal lords of the middle class. Although the shogun and all the feudal lords had the right to own the provincial districts allotted to them and might dispose of their revenues as they pleased, yet the provinces and districts allotted to the emperor and his court were placed under the absolute control of the military governor of the city of Kyoto, who was appointed by the shogun. Therefore, the emperor had neither right of ownership nor ruling power over the provinces and districts allotted to the throne. During the Tokugawa feudal period, the emperor was the only person of the ruling class who could neither own an inch of land nor have a penny at his personal disposal. (The foregoing is an abstract from the writings of Ariga and from those of Tokutomi.)
- ³ Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 802. Ariga, *Dai Nippon-Rekishi*, vol. 1, pp. 629, 649. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 274-82. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 16; vol. 15, p. vii.
- ⁴ Waseda University, *Dai-Nippon Jidai-Shi*, vol. 9, pp. 134, 136-37, 194-97. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 24-25. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 306. Kuroita, *Kokushi no Kenkyu*, p. 716. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 802. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 655-56. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 129.
- ⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 6, 131-32; vol. 15, pp. 478-79; vol. 26, p. 2. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 62. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 369. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 301. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 306, 310.
- ⁶ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-42. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 651-54, 657. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 6-7, 122. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 306-09. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 713, 740-41.
- ⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. 211-13; vol. 26, p. 2.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 121-22; vol. 14, pp. 4-5; vol. 15, pp. v-vii; vol. 26, pp. 2-3. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 803.
- ⁹ Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 800, 802-03. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-03. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 610-13. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 264, 267. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 14. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 713, 716. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 126-32.
- ¹⁰ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 130. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 305-06.
- ¹¹ Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 802. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 134-35, 196-97. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 129.
- ¹² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 6, 50-59. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 802. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-48. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 369. Hagino,

- op. cit.*, pp. 615-16. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 62-63. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 711.
- ¹³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 10-12, 97, 99-100.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. 13, pp. 4, 22-23, 121-22, 128; vol. 14, p. 4; vol. 26, p. 3. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 801-02. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 647, 653, 657. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 51. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 705-08.
- ¹⁵ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 748. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 610-11. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 63. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 802-03. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 392. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 128; vol. 14, pp. 352, 356.
- ¹⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 133-36. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 803, 832. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 25-26. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 305.
- ¹⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 9-11, 17, 97-98.
- ¹⁸ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 661-62. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 136-37; vol. 15, pp. v, 83-85. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 832, 842-43.
- ¹⁹ Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 884-85. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 732-34.
- ²⁰ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 743-45, 754-55.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 757-58, 778. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 250.
- ²² Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 796-806.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 815-16.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

- ¹ Tsuji, *Kaigai Kotsu Shiwa*, pp. 60-61, 69, 81.
- ² *Ibid.*, p. 109.
- ³ Omori, *Dai-Nippon Zenshi*, vol. 2, pp. 628-32. Aoki, *Dai-Nippon Rekishi Shusei*, vol. 2, pp. 785-86, 802-06. Kokushi Kenkyu-Kai (Research Association of the National History of Japan), *Ashikaga Jugodai-Shi*, p. 374.
- ⁴ Hagino, *Nippon-Shi Kowa*, p. 605. Ariga, *Dai Nippon-Rekishi*, vol. 2, pp. 585-86, 628.
- ⁵ Waseda University, *Dai-Nippon Jidai-Shi*, vol. 9, pp. 134, 136. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 657.
- ⁶ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 658-59. Ihara, *Tokugawa Jidai Tsushi*, pp. 273-75.
- ⁷ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 567-74. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 657-58. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. ii-iii, 35.
- ⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 136; vol. 15, p. v; vol. 16, p. 445. Taka-kuwa, *Nippon Tsushi*, p. 883. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi* (History of Japan in Reverse Order), vol. 6, pp. 34-36. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 567.
- ⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. vii-viii.
- ¹⁰ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 351-56. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-71.
- ¹¹ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-76. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 167-68.
- ¹² Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 659-60. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 280-92.
- ¹³ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 664.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 666. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 617. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
- ¹⁵ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 441-46. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 736. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. ii, 35-36.
- ¹⁶ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 565-66.
- ¹⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, p. 150. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 443. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 566.
- ¹⁸ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 664, 736.
- ¹⁹ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 443-44. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 567.
- ²⁰ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 16, pp. 441-43. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 292. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 662. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, pp. 447-48.
- ²¹ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-93, 564-66. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 661-62. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 35-36. Kuroita, *Kokushi no Kenkyu*, p. 764.
- ²² The *Sho Ich-I* is the highest rank that the emperor may confer upon any of his subjects. However, it is exceedingly rare for the emperor to confer this rank upon any of his subjects during their lifetime. The rank is generally conferred as a posthumous honor.
- ²³ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 292.
- ²⁴ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 614-15. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 249. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 9, p. 370. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 90-91.
- ²⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 16, p. 314-18; vol. 22, pp. iii-iv, 136, 157-58.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, vol. 22, p. 117. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 664, 736. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, p. 296.
- ²⁷ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, pp. 301-04. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 292, 567. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 16, pp. 442-44, 468, 470; vol. 26, p. iv.
- ²⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 465, 469, 477.
- ²⁹ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, pp. 808-09. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 732. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 114, 118, 123-24, 135.
- ³⁰ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 136-37, 146-47, 152, 380-81. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, pp. 307-08.
- ³¹ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, pp. 309-10. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 809. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 733. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 569. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 152-53, 381.
- ³² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 155, 157-59, 160, 211, 218. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, pp. 311-12.

- ³³ Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 4, pp. 313, 316.
Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 734. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 160-61, 163, 166-67, 172, 205, 285, 291.
- ³⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 162-64, 167, 172, 182. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jida-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 248.
- ³⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-59, 172-73, 184. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 734.
- ³⁶ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 734-36. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 175-76, 197-98, 362-64, 402.
- ³⁷ Kuroita, *Kotei Kokushi no Kenkyu*, vol. 3, p. 488. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 736.
- ³⁸ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 733.
- ³⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 180, 192.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 194, 201-04.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 209, 222-24, 226-27.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 159, 206-07, 214.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 217-18. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, pp. 217-18. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 602.
- ⁴⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 158-59, 206.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 209, 211, 423.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 225, 258, 265.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 214, 246.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 206-07.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 208-09, 298.
- ⁵⁰ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 251. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 232, 269, 278, 280, 304, 328. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 733-34.
- ⁵¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. vii-viii, 269.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 281-83, 348. Waseda Univ., *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 249.
- ⁵³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, p. 295.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 297.
- ⁵⁵ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 736, 737.
- ⁵⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 295, 297, 304-05.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 301.
- ⁵⁸ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 488.
- ⁵⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 148, 296, 357, 363-64, 370. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 734.
- ⁶⁰ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 296, 302, 304. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 250. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 733.
- ⁶¹ It is well-nigh an unaccountable fact that the officials in the imperial court enumerated as one of the charges against Takenouchi the fact that he regarded the emperor as a person to be more highly regarded than the shogun. In fact, in the middle of the eighteenth century, the Tokugawa shogunate was at its height. The shogun's rulings predominated in all parts of Japan. Even the court nobles were convinced that the shogun was to be revered most highly of all human beings, and that the emperor was a being who maintained his existence outside of the human world. Therefore, according to their conception, any person who advocated doctrines by which to impress his fellow men with ideas that the emperor should be more highly revered than the shogun thus committed a grave crime and thereby disturbed the established national order. (Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 139, 297, 304. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 732-33.)
- ⁶² Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 487-88. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 32, p. 374. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 569.
- ⁶³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 187-91.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 298, 303, 355.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 304-05.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 305.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 305-06.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 374. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 733-34.
- ⁶⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 301, 304-05.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 355, 357, 365.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 269, 281-83, 287-89, 318, 332, 355-58, 364, 381.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 318.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 319-20.
- ⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 320-21, 338. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jida-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 250.
- ⁷⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 318-19.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 325-26.

- ⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 312-13, 327.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 321-24, 329-30, 406-09. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 885.
- ⁷⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 269-70, 328, 343.
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 295-97.
- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 343.
- ⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 344, 349-51.
- ⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 350-51. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 250.
- ⁸⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 352-53.
- ⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 338-39, 363.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 295, 368. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 249.
- ⁸⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 357, 360-61.
- ⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 288-89, 361, 367.
- ⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 365-66, 401.
- ⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 358-59, 360.
- ⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 398.
- ⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 395.
- ⁹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 365, 375-76.
- ⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 367-68, 370.
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 405.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 400-01.
- ⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 405.
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 401-02, 404. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 488. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, pp. 250-51. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 256.
- ⁹⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 298, 403-04. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 251.
- ¹⁰⁰ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 365, 405. Takukawa, *op. cit.*, p. 885.
- ¹⁰¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. iii-iv, 117, 122, 135, 377, 381, 383, 393-94.
- ¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 387, 399, 401.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. vi.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 211-12, 409.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. vii-viii.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 416-17.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38, 147-49, 152. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 246-47. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 733.
- ¹⁰⁸ Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, pp. 251-52. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 416-17, 433-34.
- ¹⁰⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 418, 420-21, 433.
- ¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, vol. 22, pp. 415-16. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 734-35. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 489. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 252.
- ¹¹¹ Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 257. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 418-92.
- ¹¹² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 419-20.
- ¹¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 224, 228-29.
- ¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 423-24, 502.
- ¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 434, 438.
- ¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 434-35.
- ¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 435-36.
- ¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 438, 502.
- ¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 433, 439. Waseda Univ., *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, pp. 251-52.
- ¹²⁰ Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 252. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, p. 465.
- ¹²¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 469-70.
- ¹²² *Ibid.*, pp. 400, 441-42. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, pp. 252-53.
- ¹²³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, p. 442. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 253.
- ¹²⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 442-43.
- ¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 443.
- ¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 466-67, 473. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 489.
- ¹²⁷ Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 253. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, p. 461.
- ¹²⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, p. 464.
- ¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 465-66. Waseda Univ., *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 253.
- ¹³⁰ Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 254. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 469-70, 472.
- ¹³¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, p. 473.
- ¹³² *Ibid.*, pp. 473-74. Waseda Univ., *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, p. 255.
- ¹³³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 468, 472.
- ¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 477.
- ¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 134, 478.

- ¹³⁶ Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi*, vol. 2, pp. 257-58. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. 479-80.
- ¹³⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, 492-95, 500-01.
- ¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 501-02.
- ¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 493, 500.
- ¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 495, 501-03.
- ¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 503-04.
- ¹⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 494, 502. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 554.
- ¹⁴³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, p. 493.
- ¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 470-503.
- ¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 505-06. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 736.
- ¹⁴⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. iii, viii, 507.
- ¹⁴⁷ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 568-69.
- ¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 569-70.
- ¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 571-74.
- ¹⁵⁰ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 22, pp. viii-ix, 507-08.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

- ¹ Hagino, *Nippon-Shi Kowa* (Lectures on Japanese History), pp. 594, 596. Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nippon Kokumin-Shi*, vol. 11, p. 579.
- ² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 11, pp. 36-37, 52-53, 55.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 482. Takakuwa, *Nippon Tsushi*, pp. 782-83. Ihara, *Tokugawa Jidai Tsushi*, pp. 93, 95-96.
- ⁴ Aoki, *Dai-Nippon Rekishi Shusei* (Comprehensive History of Great Japan), vol. 2, p. 1158.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1154. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
- ⁶ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-98. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 782.
- ⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 11, pp. iii, 464-67, 480-81. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 782-83.
- ⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 11, pp. 480-82.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 444, 456, 464-67, 472. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 783.
- ¹⁰ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 594. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, pp. 783-84.
- ¹¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 102.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, vol. 11, pp. 179-200, 579-80; vol. 13, pp. 102-03.
- ¹³ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
- ¹⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 103-04.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. 12, pp. 16, 103.
- ¹⁶ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-09.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 109. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 103.
- ¹⁸ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 128-29.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 129.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-30.
- ²² *Ibid.*, pp. 130-31.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 131-50.
- ²⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. iii, v-vi.
- ²⁵ Kuroita, *Kokushi no Kenkyu*, pp. 711-12. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, p. 4. Waseda University, *Tokugawa Jidai-Shi* (History of the Tokugawa Period), vol. 1, pp. 204-05. Ariga, *Dai Nippon-Rekishi* (An Unabridged History of Japan), vol. 2, pp. 609-10.
- ²⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. iv-vi, 5. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, p. 712-13.
- ²⁷ Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 657. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 326. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. 406-08. Kuroita, *Kotei Kokushi no Kenkyu*, vol. 3, p. 420.
- ²⁸ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 341-47. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 419-20.
- ²⁹ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 419. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. 406-08.
- ³⁰ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 322-27, 341-49.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 243, 250-54. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 414. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 610. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. 431-32.
- ³² Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 416-20. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. iv-v, 324-25. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 610, 653.
- ³³ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 614. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 345. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. 4-5. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 370. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 656. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 6, pp. 90-91. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 176-77. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 797.
- ³⁴ Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 656-57.
- ³⁵ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 615. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 797. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 177.
- ³⁶ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 369. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 615-16. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. 200-02, 280-89.
- ³⁷ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-52. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 382, 417-18. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, p. 10. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 611. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 833. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 271.
- ³⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, p. 166. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 634, 639-40. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 805-06.
- ³⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. 140, 145, 150-51, 187, 189-90.

- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. v, 323-25.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 234-35, 544-46.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 207-08, 211, 224. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-69. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 455-56. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 565.
- ⁴³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. iv, 2.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 200, 208-09. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 454-55. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 38, 40.
- ⁴⁵ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 418. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 15, pp. 412-13.
- ⁴⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, p. 80.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 80-83, 199. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 587.
- ⁴⁸ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 444. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, p. 11.
- ⁴⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. 13-14. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 475-76.
- ⁵⁰ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. 81, 198-200.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 201-02.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, vol. 22, pp. 213-18.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, vol. 17, pp. 208, 218-19, 234, 544.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 210.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 210-11.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 211-12.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 212-13. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 651-52.
- ⁵⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. 210-17.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 219.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-20, 222-24.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 227, 241.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 225, 241-42.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 228-29.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 237-38.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 230. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 593, 596. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 42, 45, 48.
- ⁶⁶ Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 673. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, p. 223.
- ⁶⁷ Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 46. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, p. 225.
- ⁶⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. 225-26, 233, 240-41. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 52-53. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 595. Takakuwa, *op. cit.*, p. 852. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 672-73. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 368. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, p. 205. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 651-52.
- ⁶⁹ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 655.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 655-56. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 123-24. Aoki, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 596. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 165. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 686. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 420.
- ⁷¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 182-83. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 451-53. Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 687-88.
- ⁷² Ariga, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 673. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 165. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 17, pp. 544-45.
- ⁷³ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, pp. iii-iv, 4-5; vol. 27, p. 4. Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 551, 554.
- ⁷⁴ Ihara, *op. cit.*, pp. 488-89. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 506-07.
- ⁷⁵ Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 800, 805-06.
- ⁷⁶ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 506-07. Waseda University, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 370-72.
- ⁷⁷ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 303-06. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 605-06, 610-12.
- ⁷⁹ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 5, p. 201.
- ⁸⁰ Yamada, *Tenseki Sekko*, p. 220.
- ⁸¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, p. vii; vol. 27, pp. v-vi, 4. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 506-09.
- ⁸² Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 502-04.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

- ¹ Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nippon Kokimin-Shi*, vol. 23, p. 142.
- ² *Ibid.*, pp. 143-44.
- ³ *Ibid.*, p. 144.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 142.
- ⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 143.
- ⁶ Inobe, *Bakumatsu-Shi Gaisetsu* (Essential Facts of the Latter Days of the Tokugawa Shogunate), pp. 5, 6.
- ⁷ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, p. 1; vol. 23, pp. 132-33.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. 23, p. 133.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-35.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 134.
- ¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 134.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 135.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-36.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 135; Inobe, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- ¹⁵ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 23, pp. 6, 145-46.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 134.
- ¹⁸ Ihara, *Tokugawa Jidai Tsushi* (A Comprehensive History of the Tokugawa Period), p. 620; Tahobashi, *Kindai Nippon Gaikoku-Kankei Shi* (History of the Diplomatic Relations of Present-Day Japan), pp. 1-48; Hidaka, *Kyokuto no Shikan-to-Keirin* (Historical Events and National Undertakings in the Far East), pp. 29-31.
- ¹⁹ Professor Robert J. Kerner, editor of the publications of the Northeastern Asia Seminar, is writing an extensive account of this under the title of *Russian Eastward Expansion*. It is, therefore, unnecessary at this point to go into detail on this subject.
- ²⁰ See the new interpretation offered by Robert J. Kerner, "Russian Expansion to America," *Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America*, XXV (1931), 111 ff.
- ²¹ Pozdnieev, Dimitrii. *Materialy po istorii sievernoi Iaponii i eia otnoshenii k materiku Azii i Rossii* (Materials for the History of Northern Japan and Its Relations to the Continent of Asia and Russia), II, Pt. II, pp. 1-2.
- ²² Kerner, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-14.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.
- ²⁴ Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 400. Tahobashi, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- ²⁵ Tahobashi, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 53.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-01.
- ²⁸ Tahobashi, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.
- ³² *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 57.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 59.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 70, 72-73.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
- ⁴⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, p. 323.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26. Mitsukuni Tokugawa, *Dai-Nihon Shi* (History of Great Japan), vol. 240, p. 763. Okuma, *Kaikoku Taisei-Shi*, pp. 378-79. Inobe, *op. cit.*, pp. 7, 102.
- ⁴⁶ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, pp. 212-16.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 324-25.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 326-29. Inobe, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-9.
- ⁴⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, pp. 331-33.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 330.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 382. Inobe, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
- ⁵² Shoin Yoshida and Sanai Hashimoto are historically better known as Shoin and Sanai and hence the practice of writing their given names first is here departed from.
- ⁵³ Appendix XI, p. 525.
- ⁵⁴ Appendix XII, pp. 530-31.

- ⁵⁵ Appendix XII, p. 534.
- ⁵⁶ Kuroita, *Kotei Kokushi no Kenkyu*, vol. 3, pp. 531, 538-39. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-62.
- ⁵⁷ Appendix XI, p. 524.
- ⁵⁸ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, p. 335.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 336-43.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 344-46.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 22, 79-81. Okuma, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
- ⁶² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, pp. 80, 83-84.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 84-85, 87. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 385-87.
- ⁶⁴ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, p. 88.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 20.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 251-56.
- ⁶⁸ Novakovskii, *Rossia i Iaponiia*, pp. 48-64. Tikhmenev, *Istoricheskoe obozrenie obrazovaniia Russko-Amerikanskoi Kompanii*, vol. 1, pp. 100-02. Pozdniecev, *op. cit.*, 2, pp. 38-71.
- ⁶⁹ Tikhmenev, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 82-155. Novakovskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-115. Pozdniecev, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 88-127.
- ⁷⁰ Pozdniecev, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 152-236. Novakovskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-24. Tikhmenev, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 156-63.
- ⁷¹ Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 488-91, 493-501, 526-28. Tsuji, *Kaigai Kotsu Shiwa*, pp. 771-72. Hidaka, *op. cit.*, 91-92. Rikord, *Zapiski Flota Kapitana o plavanii ego k iaponskim beregam v 1812 i 1813 godakh*; Novakovskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-43. Golovnin, *Narrative of My Captivity in Japan, 1811-1813*. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, pp. 276-89, 308-12, 316-22. Tahobashi, *op. cit.*, pp. 230-45.
- ⁷² Novakovskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-58.
- ⁷³ *Ibid.*, pp. 159-83. Goncharov, *Fregat Pallada*, vol. 2, pp. 1-106, 169-233; Schilling, "Iz vospominanii starogo moriaka," *Russkii Arkhiv*, 1892, Book 2 (Nos. 5-8), pp. 126-59, 247-76, 287-318.
- ⁷⁴ Inobe, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-94. Waseda University, *Dai-Nippon Jidai-Shi*, vol. 12, pp. 189-90. Yoshida, *Tojo Nippon-Shi*, vol. 4, pp. 48, 50; Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 33, pp. 159-80; Aoki, *Dai-Nippon Rekishi Shu-sei*, vol. 4, pp. 911-15; Kurono, *Nichi-Ro Joyaku-Shu (1855-1875)*, pp. 1-6; Novakovskii, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-84.

DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER I

APPENDIX 1

Documents Exchanged Between Japan and Korea During the Preliminary Negotiations with Regard to the Restoration of Peace

UPON THE DEATH of Hideyoshi, Iyeyasu came into power. Notwithstanding that he was the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate, with which the Period of Seclusion is identified, Iyeyasu was a man of progressive ideas, especially with regard to the relations which Japan should have with the world outside. He made it his policy to gain control of trade in the Orient and thereby to advance and ensure the wealth and prosperity of Japan.^{1*} Naturally, he was desirous of gaining trade privileges with China. Nevertheless, he appreciated that China, which had suffered from the ravages of Japanese pirates for nearly two hundred years, and then from the Seven Years' War of Hideyoshi, regarded Japan as an untrustworthy and dangerous nation, and therefore could not be approached directly. Hence he decided first to make peace with Korea, which was a faithful tributary state of China's, and then to have Korea appeal to China on behalf of Japan. These peace negotiations between Japan and Korea were entrusted entirely to Yoshitomo So, the lord of Tsushima. He served with great promptness and eagerness.

Tsushima is a small island situated in the middle of the Korean Channel. Because of its barren soil and its proximity to Korea, the inhabitants of this island had always maintained their existence by importing rice and beans from Korea. However, during the period of the Seven Years' War and the years that followed, these food supplies from Korea had been entirely cut off.

Therefore, Lord So, even before being approached by Iyeyasu, strongly urged the restoration of peace with Korea.² Peace negotiations were begun in 1599, the year immediately following that of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Korea. In the brief space of one and one-half years, Lord So sent envoys to Korea three times in succession. However, upon their arrival, their whereabouts became entirely unknown.

* Superior figures refer to notes which will be found on pp. 381-388.

In 1601, Lord So sent a trusted man named Ishida to Korea as his fourth envoy, with special instructions to investigate the fate of the preceding three envoys. Ishida returned to Tsushima, bearing a state paper from Korea. This state paper was written in the form of a personal letter addressed to Lord So by Hua Cheng, a royal councilor of state in the Korean government. The state paper read as follows:

"As to Yoshiro and others with regard to whom you have made inquiry, we would make the following statement:

"They reached our country in safety. However, the military leaders with the Heavenly Commission arrested them on each occasion and sent them to the Heavenly Court [the Ming Court in China]. Our country has not been informed, since then, of the fate of these men from your country. You must remember that when, in former years, the Heavenly Envoys [Chinese] went to Japan, they were treated with great rudeness and insolence. Moreover, contrary to the Heavenly instructions [of the Chinese emperor], your country made bold to take up arms against the Heavenly troops. Naturally, the Heavenly Court has ever since been greatly offended by reason of this treacherous and brutal act of Japan's. This is the reason why Yoshiro and the others were arrested. However, you should certainly realize that no nation in the world, either in ancient or in modern times, would put an envoy of another nation to death. Our country is well acquainted with this international usage. We certainly would not kill Yoshiro and the others. We would never find pleasure in the taking of the life of a human being. Furthermore, we know that Japan would not lose much even if these men should fail to return to their country. Therefore, you should understand that we would not interfere with their return to their homeland. Hoping that you will clearly understand that our kingdom would not commit any act contrary to international propriety, we remain,

"Sincerely,

"HUA CHENG.

"[Dated] August of the twenty-ninth year of the Wan-Li era of the Ming Emperor Shen-Tsung [1601]."

Lord So was greatly encouraged upon receiving this document. In the winter of 1601, he sent a man named Ida as his fifth envoy to Korea. At the same time, a group of Korean prisoners of war was

returned to Korea, so that courtesy should be shown at the time of asking for peace. Ida came back with a state paper written by Hua Cheng, which read in part as follows:

"Since the Year of Jinshin [1592], our Heavenly Court [the Ming Imperial Court of China] has stationed military leaders in our country. All our national affairs are now under their control. We cannot even decide minor matters without their supervision. Therefore, so grave a national question as that of entering upon peace negotiations with your country is wholly out of our power. However, if your country should deeply regret what it has done in the past and make amends, henceforth refraining from crime and misdemeanors, thus showing sincerity and faithfulness, and thereby gaining the trust and confidence of the Heavenly military leaders stationed in our country, peace negotiations might be entered into."

Upon the receipt of this state paper from Korea, Lord So of Tsushima immediately replied, saying:

"Your precious letter has been read by us repeatedly. By it we understand that all the national affairs of your country, both great and small, are now under the control of the Heavenly military leaders, and that therefore neither you nor your government can express any desire or decision concerning any important question in your country. Furthermore, you have kindly advised us, saying that if we [the Japanese] should regret and atone for crimes formerly committed, thus showing sincerity and faithfulness, we might thereby gain happy results. That is, if the Heavenly military leaders of the army and of the navy stationed in Korea should be impressed by our [the Japanese] acts of rectification and repentance, they might report our reformation to the Heavenly Court in Peking. Then both Japan and Korea might enjoy great happiness through the restoration of peace. . . .

"Some years prior to his death, Hideyoshi was strongly admonished and advised by Iyeyasu to withdraw his troops from Korea, but some unscrupulous men near Hideyoshi prevented his acting in accordance with this wise advice. However, at the time of his death Hideyoshi was fully convinced that he had committed a serious error by sending troops to Korea. He therefore asked Iyeyasu to withdraw the entire fighting force from thence. Now, our coun-

try is completely reformed with regard to our former wrongdoing and we have decided to implore your country to make peace with us. If peace should be restored between Korea and Japan, it would bring great blessings to the people of both nations.''⁵

After having sent this letter to Korea, Lord So, as well as Iyeyasu, put forth his best efforts to win the good will of Korea and of the Chinese generals stationed in that country by sending back to their homes the Korean prisoners who had been taken during the Seven Years' War. In the course of two and one-half years (beginning in 1601), 1702 Korean prisoners were returned to their homes. In a single year (1605), more than 3000 were returned. Having thus become convinced of Japan's sincerity in her desire for the restoration of peace with Korea, the king of Korea in July, 1606, instructed Ibun Sei, a royal councilor of state, to write to Lord So to the effect that Korea would make peace with Japan provided Japan should meet the two following requirements:

1. Iyeyasu, ruler of Japan, should send to Korea a state paper bearing his seal, imploring peace.

2. Japan should recognize that an atrocious crime had been committed in the course of the Seven Years' War, in the digging up and dishonoring of the graves of Korean kings, and that the offenders should be arrested and sent to Korea to be punished in accordance with the laws of that nation.⁶

APPENDIX 2

State Papers Exchanged Between Korea and Japan for the Restoration of Peace

IYEYASU, as well as Yoshitomo So, perceived that Korea would not consent to the restoration of peace unless Japan should approach her in a humble and courteous manner. However, Lord So knew that Iyeyasu would not humiliate both himself and Japan by imploring Korea to restore peace as Korea demanded. Hence, Lord So, being convinced that peace could not be restored unless the demands of Korea should be met, and being well aware that the restoration of peace with Korea was essential to the very existence of Tsushima, conspired with his advisors to meet the demands of the situation by extraordinary means. Documents such as Korea

desired were forged and sent, bearing apparently the name of Iyeyasu; and Lord So took two criminals upon whom the death sentence had been pronounced and sent them to Korea as the grave desecrators—who, when they reached Korea, were executed in a public place, at the king's command.⁷ Korea's demands having been met by Japan, she decided to accept Japan's proposals for peace. In January, 1607, the king of Korea sent to Japan as his envoys Kilu Lyo, Sen Kyaku, and Ho-Kuan Ten, with a state paper in the form of a personal letter as a reply to the letter from the "King of Japan" (Iyeyasu). The state paper thus sent by Korea to Japan read:

"Yen Yi, King of Korea, hereby respectfully replies to His Royal Highness, the King of Japan. From time immemorial, all neighboring nations throughout the world have conducted their international affairs in strict accordance with established principles. For a period of two hundred years our kingdom had enjoyed peace and prosperity. We had enjoyed this happy national existence only because of the great magnanimity and blessing of our Heavenly Court [the Ming Imperial Court of China]. Throughout this period, we had neither offended nor opposed your country. Nevertheless, in the Year of Jinshin [1592] we suffered from a great military disaster. Without cause or provocation, your country sent troops to our kingdom, and our nation was subjected to extreme suffering, calamity, and privation, even to the dishonoring of the graves of our kings. In our country, both the ruling and the ruled have felt this painful experience deep in their hearts and bones. We have decided that for the sake of right and justice we should not continue to maintain our existence under the same skies with your country. During several years past, your Tsushima government has repeatedly approached us with proposals for peace; but we have each time rejected them, as we feel that it would be a great national disgrace for us to associate with Japan, a nation of such standards and practices. Now that your country has been completely reformed and has entered upon a new national life, it has written us imploring peace and stating that it has repented of the past and has rectified all the wrongs committed in former times. We are convinced of your sincere desire for the restoration of peace. We are therefore sending our envoys to acknowledge your letter and to express our apprecia-

tion of its contents. We are sending some of our local products as listed on a separate sheet.

"[Dated] January of the thirty-fifth year in the Wan-Li era of the Ming Emperor Shen-Tsung of China [1607]:"⁸

Hidetada, the son of Iyeyasu who had succeeded his father as shogun, replied to this state paper of Korea, saying:

"Hidetada Minamoto of Japan hereby replies to His Royal Highness, the King of Korea. Your precious letter was received. I have repeatedly read its pages with reverence. The pleasure and happiness that are mine because of its contents are beyond my power to describe. The fact that your three envoys have come to our country by traveling over land and sea for a thousand miles is likewise highly appreciated. We have accepted with great pleasure the unusual and remarkable products of your sacred land. We are deeply impressed by your thoughtfulness and kindness.

"According to our historical records, your country and ours have several times exchanged mutual pledges as friendly and neighboring nations and have faithfully adhered to them. Now we have come to renew with your country these happy relations of times past. Our humble country would act seriously in this matter. The men of yore despised and considered it disgraceful to maintain friendship by taking power and profit into consideration. Our keywords in the transaction of international affairs should be sincerity, justice, and righteousness. . . .

"[Signed] HIDEYADA MINAMOTO OF JAPAN.

"[Dated] May in the Year of the Teibi [1607]:"⁹

Preceding the correspondence just described, in the winter of 1605 Lord So of Tsushima had sent Tomomasa Tachibana as his tenth envoy to Korea, and had him inquire of Korea on what grounds she would agree to restoration of peace with Japan. In the spring of 1606, Ibun Sei, Chief of the Board of Rites of the Korean Government, sent a reply to Lord So which explains the matter. It reads, in part:

"Our country had maintained friendly relations with Japan for nearly two hundred years; and therefore it was a most unexpected event to us when Hideyoshi invaded our country without cause in the Year of Jinshin [1592]. He humiliated us so far as to open and dishonor the graves of our deceased kings. Hence we have neither

reason nor desire to restore peace with Japan of our own accord. However, we have learned that Iyeyasu has now adopted a different course, by disapproving of and changing everything done by Hideyoshi in the past. Therefore, if Iyeyasu should first send to Korea a state paper bearing his seal, imploring peace, and should also send the grave desecrators, we would consider the question of making peace with Japan."¹⁰

Hence it was that in the winter of 1606 a state paper was sent to the king of Korea, thus complying with Korea's demand. Modern historians believe that this paper was a forgery committed by Lord So and his advisors. At any rate, Korea received the paper and the king of Korea replied to it in January, 1607. Upon receipt of this reply, Hidetada, son of Iyeyasu, replied in May, 1607. Thus in a roundabout way was peace restored. It was done in this way because Korea refused to initiate peace negotiations.

In November, 1608, Japan sent to Korea as envoys Kagenao Yanagawa and a Buddhist priest named Genso, bearing a state paper the contents of which, not being extant, is unknown. This state paper, also, is believed to have been a forgery committed by Lord So and his advisors. Because Korea refused to permit the Japanese envoys to proceed to the Korean capital, they were unable to deliver the paper until March, 1609, at which time they met Chih-Wan Yi, the Korean representative. Under date of May, 1609, the king of Korea replied to this state paper of Japan. The king's letter read:

"Hun Yi, the King of Korea, respectfully replies to the King of Japan. The fact that you have sent your two envoys, having them cross the water to our country, fully proves that your country now urgently desires to maintain neighborly relations with us. We are greatly consoled in thus knowing that you have adhered to the pledge of international good will made some time ago. The key word of our friendly and neighborly relations is sincerity. If faithfulness and sincerity should be unchangeably observed by us, the two nations would always enjoy happiness and prosperity.

"[Dated] May of the thirty-seventh year in the Wan-Li era of the Ming Emperor Shen-Tsung of China [1609]."¹¹

Before their return to Tsushima, Kagenao Yanagawa and Genso, the Japanese envoys, and Chih-Wan Yi, the Korean representative, held a series of conferences, the result of which was the conclusion

of a trade agreement known as the "Treaty of Kiyu" (1609). By the provisions of this treaty, Korea permitted Japan to establish an official residence at Fusan. The number of trade ships (junks) that Japan (the Tsushima government) was allowed to send annually to Korea, the types and sizes of these ships, and the number of men aboard, were regulated. By this agreement, the maximum number of trade ships that might be sent to Korea from Japan annually was limited to twenty, whereas prior to the Seven Years' War Japan had been privileged to send as many as fifty trade ships to Korea each year. Thus, the trade concessions that Japan regained from Korea in 1609 were less than half of those which Japan had enjoyed during the Ashikaga period. The trade between Japan and Korea was conducted exclusively by the Tsushima and the Korean traders. Lord So of Tsushima frequently requested that Korea extend the trade concessions, especially the number of ships. However, Korea persistently denied these requests.²⁹ In 1614, Sai Kin, of the Board of Rites of the Korean government, replied to the request of Lord So, saying, in part:

"The number of trade ships that you are privileged to send us, as well as other trade concessions, was agreed upon only after we had appealed to and gained the consent of the Heavenly Court [China]. Therefore, we have absolutely no right to make any changes, no matter how slight they might be."

In the following year (1615), Lord So repeated this demand. Hsien Lin, of the Board of Rites of the Korean government, replied by saying, in part:

"Because in years past your island government made an urgent request, our country first presented the entire matter to the Heavenly Court [China] and opened Fusan to trade. Our country also concluded a treaty of trade. All this was done in strict accordance with the advice and instructions of the Heavenly Court. Since the conclusion of this treaty, we have adhered strictly to all its terms. Therefore no matter how insignificant a proposed change might be, we have not dared to present it to the Heavenly Court."³⁰

Throughout the peace negotiations, Korea repeatedly made it clear that unless Japan should initiate a peace movement, neither the king of Korea nor the Korean government would take up the question. After the restoration of peace, Korea still adhered to this

policy and informed Japan that in all their international dealings Korea would consider that it was Japan's obligation to initiate all undertakings, and to request the opinion of Korea with regard to them. Therefore, all Korean state papers were replies to papers sent by Japan. The Korean envoys were always sent under the name of *Kaito-Shi* ("An Envoy Sent as a Return Courtesy for the Envoy Whom the King of Japan Has Sent to Korea").

While relations between Japan and Korea were being conducted in this irregular way, Hideyori, the orphan son of Hideyoshi, grew into a brilliant and promising manhood. Iyeyasu feared that Hideyori might some day gain the support of the military leaders who had served under Hideyoshi, and rise against the shogunate government that Iyeyasu had founded. Therefore, in the summer of 1615, Iyeyasu and his son, Hidetada, with the purpose of destroying a possible cause of national disturbance, forced war upon Hideyori. In a most deceitful and dishonorable way, Iyeyasu defeated Hideyori and completely destroyed his family (Toyotomi). In November, 1615, he instructed Lord So of Tsushima to inform the king of Korea that he (Iyeyasu) had annihilated the family founded by Hideyoshi, whom Korea had long regarded as a national enemy, and thus had practically avenged the king of Korea, and that consequently the Korean king should send an envoy to Japan to congratulate Iyeyasu upon his great victory at Osaka. In April of the following year (1616), a royal councilor of state in the Korean government replied to this letter of Lord So's, saying that the annihilation of the family of Hideyoshi at Osaka seemed to have been merely a domestic affair in Japan, and had not been undertaken on behalf of Korea. Nevertheless, the atrocities committed by Hideyoshi and his troops in Korea had been so inhuman and so contrary to the Heavenly doctrine that they had caused great anger in Heaven above. Therefore, Heaven above had made man below act in its stead in the destruction of the family of Hideyoshi, as a punishment. Iyeyasu was undoubtedly the person selected by Heaven to fulfill this mission. Therefore, if Korea should send an envoy to Japan bearing congratulations upon the work accomplished by Iyeyasu in compliance with the Heavenly instructions, it would not be out of place. However, in Korea it was an established usage to conduct all national affairs, both great and small, only after having

presented the matter to the Heavenly Court [China] and having gained its approval. In the preceding year, when Japan had implored the restoration of peace, the matter had been referred to the Heavenly Court. Consent had been accompanied by an admonition that Korea should take care not to be deceived by Japan in reestablishing relations with her. Korea should again approach the Heavenly Court and ask for instructions in the matter of sending a congratulatory envoy to Japan of her own accord.¹⁴ In December of the same year, the Board of Rites of the Korean government wrote to Lord So, informing him that because Korea had obtained consent from the Heavenly Court, she had decided to send an envoy to Japan the following year. In May, 1617, the King of Korea sent envoys of congratulation to Japan, bearing this state paper:

"Hun Yi, the King of Korea, respectfully addresses His Royal Highness, the King of Japan. According to the representations of our court officials, we understand that Lord So of Tsushima, Japan, has sent his subject, named Choyo Yanagawa, a number of times to Korea and had him convey to us the good will of your country. At the same time he has requested that we send to your country a good will envoy of our own accord. Because no such precedent exists in our country, we have left this question undecided so that we might not make a hasty decision. However, now that you have completely subjugated Osaka and have come to control the entire land of Japan, this success of yours [in annihilating Hideyoshi's family] will certainly bring harmony and happiness both to the people of your country and to our people. Moreover, at present your country and ours are enjoying increasingly friendly relations. We hereby send our envoys to your country to convey expressions of our good will. However, before taking these steps, we have referred the entire matter to the Heavenly Court [China], and have gained Imperial approval. It is our earnest desire that your country should always maintain friendly relations with us and should not violate, even in the slightest degree, the doctrine of righteousness and justice. This being so, our two countries would always be happy and satisfied. We are sending herewith some of our local products, as listed on a separate sheet. . . .

"[Dated] May of the forty-fifth year of the Wan-Li era of the Ming Emperor Shen-Tsung of China [1617]"¹⁵

The state paper thus sent by the king of Korea reached Japan just one year after the death of Iyeyasu. Hidetada, his son, replied:

"Hidetada Minamoto of Japan respectfully replies to his Royal Highness, the King of Korea. Your rare and valuable letter has been received. I have read it repeatedly, with ever-increasing pleasure. Moreover, I feel deeply gratified because you have made your three envoys take the trouble to cross wide waters in order to come to our country, and because you have sent by them many unusual products of your country. We have received all the articles listed on the separate sheet. We are at a loss to express our gratitude for your kindness and thoughtfulness. The happiness and pleasure that we have enjoyed therefrom are so great that we are almost beside ourselves.

"The Chief of Osaka [Hideyori, the only son of Hideyoshi] had long been deserted by all the military leaders. Nevertheless, he dared to rise against us, thus making of himself a treacherous conspirator. He was indeed a traitor in time of peace. We promptly attacked both him and his family, together with his followers. We defeated and annihilated them all, without leaving a single survivor. At present, peace prevails throughout our country and the people are enjoying prosperity. Even the sea and the rivers give us an impression of calm.

"Your noble country, according to our understanding, has kindly made known the present condition of our humble country to the Heavenly Court. Our mutual good will is now firm as well as traditional. The old national pledges between our two nations will henceforth be more earnestly respected and adhered to. We shall thereby maintain permanent neighborly relations. Further details of our national affairs will be given you by our three envoys. The late autumn is now approaching. Hoping that you are enjoying good health and that you realize how precious you are, we remain,

"[Signed] HIDETADA MINAMOTO.

"[Dated] September, autumn in the Year of Teicho [1617]."¹⁶

The restoration of peace was completed in 1617, when the king of Korea sent envoys to Japan. The state papers exchanged between Japan and Korea reveal four outstanding facts:

1. Korea refused to enter into negotiations with Japan unless the latter should sue for peace, and should meet the Korean demands.¹⁷

2. All the state papers exchanged between Korea and Japan during this eighteen-year period designated the rulers of the two countries by using respectively the terms, "His Royal Highness, the King of Japan," and "His Royal Highness, the King of Korea," thus showing that Japan and Korea recognized each other as nations of equal standing.¹⁸

3. When China and her imperial court were mentioned in state papers exchanged between the two nations, both Japan and Korea always used the term, the "Heavenly Court," which meant the court that ruled the nations of the world on behalf of Heaven above.¹⁹

4. No mention was made of either the Japanese emperor or his court in any of the Japanese or Korean state papers. Thus, the existence of the Japanese emperor and of the Japanese imperial government was entirely disregarded in these transactions between Japan and Korea.

APPENDIX 3

Documents Showing That Japan Unsuccessfully Sought to Establish Relations with China and Thereby Gain Trade Privileges

JAPAN entered into peace with Korea by humiliating herself even to lowering her national standing and dignity. However, this was done merely for the sake of gaining trade privileges with China through the instrumentality of Korea. As early as 1607, Iyeyasu instructed Jotai, who had been the personal advisor of Hideyoshi, to write a state paper to Korea asking the king of Korea to implore the Ming emperor on behalf of Japan that China should grant trade privileges to Japan on the same conditions as she would grant them to a tributary state. Jotai advised Iyeyasu not to take that step. He said that only a few years before, Hideyoshi had demanded of the king of Korea that the Korean army be the vanguard of his army of invasion in China. He said further that if Japan should approach Korea in this humble way, Japan would lose her dignity and standing in the eyes of the world. Jotai's advice prevailed and the plan was abandoned.²⁰ However, Iyeyasu did not entirely give up his desire. The *Koji Saiyo*, a standard Korean work, contains a statement relating to this.

"In 1608 Japan sent her envoys Genso and Kagenao Taira, and had them request that we open a road for Japan so that she might send tribute to the Ming throne, but we refused."²¹

In another Korean document it is stated that in 1609 Iyeyasu requested Korea to gain from the Ming throne permission for Japan to send tribute to China. Korea refused to comply with this request and stated that all Korean affairs, both great and small, were under the complete control of the Ming officials stationed in Korea, and that therefore Korea had no power of initiative, not even in her domestic administration. Consequently, it was beyond her province to undertake anything in connection with China on behalf of Japan. In 1610, Lord So of Tsushima wrote to the Korean government, saying:

"The Royal Highness has requested your country to appeal to the Heavenly Court [China] with regard to the sending of tribute to the Ming Throne. Your noble country has repeatedly refused to take any steps in this matter. If your country should thus persist in refusing to comply with our request, the road for the sending of tribute to the Ming Throne can never be opened. We wonder why our humble country should not be ranked a dependent state of China, the same as is your country."²²

While Iyeyasu was thus unsuccessfully planning to establish trade relations with China, through the good offices of Korea, he at the same time approached China directly. In December, 1610, he caused a trusted subject, Masazumi Fujiwara, to write to the viceroy of Fukien, China, asking that he gain the consent of the Ming throne for the establishment of trade relations between China and Japan. The letter read as follows:

"Masazumi Fujiwara, a subject of Japan, in compliance with the instructions of our Master, hereby addresses His Excellency the Viceroy of the Fukien Government General of China. The history of the Han, Sui, Tang, Sung, Yuan, and Ming dynasties, together with the various annals of our country, outstandingly record that Japan sent envoys to China and engaged in trade with her during the reigns of those dynasties. However, in the preceding generation, when Korea was greatly disturbed nationally, the envoys of Chuka [China] came to our country. At the same time, the officers in charge as well as the interpreters in the government of our country,

actuated by selfish motives, misconstrued the state of affairs. As a result, China and our country were completely estranged and could not meet on common ground. From that time on, the sea waves rolled high and the ships ceased to sail between the two nations. This was a matter of great regret to us. However, at present, Iyeyasu Minamoto, the Master of Japan, has effected complete national unification. All the islands in our country are thus enabled to maintain a happy and prosperous existence. Both civil and military affairs have now reached a high stage of attainment. National ethics have been established and the laws and codes have been framed after those of the admirable ancient periods. The wise admonitions and warnings of preceding generations have always been respected and followed. Now, our national wealth and individual welfare manifest the power of the 'Nine Years' Accumulation.' The national customs and manners have been completely reformed and so advanced as closely to approach those of 'The Three Dynasties'.

"Because our national influence and power have reached the outside world, Korea has entered into trade relations with us; Liu Chiu has pledged loyalty to us; Annam, Cochin China, Siam, the Philippines, and Cambodia, as well as the chiefs of several barbarian tribes, have sent their state papers, and have asked for trade privileges with us. These have been granted. After having attained this national standing, we have more and more longed for Chuka [China]. We are continuously possessed by an urgent and heartfelt desire to maintain peaceful and happy relations with Chuka. It has now happened that a man named Hsing-Ju Chou, a resident of Ing-Tien Fu in Chuka, has come to the Goto Islands in our country. Because he was on his way to the Supreme Nation [China], we have fortunately been able to discuss matters of trade with him. He has said that sometime next year he may be able to induce trade ships from Fukien to come to Japan with the intention of making our harbor [Nagasaki] the port of anchorage. This having been accomplished, the traders of our two nations would be able to engage in trade by exchanging their wares to meet each other's needs. Nagasaki would then be a busy trade city. What we urgently hope for is that your country and ours may thereby profit greatly by trading.

"When the trade ships come from your province [Fukien] next year, will you be so gracious as to send us the Kango Trade License, after having obtained the consent of His Majesty the Great Emperor [of Tai-Ming]. We hope that this sort of arrangement may make it possible for our trade ships to sail west next year when the trade winds blow in autumn. When the Kango Trade License shall have been granted to us, we shall send but one large envoy-bearing trade ship. This step will be taken in order to manifest our sincerity to your country. Should other ships reach your country without the Kango Trade License, please understand that they are not ships sent by our country; they are vessels of outlawed pirates who make far-off islands their haunts and ravage the coast districts of Chuka. Your country has laws and codes by the provisions of which those plunderers should be severely dealt with. However, if our merchant ships which sail to and fro between ports in foreign lands and ports in our country should seek shelter in the harbors of Chuka because of stormy weather, may we ask that your country be so gracious as to provide them with water, fuel, and other necessities? We earnestly desire to renew the ancient national custom that has long been abandoned. Therefore, if our desire to send envoys to your country and to gain the Kango Trade License should be acceded to, the restoration of the ancient national tradition would be effected.

"Although our country is known as 'The Land of the Rising Sun,' yet in fact it is merely a small, insignificant nation. It has long been the gracious national practice of Chuka [China] to employ its great and munificent power in looking after the interests and welfare of all the small nations in the world. We may therefore expect that next year we may receive from your country the Kango Trade License. Our country in the Far Eastern Ocean will then be blest. The long-felt desire of our people will then be satisfied. Chuka is a dignified and self-respecting nation and she will certainly be moved and actuated by her national traditional doctrine and will cause all countries, far and near, to enjoy her love and blessing. We have boundless feeling and sentiment in this matter. May we therefore appeal to your gracious sympathy and understanding?

"[Dated] December sixteenth in the Year of Kōju [1610]."²⁸

Although this letter was sent by a trusted subject of Iyeyasu's and

was addressed to the viceroy of the Fukien government, yet it was in fact a state paper prepared by Iyeyasu himself for presentation to the Ming emperor. There was no way by which Japan might approach the Ming throne, directly; but he hoped that the contents of his letter might nevertheless be made known to the Ming emperor, and therefore, in order to indicate its real nature, he caused it to bear his red seal, which was always used on state papers of importance. But neither the Fukien government nor the Ming imperial government recognized this letter from Japan. In fact, it was entirely ignored and left unanswered.²⁴ At the same time, when this *de facto* state paper of Iyeyasu's was sent to China, Hasegawa, Chief of the Board of Trade and Shipping at Nagasaki, sent an official letter to Tzu-Ting Chang, the viceroy of the Fukien Government General, by the same man, Hsing-Ju Chou. This letter read as follows:

"Toko Sahei Hasegawa respectfully addresses this letter to His Excellency the Viceroy Chang of the Fukien Government General. It is unnecessary here to discuss to what degree Japan maintained relations with your country in ancient times. Within the reign of the present Imperial Dynasty—as early, in fact, as the Huang-Wu and Yung-Lo eras—your imperial government has favored our country with the Kango Trade License. In strict accordance with this Kango system, our tribute-bearing trade ships faithfully and regularly crossed the water from our country to yours once each year. However, during the past three decades the national pledges and relations have been interfered with and the way lying between the two nations has become impassable. At present, our Genkun, the ruler of our country, loves and longs for the culture and usages of Kua-Ka [China]. He is very desirous that the Kango trade system with your country should be restored. At this time, Hsing-Ju Chou, a man from your country, has fortunately come to Japan. I, therefore, have approached the ruler of our country and presented to him a plan for the establishment of peaceful relations and for the conduct of trade with your country. Our Ruler has approved of my proposal and has handed to Hsing-Ju Chou a document bearing our national seal. Chou has pledged to return to Japan next year bringing with him trade ships from Fukien and also the Kango Trade License. If Chou makes his pledge good, I, Toko, shall ask

for a commission from the Ruler of our country to cross the wide water to your country. I shall then seek an audience with Your Excellency and take up the long-pending problem, thus performing the task entrusted to me as Special Envoy of Japan. Should the old relationship be thus restored, your country and ours will certainly enjoy a happy reunion under the same sky.

"Henceforth, when the wind is calm and the sea waves do not rise high, trade ships will cross the water. The traders of our two nations will come forward and cheerfully and profitably exchange commodities, thereby bringing great benefits to their respective countries. The nations of the world have long been under the indiscriminating protection and benevolence of your country. They have thereby enjoyed happy and prosperous existences. During the many years since I was appointed Chief of Nagasaki, I, Toko, have devoted my energy and attention to the problem of making it possible for our country to share this happiness. At present, Nagasaki is the largest trade port in Japan. Traders flock to a place where profit is obtainable. If, in this next year, trade ships from Fukien should come to Nagasaki, they would be received joyfully by our people. Whether we shall be able to enjoy this happiness is entirely within the power of Your Excellency. Hsing-Ju Chou is now returning to his homeland through your province. Taking advantage of this, I am entrusting to him this communication addressed to Your Excellency.

"With the happiest feelings, as well as with great reverence and awe, I remain,

"Yours very sincerely,

"[Signed] TOKO SAHEI HASEGAWA."²⁵

This attempt of Japan's to gain trade privileges with China through the viceroy of Fukien was a total failure. Viceroy Tzu-Ting Chang ignored the communication sent by Hasegawa. He left it unanswered, just as had been the state paper of Iyeyasu, which was sent in the name of Masazumi Fujiwara to the Fukien government and the imperial Ming government.

APPENDIX 4

*Documents Showing That Iyeyasu Planned to Establish
Trade Relations with China Through the Kingdom
of Liu Chiu as Intermediary*

LIU CHIU is a small archipelago consisting of approximately fifty islands, the total area of which is less than a thousand square miles. It extends from Kyushu (Japan) to Formosa (China). Liu Chiu had long maintained her existence as a kingdom by pledging dual allegiance to China and Japan. At the time of the Seven Years' War, Hideyoshi imposed requisitions upon Liu Chiu which were far beyond her ability to meet. This caused great suffering among the people. After the war, Liu Chiu placed more and more reliance upon China. Finally, she practically discontinued the sending of tribute to Japan. Therefore, in compliance with an order from Iyeyasu, Lord Shimazu of Satsuma, Kyushu, sent to Liu Chiu in March, 1609, a punitive expedition consisting of one hundred war vessels with three thousand fighting men aboard. In April, Liu Chiu was completely occupied. In May, the king of Liu Chiu and his family, together with a number of his prominent officials, were taken prisoner,²⁸ and all were brought to Japan. After having been detained there for more than two years, the king was permitted to return to his own kingdom. Under date of September, 1611, just as he was about to leave Japan, he made the following sworn statement:

"1. I, Shonei, the King of Liu Chiu, taking all the gods and goddesses as witnesses, hereby make this pledge.

"2. Liu Chiu shall always be a dependency of Japan, and shall maintain its existence under the suzerainty of Lord Shimazu of Satsuma, Kyushu.

"3. Henceforth, whenever a new Lord of Satsuma shall succeed his father to power, the Kingdom of Liu Chiu shall always send an envoy of congratulation, together with some of our local products as a national gift.

"4. All military requisitions and other obligations that Hideyoshi imposed upon us that have not yet been met shall be promptly

complied with by us. We greatly regret this delay, which has occurred because our country is situated so far from Japan.

"5. The entire state of Liu Chiu has been conquered. I, Shonei, have myself been taken prisoner and have been required to maintain my residence in Japan.

"6. After thus living in Japan like a bird in a cage, and longing for Liu Chiu, my homeland, my lord [Shimazu] has not only permitted me to return to Liu Chiu, thus showing great compassion for me, but he has returned to me the Land of Liu Chiu with authority to rule it.

"7. This is a most thoughtful consideration and the greatest blessing that our country has ever experienced. It will be remembered and appreciated by our sons, our grandsons, and our posterity of far-off generations.

"8. Hereafter, no matter what sort of laws and regulations, obligations, and duties may be imposed upon us either by Japan or by the Lord of Satsuma, we shall cheerfully and promptly obey them."²⁷

Because, before the sending of the punitive expedition, Liu Chiu was a dependency of Japan through the feudal lord of Satsuma, and because its military subjugation was effected in the early part of the seventeenth century by the Lord of Satsuma, therefore Iyeyasu recognized the suzerain power of the Lord of Satsuma in Liu Chiu. Nevertheless, it was actually a state tributary to Japan.

Upon the return of the king of Liu Chiu to his homeland, Japan tacitly recognized his right to receive the imperial calendar from the Ming court, which signified that Liu Chiu was a state tributary to China; to receive investiture of kingship from the Ming emperor; and to send annual tribute to the Ming throne. Thus did Japan permit Liu Chiu to continue the maintenance of her suzerain and tributary relations with China while at the same time she herself claimed complete suzerainty over Liu Chiu.²⁸ Iyeyasu did this merely for the purpose of gaining trade privileges from China through the instrumentality of Liu Chiu.

A standard Chinese history of the Ming contains the following record with regard to the conquest of Liu Chiu by Japan in the seventeenth century, and with regard to the arrangement that Japan made later with the king of Liu Chiu.

"In the fortieth year of the Wan-Li era, Japan finally sent an experienced force of fighting men three thousand strong and invaded Liu Chiu. They took the king prisoner and sent him to Japan, together with the throne and all the accessories of royalty. The Japanese troops left the kingdom only after having plundered and ravaged everything of value. Tsung Yeh Yang, the military governor of the Province of Chekiang, presented the entire matter to the Throne and emphasized the necessity of completing the works of defense along the Chinese coast in order to be ready for any emergency. His petition was approved. Later, Japan permitted the king of Liu Chiu to return to his kingdom. Thereupon, the king renewed his traditional obligation of sending a tribute-bearing envoy to the Imperial Throne of China."²⁹

The course taken by China when Liu Chiu was invaded by Japan shows how strictly China adhered to the policy of keeping her hands off Japan militarily—a policy that had been adopted by the Ming government after the Seven Years' War in Korea. When Japan invaded Liu Chiu, China neither sent military assistance to Liu Chiu nor protested against the invasion by Japan of that kingdom, which was her tributary state. The Ming government took no military action beyond the completion of China's coast-defense works in view of possible attack by Japan, after that nation had completed the conquest of Liu Chiu. On the other hand, Japan permitted the king of Liu Chiu, after the conquest, to maintain his kingdom by pledging dual allegiance to both Japan and China. Iyeyasu made this concession to the king of Liu Chiu with the desire and purpose of gaining trade privileges with China through the instrumentality of Liu Chiu. In 1613, which was two years after the king of Liu Chiu had been permitted to return to his kingdom, Iyeyasu sent a state paper to the Liu Chiu government in the name of the government of the Lord of Satsuma and requested that Liu Chiu appeal to the viceroy of Fukien Province with regard to the matter of trade with Japan. The state paper read as follows:

"Your country is situated close to Chuka [China]. For a period of more than thirty years Chuka and Japan have not been sending trade ships to each other's harbors. Our shogun [Iyeyasu] is greatly worried about this. He has finally instructed me, Iyehisa, to consult with your government by proposing a plan of sending our trade

ships to your country annually and of having the traders from Tai Ming [China] and from Japan meet in your country and engage in trade by exchanging wares to meet each other's needs. If this proposal should be successfully carried out, not only would Japan be enriched, but your country also would enjoy great benefits. Then the people of Liu Chiu would be abundantly provided with both provisions and wealth. They would express their joy by singing in the cities and by dancing in the fields. The peace and prosperity of your nation would thus be manifested. To bring about this happy national situation has long been the desire of our shogun. Therefore I, Iyehisa, in the past sent two trusted officials to your country and presented the entire matter to San Shikan [the Three Supreme Ministers of your government], but they all refused to coöperate with us. Our failure in this transaction worries me both day and night because I do not know how I shall answer our shogun when he inquires of me the outcome of this affair. Now the lord of my province [Satsuma] has given me the following instructions. He has stated that there exist numerous nations in the world. Some of them have an abundance of silk and jewels while at the same time they lack woven goods. Other nations have surpluses of rice, millet, and other grains, but lack a sufficient supply of household goods and other wares. If, on the one hand, a nation has a surplus of articles of one kind and does not have an opportunity to distribute them to other nations, while, on the other hand, another nation lacks certain goods and does not know how to secure them, then in certain nations the people would always be unprovided with needed goods while in other nations the people would helplessly and regretfully see the things they possessed waste and decay. Therefore, it is essential for the nations of the world to engage in trade by the exchange of their wares and merchandise to meet one another's needs and thereby to increase their wealth.

"Although Japan has gold, jewels, household goods, and other wares, yet their quality and finish do not approach those of the excellent products of Chuka [China]. Therefore, these two nations should enter into certain agreements so that their peoples may enjoy the benefits thereof. For this purpose, we propose the three following plans.

"1. Japanese trade ships shall be allowed to enter the harbors in certain districts on the coasts of Tai Min [China] for the purpose of trade.

"2. Trade ships from Tai Min shall be induced to come to Japan with the purpose of engaging in trade.

"3. Japanese envoys, accompanied by traders, shall be permitted to come to China naturally so that the traders of the two nations may exchange wares to meet each other's needs.

"4. If these proposals should be accepted by China, the people in both nations would be enriched. Moreover, the Tai Min government would find it unnecessary to keep up its extensive defensive works along the coast against Japanese pirate bands. However, if China will not accept any of these three proposals, Japan may send many tens of thousands of fighting men from Kyushu and from the Seikaido district to invade China. Then many tens of provinces along the Chinese coast, which face Japan, would suffer great calamity. This is the plan that is actually being contemplated by our great shogun in Japan. In order to forestall this great international calamity, the lord of my province [Satsuma] earnestly desires to have the two nations, Japan and China, understand each other and satisfy each other's needs.

"I, Iyehisa, therefore earnestly request that your country [Liu Chiu] transmit the entire content of this paper to the viceroy of the province of Fukien, China, and implore his kind consideration. If, through his offices, Tai Min should accede to any one of these three proposals, our small and humble country would be greatly blessed and would enjoy an existence under the virtuous influence and benevolence of the Great Empire of Tai Min. Then the long-cherished desire of Japan would be satisfied. By so doing, the Heavenly Court would manifest its traditional humanity in protecting small and weak nations and in looking after the interests of far-off countries.

"[Dated] Mid-spring month in the Year of Kichu [1613]."³⁰

The historians have no record of the fate of this state paper. Some believe that because it contained a military threat against China, the Liu Chiu government did not dare to forward it to the viceroy of the Fukien government in China; others, that after the paper had been prepared under the dictation of Iyeyasu, the

Satsuma government realized that the Liu Chiu government would be powerless to act as a go-between, and therefore decided not to send the state paper to Liu Chiu. At any rate, the contents of this paper reveals the fact that Iyeyasu had planned to gain trade privileges with China through the instrumentality of Liu Chiu. And in the end, Liu Chiu made it possible for Japanese traders to engage in trade, under the guise of Liu Chiu subjects, with Chinese traders in these islands—on a very small scale.³¹

APPENDIX 5

Iyeyasu's Plan for Conducting Trade with China Through Formosa as Intermediary

UPON THE DEATH of Hideyoshi, the plan of subjugating Formosa was abandoned. However, with the great trade expansion of Japan in southern Asia and in the southern seas, the geographical importance of Formosa impressed itself upon Japanese traders. Furthermore, because the plan of Iyeyasu to gain trade privileges with China through the instrumentality of Korea, of Liu Chiu, and of the Fukien government had made but little progress, he regarded Formosa as a place where it might be possible for Japanese and Chinese traders to meet and exchange their wares.³²

In February, 1609, Iyeyasu instructed his trusted statesman, Masazumi Honda, to issue a command to Lord Arima of Kyushu, ordering him to send a preliminary military expedition to Formosa.³³ The essential part of this written command of Iyeyasu's read as follows:

"1. Siam, Cambodia, and many other far-off nations have rendered due reverence to us by sending their trade ships annually, but Formosa, which is situated so close to our country, has not established any relations with us. This is an international outrage which we cannot overlook. Therefore, you, Lord of Arima, are hereby instructed to send a military expedition to that island and take necessary steps.

"2. If all questions pending with Formosa should be settled without appeal to arms, your military men are to return to Japan accompanied by envoys from Formosa.

"3. If a peaceful settlement is effected, your military men shall

arrange matters in such a way that trade ships and traders from China and Japan may meet in Formosa and engage in trade.

"4. Before returning home to Japan, your military men shall cruise around the entire coast of Formosa from west to east and from north to south, and prepare a comprehensive sketch map of Formosa, which is to be presented to us.

"5. All the local products of Formosa shall be carefully sought out and studied. Then a complete list of everything, including natural products and wares of every description, shall be prepared and presented to us.

"6. All the things and articles that the Formosan people desire to have shall be generously supplied to them so that they may have a friendly feeling toward us.

"7. If your military men fail to come to a peaceful settlement after having put forth all possible efforts, and if the Formosan people stubbornly oppose you, your military men should appeal to arms and bring back with them to Japan a great number of Formosan prisoners.

"[Dated] February of the fourteenth year of the Keicho era [1609]."⁸⁴

This expedition that was sent by Lord Arima to Formosa in 1609 had scouting purposes for its object, rather than a complete subjugation, and so had no great fighting strength. Formosa was then inhabited by several powerful wild tribes. There was no central authority to deal with. Upon landing, the Japanese troops encountered many unforeseen difficulties. They engaged in fighting with tribes here and there and thus lost a number of their men. However, they finally succeeded in capturing some of the tribesmen, after which they returned home to Japan. Lord Arima reported the experiences of his men and gave the shogun some idea of conditions in Formosa. Iyeyasu had a talk with the Formosans thus brought to Japan and later sent them back to their own country with a stock of provisions, thus showing great kindness.⁸⁵ In 1616, Iyeyasu arranged a second expedition. He ordered Toan Murayama, the governor of Nagasaki, to send a fleet of thirteen war vessels, with about four thousand fighting men aboard, to invade Formosa. However, while on its way, this fleet was overtaken by a great hurricane. Part of it was forced to return to Nagasaki.

Some of the ships were driven to the Chinese coast. Very few were able to reach Formosa. Later, a certain portion of Formosa was occupied by Dutch traders, who built strongly fortified quarters there. The Japanese had many serious diplomatic and trade disputes with these Dutchmen. Thus did Iyeyasu's undertaking in Formosa end in failure. This attempt, however, shows how earnestly Iyeyasu endeavored to gain trade privileges with China.³⁶

APPENDIX 6

Documents Showing That Iyeyasu Undertook to Establish Trade Relations with Nueva España in North America in the Early Part of the Seventeenth Century

UNLIKE HIDEYOSHI, Iyeyasu made it his policy to advance the national standing of Japan by trade expansion rather than by territorial gain through military aggression. After the Seven Years' War, almost the whole of northeastern Asia, including the vast territory of China, was entirely closed to Japanese trade. However, Iyeyasu's undertakings for trade expansion in southern Asia and in the South Sea were very successful. Japanese trade ships, as well as those of foreign nations, plied between Japanese ports and those in Siam, Annam, Cambodia, the Philippines, and several other countries.

Iyeyasu also planned to extend Japanese trade to North America. As early as 1601, he turned his attention to Nueva España.³⁷ In that same year, the Spanish governor of the Philippines wrote to Iyeyasu, complaining of pirate bands from Japan that ravaged the Philippine coasts. He also requested that the number of Japanese trade ships which entered the Philippine harbors annually should be reduced. In October, 1601, Iyeyasu replied to the governor and at the same time requested that he render assistance to Japanese trade ships that were planning to sail to Nueva España in North America. The letter read as follows:

"Iyeyasu Minamoto of Japan hereby replies to His Excellency Don Francisco Tello of the Philippines. As to the Japanese and Chinese marauders who committed robbery in some of the districts along the coast of your country in years gone by, we have arrested and inflicted due punishment upon all the Japanese of-

fenders. We have no jurisdiction over the Chinese offenders, because they are the subjects of a foreign nation. However, as they have been sent back to their homeland, they have probably been punished in accordance with the laws of their own country.

"Last year a certain number of rebellious people rose against us. However, within a month we conquered and annihilated all of them without leaving a single survivor. Therefore, both land and water now being quiet, our nation is enjoying peace and prosperity. In strict accordance with your request, we shall not send unnecessary numbers of trade ships to your country. Henceforth, all the Japanese ships that are to go to your country will be provided with ships' licenses bearing official seals which are like the seal affixed to this paper. Upon reaching your waters, the ships will present these seal-bearing licenses as evidence of their being legitimate vessels. Your government should not accept any license or document that does not bear our official seal.

"It has long been our desire to establish relations of good will with Nueva España in North America. However, as that country is separated from us by a great distance, our trade ships cannot reach it without coöperation and assistance from your seafaring men, who have had years of experience in crossing the waters to Nueva España. Will you kindly select some of these experienced seamen and have them enter our service so that our trade ships may from time to time cross and recross the waters to and from Nueva España? We have received the products of your land that you so kindly sent to us. The thoughtfulness and good will you thus expressed from a great distance are deeply appreciated. We lack words to express our gratitude. Winter is approaching. We hope that you are well and strong and will be able to withstand the cold season.

"[Dated] October of the sixth year of the Keicho era [1601]."⁸⁸

In August, 1602, Iyeyasu again wrote to the Spanish governor of the Philippines. His letter read as follows:

"Iyeyasu Minamoto of Japan hereby replies to His Excellency the Master of the Philippines. A man has come to our country who has traveled over great waters, and he has delivered your letter to us. This letter informs us of the admirable administration of your country. You have also sent us valuable products of your land, which we gratefully accept. Although we have not the pleasure of

seeing you face to face and cannot engage in conversation with you, yet the happy relationship now obtaining causes us to feel that our two nations, though separated by great waters, are but one happy family. We always appreciate your kind thoughts and consideration for us and our country. We have long desired to establish trade relations with Nueva España. In fact, the making it possible for the trade ships of the two nations to cross the seas to the harbors of each other will not be for the benefit of our country alone, but will benefit all the nations concerned. Men from your country (the Philippines) have told me in the past that the Kanto district in our country has ideal harbors for anchorage for vessels from the Philippines on their way to Nueva España. These vessels will find shelter in stormy weather in the harbors of the Kanto district. Then these ships will be able to sail from our Kanto district to Nueva España. Thus will happy and beneficial results be obtained by the three nations. Therefore, if your trade ships sailing from the Philippines to Nueva España desire to have the privilege of entering into and anchoring in our harbors of the Kanto district, we shall gladly make this concession through your government. . . .

"[Dated] August in the seventh year of the Keicho era [1602]"³⁹

In the following month (September, 1602) Iyeyasu again wrote to the governor of the Philippines, informing him of the assistance rendered by the Japanese to ships from the Philippines which, while on their way to Nueva España, were nearly shipwrecked off the coast of Japan, and offering like assistance in the future. His letter read as follows:

"Iyeyasu Minamoto of Japan hereby addresses His Excellency the Master of the Philippines. In the autumn of the present year a trade ship from your country that was on the way to Nueva España was overtaken by a dangerous storm but managed to reach the seacoast district of Toshu in our country. For many years our country has maintained friendly relations with your country. Although our two countries are far distant from each other, yet we pledge our mutual good will as neighboring nations. At present, I fortunately have sole authority in my country. Therefore, I am able to make it possible for the foreign traders and their ships to come hither without fear of being plundered. However, still remembering what happened in our country in the past, some trade

ships have hesitated to remain in our harbors, once a favorable wind sprang up. Now, upon landing, your men who were aboard the unfortunate ship have presented to us valuable products of your country. The good will thus expressed is highly appreciated by us. Henceforth, if your trade ships should encounter a storm in which their masts or their oars are damaged, they must come to our country for shelter and protection. We have issued instructions to the people in all parts of our country to render all possible assistance to such ships. Your tradesmen have stated that the total number of Philippine ships that sail to Nueva España annually is eight. If Japan should issue licenses bearing the government seal to these ships, conferring upon them the privilege of entering any of the harbors in Japan in the event of a storm, the Philippine nation would keep those licenses as a national treasure for hundreds of generations to come.

"I, Iyeyasu, always love and protect my fellow men everywhere, especially those from far-off countries. In order to protect them from being plundered or otherwise endangered, I hereby prepare eight sheets of paper [licenses] which bear our national seal and send them, through you, to your trade ships. A trade ship provided with one of these seal-bearing papers will be privileged to enter the bays, seas, and waterways of all the islands of our country. Traders aboard these ships will be permitted to travel and reside in any of the cities, towns, villages, and hamlets of our country without being molested. Traders from your country who are returning home have seen and learned of the conditions and life in our country. We therefore feel it unnecessary to give any details regarding Japan.

"[Dated] September in the seventh year of the Keicho era [1602]."⁴⁰

There are extant several kinds of seal-bearing papers granted by Iyeyasu and his government to the Philippine trade ships sailing to Nueva España.

The following are typical.

(a) "This official document is hereby conferred upon Captain — of the Philippine trade ship —, bound for Nueva España, giving full privileges to sail into and anchor his ship in any of the harbors of Japan whenever in danger of storm.

"[Dated] October 6th in the fourteenth year of the Keicho Era [1609].

"[National seal of Japan in red]"

(b) "This official document is hereby conferred upon Captain — of the Philippine trade ship —, bound for Nueva España, giving full privileges to enter any of the waterways of Japan. Therefore, whenever this ship is in danger because of attack by pirate ships or of threatening storms, the captain should without hesitation sail his ship into our waters and present this seal-bearing document to our officials, asking due protection, thereby making himself free from danger or harm.

"[Dated] Midwinter in the fourteenth year of the Keicho era [1609].

"[National seal of Japan in red]"⁴¹

Beginning in 1601, Iyeyasu wrote letters a number of times to the governor of the Philippines regarding the problem of trade with Nueva España, with the hope of making it possible for Japanese trade ships to ply between Japan and Nueva España. He attained no success until 1610, when he was finally able to have a government ship, built in a Japanese shipyard, cross the Pacific Ocean to Nueva España, for the first time in the history of Japan. In 1609, a Philippine ship *en route* to Nueva España encountered a hurricane and drifted, well-nigh shipwrecked, into the Bay of Wada in the Province of Kazusa. Among the passengers was Don Rodrigo de Vivero, a retired governor of the Philippines who was on his way back to Spain. He was rescued and treated kindly. Later, he was escorted to Yedo, the military capital of Japan, by Lord Honda of the District of Otaki in the Province of Kazusa. Upon reaching Yedo, Don Rodrigo had an interview with Iyeyasu and his son.⁴² They discussed trade problems and other matters of importance. Since it was a time of extensive mining undertakings in Japan, Iyeyasu expressed an earnest desire to employ Spanish mining engineers.

A few days after this interview,⁴³ Don Rodrigo presented the following proposals to Iyeyasu:

"(1) Don Rodrigo will obtain the consent of the King of Spain and of the Viceroy of Nueva España to send fifty mining experts to Japan, under the following conditions. One-half of the output

mined in Japan shall be given to the aforesaid fifty miners. The remaining half shall be divided into two equal parts, one of which shall go to the King of Spain, the other to Iyeyasu. The King of Spain shall be privileged to dispatch his business officials to Japan to look after his mining interests there.

“(2) These Spanish miners shall be permitted to come to Japan in company with Catholic priests of any order they may desire. They may live strictly religious lives, and attend church services and Mass.

“(3) Because Holland is an enemy of Spain, after this agreement has been entered into, all Dutch traders and other Dutch residents in Japan shall be expelled therefrom.

“(4) All the Spanish ships that come to Japan for trade or other purposes shall be protected by the Japanese government, the same as are the ships of Japan.

“(5) When ships sent by the King of Spain to Malacca or Manila shall require repairing, or when new Spanish ships shall be built in Japan, all the necessary materials and labor shall be provided by the Japanese government.

“(6) Envoys from Spain and captains of Spanish ships shall be received with due courtesy and respect. They shall enjoy full religious privileges.

“(7) All Spanish subjects in Japan shall enjoy extraterritorial rights. Spanish offenders shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the laws of Spain.”⁴⁴

Don Rodrigo lived in Japan several months. At his request, Iyeyasu made an official announcement that Japan would gladly enter into any kind of trade agreement with so powerful a nation as Spain. He promised to afford all possible conveniences and protection to Spanish trade ships and traders that should come to Japan. However, he refused to expel the Dutch traders. Moreover, he did not accept the terms suggested by Don Rodrigo with regard to mining undertakings. Nevertheless, he earnestly requested Don Rodrigo to induce Spanish miners to come to Japan.⁴⁵ In pursuance of Don Rodrigo's advice, he consented to send a Spanish priest, named Alonso Muñoz, who was a resident of Japan, as *de facto* envoy of Japan to the Spanish court at Madrid, bearing state papers and a national gift to the Spanish throne.

Iyeyasu instructed his trusted statesman, Masazuma Honda, to prepare state papers to be sent by Alonso Muñoz. The papers thus prepared contained the following provisions:

"1. All Spanish ships that reach Japan from Nueva España shall be permitted to enter any harbor in Japan. The Spanish subjects aboard these ships shall, upon having landed, be allowed to build any kind of structure. Lots suitable for residences shall be provided by the Japanese government.

"2. All Spanish priests shall be allowed to proceed to any part of Japan and maintain residence there.

"3. All Spanish ships from the Philippines, bound for Nueva España, shall be allowed to enter and anchor in any harbor in Japan at their convenience. They may remain in port throughout the entire winter season, and at their convenience sail for their destination in Nueva España.

"4. If Spanish ships require repairs, or if new Spanish ships are built in Japan, all the necessary materials, labor, and food shall be provided. Unreasonable demands for financial compensation in this connection shall be strictly prohibited.

"5. When the King of Spain and the Viceroy of Nueva España shall send their respective envoys to Japan for the purpose of concluding a treaty of amity and commerce with Japan, these officials shall be welcomed and received with due respect and courtesy.

"6. When Japanese trade ships shall proceed to Nueva España, the Japanese traders aboard shall be dealt with kindly and shall be accorded every privilege and convenience.

"7. When Spanish trade ships enter Japanese harbors, representatives of the two nations shall meet to discuss and settle upon the prices of all the commodities on board. Then the Spanish and Japanese traders shall enter into business transactions. In conducting business, irregularities and violent acts shall be strictly prohibited.

"The foregoing provisions having been voluntarily proposed by Iyeyasu, the Ruler of Japan, we, in the name of Japan, hereby pledge ourselves to adhere to all these provisions, faithfully, strictly, and permanently. Three sets of armor and one sword are hereby presented to His Majesty the King of Spain. Further details will be delivered orally by Alonso Muñoz to the Throne of Spain.

"[Dated] January 9 of the fifteenth year in the Keicho era [1610]."⁴⁸

Hidetada, the son of Iyeyasu, who succeeded his father as shogun, also sent a state paper to Spain. This paper read as follows:

"Hidetada Minamoto, Sei-i Tai-shogun of Japan, hereby addresses His Excellency the Duke de Lerma of Spain. We have been informed by the former Master of the Philippines that Spanish trade ships are being sent from Nueva España to our country. Hence, I hereby issue this paper giving full privileges to those ships to enter and anchor in any port, harbor, or bay in our Land of the Rising Sun [Japan]. I am sending five sets of armor to you as a national gift. Further details with regard to trade and trade ships will be delivered orally by Fray Alonso Muñoz and by Luis Sotelo.

"[Dated] May 4 of the fifteenth year in the Keicho era [1610].

"[National seal in red]"⁴⁷

"[Signed] HIDETADA.

NOTE: The original of this document is now in the archives of the Seville Library, in Spain.

Iyeyasu and his government put great hopes in trade transactions with Nueva España. Therefore, in order to make a great impression at the time of launching this undertaking, Iyeyasu ordered his government to prepare a special ship of Occidental type for the voyage of Governor Don Rodrigo and of the Japanese envoy, Alonso Muñoz. In honor of the Spanish governor the name of the ship was changed from the Japanese to the Spanish name of "San Buena Ventura." Iyeyasu also ordered twenty-three prominent Japanese traders, including Ryusei Shuya, Shosuke Tanaka, and Mitsutsugu Goto, to go to Nueva España in the same ship, with instructions to make a careful study of trade conditions as well as of the methods of mining gold and silver in that country.

The following facts should be noted:

(1) The "San Buena Ventura" was the first ship of Occidental type ever built in a Japanese shipyard.

(2) This ship was designed and constructed by William Adams, a Britisher, who was the first Occidental to be naturalized as a subject of Japan.

(3) Although the "San Buena Ventura" was the first Japanese ship to cross the Pacific Ocean to America, it was a small vessel of only 120 tons.⁴⁸

The "San Buena Ventura" sailed from the Bay of Yedo [now the Bay of Tokyo] on June 13, 1610, and arrived on October 27 at Man-

zanillo, Lower California, whence she sailed for Acapulco. The Spanish king was greatly pleased because of the safe return of Don Rodrigo and his party to Spain and the kindness that had been shown them by Iyeyasu. He therefore decided to send a special envoy to Japan to express his gratitude. Sebastián Vizcaíno was selected for this special mission. On March 22, 1611, this Spanish envoy and his party, accompanied by the twenty-three Japanese traders who had been sent by Iyeyasu to Nueva España to inquire into trade conditions and other matters, sailed from Acapulco for Japan, and arrived at Uraga, Japan, on June 10 of the same year. Shuya, Tanaka, Goto and other traders who returned from Nueva España reported their findings in that country to Iyeyasu. They stated that although Nueva España had gold and silver in far greater quantities than did other countries in the world, yet Nueva España did not have such extraordinary quantities of these precious metals as had been expected. As for trade, Nueva España could only be reached by sailing about eight or nine thousand miles. Moreover, the people in that country not only greatly discouraged the coming of Japanese traders, but many of them openly opposed the coming of both Japanese traders and other Japanese.⁴⁹

On June 22, 1611, the Spanish envoy Sebastián Vizcaíno and his party went to Yedo to have an interview with Hidetada, the son of Iyeyasu; and on July 4, at a place called Sumpu, they had audience with the shogun. They gave him a large gold clock, several rolls of tweed broadcloth, several cases of wine, and oil paintings of the Spanish king, queen, and crown prince. Iyeyasu was greatly disappointed because the envoy did not bring even a single mining engineer in his party and because the Japanese traders whom he had sent to Nueva España had not been kindly received. Moreover, at this time Japan began to have trouble with the Catholics. Iyeyasu in his reply therefore entirely disregarded his pledge made in the preceding year (1610) in which he had promised to render all possible protection to the Catholic priests. He even opposed the propagation of Catholicism in Japan.

The letter of Iyeyasu to the viceroy of Nueva España read as follows:

"Iyeyasu Minamoto of Japan respectfully replies to His Excellency the Master of Nueva España. I have received your letter and

have read it over and over. I have also received the products of your land as listed on a separate sheet. Your kind and thoughtful gift is accepted with great appreciation. Last year, a ship of your country was overtaken by a disastrous storm and was well-nigh shipwrecked off our coast. Although the masts and the oars were badly damaged, yet the ship managed to reach our waters. This unfortunate happening afforded us an opportunity to welcome friends from a distant country and made it possible for us to extend courtesies and assistance to them. We thereupon prepared a large vessel, well provisioned, for them, thus making it possible for them to return to their home. Now, having been informed by you of their safe arrival in Nueva España, we are greatly pleased and feel easy.

"If your country and ours should establish diplomatic relations and make it possible for the two countries to send trade ships annually to each other's harbors, thus exchanging our products to meet each other's needs, then both the governments and the people of our two nations would gain all the desired results of our undertaking and would enjoy prosperity and benefit.

"Our country, Japan, is Shinkoku [the Divine Nation]. Since the founding of our nation, we have revered our gods and worshiped the Buddhist deities. Under divine protection and guidance, we have maintained due relations between ruler and ruled, and have followed the teachings of the doctrine of loyalty and righteousness. Indeed, our native gods are none but Buddhist deities, incarnated in the forms of our native deities. Therefore, the Buddhist deities and our native gods are one and the same kind of divine beings. We cannot differentiate between them. Persons who are selfish and who do wrong always suffer divine punishment. Those who do right and are just always receive divine rewards. Divine revelations and manifestations are so prompt and sure that they are evidenced in our daily lives. In our country, when interstate agreements are made, both parties always invoke the divine beings as witnesses and exchange their pledges in their presence, beseeching prompt divine punishment upon the party that fails to keep the pledge. The divine beings always keep watch over our nation. Under their guidance and protection we maintain our human relations, always practicing benevolence, justice, ceremonials, wise conduct, and sincerity. The religious laws and teachings of your country differ en-

tirely from ours. They have absolutely no relation or connection with our national life and existence. One of the Buddhist sutras reads as follows: 'Divine salvation cannot be extended to those who are not related by the Divine Law'. Therefore, you may not consider as feasible the propagation of your religious teachings in our country. It would be best for you to abandon any plan to propagate them, because it will be found wholly impracticable. However, we hope that your country will turn its energy and attention to the establishment of trade relations with us. If trade ships should cross the seas and endeavor to advance trade, our nations would enjoy boundless blessings. When trade ships from your country come to our coasts, they will receive a hearty welcome. Those ships will be given full privileges to enter any port, bay, or waterway in our country. They may engage in trade wherever they like. We have already issued in all parts of our country instructions that ships and traders from your country should be received with the utmost courtesy, kindness, and respect. We hereby send some of our local products, as listed on a separate sheet.

"[Dated] June of the seventeenth year of the Keicho era [1612]"⁵⁰

Five pairs of large Japanese folding screens, entirely covered with heavy gold leaf, were sent with this letter to the viceroy of Nueva España.

Hidetada, the son of Iyeyasu, also wrote a letter to the viceroy. This letter read as follows:

"Hidetada Minamoto, the Sei-i Tai-shogun of Japan, hereby replies to His Excellency the Master of Nueva España. I have read with great pleasure and attention the letter sent by you. I have also received several examples of rare products of your country, listed on a separate sheet. I highly appreciate your good will and thoughtfulness. Although we are separated by great waters, yet our mutual friendship and admiration make us feel as if we lived as neighboring nations. That which I desire most earnestly is for our trade ships to cross the seas every year to exchange wares, thus meeting each other's needs. I should thereby be able to hear from you from time to time with regard to conditions and events in your country. Although they are not things of any special value, yet for the purpose of expressing our good will we are hereby sending several military weapons together with three sets of armor. Masanobu will

orally give further details and inform you with regard to minor affairs that I have not mentioned in this letter.

"[Dated] Mid-autumn of the seventeenth year in the Keicho era [1612]."⁵¹

On September 16, 1612, Sebastián Vizcaíno, the Spanish envoy, took with him letters of Iyeyasu and of Hidetada addressed to the viceroy of Nueva España, together with gifts from them, and sailed from Uruga, Japan. Upon reaching Nueva España, Vizcaíno had an interview with the viceroy in which he gave him information with regard to religious conditions in Japan. He stated that Iyeyasu not only opposed the further introduction of Catholicism into Japan, but that Japan was practically ready to promulgate an anti-Christian law with the purpose of exterminating Christianity there. This statement was corroborated in some degree by the letter of Iyeyasu to the viceroy of Nueva España, in which Iyeyasu emphatically stated that Spain should abandon the plan of propagating Christianity in Japan because its teachings were wholly contrary to Japanese traditions. At the same time, Iyeyasu stated in his letter that Nueva España should devote her entire energy to the establishment and development of trade with Japan. However, the anti-Christian policy of Iyeyasu made it impossible to establish trade relations between the two nations.

Fray Alonso Muñoz, who, bearing a state paper, was sent by Iyeyasu to the Spanish court in 1610, crossed the American continent and then sailed to Spain. Because in his state paper Iyeyasu guaranteed protection to Catholicism and to the Catholic priests in Japan, and because at the same time he expressed an earnest desire to establish trade relations between Japan and Nueva España, the king of Spain was deeply impressed and was strongly inclined to grant trade concessions to Japan. In April, 1615, Alonso Muñoz returned to Acapulco, Nueva España, bearing the reply of the king of Spain to Iyeyasu, in which the king expressed a willingness to have Nueva España enter into trade relations with Japan. The king suggested that Nueva España and Japan might each send one large trade ship each year to the country of the other. However, the long journey of Alonso Muñoz from Japan to Nueva España and then across the Atlantic to Spain and back again to Nueva España had taken nearly four years, as he had attended to many important

official duties entrusted to him by Iyeyasu. During this period, the international situation had greatly changed. Iyeyasu had broken the pledge made in his state paper addressed to the Spanish throne, and had strenuously objected to the propagation of Catholicism in Japan. This attitude of Iyeyasu's greatly offended the viceroy of Nueva España, who therefore strongly opposed the plan of the king of Spain to open Nueva España to trade with Japan, as the king had suggested in his letter that was to be sent to Iyeyasu. Consequently, in compliance with the request of the viceroy, the king's letter was rewritten, denying trade privileges with Nueva España to Japan. Thus did the long-contemplated plan of Iyeyasu to establish trade relations between Japan and Nueva España end in failure.⁵² Nevertheless, Iyeyasu was not wholly discouraged. In 1613, Lord Date, in accordance with the request of Iyeyasu, sent his trusted subject, Rokuyemon Hashikura, as an envoy to both the court of Spain and the Vatican. In January 1615, Hashikura reached Spain. He requested a reply to the state paper presented to the Spanish throne and besought Japanese trade privileges in Nueva España. The king, in his reply, demanded only protection for the Catholic priests in Japan, without saying anything at all with regard to trade. The envoy Hashikura and his party returned to Japan in August, 1620, after having spent about four years in America and Europe. By the time he returned, radical changes had taken place in Japan. The Catholic problem had become an increasingly serious national question. Not only had Japan entirely closed the nation to Catholicism by driving out the priests and exiling or putting to death Catholic converts, but also she was strongly inclined to drive away all Occidental traders because Catholic priests were continually being smuggled into Japan in the guise of traders. And thus the ambitious plan of Iyeyasu to extend Japanese trade to the American continent came to nought.⁵³

CHAPTER II

APPENDIX 7

Documents Showing How Japan Entered the Period of Absolute Seclusion Which Ended in 1854-58

FOR A PERIOD of about fifty years, beginning in the latter part of the sixteenth century, the extirpation of Christianity was the national policy of Japan. In the beginning, it was not intended to close the nation to the outside world. Both Hideyoshi and Iyeyasu, being men of progressive ideas, undertook to increase the national wealth through expansion of foreign trade. They took it for granted that the Catholic problem and trade could be dealt with separately. Hence, after the promulgation of the Anti-Christian Law of 1587, the Catholic churches were destroyed, and their priests and converts either exiled or executed, on the one hand, while on the other the national energy was turned toward the development of foreign trade. When Iyeyasu gained sole power, he became aware of the close relations obtaining between the traders and the Catholic priests, and therefore deemed it necessary to tolerate Catholicism for the sake of further trade development. His policy brought about the desired results. Japanese trade ships plied between the ports of Japan and those of some twenty other nations. Iyeyasu even planned to extend Japanese trade to North America. He hoped to make Japan a trade center for Occidentals. However, in the latter part of his life, he became aware that Catholicism in Japan was dangerous to the nation. So, in 1612, he promulgated an anti-Christian law which was more severe than that of Hideyoshi. Moreover, he followed Hideyoshi's policy of seeking to destroy Catholicism while at the same time trying to develop Occidental trade. How to prevent the smuggling of Catholic priests into Japan under the guise of Spanish or Portuguese traders became a grave national problem which caused Japan gradually to place restrictions on traders from the Occident. After the death of Iyeyasu, who had been the most ardent promoter of foreign trade, the ever-increasing fear that the national existence of Japan might be threatened by Catholic intrigue caused foreign trade to be regarded as of less importance than national safety.¹

In 1616, Japan entered upon her first stage of national seclusion. The nation-wide trade plan was abandoned, and all the privileges and concessions that had been granted to traders were taken away. All the leading cities, including Kyoto, Osaka, Yedo, and Sakai, were closed to trade and the traders were expelled. With the exception of the two ports of Nagasaki and Hirado, all the coastal harbors and ports were closed to trade ships and traders. In 1633-34, Japan entered upon the second stage of her national seclusion. Restrictions were placed upon Japanese sailing to foreign countries. Trade ships and traders were strictly prohibited from sailing from Japanese waters to those of foreign countries unless, in addition to their licenses, they had special written permits granted by the Japanese government. In 1636, Japan entered upon the third stage of her national seclusion. Japanese ships and traders were absolutely prohibited from sailing to foreign countries. Thus, so far as Japan was concerned, absolute seclusion was effected. In 1639, just one year after the suppression of the Catholic uprising, Japan entered upon the fourth and last stage of her national seclusion. In 1825, national seclusion was made yet more effective by the promulgation of a law which provided that all foreign ships approaching the Japanese coasts should be fired upon without investigation of either their nationality or their purpose.²

Prior to 1616, all Occidental traders, including the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and British, with their trade ships, were permitted to enter the waterways of all parts of Japan, and to establish residence and engage in trade in any part of Japan. That is to say, all Japan, both land and sea, was opened without restriction to foreign traders. The following written trade concession, issued to British traders in 1613, shows how liberal Iyeyasu was in dealing with Occidental traders.

“(1) Within the confines of the domain of Japan, all harbors and ports, without any restrictions whatsoever, shall be opened to your ships. Therefore, your traders and ships may enter our ports and anchor therein for purposes of trade at their convenience. Whenever your ships encounter disastrous storms, our government has no objections to their entering any of our waterways for shelter.

“(2) In Yedo [also in other cities], you are privileged to establish residence wherever you choose, with rights to engage in trade.

"[Dated] August 28 of the eighteenth year in the Keicho era [1613]:"³

In September, 1611, the following ordinance was promulgated throughout Japan, telling the people how they should deal with Occidental traders coming to their land or their waters.

"(1) All classes of people, both high and low, are hereby instructed not to treat rudely or unkindly the traders from the lands in the South Sea [Portuguese and Spanish traders].

"(2) If traders from those parts should reach your districts by land or by water, you must always provide them with suitable guides who shall accompany them to their respective destinations, rendering them all possible assistance.

"(3) If traders who have come to your harbor need a small boat to dispatch part of their men to neighboring harbors for the purpose of investigating trade conditions and anchorage accommodations, you are hereby instructed always to comply with their requests, and to lend them a boat.

"[Dated] September 15 of the sixteenth year in the Keicho era [1611]:"⁴

Within the short space of five years, Japan underwent radical changes. In August, 1616, the Japanese government issued the following instructions to the people, which indicated the new national policy of closing Japan to Occidentals.

"One of the provisions of the law promulgated in 1612 strictly prohibited the propagation of Catholicism and the coming of Catholic priests to Japan. All the people, both high and low, have been strictly instructed to renounce and reject those teachings. The black ships [ships of Occidental nations] belong to countries of that religion. Therefore, if in the future those black ships should enter your waterways, you must order that they proceed immediately to Nagasaki or Hirado. None of your people shall be permitted to engage in trade with those ships."

This order was issued because in those times all the ports in Japan, with the exception of those of Nagasaki and Hirado, were closed to foreign traders. In 1616, two British trade ships entered Uraga. The captains of those ships were surprised at being informed that all the leading cities in Japan, including Kyoto, Osaka, and Sakai, were closed to foreign trade, and that all foreign traders

were driven away. Under date of August 20, 1616, captains of British ships received the following instructions:

"1. Trade ships coming from England to Japan shall henceforth be allowed to enter the port of Hirado only, to engage in trade.

"2. Upon their arrival, all British ships must prepare complete lists of their cargoes and ship properties, to be presented to the local government.

"3. British traders shall be strictly prohibited from forcing the Japanese to buy their goods.

"4. If a British trader dies, his property shall be placed under the control of the captain of his ship.

"5. British offenders shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of British law. The captain of a British ship shall serve as judge.

"[Dated] August 20 of the second year in the Genwa era [1616]."⁵

In 1616, when these instructions were issued by the Japanese government, the British traders in Japan, in strict compliance with the terms of the "Red National Seal-Bearing Agreement" issued by Iyeyasu under date of August 28, 1613, maintained headquarters at Hirado, at Osaka, and at Yedo. The Hirado headquarters had a branch at Nagasaki. The Osaka headquarters had branches at Sakai and at Kyoto. The Yedo headquarters had branches at Sumpu and at Uruga. The Hirado headquarters, being general as well as local, sent its agents to all the important districts, cities, and towns in Kanto (East Japan) and in Kansei (West Japan) in order that they might engage in trade with the local merchants. In this connection, British agents established permanent residence in leading districts including Fukui, Kochi, Fukuoka, and Karatsu. In accordance with this same agreement, British traders were permitted to enter the waterways in all parts of Japan for the purpose of trade. Within the brief space of three years, however, the British traders were required to give up all their trade in the interior of Japan, and most of their coastal trade as well. The captains of the British ships were astounded by this radical change in the trade policy of Japan. They protested earnestly to the Japanese government, without avail. The trade restrictions applied not only to British traders, but to all other foreign traders also. Thus, in 1616, Japan clearly indicated that she would close her nation to the

outside world. Nevertheless, it was with great reluctance that Japan thus closed the nation and sacrificed trade because of trouble with the Catholics. In the seventeenth century it was the nation-wide feeling in Japan that Christian teachings (the teachings of Catholicism) were entirely contrary to Japanese traditions and organization. Therefore, the Japanese concluded that, in self-defense, Japan should cut off all communication with the outside world in order to prevent further inroads of Catholicism.⁶ The following is a brief outline of the contents of some of the books and documents in which Japanese statesmen and writers of the early part of the seventeenth century expressed their views regarding Catholicism.

"1. Christianity wholly ignores both the traditions and the laws of our nation.

"2. Christianity ignores and despises our national religions [Shintoism and Buddhism]. It is continuously causing national troubles and disturbances.

"3. The Christian churches and organizations make themselves centers of attraction to dissatisfied people and stragglers. They are headquarters for disturbing elements in Japan.

"4. Because of their religious interests, both the Christian priests and the Christian converts in Japan establish relations with the kingdom of Spain and serve as spies for the Spanish king, thus paving the way for an invasion of Japan.

"5. Christian priests always enter into secret understandings with ambitious and unruly Japanese, and help them to utilize religious influence for their own selfish purposes."

In 1633, seventeen years after Japan had abandoned trade with foreigners and closed all her ports except Nagasaki and Hirado, she entered upon the second stage of her national seclusion; she placed rigid restrictions upon the sailing of Japanese trade ships and traders to foreign countries. In that year, a law was promulgated to that effect. This law contained seventeen articles, the most important provisions of which were the following:

"1. All Japanese ships not provided with special written permits from the government, besides the regular ship licenses, are strictly prohibited from sailing to foreign waters.

"2. All Japanese, both traders and others, are strictly forbidden to sail to foreign countries in other ships than those with special

written permits. Violators of these provisions shall be put to death. The ships in which violators are found aboard shall be detained in harbor and their owners arrested and tried.

"3. Japanese who are resident in foreign countries shall not be permitted to return to Japan. Violators shall be put to death. However, those who have resided in foreign countries for less than five years and who have decided to return to Japan, giving up entirely their interests in foreign countries, shall be allowed to reënter Japan provided they make satisfactory explanations to the official in charge. Nevertheless, if these Japanese thus readmitted to Japan shall again plan to leave, they shall be put to death.

"4. Persons who report to the government the whereabouts of Catholic priests in Japan shall be rewarded to the extent of as much as one hundred pieces of silver.

"5. All incoming ships shall be carefully inspected to discover whether there be any Catholic priests aboard.

"6. All incoming trade ships are required to supply complete lists of their cargoes, to be sent to the central government at Yedo. However, the traders may sometimes be allowed to engage in trade before they receive instructions from the Yedo government.

"7. All foreign trade ships that have entered the ports of Nagasaki and Hirado must sail out before September 20. However, as a special consideration, fifty days of grace may be granted to ships that arrived late in the trade season.

"8. All unsold commodities shall be carried back to the homeland, because no foreign goods may be stored with individuals or firms, either at Nagasaki or at Hirado.

"9. No trade at Hirado may be engaged in until after trade quotations have been announced at Nagasaki.

"[Dated] February 28 of the tenth year in the Kanyei era [1633]."⁸

In 1634, the government erected an official bulletin board bearing the following regulations, at Nagasaki Harbor:

"1. Catholic priests shall not be permitted to enter Japan.

"2. Japanese weapons shall not be sent to foreign countries.

"3. No Japanese shall be allowed to sail for foreign countries except in ships provided with special written permits issued by the government. Offenders shall be promptly and severely punished.

"[Dated] May 28 of the eleventh year in the Kanyei era [1634]."⁹

In 1636, the government promulgated a law by the provisions of which Japanese persons and ships were prohibited from sailing to foreign countries. This law was, in fact, a revision of those of 1633 and 1634. It closed the doors of Japan completely as far as the Japanese themselves were concerned. It did not apply to foreigners. This law contained seventeen articles, the most important provisions of which were the following:

"1. Japanese ships of all classes and descriptions are hereby strictly prohibited from sailing from Japanese waters to foreign lands.

"2. Under no circumstances shall Japanese be permitted to sail to foreign lands. Violators of this provision shall be put to death. Ships having violators aboard shall be detained in harbor and their owners shall be arrested and tried.

"3. Japanese who have established their residence in foreign lands shall not be permitted to return to Japan, no matter how brief their foreign residence may have been. Those who attempt to enter Japan secretly shall be put to death.

"4. Persons who report to the government the whereabouts of Catholic priests in Japan shall be rewarded to the extent of as much as from two hundred to three hundred pieces of silver.

"5. If any Catholic priest or any Spaniard or Portuguese of ill repute shall be found aboard an incoming ship, he shall be arrested and detained in Omura prison for trial.

"6. All Eurasian children shall be exiled to foreign lands [Manila or Macao]. Those who secretly remain in Japan shall be put to death. Persons who render any assistance to Eurasians thus remaining secretly in Japan shall be punished.

"7. Under ordinary circumstances, persons who have adopted either Eurasians or their descendants shall be put to death, but the death sentence may be commuted to exile to a foreign land [Macao or Manila]. Nevertheless, those who attempt to reënter Japan shall be put to death.

"[Dated] May 19 of the thirteenth year in the Kanyei era [1636]."²⁰

The rest of the seventeen articles retain the original form of those of the law promulgated in 1633.

Some years prior to the promulgation of this law, in order to make it impossible for Japanese to sail to foreign countries, all the

large Japanese ships fitted for ocean voyages were destroyed by the government. The building of large ships was strictly prohibited.¹¹

In 1639, after the suppression of the Catholic uprising (1637-38), the Japanese government promulgated a law by the terms of which the entry of Occidental ships into Japanese waters was strictly forbidden. Thus did Japan enter upon the Period of Seclusion. This law read as follows:

"In the past, *galeota* ships [foreign ships] from the outside world have entered our waters and committed the following offenses against our nation:

"1. Notwithstanding that Christian teachings are strictly prohibited throughout Japan, these ships have secretly brought to Japan Catholic priests and other persons whose sole purpose in coming was to propagate this religion which is forbidden in Japan.

"2. These ships have on many occasions rendered assistance to Catholic adherents and have made it possible for them to rise against the Japanese government, thus causing great bloodshed and loss of life.

"3. These ships have carried various commodities and have provided with these things the Catholic priests who were smuggled into Japan and secluded in various parts of the country.

"4. Because of continued offenses of this sort by the *galeota* ships, their entrance into Japanese waters is strictly prohibited. If any of these ships shall violate this law and enter Japanese waters, they shall promptly be destroyed, and all persons aboard shall be put to death.

"[Dated] July 5 of the sixteenth year in the Kanyei era [1639]."¹²

In July, 1639, the following instructions were sent by the central government to all local feudal governments in Japan.

"1. Despite the fact that Christianity has been strictly prohibited by national law, yet, in the past, *galeota* ships have dared to violate the provisions of this law and have smuggled Catholic priests into Japan. Therefore, all the *galeota* ships shall henceforth be strictly prohibited from entering the waterways in any part of Japan.

"2. Your government is hereby requested to keep guard of the waterways in the districts under your control. If any ship of a suspicious nature shall enter any of your harbors or bays, your guard shall carefully investigate the nature and the purpose of the ship.

The guard shall first ascertain the number of men aboard, and under no circumstance shall allow any of them to land. Then, your government shall instruct the captain of the ship to proceed immediately to Nagasaki.

"3. If any of your people shall discover that the ship is carrying suspicious characters, or that any of the men aboard the ship have been secretly landed, upon notifying your government of these facts, they shall be liberally rewarded.

"[Dated] July 5 of the sixteenth year in the Kanyei era [1639]"¹³

Even after having entered upon the Period of Absolute Seclusion, Japan permitted the Dutch traders to remain in her country because the Dutch asserted that they were "Protestants" and therefore not "Christians." Moreover, the Dutch had given military assistance to the Japanese government at the time of the Christian uprising, by bombarding the Christian stronghold with their gunboats. Also, for nearly a quarter-century the Dutch traders served as secret-service men to the Japanese government, informing it of all movements of the Catholics, as well as of their so-called intrigues. Nevertheless, the Dutch were permitted to remain in Japan only under strict regulations. They were completely segregated; in fact, they were practically imprisoned on a small island. Since they were thus completely cut off from all relations with the Japanese people, as well as from the main islands of Japan, their residence did not affect the policy of national seclusion. Furthermore, the Dutch traders in Japan were not allowed to use the Christian calendar. The Dutch were not only prohibited from observing Sunday religiously, but even from making it a day of rest. They were forced to work seven days a week. They were not permitted to have Bibles in their homes.

In the short space of twelve days, beginning on June 12 and ending on June 24, 1641, all the Dutch traders in Japan were ordered to segregate themselves on the small island known as Deshima, an artificial island built in the harbor of Nagasaki. Its total area was 16,000 square yards. On it were sixty-five small cottages. Deshima was connected with Nagasaki by a stone bridge. Strong guards were stationed at both ends of this bridge.¹⁴ At the Nagasaki end of the bridge the Japanese government set up a bulletin board on which the following regulations were written.

"1. With the exception of licensed prostitutes, no women shall be allowed to visit or enter the island.

"2. With the exception of the monks of the Koyasan Buddhist monastery, neither Buddhist priests, traveling monks, nor Japanese of any other class shall be allowed to visit or enter the island.

"3. Beggars, peddlers, and solicitors of other sorts shall not be allowed to set foot upon the island.

"4. No ship shall be permitted to sail into the waters around Deshima that are marked off by the series of wooden posts.

"5. Without special permits from the Japanese government, the Dutch residents shall not be allowed to leave Deshima."¹⁵

Dutch trade ships were allowed to enter Nagasaki Harbor but once a year. They usually reached Japan in June or July and stayed there until September 20. Should a ship arrive late, fifty days of grace were granted, although by law September 20 was fixed as the last day for the Dutch ships to sail out of Japanese waters. During this period the Dutch traders were permitted to engage in trade, under the supervision of officials of the Japanese government, with those Japanese traders who were specially licensed by the government.¹⁶

For a period of about one hundred and fifty years after Japan entered upon the Period of Seclusion in 1639, she enjoyed peace and prosperity without any trouble or disturbance, either diplomatic or domestic. However, in the second half of the eighteenth century, Russia established herself in Kamchatka and surrounding waters. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Russian ships appeared frequently in the waters around the Kuriles and off the coast of Yezo. Because of the appearance of ships of an unknown nation along the coasts of the northern islands, Japan feared that she was threatened.¹⁷ She therefore made her law of seclusion more rigid. In order to do this, on September 1, 1791, the Japanese government issued the following ordinance to all the local feudal governments:

"Your government is hereby instructed that when a ship from a foreign nation appears near your coast, you shall promptly dispatch a ship with officers aboard and have them learn the destination of the foreign ship. However, these officers shall under all circumstances assume a peaceful attitude. Upon reaching the ship,

one of your officers who is able to engage in conversation with foreigners by means of writing, and also an officer who shall act as inspector, shall go aboard the ship. They shall carefully investigate both the purpose and the condition of the ship. If the foreign ship should refuse our demands and oppose the boarding of the ship by your officers, your government shall appeal to force in order to uphold our national rights. Armed men should be sent promptly to the ship and the foreign officers, including the captain, should be arrested. If the necessity arises, your government may use cannon and fire arrows. However, your government shall do its best to settle matters peaceably by conversing in writing in order to enforce our demands without appeal to arms. After having completed the investigation of the ship and its purpose, your government should take steps to detain the ship in your waters. The essential parts of the ship's rigging shall be removed and taken on land. The men in the ship shall be ordered to land and shall be placed under the charge of officers of your government. After having thus made it impossible for the ship to sail out of your waters, your government shall promptly report to our central government for further instructions. Should the ship's men object to the steps taken by your government, you should arrest and imprison them.

"[Dated] September 1 of the third year in the Kansei era [1791]."¹⁸

Almost immediately after the promulgation of the Ordinance of 1791, both Russian and British ships began to come to Japan with great frequency. In 1792, a Russian ship having aboard a man named Laxman, who was a sort of envoy, entered the harbor of Nemuro, in Yezo, and demanded trade privileges. In 1804, a Russian ship bearing the envoy Rezanov entered Nagasaki Harbor. He made a formal demand for trade privileges. Japan promptly refused. This refusal caused Russia to take military measures. In the years 1806, 1807, 1811, 1812, and 1813 Russian ships and gunboats made frequent appearances off the coasts of Sakhalin and Yezo. Sometimes these ships landed men, who acted with great violence. In the years 1808 and 1813, British ships forced an entry into Nagasaki Harbor and caused trouble there. In the years 1817, 1818, 1822, and 1824 British ships entered Japanese waters in Kyushu and Honshu. On many occasions men from those ships landed and

plundered. The Japanese government therefore, for purposes of defense, adopted a radical policy and decided to fire upon all foreign ships that appeared in Japanese waters.³⁰ In 1825, the Japanese government promulgated the following ordinance and instructed the local feudal governments to destroy all foreign ships that neared their coasts.

"Our government has in the past issued ordinances a number of times instructing the local governments in how they should deal with ships from foreign countries that enter our waters. In the Bunka era (1804-17), when Russians began to appear along our coasts, our government issued special instructions regarding our national policy in dealing with Russian ships. Some years ago, British ships entered the harbor of Nagasaki and caused great disturbances there by their violent conduct. In more recent years, the British have on many occasions sent small ships to various parts of our country, and have made demands for water, firewood, food, and other things. Last year, these ships violated our laws and landed their men either in districts along our coast or on islands off the coast. Some of these forcibly took rice and other grain from our transport ships. Others chased and caught wild cows and bulls in our island districts and carried them away. Not only did they thus act wildly and more wildly, but, we are given to understand, even urged our people to embrace the teachings of the evil religion [Christianity]. Now affairs have become so serious that we have found it necessary to take definite steps against those foreigners and their ships. On the whole, the British as well as the Spanish, Portuguese, and other Occidental nations are countries that believe in the evil religion [Christianity] which our country strictly prohibits. Therefore, you are hereby instructed to fire, hereafter, upon ships of any Occidental nation that approach your coasts, no matter in what part of our country. The firing shall be done by your men in charge of coast defense, without either hesitation or mercy. However, because it is our purpose to frighten and drive away all foreign ships that come to our waters, if the ships sail away after having been fired upon, your government is not required to send its ships out to pursue and capture them. Those foreign ships shall be permitted to take their own course, provided they do not remain in our waters. If the men in them dare to come to our coast in small

boats and effect a landing, you must understand that it is your obligation as well as your right to kill or arrest them. Should any of the main ships approach your coasts directly, your government may destroy them or sink them to the bottom of the sea. Otherwise, your government may take any emergency steps to meet the situation. Your government is especially required to have all the officers and men in charge of the ports, bays, and other waterways along your coast well informed of all the foregoing instructions. You must also see that they attend to their duties promptly and report to your government all happenings relating to foreign ships.

"As for your coast defense, your government must take into consideration both the local conditions and the geographical features, and erect practical works. You may use your own judgment, but you must not incur unnecessary expense by building elaborate defensive works; at the same time, you should not neglect, because of financial strain, the building of works of defense in certain places where they are needed. The work done shall be of a practical and permanent nature. When your men fire upon foreign ships, they will be able to differentiate readily between ships from China, Korea, and Liu Chiu and those from the Occident because of the marked differences in shape, size, and construction. The Dutch ships may possibly be mistaken for those of other Occidental nations. Nevertheless, even though your men might fire upon Dutch ships by mistake, it would not result in serious trouble. The men who may thus fire upon those ships will not be punished. Therefore, your men in charge of coast defense shall be instructed that to fire upon foreign ships is their most essential duty and that they are required to keep a constant watch upon movements near the coast, and to be ready to fire at any moment, whenever and wherever a foreign ship may make its appearance.

"In the past, when a foreign ship has entered our waterways or one of our ships has met a foreign ship off our coasts, the reports by the local governments have been too general and have lacked detail. Therefore, our government has had difficulty in apprehending the exact situation. Hereafter, your government shall be required to instruct all the officers and men in charge of your waterway districts to give detailed accounts, without omitting any incident, no matter how insignificant it may seem. Your government

must train and direct those officers and seamen to report to it everything that they have seen and done, by describing things exactly, without omission or error. It is a matter of regret that our government is obliged to make it a national policy to fire upon all the foreign ships that may appear in the waters along our coasts. At present, however, the situation is so serious that no other course would be effective in the enforcement of our time-honored policy of national seclusion. Consequently, your government is hereby instructed and required cheerfully and diligently to cooperate with our central government in carrying out this new national project.

"In the past, our government has issued a number of ordinances prohibiting all provincial transport ships and fishing boats from approaching secretly and making contact with foreign ships at sea. However, our nation has not been free from violators of these ordinances. Our government has now made it a national policy to fire upon and drive away all foreign ships that appear in our waters. Therefore, your government is required to warn both transport ships and fishing boats and their owners that they must adhere strictly to our time-honored national regulations of neither approaching nor associating with foreign ships at sea, and that violators and offenders who have committed crimes and kept their offenses secret shall be punished to the full extent of the law. Nevertheless, should some of the offenders present themselves to the government and confess their crimes, also giving the names of the other offenders, they shall not only be granted immunity, but shall be liberally rewarded. Your government shall keep strict watch and not permit those shippers and fishermen to violate our national regulations. At the same time, your government shall urge and induce offenders to come forward and confess their crimes, as well as to give the names of their accomplices, so that they may obtain both immunity and due reward.

"[Dated] February of the eighth year in the Bunsei era [1825]."²⁰

This ordinance is known as the *Bunsei Uchiharai Rei* ("Law of Firing Upon and Driving Away Foreign Ships of the Bunsei Era").

After the promulgation of the Uchiharai Rei, a number of foreign ships were fired upon, but as they were either whalers or unarmed small merchantmen, they sailed away without returning the fire. The Japanese government therefore concluded that the Uchi-

harai Rei could be enforced effectively and Occidental nations easily coped with.²¹ On July 27, 1837, the American ship "Morrison" was fired upon and sailed away without entering the Bay of Uraga, which was her destination. Her mission had been to return shipwrecked Japanese to their homeland and to investigate possibilities of reopening Japan. By that time, the national condition of Japan had changed considerably. Men of progressive ideas strongly criticized the government for having fired upon the foreign ship that had come to Japan to bring shipwrecked Japanese to their homeland. They said that this act was not only contrary to the maintenance of national dignity and honor, but a violation of the laws of humanity as well.²²

In 1841-42, Japan heard of the Opium War and its results. When this Chinese military disaster and China's national disgrace in concluding a treaty of peace under the dictation of Great Britain and France, by the terms of which China ceded territory, paid heavy indemnity, and was forced to open her nation to Occidental trade, became known to Japan, she realized that there would be great danger in dealing recklessly with Occidental nations. Therefore, in 1842, Japan repealed the Uchiharai Rei of 1825, and in its stead issued the following ordinance:

"1. In 1825, our government issued an ordinance instructing all the local governments to fire upon all foreign ships that might approach our coasts, without either hesitation or mercy. Our country has now entered upon a period of reform, with the hope of duplicating the admirable administrations of the Kyoho and Kansei eras. Benevolence is to be emphasized in all national policies and undertakings. This national grace will be extended to foreign nations. Therefore, should a foreign ship hereafter encounter a disastrous storm or be rendered helpless through some other mishap and come to our waters asking for assistance, water, firewood, and provisions, it must not be fired upon. The taking of so merciless an action without making any investigation is contrary to world-wide usage.

"2. Our government has decided to reinstate the ordinance and regulation issued in the third year of the Bunka era for the regulation of foreign ships coming to our waters. Therefore, if a foreign ship approaches our coast, your government shall investigate care-

fully its condition and needs. If the ship is found unable to continue its voyage by reason of lack of water, firewood, or provisions, your government shall provide everything that the ship may need and order it to sail out of our waters immediately. However, under no circumstances shall the men aboard be permitted to land on our coast.

“3. This new national policy of our government shall not be misconstrued to imply that your coast defense is less necessary or that your people shall be allowed to associate or even communicate with foreigners. In fact, our government urgently requests that all local governments strengthen and improve their coast defenses yet more. The strength of the coast guard, the military weapons, ammunition, provisions, and so on, shall receive special attention.

“4. Sometimes it may happen that a ship from a foreign country will come to our coast and fire upon us merely for the purpose of discovering our attitude and state of preparation. In such an event, your coast guard must not become agitated. It shall investigate the purpose of the coming of such ship before taking any action. Your people shall be fully instructed with regard to our new national policy of benevolence so that they may be able to deal properly with foreign ships and foreigners. However, if foreign ships violate our laws and act with great violence, or if they refuse to sail out of our waters after having been provided with all the things of which they are in need, your government will be both privileged and required to fire upon them promptly and to take all steps necessary.

“5. Although your government has undoubtedly a copy of the ordinance of the third year of the Bunka era on file, yet, for the sake of reference, we here give its main content:

“Some time ago, Russian ships entered the harbor of Nagasaki and requested trade privileges. We promptly refused this request, giving a full explanation of why Japan found it necessary to remain in seclusion. At the same time, we confiscated the official certificate that had been given them by one of our local governments several years before. We also ordered them to sail away from Nagasaki, with strict instructions not to return to any of our waters. Therefore, although we believe that no Russian ships will again come to our country, yet some of them may, under pretense of some disastrous happening, enter and anchor in our waterways. Therefore,

if any foreign ship should henceforth appear in our waters, your government shall send some men to inquire into its purpose and condition. If these men find that the ship in question is from Russia, your government must carefully explain to the ship's captain our national policy of seclusion and demand that his ship promptly sail out of our waters. However, if a ship has really encountered disaster and has been forced thereby to drift to our coast, or if a ship lacks water, firewood, or provisions, your government shall render all necessary assistance and provide the things needed, after which you shall demand that the ship sail out of your waters. No matter how urgent an appeal the captain may make, you must not, under any consideration, permit the men aboard to land on your coast. During the time that a ship is anchored in your waters, you must keep a number of boats on guard around it, and see that the men on board the ship do not spy out the conditions in the harbor or on the coast. Your government shall have every movement of the ship and its men properly reported to you. If, after it has been put into condition to sail and all necessities have been supplied it, a ship should repeatedly refuse to sail out of your waters, thus disregarding your demands, your government shall then fire upon it. Moreover, your government is at liberty to act in any emergency without obtaining permission from our government. Your government need only report to us why and how the action has been taken.

"If a Russian ship is to be dealt with in the manner described, your government shall take the necessary steps in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance issued in the third year of the Kansei era [1791] with regard to foreign ships.

"[Dated] July 26 of the thirteenth year in the Tempō era [1842]."²⁸

In October, three months after the promulgation of the Ordinance of 1842, the shogunate government issued the following ordinance:

"In the eighth year of the Bunsei era [1825], our government issued an ordinance instructing you to fire upon all ships approaching your coast, showing neither hesitation nor mercy. Now, our government has made it its national policy to show mercy and benevolence and has decided not to fire upon foreign ships seeking entrance to our waterways solely because of disastrous storms, and without having any unfriendly feeling or purpose. However, our

time-honored national policy of seclusion must be strictly enforced and all military preparations, especially those of coast defense, must be carefully kept up. Moreover, our provincial transport ships and our fishing boats shall be instructed to make careful selection of their water routes so that they may not come into contact with foreign ships. Nevertheless, if any of these transports or fishing boats should unavoidably come into contact with foreign ships, or if they should be approached by foreign ships and receive from them assistance or gifts, these ships of ours shall, upon coming back to our coast, report to the officials of the local government, giving a detailed account of the incident and of their experiences in dealing with the foreigners and their ships.

“Our government has issued a number of laws and ordinances prohibiting our ships and fisheries from associating with foreign ships and traders. Therefore, by this time, our national policy should be clearly understood. Nevertheless, some of our ships and fisheries have either purposely or unavoidably come into contact with foreign ships, thus violating our laws. However, these offenders will not be punished provided they report promptly to the officers in charge, stating what they have done. On the other hand, offenders who keep their violations secret shall be punished to the full extent of the law. If some of the old offenders come forward and confess, giving detailed accounts of their violations together with the names of their accomplices, they shall not only be granted immunity but, usually, will be rewarded. Our government hereby instructs both ships and fisheries neither to delay nor to neglect reporting to us their association with foreign ships.

“[Dated] October 11 of the thirteenth year in the Tempo era [1842].”²⁴

This ordinance was issued to all the local governments, with instructions to write its entire content on large bulletin boards which were to be set up in every harbor, port, and waterway in their respective provinces.²⁵

APPENDIX 8

*State Papers Exchanged Between Japan and Korea
During the Period of Absolute Seclusion*

KOREA was the only nation with which Japan had diplomatic relations during her period of seclusion of 264 years. The following documents are both typical and significant. They show how Japan and Korea regarded each other's national standing.

1. Letters exchanged between the king of Korea and Iyemitsu, the third shogun of the Tokugawa government:

"Tsung Yi, the King of Korea, respectfully addresses this letter to His Royal Highness the King of Japan. Last year the Tsushima government sent an envoy who crossed wide waters and came to our country for the purpose of cultivating friendly relations. By the information thus received, we understand that you, the Wise King, have succeeded to the ruling line of your country, and that you have expressed an earnest desire to resume relations with us. To maintain friendly relations with neighboring nations is a most happy and essential practice. We hereby send our trusted subjects, Chuan and others, to express our congratulations and to be present at this glorious ceremony in your country. We are ashamed that the local products we are sending to you are insignificant and fail to meet the *Rokuhei* form. However, our purpose in sending this present is merely to express our earnest and sincere desire for the ever-increasing prosperity and greatness of both your government and yourselves.

"[Dated] August in the fourth year of the Tien-Chi era of the Ming Emperor Hsi-Tsung of China [1624]."²⁸

"Iyemitsu Minamoto of Japan respectfully replies to His Royal Highness the King of Korea. It is a winter month, and the entire country is now in the grip of severe cold. We have received your letter, together with your hearty greetings and inquiries expressed by you through your three envoys. A cheerful and harmonious atmosphere having thus been produced, we feel as if we were sitting in a place where a gentle spring wind is blowing. Fortunately, I have come to control and rule the entire land of Japan. You, having received this information, have sent your three envoys to

attend our ceremony and to present to us both your kind words of congratulation and rare and valuable products of your country. We accept it all with great appreciation and gratitude. We earnestly desire that our traditional good will and friendly relations as neighboring nations shall be more firmly cemented and maintained. May the international pledges exchanged between our two nations be observed and adhered to for myriads of generations to come. Hoping you are able to withstand the cold of this severe winter and that you will take the best care of yourself for the sake of the nation, I am “[Signed] IYEMITSU MINAMOTO of Japan.

“[Dated] December in the Year of Koshi [1624].”²⁷

2. Letters exchanged between Tun Yi, the king of Korea, and Iyenobu, the sixth shogun of the Tokugawa government:

“Tun Yi, the King of Korea, respectfully addresses this letter to His Royal Highness the King of Japan. Since we sent our last envoy of good will and inquiry to your country, a generation has passed away. We have now been informed that Your Royal Highness has succeeded to the ruling power, and is controlling a wide extent of territory. We, the Master of a nation maintaining neighborly relations with your country, are overwhelmed with joyful and cheerful feelings by reason of this great event. We herewith send our envoys to express our sincere good will and to reassure you of our harmonious diplomatic relations with your country. At the same time, we are sending our hearty congratulations upon your rise to power. In accordance with established usage, we herewith present to you some of the products of our country, which lies a great distance over the waters. These products are sent not by reason of their value, but to express our happiness and congratulations upon your succeeding to power. Hoping that we may enjoy a long period of friendly relations with your country, I am

“[Signed] TUN YI, the King of Korea.

“[Dated] May in the Year of Shinbo [1711].”²⁸

“Iyenobu Minamoto, the King of Japan, respectfully replies to His Royal Highness the King of Korea. The peaceful and harmonious season of the present is well-suited to bring the Three Great Elements [Heaven, Earth, and Man] into happy contact. Our precious neighborly relations, harmoniously maintained, give us hope for a hundred years more of national friendship. Your

present to us is both luxurious and abundant. The wording of your letter is both cheerful and thoughtful. The gratitude and appreciation which these things cause us are so great that they cannot be expressed in words. We have a present for you in return, which we have requested your envoys to carry to your land. Hoping that you will kindly accept these products, I am

“[Signed] IYENOBU MINAMOTO, the King of Japan.

“[Dated] November of the first year in the Shotoku era [1711].”²⁹

3. Letters exchanged between Chiu Yi, the king of Korea, and Yieshige, the ninth shogun of the Tokugawa government.

“Chiu Yi, the King of Korea, respectfully addresses this letter to His Royal Highness the *Taikun* [Great Lord of Japan]. A vast stretch of time lies between the sending of our last envoy of good will and inquiry and the sending of the present one. Nearly thirty years have already gone. We have now been informed that Your Royal Highness has come to administer the great national government and to rule the vast districts of your country, thus assuring peace and prosperity to your people. Cheerful and happy voices are heard everywhere that this happy news reaches. I earnestly desire to congratulate you upon this great occasion, and to promote harmonious relations with your country by observing the national rites. We are hereby sending our envoys to express our neighborly good will. Some of our local products are being sent merely for the purpose of expressing esteem and sincerity from us who are in a far-off land. Hoping that our time-honored international good will may be maintained in an ever-increasing degree, and that you may enjoy everlasting happiness and prosperity, I am

“[Signed] CHIU YI, the King of Korea.

“[Dated] November in the Year of Teibo [1747].”³⁰

“Yieshige Minamoto of Japan respectfully replies to His Royal Highness the King of Korea. Your envoys of good will and inquiry have reassured us of the continuance of friendly relations between your country and ours. The wording in your letter expresses properly the affairs of your country as well as those of yourself. We have thereby come to understand your daily life, and we hereby express our happiness with regard to it. Upon receiving information that I have succeeded to the ruling line of our country and that our national foundations have thereby been strengthened,

you have, in accordance with the established tradition, reaffirmed our friendly relations by expressing your kind and cheerful sentiments, and by sending an abundance of presents. The rites thus observed and the sincerity thus shown will certainly augment the good will of our two nations, thus making it possible for neighborly relations to extend to future generations. We hereby send some of our local products, which we have requested your envoys to carry to your land. Hoping that we may enjoy harmonious and cheerful relations without any altercations, and that we may always have a quiet and felicitous atmosphere around us, I am

“[Signed] IYESHIGE of Japan.

“[Dated] June of the fifth year in the Yenkyo era [1748].”⁸¹

4. Letters exchanged between Chin Yi, the king of Korea, and Iyeharu, the tenth shogun of the Tokugawa government.

“Chin Yi, the King of Korea, respectfully addresses this letter to the Taikun of Japan. More than a decade has already passed since our last envoy of good will and inquiry sailed to your country. We have been informed that Your Royal Highness has succeeded to the ruling line, and has come to reign over the land within the sea. We, who have long maintained happy national relations with your country, are overwhelmingly rejoiced by this glad news. In accordance with established usage, we are hereby sending envoys to convey our congratulations and to further our harmonious relations with your country. Although they are quite insignificant, some of our local products are being sent to you to express joyful and sincere congratulations from us in a far distant land. Expressing an earnest desire to maintain our former happy relations, and hoping from the bottom of our hearts for great success in the new administration of your country, I am

“[Signed] CHIN YI, King of Korea.

“[Dated] August in the Year of Kibi [1763].”⁸²

“Iyeharu Minamoto of Japan respectfully replies to His Royal Highness the King of Korea. Your envoys have come to us after traveling a great distance over land and sea. The Rites of National Inquiry have been performed in a most glorious way. I have been made acquainted with your prosperous daily life and therefore feel easy and happy. As I have now succeeded to the ruling line and have come to protect and enhance the welfare of the multitudes

of our people, you have sent us valuable presents, in accordance with established regulations, together with kind and cheerful words of congratulation. Moreover, these ceremonial rites, so gloriously observed, reflect our harmonious and friendly relations of generations past. They also further the sincere good will of our two nations. Although they may be quite insignificant, we are sending certain articles by your envoys, which they have kindly consented to carry and to present to you. Hoping that we may enjoy everlasting good understanding, thereby maintaining happy neighborly relations by the grace of Heaven, I am

“[Signed] IYEHARU MINAMOTO of Japan.

“[Dated] March of the fourteenth year in the Horeki era [1764].”³³

Throughout the entire Tokugawa period, in accordance with a mutual understanding, Japan and Korea sent envoys of good will and inquiry but once during the entire ruling period of each shogun on the part of Japan, and but once during the reign of each king on the part of Korea. Being envoys of congratulation, as a rule they were sent immediately after the coming into power of a shogun or a king. In state papers, the king of Korea always signed his name with the title “King of Korea.” He addressed the shogun of Japan by using the term “His Royal Highness the King of Japan,” or “His Royal Highness the Taikun of Japan.” *Taikun* means “Great Lord.”

In the state papers of Japan (replies to letters from the king of Korea), the shogun always addressed the king of Korea by using the term, “His Royal Highness the King of Korea.” The shogun generally signed his name only, using the words, “So-and-so of Japan.” Sometimes the shogun signed his name and affixed the words, “King of Japan,” using the term, “So-and-so, the King of Japan,” in exactly the same way as the kings of Korea always signed their state papers. Thus, during the Tokugawa period, in their international transactions Japan and Korea regarded each other as nations of equal standing in every respect.³⁴

In the state papers thus exchanged between Korea and Japan, when either Chinese emperors or the Chinese government were mentioned, both Korea and Japan always used the term, *Tien-Chao*, which means the “Heavenly Court.” Heavenly Court means the imperial government that came into existence in accordance with

a commission from Heaven. Thus did both Korea and Japan regard China as the nation of supreme power, which had a ruling authority entrusted to her by Heaven.

Neither Japan nor Korea recognized the existence of the emperor of Japan or the imperial government of that country. The shogun never used his official titles, such as *Shogun* or *Sei-i Tai-shogun*, or any other official titles or ranks conferred upon him by the emperor of Japan, in the state papers sent to Korea, although these titles were used in the state papers sent to Annam, the Philippines, and Nueva España. The Tokugawa shogunate thus kept the existence of the emperor of Japan from the knowledge of Korea.³⁵ Therefore, when in 1868-69 after the imperial restoration the imperial government of Japan sent state papers to Korea in which such terms as "His Majesty the Emperor of Japan" and "imperial desire" were used, Korea neither accepted Japan's state papers nor recognized the imperial government.³⁶ The Korean question, which brought about the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), was really caused by the abnormal international transactions between Japan and Korea during the Tokugawa period.

Whenever a new shogun came into power, the lord of Tsushima, who was master of the small Japanese island in the Korean channel, notified the Korean government to that effect. Korea then sent envoys of congratulation under the name of "Envoys of Good Will and Inquiry to Japan." Whenever a new king ascended the throne of Korea, the lord of Tsushima always sent "Envoys of Good Will and Inquiry" at the request of the shogun. It was probably necessary for Japan to take this course because, in the early international transactions, Korea had refused to admit envoys from Japan to her national capital. The state papers exchanged between Japan and Korea, addressed to each other's rulers, contained only expressions of desire for the maintenance of good will and neighborly relations. They were merely formal documents and had no special international significance.³⁷ However, when the lord of Tsushima sent his envoy in behalf of the shogun, he always sent *de facto* state papers in the form of memorials to the throne. Owing to the great difference between his own rank and that of the king of Korea, he could not address memorials to the king directly. Therefore, this memorial was sent through the Korean Bureau of Rites.

In this *de facto* state paper, the lord of Tsushima used most extravagant expressions, eulogizing the new king of Korea as if he were a divinity of heavenly virtue with supreme ruling authority. The following document exemplifies this:

"Yoshimasa, Lord of Tsushima, a subject of Japan, respectfully addresses this memorial to His Royal Highness the new King of Korea, through His Excellency Taijen Tsao, chief of the Bureau of Rites of the Korean government. His Royal Highness, having received a holy and glorious mission, has ascended the throne. Heaven above and earth below have made of Korea a land where nothing shall take place but holy and sacred things. Mountains and rivers have assumed the duty of protecting and guarding the royal court. All living things now enjoy a happy existence. I, Yoshimasa, with infinite reverence and joy, bow my head low and address the Throne thus:

"Heaven and earth maintain their respective positions permanently. The sun and the moon shine high above. The four seasons pursue their courses, and myriads of things thrive in evidence of the glory of the coming reign of our new king. His Royal Highness has a divine personality. His brilliant virtue radiates light in the four directions of the universe. His Royal Highness, having inherited the practices of the ancient sages, shall elevate and educate young men of genius and ability throughout his kingdom. Therefore, the reign of Yao-Shun, an ancient emperor-sage of China, and the brilliant rule of the founder of the Great Han, will soon be reproduced in the present generation. Unruly and disorderly people will be overcome. Four Hsing and eight Yi, together with their followers, shall make their escape far beyond the borders of the kingdom. In the coming reform the kingdom will be placed under the best administration. His Royal Highness, the lord, stands majestically above. Below him, his loyal subjects diligently perform their tasks. Widows and widowers forget their loneliness and enjoy happy existences. Multitudes of people cultivate virtue and diligently pursue their daily tasks.

"I, Yoshimasa, have continuously cultivated and promoted neighborly relations with your esteemed country, reverently carrying out the commands of the ruler of our country. The national pledges thereby exchanged between our two nations are as firm

as the mountains and as lasting as the rivers. As heaven and earth have witnessed, the exchange of communications of good will has never been discontinued. Now, availing ourselves of the opportunity again to observe a royal accession to the throne, I rejoice and am happy. Acting in accordance with the established tradition, I hereby send Narimitsu Taira as envoy to carry some of our local products to the throne. With overwhelming admiration and lasting devotion to the royal court, I, Yoshimasa, Lord of Tsushima, a subject of Japan, with reverence and awe, respectfully present this memorial to the royal throne with heartfelt congratulations. May I hope that this memorial may reach the hearing of His Royal Highness?

"[Dated] January of the third year in the Manji era [1660]." ³⁸

APPENDIX 9

Korean-Japanese Relations: State Papers and Presents Exchanged Between the Two Nations, Their Nature and Purposes

IN 1601, immediately after Iyeyasu had come into power, he expressed an earnest desire to restore peace with Korea. The lord of Tsushima was entrusted by him with this national mission. Tsushima, being close to Korea, naturally had commercial and economic relations with that kingdom. Therefore, the lord of Tsushima desired just as ardently as did Iyeyasu to have peace restored to Korea. However, Korea persistently refused to enter into any sort of relations with Japan. Nevertheless, in 1623, when Iyemitsu became the third shogun, nearly a quarter-century had elapsed since Japan had made her first overtures of peace to Korea. By that time, most of the Korean demands had been satisfied. Japan had returned thousands of prisoners to Korea. She had sent to Korea those Japanese who had dishonored the graves of former Korean kings, to be punished in accordance with Korean laws. She had even gone so far as to profess having destroyed Hideyoshi's family in order to avenge Korea for his military brutality in Korea. Finally, therefore, the feeling of enmity held by Korea with regard to Japan was overcome.³⁹ Consequently, when Iyemitsu, the third shogun, came into power, the new international

tradition of exchanging envoys of congratulation whenever a new ruler came into power was established. During the Tokugawa shogunate, the lord of Tsushima was requested by the shogun always to send an envoy to Korea on each of the following occasions:

1. The accession of a new shogun to power.
2. The retirement of a ruling shogun.
3. The death of a shogun.
4. The birth of a son to the shogun.
5. The announcement of the heir apparent to the shogun.
6. The changes of season (spring, summer, autumn, and winter).
7. The asking of the date of departure of the Korean envoy of good will and inquiry to Japan.
8. The escorting of the Korean envoy and his party back to Korea from Japan.

Not only was the lord of Tsushima thus obliged to inform Korea of the national affairs of Japan, but he also had to send envoys to Korea on his own account on the following occasions:

1. The succession of a new lord of Tsushima.
2. The retirement of the ruling lord of Tsushima.
3. The expressing of condolence at the time of the death of a Korean king, queen, or queen dowager.
4. The reporting of any shipwreck of Koreans and the escorting back to Korea of the survivors.

Likewise, the Korean government had to inform the lord of Tsushima of all important national affairs in Korea.⁴⁰ With the exception of the information that new rulers had come into power in either Korea or in Japan, no action of a national character was taken on other information. However, when Korea was informed that a new ruler (shogun) had succeeded to power in Japan, the king of Korea wrote a state paper and sent an envoy bearing presents. There was no fixed interval of years for the sending of an envoy by Korea to Japan. It depended entirely upon the length of the ruling period of each shogun. The intervals ranged from nine to forty-nine years. Korea always sent her envoy and his party in a most dignified and luxurious way. The party usually consisted of from three hundred to five hundred members. Table 5 gives data on the arrival of the envoys and their parties.⁴¹

Although, prior to 1624, beginning indeed in 1602, when inter-

national relations between Japan and Korea were first entered upon, Korea had sent national representatives to Japan in different capacities as many as four times, it was only after the third shogun came into power (in 1623) that Korea sent her first envoy of congratulation under the name of "The Envoy of Good Will and Inquiry to Japan." Envoys were always entertained at Yedo (Tokyo), the military capital of Japan. However, when the tenth envoy came to Japan in 1811, the Korean envoy was entertained

TABLE 5
DATA RELATING TO ENVOYS SENT BY KOREA TO JAPAN

Year of arrival	Number of envoys	Number of members of the party	Place of meeting
1624.....	3	300	Yedo
1636.....	3	360	Yedo
1643.....	3	400	Yedo
1655.....	3	480	Yedo
1685.....	3	362	Yedo
1711.....	3	491	Yedo
1719.....	3	475	Yedo
1748.....	3	477	Yedo
1764.....	3	480	Yedo
1811.....	2	330	Tsushima

on Tsushima in the Korean Channel, in order to curtail expenses. There, state papers and presents were exchanged. From that time on, Korean envoys ceased to go to Japan; and therefore, neither state papers nor presents were exchanged. This shows that, during the Tokugawa period, envoys came from Korea to Japan voluntarily and not by reason of any national obligation.

The envoys had always traveled slowly and in a most dignified way. In 1655, when the fourth envoy came to Japan, he and his party, consisting of four hundred and eighty members, sailed from Fusan, Korea, on June 9 and reached Tsushima on June 15. On August 4 they reached Shimonoseki, on the main island of Japan. After having stayed at thirty different cities and towns, they finally arrived, on October 2, 1655, at Yedo. Thus, they spent about four months in traveling from Fusan to Yedo. It took them two months

to go from Shimonoseki to Yedo, which is halfway across the island of Honshu. This same distance is covered by train in forty hours at the present time.⁴²

The shogun received the Korean envoy and his party as national guests, showing them great courtesy and respect in every possible way. The lord of Tsushima, in compliance with instructions from the shogun, always escorted the Korean envoy and his party both ways on their journey—from Tsushima to Yedo, and then back to Tsushima. The shogun ordered his government to put the national roads in condition and to make arrangements for the accommodation of the envoy and his party along the way. Rich and powerful feudal lords were ordered by the shogun to entertain the travelers. The shogun sent his representatives to one or two of the most important cities to await the coming of the envoy and his party and to give great banquets in their honor. The guests usually stayed for two or three weeks in Yedo, the military capital. They were received in the grandest possible style and were banqueted and honored in every way possible.⁴³

During the Tokugawa period, the receiving, accommodating, and entertaining of the Korean envoys and their parties was a great national event as well as a very expensive undertaking. How to carry out this national obligation in a less expensive way was a serious national problem. In 1787, when the eleventh shogun, Iyenari, came to power, Japan was already in financial difficulties, and was visited, moreover, by a nation-wide famine. Therefore, since it was impossible to entertain the Korean envoy in the usual way, Japan requested the Korean government to postpone the sending of her Envoys of Good Will and Inquiry to express congratulation for the accession of Iyenari to power.⁴⁴ Later, the shogun decided to change the place of entertainment of Korean envoys, from Yedo to Tsushima in the Korean Channel. For this purpose, the shogunate government issued the following instructions to the lord of Tsushima:

“In preceding years, because of nation-wide famines, and also by reason of financial difficulties, we have postponed the reception of envoys from Korea and have notified the Korean government to that effect. In the past, Korean envoys and their parties have been received and entertained in too grand a style, thus causing

us great national expenditure and a tremendous amount of work. Our nation is now suffering from a second famine. However, if, because of this, we should again postpone the reception of Korean envoys, it would reflect upon the honor and dignity of our nation. At the same time, if, in view of our financial situation, we should receive the Korean envoys, we must realize what the outcome would be. Therefore, the reception of the Korean envoys at our military capital constitutes a most serious national problem. The best solution would be to reduce the expense and to receive the envoys in the simplest possible way. With this in mind, the shogun feels that if we should be able to arrange this matter with Korea in such a way as to receive the Korean envoys at Tsushima in the Korean Channel, then the expenses of travel and of the observation of ceremonial rites would both be reduced. If we should make this our practice henceforth, the problem with regard to the receiving of the Korean envoys would be solved. Therefore, you, the lord of Tsushima, are hereby requested to take up this matter with Korea and gain that nation's consent to this new plan. This is the earnest desire of the shogun. You must give it serious consideration and make it possible for our nation to solve this long-pending national question."⁴⁵

The lord of Tsushima had great difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Korean government. Korea strenuously objected to the changing of the place of reception from the military capital at Yedo to an insignificant island in the Korean Channel. Nevertheless, she finally agreed to the new plan. In 1787, Iyenari became the eleventh shogun. However, because of financial difficulties, and because of a subsequent dispute with Korea regarding the change of place where the Korean envoy was to be entertained, Japan could not make ready to receive the Korean Envoy of Good Will and Inquiry until 1811, twenty-four years after Iyenari's accession. By the new plan, in May, 1811, the king of Korea sent the long-delayed envoy of congratulation to Japan. On her part, Japan sent the lord of Ogasawara and the lord of Wakizaka as representatives of Iyenari to meet the Korean envoy at Tsushima. Thus did the Korean envoy and the Japanese representatives each go halfway across the Korean Channel to meet each other on Tsushima, where they exchanged state papers and national presents. This was the

last time that a Korean envoy was sent to Japan, as the king of Korea discontinued sending envoys to Japan after this envoy and his party had been entertained on this small island in the Korean Channel.⁴⁶

During the rule of the Tokugawa, which lasted 264 years, envoys came from Korea fourteen times. Ten of them were envoys of congratulation. When they came under the name of Envoys of Good Will and Inquiry, they always brought state papers and national presents, which were exchanged for state papers and national presents from Japan. However, these state papers were merely personal letters of the king of Korea and of the ruler of Japan (the shogun). The national presents were personal gifts of the ruler of Japan and of the king of Korea. In fact, when an envoy came from Korea, presents were sometimes exchanged between the Korean king and the retired shogun and also between the Korean king and the shogun's heir. Moreover, presents were exchanged between the shogun's advisor and the chief of the Bureau of Rites of the Korean government, as well as between prominent officials in the shogunate government and in the Korean government. In fact, both the national presents and the personal presents constituted a sort of trade between the Korean and the Japanese governments.⁴⁷ Because this exchange of so-called presents between Japanese and Korean officials came to be conducted more and more irregularly and unsatisfactorily, in the eighteenth century the shogunate government strictly prohibited the exchange of presents by its officials with Korean officials. Nevertheless, the exchange of presents between the Korean and Japanese rulers was continued. The following lists show what sort of articles were exchanged between them under the name of "national presents."

In 1719, the king of Korea sent an envoy with the following presents⁴⁸ for the ruler of Japan (the eighth shogun):

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Jenseon (ginseng, a medicinal herb), 50 pounds. | 7. Fish skins, 100 pieces. |
| 2. Light and heavy damasks, 10 rolls each. | 8. Green skins, 30 pieces. |
| 3. White cotton pongee, 50 rolls. | 9. Yellow honey, 100 pounds. |
| 4. White, yellow, and black hemp goods, 30 rolls each. | 10. Refined honey, 10 jars. |
| 5. Tiger skins, 15 pieces. | 11. Stationery, including 30 rolls of writing paper; 50 writing brushes; 50 sticks of Chinese ink. |
| 6. Leopard skins, 20 pieces. | 12. Falcons and hunting sets, 20 each. |
| | 13. Horses with saddles, 2. |

The ruler of Japan (shogun) sent the following presents⁴⁹ in return, the first four items being sent to the Korean king, and the remaining seven being given to the envoy and his party:

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Large six-fold gold-foil screens, 20 pairs, being 40 pieces. | 7. Three hundred silver pieces and 300 bundles of cotton for the assistant to the envoys. |
| 2. Lacquer saddles, ornamented with gold, 20 sets. | 8. Four hundred silver pieces for the two interpreters. |
| 3. Damask with flower designs, 100 rolls. | 9. One hundred and fifty silver pieces for the three secretaries. |
| 4. Silk pongee, 200 rolls. | 10. Five hundred silver pieces for forty-four officers of high rank. |
| 5. Five hundred silver pieces and 300 bundles of cotton for the envoy himself. | 11. One thousand silver pieces for the 423 other members of the party. |
| 6. The same for the assistant envoy. | |

(The differences in the make-up of the two foregoing lists, Korean and Japanese, is instructive.)

In February, 1725, Ying-Tsung, the king of Korea, ascended the throne. The shogun, under the designation "Ruler of Japan," instructed the lord of Tsushima to send an envoy of congratulation and to have him carry the following presents⁵⁰ to this new king of Korea:

- | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Heavy armor, 500 sets. | 7. Rice, 300 sacks. |
| 2. Light armor, 200 sets. | 8. Salted beans, 100 pounds. |
| 3. Swords, 350 pieces. | 9. Dried sardines, 4 baskets. |
| 4. Halberds, 52 pieces. | 10. Dried Katsuo fish, 7 packages. |
| 5. Spears, 15 pieces. | 11. Various kinds of porcelain ware. |
| 6. Muskets, 23 pieces. | |

Apparently the king of Korea accepted these presents from the ruler of Japan, but sent none in return. However, the envoy sent by the lord of Tsushima received some presents.

In 1748 the king of Korea sent an Envoy of Good Will and Inquiry to Japan bearing the following presents⁵¹ for the shogun, the ruler of Japan who had just come into power:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Jansen (ginseng, a medicinal herb), 50 pounds. | 7. Fish skins, 100 pieces. |
| 2. Light and heavy damasks, 10 rolls each. | 8. Green skins, 30 pieces. |
| 3. White and black hemp goods, 30 rolls each. | 9. Yellow honey, 100 pounds. |
| 4. Unbleached hemp goods, 30 rolls. | 10. Refined honey, 10 jars. |
| 5. Tiger skins, 15 pieces. | 11. Stationery, including 30 rolls of writing paper, 50 writing brushes, and 50 sticks of Chinese ink. |
| 6. Leopard skins, 20 pieces. | 12. Falcons, 20 birds. |
| | 13. Horses, 2. |

The ruler of Japan (the ninth shogun, Iyeshige) sent the following presents⁵² to the king of Korea, in return:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Large six-fold gold-foil screens, 20 pairs. | 5. Silk fabrics, 100 rolls. |
| 2. Lacquer saddles ornamented with gold, 22 sets. | 6. Silk pongee, 200 rolls. |
| 3. Gold lacquer stationery boxes, 5. | 7. Thirteen hundred silver pieces and 900 bundles of cotton for the two envoys and their assistants. |
| 4. Gold lacquer inkstone boxes with complete writing sets, 5. | 8. Sixteen hundred silver pieces for 474 members of the party. |

In 1811, when the king of Korea sent an Envoy of Good Will and Inquiry to congratulate the ruler of Japan (the eleventh shogun, Iyenari) upon his accession to power, he sent the following presents,⁵³ which were only about half the quantity that the kings of Korea had sent to Japan during the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth centuries:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Jansen (ginseng, a medicinal herb), 33 pounds. | 8. Fish skins, 50 pieces. |
| 2. Light and heavy damask, 5 rolls each. | 9. Green skins, 15 pieces. |
| 3. White and unbleached hemp goods, 5 rolls each. | 10. Matting with floral designs, 10 pieces. |
| 4. Black hemp goods, 15 rolls. | 11. Stationery, including 15 rolls of writing paper, 30 writing brushes, and 30 sticks of Chinese ink. |
| 5. White cotton pongee, 25 rolls. | 12. Yellow honey, 50 pounds. |
| 6. Tiger skins, 7 pieces. | 13. Refined honey, 5 jars. |
| 7. Leopard skins, 10 pieces. | 14. Falcons, 10 birds. |

The ruler of Japan (the eleventh shogun, Iyenari) sent the following presents to the king of Korea, in return:

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Gold-foil screens, 20 pairs. | 4. Hemp goods, 100 rolls. |
| 2. Saddles, 10 sets. | 5. Inkstone boxes with complete writing sets, 3 sets. |
| 3. Silk habutai goods, 50 rolls. | |

In the exchange of national presents, it was for Korea to decide what kinds, qualities, and quantities of articles should be sent to Japan in the name of the king of Korea.⁵⁴ In the latter part of the Tokugawa period, the king of Korea gradually reduced the presents to Japan in both quantity and quality. But Japan had no right to complain. From the beginning, it was not the privilege of Japan to make specifications or regulations with regard to the presents. As already stated, the exchange of national presents was a sort of trade between the two governments.⁵⁵ Therefore, when Korea sent fewer articles, Japan might send a correspondingly smaller amount

of presents in return. The exchange of national presents in 1811 clearly illustrates this. Moreover, the sending of an Envoy of Good Will and Inquiry to Japan on the part of Korea, and the receiving of this envoy on the part of Japan, were conducted with diplomatic courtesy, full respect being shown by each country to the other. Even the place where the Korean envoy was to be received in Japan had to be decided upon by mutual agreement. In 1811, with the consent of Korea, Japan changed the place for the reception of the Korean envoy from Yedo, the military capital, to Tsushima in the Korean Channel. Korea, however, was highly displeased at having had her envoy thus entertained in so informal a manner at Tsushima,⁵⁸ and therefore, in 1837, when Iyeyoshi became the twelfth shogun, the question arose between Japan and Korea of how and where the Korean envoy should be entertained by Japan. In 1852, after fifteen years of controversy, a compromise was reached. Osaka, the second largest city in Japan, was selected as the place of reception. That city is situated halfway between Yedo and Shimonoseki, which is the landing place in the Korean Channel. By this new arrangement, the Korean envoy and his party, after having crossed the Korean Channel to Japan, would have to travel about 350 miles inland in order to reach Osaka. At the same time, they would expect to be well entertained at each stopping place throughout their journey. The ruler of Japan, the twelfth shogun, would likewise have to travel about 350 miles from Yedo to Osaka, where he would expect to entertain the Korean envoy and his party at the Osaka palace. The autumn of 1852 was agreed upon by Korea and Japan as the time for the sending and receiving of the envoy. However, by reason of financial stress, and because of a great inundation in 1852, Japan found it impossible to receive the Korean envoy and his party in due style, and therefore requested Korea to postpone the sending of the envoy. From that time on, the question was never taken up again, neither Korea nor Japan taking the initiative. Hence, the Envoy of Good Will and Inquiry who came to Japan in 1811 to congratulate the ruler of Japan (the eleventh shogun, Iyenari) upon his accession to power was the last envoy that the king of Korea sent to Japan during the Tokugawa period. After the custom had been entirely discontinued, the lord of Tsushima occasionally exchanged communications and

presents with the mayors of both the Torai and the Fusan districts in Korea. However, this was done by each party in a private capacity, without either the knowledge or the consent of their respective governments.⁸⁷

In 1868, after the imperial restoration in Japan, Korea refused to recognize the Japanese imperial government. Thereupon, Japan demanded that China define her relations with Korea. China persisted in claiming that Korea was her time-honored dependent state. After having exchanged communications with China a number of times on this matter, Japan finally stated that China had failed to substantiate her claims in Korea and to convince Japan that Korea was a dependent of China. In 1876, Japan forced Korea to acknowledge that she was an independent nation having equal national rights and standing with those of Japan. A treaty of amity and commerce was then concluded between Japan and Korea by the terms of which they recognized each other as nations of equal standing. In that same year, the king of Korea sent Chi-Hsui Chin as envoy to Japan. Thus did a Korean envoy come to Japan in 1876 after the long interval of sixty-five years, no envoy having been sent to Japan since 1811.⁸⁸ The practice of exchanging national presents was likewise renewed. Japan sent a few pieces of field artillery and some rifles. Korea sent presents in return. However, the exchange of envoys between Japan and Korea came to be conducted in a more modern manner, and the exchange of national presents was gradually discontinued.⁸⁹

Occidental historians occasionally make erroneous statements in regard to Oriental history. One of them may be quoted in order to show how Korean-Japanese relations have been treated by them.

"China's claim to control dated from the twelfth century, Japan's from the sixteenth. Indeed, Korea at one time or another had recognized both nations as having sovereign powers, and although she had perhaps favored China's claim, she had nevertheless paid a yearly tribute to the Shogun of Japan until the time Japan began adopting the western civilization."⁹⁰

CHAPTER III

APPENDIX 10

The Imperial Throne and Its Relation to the Nation During the Tokugawa Period: Documents Showing How the Throne Was Financially, Socially, and Politically Placed under the Control of the Shogun

DURING THE PERIOD of the Tokugawa rule, which began in 1603 and terminated in 1867, Japan enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity unparalleled in the history of any other nation. Once started on this period of two and one-half centuries, Japan did not suffer from a single major disturbance, either domestic or foreign. The successful rule of the Tokugawa may be attributed mainly to the adoption and enforcement in Japan of two sorts of policies of absolute seclusion. In the first place, Japan completely cut off its relations with the outside world, thus making it impossible for both the nation and the people to come into contact with foreign nations, especially with Christian nations. In the second place, the Tokugawa shogunate recognized and feared the influence of the throne upon the people.¹ Iyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate, entirely separated the throne and the nation so that the emperor and the people could never come into contact with each other. Therefore, during this long period, the imperial court was completely secluded from the life of the nation. The emperor thereby became a person who might only be known or seen by certain court nobles. In fact, the throne was as completely secluded from both the people and the national life as was Japan herself from the outside world. However, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, conditions began to undergo radical change. Russia, Great Britain, and the United States steadily approached Japan on the Pacific Ocean from different directions and made it impossible for Japan to enforce her seclusion law.² At the same time, Japan entered into the period of her national renaissance. Through intensive studies of her national history and her classics, the power of the throne and the relationship between the emperor and the shogun as sovereign and subject became clarified, reverence for the throne becoming a nation-wide

demand.³ The shogun gradually came to realize that the seclusion of the throne from the people could no longer be maintained.

In 1858, under the strong pressure of Occidental nations, without the imperial sanction and with disregard for the opposition of the feudal lords, the shogun concluded treaties of amity and commerce with the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, and Holland. In June, 1859, the shogunate government was forced to open Kana-gawa, Nagasaki, and Hakodate to the trade of these five Occidental nations. Thus, the time-honored policy of national seclusion was abandoned. On March 3, 1860, Lord Iyi, who was the military regent of the fourteenth shogun, was attacked in broad daylight in the military capital, Yedo.⁴ After a bloody fight in the street, Lord Iyi was pulled out of his sedan chair and beheaded. This practically marked the end of the rule of the Tokugawa. The shogun realized that it would be necessary to recognize in some degree the imperial authority and to pay due reverence to the throne, thereby impressing the people with the fact that Japan was to be ruled in coöperation between the imperial government and the shogunate government. Therefore, in April of the first year of the Ganji era (1864), the fourteenth shogun, Iyemochi, presented a memorial to the throne, proposing eighteen articles in accordance with which national affairs should thereafter be conducted. Because the concessions the shogun voluntarily made to the throne in these articles incidentally explain under what restrictions and regulations the emperor and his court maintained their existence during the Period of Seclusion,⁵ and because through the study of these provisions the relation of the imperial throne to the nation during the Tokugawa period can be readily understood, these eighteen provisions of 1864 are here explained in detail.

(1) "The ruling authority shall be entrusted by the throne to the shogun, the same as it has been heretofore.⁶ However, in the conduct of grave national affairs the shogun shall take action only after having inquired concerning the imperial opinion. The shogun shall pledge allegiance and pay reverence to the throne, thus acting as a subject toward a sovereign and as a lower toward a higher. In all communications and written statements presented by the shogun and his government to the throne and the court, the appropriate terms shall be employed without the slightest variation.

(2) "When, by reason of the death or retirement of the ruling shogun,⁷ his heir apparent shall succeed to the family line and shall therefore be appointed shogun by the emperor, the heir shall immediately go in person to the imperial capital, Kyoto, and express to the throne his acceptance of the imperial appointment, and his gratitude.⁸ Should the newly appointed shogun be less than seventeen years of age, he may send a representative to Kyoto, on the condition that after having reached the age of seventeen he shall himself go to the capital and accept the imperial appointment.

(3) "All the feudal lords, including the heads of the three leading branches of the Tokugawa, as well as the heads of other military families,⁹ whose annual income exceeds 10,000 *koku* of rice, shall, after their succession to the family line, go to Kyoto and pay due homage to the throne, there expressing their grateful acceptance of the title or rank conferred upon them by the throne.¹⁰

(4) "The feudal lords in western Japan may be allowed, if they so desire, to enter Kyoto and stop there in order to pay homage to the throne, both on their way from their home districts to Yedo, the military capital, and on their way back from Yedo to their home districts.¹¹ However, under no circumstances should the feudal lords be allowed to stay in Kyoto for more than ten days.¹²

(5) "Henceforth, it shall be arranged for the emperor to make two journeys each year—one in the spring and the other in the autumn—to certain places in the District of Yamashiro, provided these places are not far from the imperial capital at Kyoto.¹³ The purpose of these journeys shall be the payment of homage by the emperor at various Shinto shrines.¹⁴ However, it is to be hoped that they may be conducted in a simple and informal way, so that the people may not be inconvenienced and burdened unnecessarily by reason of the imperial journeys.

(6) "Henceforth, certain provisions shall be made for the imperial family¹⁵ so that the imperial princes and princesses may not necessarily be required, as they have been in the past, to enter a Buddhist temple or nunnery, thus becoming Buddhist priests and nuns, shaving their heads and remaining unmarried throughout their lives.¹⁶

(7) "The birthday of the emperor shall henceforth be observed as a national holiday. On that day, no criminals shall be executed—just as has been the practice on the birthday of the shogun.¹⁷

(8) "The anniversary days of the deaths of the imperial father and of the imperial mother shall be observed as days of national abstinence, in the same way as are the anniversaries of the deaths of the members of the family of the shogun.¹⁸

(9) "On the days of mourning of the imperial court, the sentences of all criminals shall be suspended, as is customary on the days of mourning of the shogunate government.¹⁹

(10) "When the emperor announces the suspension of the court on account of the death of the imperial prince or of the state minister of the imperial court, the people shall be instructed not to hold music-and-dancing parties or to engage in other forms of noisy entertainment, the same as they are required to do on days when the shogun suspends his military court.²⁰

(11) "The people shall be instructed neither to use nor to write in their documents the character that the emperor has adopted for his personal name unless it be written in accordance with a specified form—in the same manner as is the character adopted by the shogun for his personal name.²¹

(12) "In compliance with the imperial request of the preceding year, at the beginning of the present year (1864) the annual provision for the national temple at Ise (where the imperial ancestress, the Sun Goddess, is installed) shall be increased by 2000 sacks of rice per year.²²

(13) "The burial grounds of the imperial family in the Senyu Buddhist temple shall henceforth be carefully attended to, especially with regard to the daily sweeping, weeding, and upkeep of the grounds.²³

(14) "All the feudal lords shall henceforth be instructed to present annually to the throne one or two of the local products of their respective districts. In the event, however, of famine or other catastrophe, these presents may be made but once in five years.²⁴

(15) "The men in charge of the imperial dining room and the kitchen in the palace shall be instructed to improve the imperial diet by using carefully chosen materials.²⁵

(16) "Military families whose annual revenue ranges from 3000 to 10,000 *koku* of rice shall be instructed to send their military men by turns as guards of the nine gates of the imperial palace. [One *koku* of rice equals 4.96 bushels.]²⁶

(17) "Within the next two years, not later than 1866, the Gishu Gate of the imperial palace shall be replaced by a gate of grander style, and the grounds surrounding it shall be greatly improved."²⁷

(18) "The northeastern part of the imperial grounds shall be extended so that the imperial flower gardens as well as the residences of the retired emperors and other buildings may be materially improved."²⁸

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Tokugawa shogunate had outlived its usefulness, and its downfall after a rule of more than two and a half centuries was a matter of course.²⁹ However, the abandonment of the policies of seclusion was apparently connected directly with the end of the Tokugawa rule. In 1858, Japan was reopened by concluding treaties of amity and commerce with several Occidental nations. In 1864, by establishing harmonious relations between the imperial court and the shogunate government, the shogun made it possible for the feudal lords and for the heads of other military families to approach the throne. In 1867, finding his position untenable, the shogun surrendered all ruling authority to the throne, thus completing the imperial restoration. The national life was thus renewed, and Japan of the present day came into being.

The downfall of the Tokugawa shogunate, which had ruled Japan for 264 years, occurred nine years after the abandonment of the policy of national seclusion and four years after the abandonment of the policy of imperial seclusion.

CHAPTER IV

APPENDIX 11

Shoin Yoshida's Plan for the Founding of Greater Japan

SHOIN YOSHIDA was born in August, 1830, and died at the age of twenty-nine years. His life, though brief, was eventful. He was a man of great patriotism and an outstanding imperialist. Moreover, he was a man endowed with personal magnetism. For his opposition to the policy of the shogunate government, he was arrested and imprisoned a number of times. While in prison, he always expounded his national and expansionist doctrines, and he converted to his views not only his fellow prisoners, but also the prison guards and officials. In 1854, when Japan was confronted by the problem of how to deal with the demand of the United States that Japan should be reopened, and with the problem of suppressing the nation-wide opposition to the possible abandonment of the time-honored seclusion policy, Shoin decided that international affairs could not be conducted satisfactorily without actual knowledge of conditions in Occidental nations—despite the fact that he was himself opposed to foreigners and very conservative. On March 29, 1854, Shoin and a friend secretly boarded the flagship of Commodore Perry's fleet, which had just entered the Bay of Shimoda. They earnestly petitioned, in vain, to be taken to the United States. Because in those days it was a national crime in Japan for Japanese to sail to foreign countries, Shoin and his friend were arrested and imprisoned.¹ While confined in the prison at Noyama, Shoin wrote his famous book, *Yushu-Roku* ("A Prisoner's Memoir"), in which he outlined a plan for the expansion of Japan. In 1856, Shoin was discharged from prison on parole. About half a year later, he founded a private school, which was known as the *Matsushita Sonjuku* ("Village Institute at Matsushita"). For two and one-half years he was sole owner and master of this small village school, which comprised but two rooms, twelve and fifteen feet square, respectively. Small as it was, this school of Shoin's is revered as the sacred hearth of the founders and organizers of New Japan. In the course of its brief existence, most of the promising young men who

later distinguished themselves as organizers of New Japan received there an education that inspired them with nationalism, patriotism, and loyalty.² These included Kido, who later became one of the three founders of New Japan; Ito, the "Father of the Japanese Constitution"; Yamagata, the founder of the modern Japanese army; Yamada, the founder of the present judicial system of Japan; and Shinagawa, the founder of modern industry in Japan. After the Sino-Japanese War, when Japan had completed the first stage of her imperial expansion, Ito composed a short poem in which he eulogized Shoin, saying, "He taught us nationalism, loyalty, and *Bushido* ethics with divine inspiration. Most of our leaders who have distinguished themselves by serving the throne are persons who have come from the Matsushita School."³

Because of an offense that he committed against the Tokugawa shogunate, Shoin was beheaded in October, 1859. In November, 1882, a shrine, Shoin Jinsha, was built and dedicated to his divine soul: thus he was deified.⁴

The outline of Shoin's plan for expansion was as follows:

"The sun rises or otherwise sets. The moon likewise waxes or otherwise wanes. The nation is destined to decline unless it advances and flourishes. Therefore, those who know how to look after the welfare of their country should not be satisfied with maintaining and protecting that which their country already has, but at the same time should aim to reform and improve upon that which their country already possesses. They should also strive to gain and add that which their country has not, thereby extending the power and glory of the nation beyond its borders. Present-day Japan should first of all complete her military preparations, by building the necessary battleships and by providing herself with all sorts of military weapons and ammunition. Then she should develop and colonize Yezo and entrust its rule to worthy feudal lords. At her earliest opportunity, Japan should occupy Kamchatka with an army and place the Sea of Okhotsk under her sole control. Liu Chiu [otherwise known as Lu Choo or as Ryu Kyu] should be instructed to make her king come in person to pay homage to Japan so that he and his kingdom may pay reverence to Japan as do all the feudal lords in the homeland. Japan should upbraid Korea for her long negligence in the observation of her duty to Japan, and have her

send tribute-bearing envoys, and Japan should also instruct Korea to give hostages to Japan for her good behavior, as she did during the glorious imperial period of ancient Japan. In the north, Manchuria should be sliced off [from China for the benefit of Japan]. In the south, Japan should receive [take under her control] Formosa and the Philippines. In this way, Japan should demonstrate her policy of expansion to the outside world. We should always look after the welfare and interests of our people. At the same time, we should raise and train our fighting men to meet the needs of the nation. Then our country and the far-off lands in our possession will be well guarded and protected. By pursuing these policies, Japan may go forth into the world and proclaim that she is able to maintain her national standing. If a nation in this struggling world should be surrounded by nations of aggressive inclination and should remain inactive, she would certainly be destined to decline and become obscure.”

Toward the close of the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi planned and even actually undertook to conquer Korea, Manchuria, and China, and to place Liu Chiu, Formosa, and the Philippines under the rule of Japan. In the latter part of the eighteenth century (1798), Toshiaki Honda advocated the national expansion of Japan and proposed that the national capital should be moved to Kamchatka, and that a second, fortified, capital for defensive purposes be established on the island of Sakhalin, thus making of Japan a great imperial power that might rival China and Russia. Shoin Yoshida should not be credited as the originator of expansion; his proposal was merely a combination of plans previously formulated by Hideyoshi and Honda. However, the greatness of Shoin lay in the fact that in the middle of the nineteenth century, while Japan was at a crisis, when both the government and the people centered their energy upon the solution of the problem of meeting the demand of the United States with regard to the opening of the nation, and at the same time of maintaining the time-honored seclusion policy, Shoin alone quietly studied the future possibilities and outlined a plan of expansion by means of which Japan might become a great world power.

Three-quarters of a century after Shoin, Japan had fulfilled his prediction.

1. Yezo, which was known as "The Land of Bears and Ainus," had been colonized and developed. It is now a source of great national wealth and is regarded as a part of Japan proper, being known as Hokkaido.⁶

2. Formosa was annexed to Japan as a result of the Sino-Japanese War, and under the rule of Japan it has been developed into a very prosperous island.⁷

3. The Liu Chiu Islands and Korea, which Shoin hoped would become states tributary to Japan, are now integral parts of the Japanese Empire.⁸

4. With the founding of Manchukuo and the subsequent creation of the new Manchu Empire, China's power therein has been overthrown and the ascendancy of Japan established, most of the important government positions in the Manchu government being held by Japanese under the appointment of the Manchu emperor.

5. Kamchatka has not yet been occupied by Japan. However, Japan has completely established her fishery rights in the Sea of Okhotsk and, in fact, has extended them far beyond these districts into the Bering Sea.⁹

6. The Philippines came under the rule of the United States, years after the Sino-Japanese War. Therefore, Japan turned her course of expansion toward the Straits Settlements, Java, and India, where she established so great a trade that the British and Dutch governments, by taking advantage of their ruling authority therein, have practically declared a trade war. Japan has also gained a mandate over a group of islands in the south.

In 1917, Horace Coleman translated into English Shoin's plan for the national expansion of Japan and published it in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Japan*. Shoin wrote in the classical Chinese language. Because of insufficient knowledge of Japanese or Chinese, Coleman made serious errors in his translation. He mixed up the Philippines, the Liu Chiu, the Ryu Kyu, Okhotsk, the Kuriles, Yezo, and Hokkaido. Furthermore, the Liu Chiu, which are also known as Ryukyu and as Luchoo, were described by Coleman as two different groups of islands situated in far-off places. Coleman translated Shoin's description of Luzon and several other islands as Luchoo, when it was really a description of the Philippines. Thus Coleman describes the islands, the area of which is

114,400 square miles, as a small group with an area of 950 square miles.

The translation by Coleman of Shoin's plan for the national expansion of Japan reads as follows:

"He advocated the opening of Hokkaido and the establishing of clan lords there, the taking of Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands, and advising the Lord of Ryukyu to attach them to Japan; to compel the Koreans to pay tribute to our own country as in former times; to take a part of Manchuria; and to take Formosa and the Luchoo Islands and gradually show an aggressive tendency."¹⁰

APPENDIX 12

Sanai Hashimoto's Plan for the National Expansion of Japan

SANAI HASHIMOTO (1834-59) was a contemporary of Shoin Yoshida (1830-59). Because of a grave offense against the Tokugawa shogunate, Sanai Hashimoto was beheaded at the age of twenty-four, on the same day and at the same place as was Shoin Yoshida. Though he died so young, Sanai Hashimoto is still regarded as one of the greatest scholars and statesmen that Japan has ever had.

Shoin and Sanai were two preëminent men in Japan in the middle of the nineteenth century. In fact, they distinguished themselves as the only persons of their time who had the foresight to take up the problem of national expansion, a question that had never so much as been thought of by their contemporaries. There are, however, marked differences between Shoin's plan and that of Sanai. Shoin's plan savored of a prophecy which showed in what directions and to what extent Japan might expand. Sanai proposed and formulated the course that Japan should pursue in her expansion and in the advancement of her national prestige in the world at large.

The plan of Sanai Hashimoto was as follows:

"The question of how Japan may be able to maintain her existence as a power and claim proper standing among the nations of the world may be solved satisfactorily provided she should annex the Santang districts in Manchuria, together with the whole of Korea, and extend her territorial possessions to India and to

America. However, Japan has remained in seclusion for so many centuries and has reappeared in the world so late that to undertake such a course at present would not be possible, as all available territory has already been mapped out and occupied by the leading powers. India is now under the rule of the British; the aggressive policy of Russia has met with success in the Santang districts in Manchuria. Moreover, present-day Japan is not prepared to take up arms against Occidental nations and engage in wars that might last for years. The sole course that is now open to our nation is to form an alliance with one of the great European powers on the one hand, and on the other to cultivate friendly relations with America and to place our national reliance and trust in her. The conflicting interests and the steadily increasing enmity of Great Britain and Russia, the two great European nations, will not permit of their coexistence as powers in the Orient. Japan should take advantage of this situation and should make one of these powers her ally. I am strongly inclined toward Russia. Great Britain is both tricky and more aggressive and takes unjustifiable steps. Moreover, she is self-centered. Russia is more trustworthy, and she is our neighbor, her borders adjoining those of Japan. If we should show a readiness to coöperate in a military way with Russia, she would recognize our friendship as being of great value and would make ample return by giving us needed assistance in international affairs. Therefore, we should prepare ourselves to be ready to reply in the negative if Great Britain should go to war with Russia and should ask us to render military coöperation or to permit temporary occupation by her of either Yezo or Tsushima as a military base. If our nation should offend Great Britain by rejecting either of these requests, she might invade Japan. We should be ready to accept the challenge with confidence. If we should be obliged to go to war single-handed with so powerful a nation as Great Britain, a great national disaster might result. On the other hand, if we should engage in war with Great Britain with the military support or even the moral support of Russia, though we might be defeated, yet we would not be reduced to the condition of a vassal state of a victorious nation. At any rate, whether we should gain the victory or should suffer defeat, such a war with Great Britain would be a turning point in our nation, and it would make it possible for us to rise as one

of the great nations of the world. A nation can only attain glory and prosperity after having risked her existence and having successfully passed through great national crises. Nevertheless, before going to war for the purpose of raising her national prestige, Japan must undergo a complete reformation. She must have well-trained armies and navies. In order to carry out all these national aims, we must invite to our country men of knowledge and experience from Russia and from America and place ourselves under their guidance. First of all, we must establish amicable relations with Russia. This can be done by showing our trust in her and appreciation of all assistance rendered to us. We should send a special envoy to Russia, thus showing courtesy and respect. The diplomatic relations thus established between our country and Russia should neither be disturbed nor interfered with by a third nation. This can only be effected by showing great trust in America and reliance upon her. . . . On the whole, we must regard America as our national defense in the East. The nations in Europe are but far-off friendly states. Above all, we must trust in Russia and regard her as a nation inseparably belonging to our family. After our national prestige and safety shall have been thus assured, we may pursue an aggressive course with regard to the smaller states in Asia situated near us."¹¹

Because Sanai Hashimoto prepared this plan for the national expansion of Japan when the Opium War was taking place, Great Britain was then known to the Japanese as a nation which had forced China to buy poisonous opium, and then, because of a dispute over the opium, had appealed to arms, causing the destruction of cities and loss of human life in China. Because of this aggressive warfare, Great Britain was regarded in Japan as a self-centered, scheming, and dangerous nation. Sanai therefore naturally advocated the forming of an alliance with Russia instead of with Great Britain.¹² However, his plan was to form an alliance with either Great Britain or Russia as the first and most essential step that Japan should take in order to gain a recognized standing among the nations of the world and therefrom to undertake national expansion. Therefore, with the growth of Japan, whether to form an alliance with Great Britain or with Russia became a vital national problem. Toward the close of the nineteenth century, when Russian aggression in China and Manchuria became apparent and

threatened the interests of both Japan and Great Britain, thus making it imperative for them to take joint action for the protection of their interests, the national opinion in Japan was divided.¹³ Some leaders insisted that because Russia was a neighbor, Japan should enter into an alliance with her. Other leaders insisted that Japan should form an alliance with Great Britain and check Russian aggression in Asia. Such prominent elder statesmen and diplomats as Ito and Inouye strongly advocated the forming of an alliance with Russia,¹⁴ while on the other hand such rising young statesmen and diplomats as Katsura, Komura, and Kato were strongly inclined toward the formation of an alliance with Great Britain.¹⁵ This grave national problem, which had been originated by Sanai, was not definitely settled until the Emperor Meiji indicated an inclination toward Great Britain, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded on January 30, 1902.¹⁶

APPENDIX 13

The Population of Japan, with Special Reference to Its Abnormal Character During the Seclusion Period of the Tokugawa Rule

DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD of about four hundred years of the Kamakura and Ashikaga rules, no census or official estimate of the population of Japan was undertaken; hence, Japan today has no sources of material on which to base an estimate of the population of the early feudal period. Consequently, a noted statistician, Yoshikiyo Yokoyama, took as a base the number of counties and other geographical units that existed during the period of 148 years ending in 1333 and estimated the population of Japan of those times to have been 9,750,000 on an average.¹ Togo Yoshida, a distinguished historian and geographer, arrived at the conclusion that there was a definite relation between the population and the quantity of rice (the staple food of Japan) consumed annually. He therefore carefully studied and estimated the quantity of rice produced in Japan during the Tensho era (1573-91) and, taking as a base the quantity of rice consumed annually by each individual, estimated the population of Japan during the Tensho era to have been approximately 18,000,000.²

In the year 1600, the greatest and most decisive battle in the feudal period was fought at Sekigahara. In consequence of his complete victory, Iyeyasu became the undisputed master of Japan. Thus was the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate completed.³ With the beginning of the Tokugawa rule, Japan entered upon a new national life and enjoyed an undisturbed period of peace of 264 years. In this period, Japan, for the first time in her history, saw her population grow at a regular and rapidly increasing rate. The causes of this increase of population were the following: (1) Iyeyasu, in order to insure lasting peace to the nation, enforced a nation-wide limitation of armaments so as to forestall a recurrence of domestic and foreign wars; hundreds of thousands of men who in preceding centuries had continuously engaged in warfare and had risked their lives then became heads of families, ambitious to be surrounded by their children. (2) With peace came improvement

and advancement in agriculture, industry, and commerce. This made it possible for most families to increase in size. (3) Because Iyeyasu had made trade expansion a national policy, with the increase of foreign trade and the economic strength of the nation the Japanese became more and more ambitious. The ever-increasing

TABLE 6

DATA FROM CENSUS RECORDS OF THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD

Domains of	Population	Year	Increase in population	Average increase per 1000
Lord Mayeda.....	551,750 576,734	1720 1732	12 years: 24,980	3.77
Lord Shimazu.....	260,961 339,955	1698 1732	34 years: 78,994	15.66
Lord Ikeda.....	185,043 207,215	1686 1706	20 years: 22,172	5.34
Lord Todo.....	252,061 284,126	1665 1690	25 years: 32,065	4.52
Lord Hachisuka.....	208,880 385,751	1665 1688	23 years: 76,863	10.82
Lord Nambu.....	245,635 306,142	1669 1703	34 years: 60,507	5.81

population found ready outlets and established trade settlements on a large scale in various foreign lands.⁴

During the early Tokugawa period, no nation-wide census was taken. However, some of the leading feudal lords, in compliance with the suggestions of the shogun, had started to take censuses and had kept the records of census returns in perfect condition. Table 6 gives an abstract⁵ of the census registration kept by some of those feudal families.

In taking these censuses, children under two years of age were omitted.⁶ During the early Tokugawa period, that is, throughout the seventeenth century, the population of Japan increased rapidly

and regularly; but in the beginning of the latter part of that century the rate of increase gradually decreased. Then, throughout the eighteenth century, the population of Japan became so dense that the economic situation left no room for further increase. Thus, during the first half of the Tokugawa period the population of Japan grew continuously at an unusually rapid rate, and in the second half it remained almost stationary.⁷ In some years the population actually decreased; in others, it increased scarcely enough to make up for the decrease of the preceding years. On the whole, throughout the entire second half of the period the population of Japan remained at 26,000,000 on the average, according to official census figures for the classes included.⁸

During the second half of the Tokugawa rule, the national census was taken systematically at regular intervals. All records of the census returns, the census registrations, and the methods and regulations of census taking, as well as the Tokugawa policy regarding the control of the population and the rulings governing population distribution in the city and country districts, are still extant. Therefore, the population problems and conditions of Japan during the second half of the Tokugawa period can be investigated and discussed on the basis of authentic materials.⁹

In the sixth year of the Kyoho era (1721), Yoshimune, the eighth Tokugawa shogun, decided to make a nation-wide estimate of the population of Japan. In compliance with his request, in the summer of the same year, the shogunate government issued an instruction to all the ruling authorities of various ranks in the provinces and districts under the direct rule of the shogun, as well as those of the feudal lords, and requested them to report in written form the numbers of habitations of all kinds in their respective geographical units, and the numbers of farmers, merchants, artisans, and religious workers and persons of other classes.¹⁰ Family employees and domestic servants were not included. The government instructions further stated that in order to make written reports of the population of the various classes of people mentioned above, it was not necessary to take new censuses. New and old records of the population, kept in the offices, might be used. Nevertheless, all duplications were to be avoided and pains taken not to overlook any class of people. The number of people officially estimated,

whether in this year or in preceding years, might be used in the required report. However, if this was done, it was required that the date on which the estimates had been made should be clearly mentioned, with a statement that this number of people was the one actually reported in a given year. In the report, an explanatory note was to be made showing the lowest age limit of persons enumerated—indicating that children under a certain age were omitted in the estimate. The instruction to omit employees and servants from being counted among the national population was to be applied to those working in military families only.

In the spring of the eleventh year of the Kyoho era (1726), the shogunate government issued its second census instructions. (1) In order to make a written report of the population of farmers, merchants, religious workers, priests, and nuns, and people of all other classes in various provinces and districts, the census of their respective populations should be newly taken that year.²⁴ The new population figures thus obtained should alone be used in the required report. (2) The census might be taken at any time between April and November (an explanatory note should be given, stating the month in which the census was taken and the minimum age of children included in it). (3) All employees and servants in the military families might be omitted from the census. (4) Henceforth, in every sixth year, Ne-doshi and Uma-doshi (the first year and the seventh year of the sexagenary cycle), the census should be taken regularly. In every census year, this work had to be attended to in strict adherence to these rulings.

In the third year of the Kanyen era (1750), and also in the first year of the Bunka era (1804), the following additional instructions were issued by the shogunate government: (1) The census of the population in the various provinces and districts should be newly taken in every census year by the ruling authorities therein. The census work should be completed within the period beginning in the spring and ending in November. In December, all census materials should be written up systematically in the form of a pamphlet and forwarded to the shogunate government. (2) Children under fifteen years of age might be excluded from the census by the ruling authorities of the census districts. (3) All the people in Yedo, Kyoto, Osaka, Nagasaki, and other specified cities, as well

as in the specially privileged districts under the control of the shogun and of Buddhist and Shinto institutions, should be included in the census taking. (4) All employees and servants in the military families, and all individuals who had no means of independent existence and had to depend upon others, were to be excluded from the census roll.¹²

During the period of 125 years beginning in 1721, when the

TABLE 7
POPULATION OF JAPAN UNDER THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE

Year	Male	Female	Total population
1721.....	26,056,425
1726.....	26,548,998
1732.....	14,407,107	12,514,709	26,921,816
1744.....	26,153,450
1750.....	13,818,654	12,099,176	25,917,830
1756.....	13,833,311	12,338,919	26,172,230
1762.....	13,785,400	12,136,058	25,921,458
1768.....	26,252,057
1774.....	25,990,451
1780.....	26,010,600
1786.....	25,086,466
1792.....	24,891,441
1798.....	25,471,033
1804.....	25,517,729
1816.....	13,427,245	12,194,708	25,621,953
1828.....	14,160,736	13,040,064	27,200,800
1834.....	27,063,907
1846.....	13,854,043	13,053,582	26,907,625

shogun Yoshimune decided to estimate the population of Japan, and ending in 1846, when the last national census of the Tokugawa period was taken, eighteen national censuses were undertaken, that is, approximately one in every six years.

Table 7¹³ includes the population of Japan estimated by local authorities under the supervision of the shogunate during the Tokugawa rule.

The estimate announced by the shogunate in 1721, giving the population of Japan as 26,056,425, was not the result of a formal census. The ordinance of 1721 regarding the national population

stated that the local authorities were not required to make new special estimates of the population in order to make official reports, but that they might use the numbers of the current year or of preceding years which were kept in their official records. This means that the population of Japan announced by the shogunate in 1721 consisted of the population of certain districts in 1721 and likewise of the estimated population of other districts in 1720 or in earlier years.¹⁴ In fact, in 1721 the census-system regulations were not put into operation. It was in 1726 that the shogunate government definitely decided that certain stated years were to be census years and required that the census be taken in certain stated months therein. Therefore, the estimate of population made in 1726 was the first national census taken during the Tokugawa period. This being so, seventeen censuses, rather than eighteen as is generally believed,¹⁵ were taken during the second half of the Tokugawa rule.

As already indicated, the population figures estimated during the Tokugawa period did not include people of all classes in Japan. In the first place, because of the strict observance of traditional usages and sentiments, certain classes and certain types of people were entirely omitted. As a result, more than 2,000,000 people were systematically excluded from the census rolls. Because the census was taken at different times in the same year, the estimate of the national population lacked a uniform standard. Also, errors crept in because the census rules were drafted in too general a manner. However, the census regulations issued by the shogunate had certain other fixed principles which had to be strictly observed, as a result of which the census takers could not make arbitrary and imaginary estimates. Consequently, those census returns which were officially recognized and adopted by the shogunate as the national estimate of population are of sufficient accuracy and reliability to be used as a base for purposes of discussion and study.¹⁶

If we compare the population of Japan estimated during the period of 120 years ending in 1842, taking the population in 1726 as the base, we can readily see the abnormal conditions existing throughout this second half of the Tokugawa rule. In the seventeen census returns, the population increased as compared with the population in 1726 in only four census years, namely, 1732, 1828, 1834, and 1846. In all other census years, the population decreased

as compared with the population in 1726. Furthermore, in comparing the population in 1828, which was the maximum during the second half of the Tokugawa rule, with the population in 1726, it can be seen that the increase during a period of 102 years was only 651,802.¹⁷ This means that the average annual rate of population increase was only 0.24 per 1000. On the other hand, in comparing the population in 1792, which was the minimum during the second half of the Tokugawa rule, with the population in 1726, it can be seen that the decrease of the population of Japan in the brief space of sixty-six years was as much as 1,657,557. On the whole, we can say that during the entire period of the second half of the Tokugawa rule the population of Japan remained practically at a standstill, maintaining its average approximately at 26,000,000, shifting irregularly from 25,000,000 to 27,000,000, in round numbers.¹⁸

However, it is statistically and historically wrong to assume that the average population of Japan during that particular period was 26,000,000, because, as has been previously stated, various classes of people had always been excluded from the census rolls.

In the first place, all members of the imperial family and of the families of the court nobles, as well as of the shogunate family, of the families of the feudal lords and of the samurai, and of other military families, together with all employees and dependents, were omitted. The population thus excluded is estimated to have been at least between 1,250,000 and 1,750,000.¹⁹

According to the shogunate census regulation, whether to include children under the age of fifteen years in the census rolls was left to the discretion of the local feudal governments. Although, according to the statistical records, only a few local governments omitted all children under the age of fifteen, it was the prevailing practice to omit children born in the census year. Sometimes a number of local governments excluded all male and female children who had not attained the age of two years in the census year. The number thus omitted is estimated to have been about 750,000. All classes of people known by the name of *Hinin* ("Not-Human-Beings"), including pariahs, beggars, outcasts, vagrants, prostitutes, and those without fixed domiciles, were omitted. The number thus excluded is estimated to have been about 333,000.²⁰

If a demographer were to estimate the vital statistics of population during the second half of the Tokugawa rule solely upon the official census returns during that period, his findings would be 26,000,000 on the average. However, if he should make the same effort, taking into consideration the fact that all the people who belonged to certain classes and to certain particular types had always been omitted whenever the census was taken, he would find that the actual population might be fairly obtained by adding from 2,000,000 to 3,000,000 to the assumed population. That is, the average population during the second half of the Tokugawa rule should be considered to have been about 29,000,000, with a variation from 28,000,000 to 30,000,000.²¹

To assume the population of Japan during the eighteenth century to have been either 26,000,000 or 29,000,000 on the average is a mere statistical problem. However, why and how the population thus remained almost at a standstill, whereas during the first half of the Tokugawa period it increased at abnormal rates, is a puzzling population question, as well as a remarkable occurrence in Japanese history.²²

The causes of the decrease may be regarded as twofold. (1) Luxury and extravagance became general because of the long period of peace. Then, in consequence of financial difficulties and of ever-increasing tax rates, together with the frequent promulgation and enforcement of laws encouraging thrift, the people became less active and more and more conservative in their business activities. With the accompanying decline and impoverishment of agriculture, the people became more and more indigent. These national conditions resulted in a general desire for families of smaller size.²³ (2) Throughout the Tokugawa rule, almost all the financial burden was placed on the shoulders of the farmers. They were regarded as the main source of revenue. However, the agricultural class, which had patiently suffered hardships, gradually came to envy the freer and easier lives of the people in the cities and began to long for city life, and in the eighteenth century there was a shift of population from the farming districts to the large, prosperous cities.²⁴ A result of this change was that the farmers, who had been independent taxpayers and food producers, became dependents of the city people or petty mongers and food consumers. Young men in

the farming districts who once had prospects of having families of their own became hand-to-mouth men and remained unmarried. As a rule, they gave themselves up to the low, immoral life of the cities. With abandoned and uncultivated arable land increasing in consequence of the depopulation of the villages, the government came to feel keenly a steady reduction of national revenue. Both the shogunate and the local feudal governments devised, in the second half of the eighteenth century, various plans to remedy the threatening economic and social situation. They adopted a sort of quota system by which they instructed the village governments to allow only certain proportions of the village populations to migrate to the city districts. The shogunate government also adopted and enforced the *Hito Kayeshi Ho* ("Policy of Sending Agricultural Deserters in the Cities Back to Their Former Farmlands"), with the guarantee of all possible financial and material assistance and protection.²⁵

However, these government plans and devices failed to bring about the desired results. Therefore, throughout the second half of the Tokugawa rule the drift of population to the cities became a problem that seriously involved the national welfare.²⁶ Also, during this period, Japan was frequently visited by great famines and epidemics, thus causing a further decline of population. Three great famines in the Kyoho era, in the Temmei era, and in the Tempo era were so catastrophic that the decrease of population attributed to starvation, infanticide, and abortion during the second half of the Tokugawa rule might be rightfully attributed to them. Of famines and epidemics, the former were the more destructive as causes of the depopulation. They also brought about a retardation of the population for an appreciable time afterward.²⁷ An immense number of deaths from starvation was a direct result of the famine;²⁸ and physical weakness among the survivors, on account of the lack of supplies, was an indirect result. However, the destructive power of epidemics was only temporary. The healthier and stronger people survived. The numbers of the working class diminished, but wages increased and food supplies were adequate. The economic condition of the nation became strengthened thereby.²⁹ The nation, as a rule, had greater recuperative power after an epidemic than after any other natural catastrophe.

In striking contrast, famines always had lasting destructive power, which did not, as a rule, terminate with the end of the famine. After famines, the nation continued to suffer from depopulation. The people could not raise and maintain large families, because of their weaker physical condition. These facts are true for the second half of the Tokugawa rule. In comparing the national census returns of 1786 with those of 1780, it can be seen that the population during the six years was decreased by 920,000.³⁰ In comparing the census returns of 1792 with those of 1786, it can be seen that the national population had decreased during that time by 200,000, in round numbers. Thus, during the twelve years under consideration Japan had lost in population to the extent of 1,120,000. This depopulation was caused by the two great famines in the third and in the seventh years of the Temmei era (1783 and 1788). Likewise, it can be seen that a reduction in population of 770,000 took place in the six years ending in 1744. A further drop of 156,000 took place again in the twelve years ending in 1846. These declines were respectively attributed to the great famines in the seventeenth and eighteenth years of the Kyoho era (1732-33) and the seventh and eighth years of the Tempo era (1836-37).

Some writers have said that the practice of pederasty was one of the causes of the depopulation during the second half of the Tokugawa period.³¹ It is an undeniable fact that in certain provinces in Kyushu the practice of this unnatural vice was a prevailing custom. Also, in Buddhist temples and in rich military families boys and youths noted for their beauty were employed under the name of "personal attendants." In large cities, such as Yedo, Kyoto, and Osaka, with the full recognition of the government, many houses of ill fame existed for the special purpose of pederasty. In the second half of the eighteenth century, at Yedo, the shogun's capital, twelve different special districts were assigned for houses of catamites. It is said that one of the prosperous houses always kept as many as a hundred boys and youths. The fact that ladies in waiting in the shogun's court were accustomed to patronize some of those houses for sexual purposes fully evidenced the fact that the inmates in those brothels were not only mere boys of tender years, as it was generally believed, but included young men as well. Therefore, catamites, who were subjected to and practiced pederasty,

undoubtedly lost opportunities of becoming fathers. Hence a retardation of population was certainly caused by the prevailing practice of this unnatural vice during the Tokugawa period. Nevertheless, there are even today no reliable sources of information through which to ascertain exactly how much the population was thereby decreased.

Out of all the causes of depopulation during the second half of the Tokugawa rule, the absolute seclusion of Japan was the greatest and most lasting.³² It forced the Japanese to stay at home; and the balancing of population and the production of food in Japan became a serious question. Restriction of the population was the natural outcome. When the nation starved, not even a single bushel of rice or of any other grain could be imported. Hence, besides death from starvation, there was infanticide. During the Temmei era (1783-88), when Japan suffered from the greatest famine, the practice of infanticide became nation-wide. Even after the famine, this crime was extensively committed in the belief that it was a simple and practicable way to reduce families to the desired size.³³

On the whole, throughout the second half of the Tokugawa rule, the necessity for the restriction of population was nationally recognized. Therefore, abortion and infanticide were unhesitatingly practiced in city and country districts and among both the higher and lower classes of people,³⁴ including even the high and rich military families of samurai rank. On the whole, to have families of small size was steadily becoming a national habit. During the Genroku era (1688-1703), in the latter part of the first half of the Tokugawa rule, the poor as well as the rich had still maintained large families, their numbers ranging from five to eight.³⁵ However, by the middle of the eighteenth century, that is, half a century later, ideas had undergone radical changes: parents had no desire to raise more than two or three children.³⁶ Although rich and prosperous families sometimes had three children, families in the farming districts made it almost a standing rule to raise only their first-born child and to dispose of others at birth. In certain districts, parents who had raised two or three children were regarded as lacking in courage and common sense.³⁷

As a rule, abortion was the method adopted in the cities, and infanticide was practiced mostly in the agricultural districts.³⁸ In

order to bring about abortion effectively, one or other of the following methods was generally adopted: (1) injection of poison by means of a specially prepared long, slender needle; (2) the use of an internal medicine prepared for expectant mothers by specialists; (3) the repeated practice of a sort of operation, consisting mostly of hand manipulation and massage; and (4) the use of proprietary medicines procurable from druggists.³⁹

At that time, obstetricians and midwives were regarded as practitioners of abortion instead of assistants in childbirth. Soon there arose a great number of abortion specialists, styling themselves "Chujo School Physicians."⁴⁰ It is said that their professional signs were hung in prominent places in the cities. Most of them had extensive practices. Some became so rich that they practiced usury in addition to medicine. Drug stores in large cities displayed large gold-painted signs reading, "Jiyu-Gan [freedom pills] sold here."⁴¹ Expectant mothers were assured that they could be freed from bearing children without suffering any ill effects.

The agricultural term *Mabiki* ("Thinnings") was used to define, in a general way, various methods of infanticide.⁴² *Mabiki* did not mean to dispose of weaker children for the sake of stronger children, nor to dispose of illegitimate children to cover the shame and disgrace of their unwed mothers. *Mabiki* was practiced by disposing of the second, third, and later-born children in order to be able to give better care physically and economically to the first-born child, by disposing of female children in order to give better care to the male children, and by disposing of twins and triplets, which were traditionally called "beastlike births," in order to hide the family disgrace.⁴³

In Japan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries preventives were not known. This was because medical science was still in its infancy and nothing of this kind had yet been produced. Furthermore, the Japanese in those days preferred the other methods of birth control. *Mabiki* was carried out immediately after a child was born, without letting it see the light.⁴⁴ It was believed that the infant had to be sent from darkness to darkness. The infant was killed by forcing rice bran down its throat. Sometimes it was crushed to death by placing it under a man's knee or under the family millstone. Sometimes it was strangled. Rarely, it was buried

without anyone's troubling to see whether it was alive. If a mother died in childbirth, the infant was buried alive in the mother's coffin, with the belief that the souls of the mother and child would console each other in the future world.⁴⁵ Undeniably, infanticides were committed and abortions were brought about in extremely inhuman and brutal ways, in the second half of the Tokugawa rule. Yet they were not problems to be dealt with merely as questions of morality or humanity; they were grave national problems.⁴⁶

In the eighteenth century, Japan came to feel keenly an increasing shortage of food. The question of how to adjust the population to the food-producing power of the nation caused the Japanese to discuss seriously the restriction of population. In consequence of the isolation of the country from the trade of the world, national industries and economic conditions were greatly harmed. The financial strength of Japan was undermined. How to balance the family budget became a grave problem to people of all classes. Therefore, the disposal of the second, third, and later-born children for the sake of the first-born, and thereby to restrict the family to the smallest possible size, was considered practicable and simple. On the whole, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Japan and the Japanese were struggling for the existence of the nation and the perpetuation of families by following any way open to them.⁴⁷ Although the government did not approve, yet it had to tolerate and even to give tacit consent to this nation-wide practice.⁴⁸

In Japan, the shogunate and all local feudal governments maintained their existence by depending upon the land tax, this having long been the main source of the national revenue. It had been traditional in Japan to regard farming as the foundation of the nation.⁴⁹ Therefore, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the decreasing depopulation and the increasing extent of devastated and uncultivated areas in agricultural districts came to be regarded as of grave national importance.

Tomita village, in the province of Kazusa, which in the beginning of the eighteenth century had 196 families and a total population of more than 1000, was reduced in 1855 to a small village of 112 families and a total population of 517. According to the records kept in certain parts of this village, in 1858 twenty-six children were born and only thirteen survived.⁵⁰ Fourteen of the twenty-six births

were of first-born, and of these ten survived. The remaining twelve were the second, third, and later-born children, of whom only three survived. This shows that the death rate of the first-born children was 25 per cent; that of the second, third, and later-born children, 75 per cent. If those who died by reason of abortion should be added, the death rate of the later-born children would show itself to have been far greater.

The shogunate and the local feudal governments fully appreciated the seriousness of this national condition and devised and adopted various plans with the hope of wiping out the vile and brutal practices of abortion and infanticide.

As early as the third year of Seiho (1646), within a decade after the initiation of national seclusion, the shogunate issued an ordinance prohibiting men and women from displaying professional signs with the purpose of engaging in abortion.⁵¹ In August, 1680, and again in June, 1686, the shogunate government issued a law by the provisions of which all the physicians who had caused the deaths of expectant mothers through abortion were to be sentenced to solitary confinement in their homes,⁵² and a few months later, another, providing that all women physicians who had caused the deaths of expectant mothers were to be put to death. Thus the laws against abortion were made more strict and severe. In the Tempō era (1830-42), the shogunate strictly prohibited women physicians and midwives from engaging in the practice of abortion.⁵³ The offenders, as well as all accomplices, were to be arrested, and due punishment meted out to them. In the third year of the Tempō era (1832), the lord of Hyuga issued an exceedingly strict law, with a view to stopping abortion and infanticide entirely. The law contained the following provisions: (1) All women were required to report to the local government of their respective communities within five months after conception and to place themselves under charge of the proper officials. Offenders, and their parents, were to be put to death. (2) Neighbors knowing the condition of an expectant mother who had neglected to report to the government, but failing to notify the local authorities, were to be imprisoned for life. (3) Midwives and physicians who performed abortions were to be put to death.⁵⁴

Thus various laws and ordinances prohibiting inhuman acts

were issued. However, the framers of the laws did not inquire into why and how abortion and infanticide had become nation-wide practices. They did not sympathize with the people who loved their infants and who knew just as well as did the government that the killing of infants was a serious crime, yet who took action because of pressing economic and food conditions. The shogunate and the local feudal governments, without tracing and removing the causes of the national troubles or setting forth any remedies for them, were determined to exercise their authority by prohibiting the acts and inflicting severe punishment upon the offenders. However, because these inhuman practices had become so deeply rooted, the laws and ordinances brought none of the expected results. Government was practically forced to tolerate the prevailing national practice because the nation could not obey the laws and survive.⁵⁵

The shogunate and local feudal governments at the same time began to pursue passive and even compromising policies. As early as July, 1663, the lord of Aizu instructed his government to issue the following requests to the people:

"It is not the desire of our lord to promulgate a law the provisions of which would inflict punishment upon the mass of the people who destroy their newborn infants.⁵⁶ His command to the government is to instruct all the people to be always sympathetic and thoughtful with regard to children. If any of you should fail to respect this noble desire of our lord, and if reports of your inhuman acts thus committed should reach him, it would cause him great regret and grief. Therefore, the government hereby requests you, the mass of the people, to fulfill, immediately and strictly, the noble desire of our lord and cease to stray from the humane and righteous way."

This instruction of the lord of Aizu indicates that in the second half of the seventeenth century the policy of dealing with offenders began to change. Although the special laws of the early period still remained in force, and others of a similar nature were continually being issued, yet they were generally unenforced. The shogunate and local feudal governments then began to send spirit-rappers, teachers of Confucianism, and Buddhist priests noted for their eloquence, to certain parts of Japan to preach on subjects of human welfare, especially emphasizing all possible consequences of the

crime of infanticide.⁵⁷ The various governments also adopted a sort of subsidy system and supplied rice and money to the families into which infants were born. They had several methods of subsidizing; but there was one standard rule that was universally observed: subsidies were never granted to first-born children. This step was taken because there was no danger that the first-born child would be sacrificed. The granting of subsidies was often decided upon by taking into consideration the financial and social standing of the families. On some occasions, subsidies were granted exclusively to families in the farming districts or to people of the poorer class.

According to official records, during the Kansei era (1789-1800) several of the deputy offices of the shogunate granted to all children who were born in the respective villages under their control monetary subsidies at the following rates: (1) one *bu* in the month in which the child was born; (2) two *shu* every month throughout the first year; (3) two *shu* every month during the following four years.⁵⁸ (A *bu*, which was equal to one-fourth of a *ryo* [dollar], had a monetary value of twenty-five cents. A *shu* was equal to one-fourth of a *bu*. It had a monetary value of one-sixteenth of a *ryo*.)

Although no special explanations were given, yet it is believed that these monetary subsidies were granted generally to all children except the first-born.

In 1790, the lord of Shirakawa instructed his government to grant monetary subsidies to all children, excepting the first-born, at the following rates: two *bu* were given to all children in the first month and in the twelfth month in the years in which they were born.⁵⁹ In 1797, the amount of the monetary subsidy was increased from two *bu* to one *ryo*.

In 1832, the Nihonmatsu local government decided to give a garment annually to each child under ten years of age, with the exception of the first-born.⁶⁰ Monetary subsidies were also granted annually at the following rates: two *bu* to the third-born child, three *bu* to the fourth-born, one *ryo* to the fifth and to later-born children, eight *ryo* to twins.

Hoyei Takahashi, a noted economist, wrote a book in 1825 in which he estimated the minimum living expenses in raising children during the first fifteen years in the following ways: the first year, 6 *ryo*; the second, 12; the third, 19; the fourth, 27; the fifth, 38; the

sixth, 50; the seventh, 65; the eighth, 83; the ninth, 114; the tenth, 130; the eleventh, 161; the twelfth, 198; the thirteenth, 243; the fourteenth, 296; the fifteenth, 361.⁶¹ If expenses for clothing and other needs, social and public, are added to these minimum expenses, the total amount of money that the parents had to spend in raising one child up to fifteen years was 1000 *ryo*. Therefore, such monetary subsidies as 2 *bu*, 1 *ryo*, and 2 *ryo*, that were granted by the government to each of the children during a period of four or five years, were practically useless undertakings.

In the ninth year of the Horeki era (1759), the local government of the lord of Tosa issued the following official instructions:

"It is a matter of great regret that such inhuman practices as *Mabiki* have long existed among our people, who, by reason of extreme poverty, have found themselves in great difficulties in raising several children.⁶² They have disposed of them immediately upon their being born, sometimes even while in the mother's womb. This practice has gradually been extended to families that would have had no difficulties in raising children.

"It has now become a nation-wide practice that is committed by people of all classes without either hesitation or shame. This is an act that is practiced by persons who dare to disregard the laws and teachings of Heaven and who have no humanity. You, the people, are hereby warned and instructed not to stray from humane and righteous ways."

In August, 1823, the government again issued instructions, as follows:

"During the past several years, our people who are extremely poor, and who have found it difficult to raise many children, have disposed of infants either immediately after birth or while still in the mother's womb.⁶³ This custom has gradually been extended to families that have had means enough to raise more children. In 1759, the government instructed you to refrain entirely from these inhuman acts. Nevertheless, the government has been frequently informed that people, with the pretension of having still-born children, have continued to indulge in this vile practice. You, the people, are hereby required henceforth strictly to adhere to the instructions of 1759 and not to stray from the humane and righteous way."

These government instructions of 1759 and 1823 clearly indicated the changing tendency of Japan in dealing with offenders who committed abortion and infanticide. During the second half of the eighteenth century, the government, instead of inflicting severe punishment upon the offenders, began to appeal to the consciences and to the religious faith of the people and requested them to coöperate with the government in ceasing from these inhuman and unwholesome practices. At the same time, the government adopted the new subsidy system and endeavored to check the practice of infant murder.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, in addition to the monetary subsidy, a system of rice subsidies was introduced. It was in the fourth year of the Temmei era (1784) that the lord of Shirakawa originated the granting of a sort of rice subsidy and instructed his government to grant one sack of rice annually to all the families that had raised five or more children.⁶⁴ Usually, a sack of rice contained two and one-half bushels.

In 1787, the government of Lord Nakamura adopted the rice-subsidy system in a more definite and substantial manner.⁶⁵ It granted the subsidy to all classes of people, including the military families, allowing for each newborn child one sack of rice each year for a period of seven years from its birth. In 1799, this subsidy system was revised, the grant having been greatly increased at the following rate:

The third-born child was allowed two sacks for the first year and one sack annually for the following four years; the fourth-born child, four sacks for the first year and two sacks for each of the following six years; the fifth-born child, five sacks for the first year, three sacks annually for two years, and two sacks annually for five years; twins, twelve sacks annually for three years.

In 1814, the Nihonmatsu local government adopted the following rice-subsidy system: The first-born child, none; the second-born child, one sack; the third-born, three sacks; the fourth-born, three sacks; the fifth- and later-born, four sacks; twins, five sacks each in the third month of the first year and three sacks annually for the following four years.⁶⁶

The government of the lord of Shinjo allowed rice subsidies exclusively to poor families, taking into consideration the degree of

poverty, in the form of three kinds of grants: (1) three sacks, five sacks, and seven sacks for a period of three years; (2) one sack annually for three years, two sacks annually for the first two years, and one sack for the third year; (3) three sacks the first year and two sacks annually for the following two years.⁶⁷

Thus, during the second half of the Tokugawa rule, in order to prevent *Mabiki*, two kinds of subsidies, one in the form of money and the other in the form of rice, were given. Some of the governments allowed the rice subsidy only and others allowed a monetary subsidy, while quite a number of local governments, including the deputy governments of the shogunate, allowed both rice and monetary subsidies. However, the rice subsidy predominated. Although different quantities of rice were granted, a grant of three sacks of rice annually during a period of three years was the system most widely adopted.⁶⁸ As for the working of these rice subsidies, some might say that they were failures; others, that they were in some degree a success.

Hoyei Takahashi carefully studied what part the rice, the national staple food, constituted in the daily diet in Japan and investigated the average quantity of rice consumed by children, youths, and grown-up persons for each month. He then declared that in the eighteenth century an adult required at least 270 sacks of rice annually to maintain himself.⁶⁹ Therefore, the few sacks the governments granted in their subsidy system were entirely inadequate to make any material assistance to needy families in raising their children.⁷⁰

Shinyen Sato (1769-1850) criticized the rice-subsidy policy, saying that it was human nature for parents to love their children and to protect them from injury and harm.⁷¹ However, at the same time, it was an undeniable fact that the people had long practiced infanticide. They had taken this step because of difficulty in obtaining food and other necessities. Government officials made no efforts to develop and advance agriculture in order to make it possible for the people to obtain food, and thus to remove the cause of the pressing national difficulty.⁷² The officials made merely superficial studies of these grave national problems. Sometimes they promulgated severe laws threatening offenders of inhuman acts with severe punishments. Sometimes they granted rice subsidies, allowing

such nominal grants as three sacks for three years—nine sacks in all. One can readily see that these nine sacks of rice for the raising of children were but a drop in the bucket. Some families might raise additional children and receive therefor rice subsidies from the government. Nevertheless, they raised those children with family means of their own and not with the rice granted by the government. There were innumerable poor families which, because they had no family means, nor were able to find it possible to raise additional children with the government grants alone, concluded that the best and most practicable thing was *Mabiki* and disposed of newborn children immediately after birth, not seeking the government rice grant.⁷⁸ Sato concluded his findings by saying that the rice subsidy was a most ineffective and wasteful undertaking.⁷⁴

Toshiaki Honda (1744–1821) held quite a different view. He apparently believed that the rice-subsidy system might be adopted as a temporary plan to meet emergencies, provided it was conducted in a more efficient way. He acknowledged that *Mabiki* and abandonment of arable land had long been lamentable.⁷⁵ He then argued that the national welfare and population conditions were inseparably related, the latter always being a source of national power and strength.⁷⁶ Therefore, on political and economic counts, the government had to hold the maintenance of the population at a desirable rate of increase as a fundamental national policy. Honda devised a rice-subsidy system of his own and said that expectant mothers should be placed under the custody of local government officials and two sacks of rice should be granted to them annually for fifteen years after the birth of children.⁷⁷ He further planned to develop agricultural and industrial undertakings greatly, so that with the increase of population the nation might correspondingly increase its production of food and other necessities.⁷⁸ Honda declared that the population of Japan should be increased about twenty times in the next thirty-three years.⁷⁹ The Japanese could then no longer remain in isolation.⁸⁰ They would have to develop all the districts near the homeland, establishing colonies and settlements. Japan also would have to open herself to the trade of the world. Thus Honda concluded his findings by advocating that the reopening and national expansion of Japan would be the best solution of her population, food, and economic problems.⁸¹

In December, 1930, Eijiro Honjo, a scholar of note in the field of economics, published a book entitled *Jinko oyobi Jinko-mondai* ("Population and Population Problems [of Japan]"). In writing it, he availed himself of all standard works, such as those on economics, statistics, geography, history, and the national statutes, as well as magazine articles, documents, and manuscripts. He used an elaborate and careful footnote system, indicating the sources and origins of all his findings and statements. He devoted the greater portion of his book to dealing with the population problems of Japan during the Tokugawa period. This is the most authentic and valuable work on the subject. In preparing Appendix 13 to the present work, the writer has drawn freely from Honjo's book.

NOTES TO DOCUMENTS—CHAPTER I

APPENDIXES 1-6

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- ²² Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 479.
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- ²⁵ Kondo, *op. cit.*, vol. 8, p. 75.
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- ³¹ Yoshida, *op. cit.*, vol. 6, pp. 137, 139. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 247-48, 271. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 489.
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- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 185, 257, 272.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 272-74. Kondo, *op. cit.*, vol. 21, p. 201.

- ³⁹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 274-75, 292.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 276-77. Okuma, *Kaikoku Taisei-Shi*, p. 212. Kondo, *op. cit.*, vol. 21, pp. 202-03.
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- ⁴³ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 498. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 13, pp. 283-84, 285-86.
- ⁴⁴ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 498. Okuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-17.
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- ⁴⁷ Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 498.
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NOTES TO DOCUMENTS—CHAPTER II

APPENDIXES 7-9

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APPENDIX 10

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² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, vol. 25, pp. 12, 401.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. i-iii, 402, 404. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 732-34, 736.

⁴ Kuroita, *Kokushi no Kenkyu*, pp. 861-62. Hagino, *op. cit.*, pp. 793-94.

⁵ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 795.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 798. Ihara, *Tokugawa Jidai Tsushi*, pp. 817-18.

⁷ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 797.

⁸ Prior to 1864, at the time of the appointment of a shogun the emperor always sent his envoy and party to Yedo, the military capital of the Tokugawa shogunate. The envoy traveled thence from Kyoto, the imperial capital, the distance being about four hundred miles. Upon reaching Yedo, the imperial envoy conferred the title of shogun upon the heir of the former shogun, in the name of the emperor. Thereupon, the new shogun gave a grand reception to the envoy and his party, requesting that his acceptance of the imperial appointment be conveyed to the throne. In this way, the head of the Tokugawa family always received the imperial appointment while dwelling at a place that was four hundred miles distant from the throne. Before 1864, the shoguns never visited the imperial capital; neither did they pay reverence to the throne in person, either before or after appointment as shogun. Therefore, although the emperor was the ruler and the shogun was a subject, they never met each other. The shogun had absolute ruling power, and the emperor was in fact but a pensioner who had been deprived entirely of both social and political power. This situation ob-

tained until 1864, when the shogun voluntarily agreed to present himself at the imperial court to receive his appointment directly from the emperor, thereby rendering due reverence to the throne.

⁹ Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 797.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 801-02.

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¹⁸ Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 866. Hagino, *op. cit.*, p. 797.

¹⁹ Hagino, p. 798. Ihara, *op. cit.*, p. 866.

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- ⁴ Fukumoto, *op. cit.*, pp. 897-902. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, p. xii. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 539.
- ⁵ Uyemura, *Dai-Nippon Shiso Zensho* (Complete Work on the Thought of Japan), vol. 17, pp. 219, 225-26. Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-92. Education Association of Yamaguchi Prefecture, *Yoshida Shoin Zenshu* (The Complete Work of Shoin Yoshida), vol. 1, p. 596.
- ⁶ Sato and Yamasaki, *Dai-Nippon Chishi*, vol. 9, pp. 490, 753-54.
- ⁷ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 582. Appendix V, pp. 33-36.
- ⁸ Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 582-83. Kida, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-80. Appendix IV, pp. 26-33. Appendix VI, p. 36.
- ⁹ Hidaka, *Kyokuto no Shikan-to-Keirin*, pp. 328, 372-75.
- ¹⁰ *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan* (September, 1917), vol. 45, part 1, p. 161.
- ¹¹ Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, pp. 393-95. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 539. Heibonsha, *Dai-hyakka-Jiten* (The Universal Encyclopedia), vol. 20, p. 632.
- ¹² Tokutomi, *op. cit.*, pp. 395-96.
- ¹³ Ishii, *Gaiko Yoroku* (Memoirs of My Diplomatic Life), pp. 53-60.
- ¹⁴ Tokutomi, *Seijika Toshita Katsura-Ko* (Prince Katsura as a National Statesman), pp. 114, 117-19, 121.
- ¹⁵ Ito, *Kato Komei Den* (Life of Komei Kato), vol. 1, pp. 662-66.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 666, 668.

NOTES TO DOCUMENTS—APPENDIX 13

- ¹ Honjo, *Jinko oyobi Jinko-mondai* (Population and Population Problems [of Japan]), pp. 7-9, 12-14, 15-16.
- ² *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 16.
- ³ Kuroita, *Kotei Kokushi no Kenkyu*, vol. 3, pp. 357, 359, 366-67.
- ⁴ Tsuji, *Kaigai Kotsu Shiwa*, pp. 481-541, 582-91. Honjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-48. Hagino, *Nippon-shi Kowa*, pp. 637-39.
- ⁵ Honjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-46.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.
- ⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 49, 62.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39, 42. Ihara, *Tokugawa Jidai-Tsushi*, p. 453.
- ⁹ Honjo, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-23. Japan: Department of Justice, *Tokugawa Kinrei Ko* (Compilation of the laws and interdicts of the Tokugawa rule), vol. 6, pp. 515-24. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, p. 484.
- ¹¹ Honjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-22, 37, 41-42.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23, 27-30.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39. Droppers, "The Population of Japan in the Tokugawa Period," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, vol. 22, p. 206.
- ¹⁴ Honjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, 20, 26.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 19, 37.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 30.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39, 42-43.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 25, 38-39, 43, 69, 70-71.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25, 39, 40-41.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 39, 42, 44-46.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 42.
- ²² *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 49, 62, 69, 158.
- ²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49, 110-11.
- ²⁴ Honjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 75-77, 79, 85, 121, 160.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 80, 87, 169-70.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83, 89-108, 161-62, 171-72.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 54. Droppers, *op. cit.*, pp. 281-82. Heibon Sha, *Dai-hyakka-Jiten*, vol. 5, p. 16; vol. 16, p. 631. Takekoshi, *Nippon Keizai-Shi* (Economic History of Japan), vol. 3, pp. 539-41; vol. 8, pp. 229-30.
- ³² Honjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49. Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-99. Kuroita, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 388, 425-26. Tokutomi, *Kinsei Nippon Kokumin-Shi*, vol. 14, pp. 471-76, 479.
- ³³ Honjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 110, 116.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 112-13.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 111.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 113.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 115.
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 113, 116.
- ⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 115-16, 120-21.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.
- ⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 113-14, 116, 119.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 111, 114, 119.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 114-15.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.
- ⁴⁶ Honjo, *op. cit.*, pp. 174, 176.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-11.
- ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 120.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 87, 121, 161, 170.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 117-18, 122.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 116.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 122.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 145-46.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 146-47.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 146, 174, 176-78.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 130.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 127, 132-33, 142, 147, 172.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 122-24.
- ⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.
- ⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 181-82.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 144.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 145.
- ⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 126.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 132-34.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-39.
- ⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-44.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 148-49, 173, 177.
- ⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 183.
- ⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-78.
- ⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 176, 178.

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 176-77.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-10.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 149-60.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 175-76.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. KUROITA, KATSUMI. *Kotei Kokushi no Kenkyu* (Research in the National History of Japan, complete revised edition; Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1931-36), 3 vols.

Since 1918, when Kuroita published the results of his research in the national history, his has become a standard historical work in Japan. However, Kuroita was not satisfied with it, and therefore decided to revise it completely and to enlarge it. In 1931, he published Volume I of the revised edition, 524 pages; in 1932, Volume II, 530 pages; and in 1936, Volume III, 580 pages. Notably, he has given clear, concise statements concerning his research findings, and not lengthy and tiresome accounts. Also, he has given complete lists of standard historical documents, magazine articles, and other valuable publications as source materials on every historical account and national event, thus making it possible for readers to make extensive researches of their own.

In my work, both the old and the revised editions have been used. *Kokushi no Kenkyu*, with volume numbers, indicates the revised edition; the same title without the volume numbers refers to the old edition.

2. KOKUBU, TANENORI. *Dai-Nippon Gendai-Shi* (History of Great Japan in the Present Generation; Tokyo, Hakubun-Kan, 1909), 1950 pp.

This is a history of present-day Japan, beginning in the eighteenth century when Russia and Great Britain began to make advances in the Orient, gradually gaining great power therein, and ending with the rise of Japan as a world power in consequence of her successful war with Russia. It deals with the national development and undertakings of Japan, and discusses in detail the relations of Japan with both Oriental and Occidental nations. The author also gives the essential features of all the treaties and agreements into which Japan entered with other nations. Although Kokobu's history is not of prime importance, yet, because it was written clearly and systematically, it is useful for purposes of verification.

3. KONDO, KAMEKI. *Shiseki Shuran, 21 Satsu* (A Compilation of Rare Historical Works and Documents, Vol. 21; Tokyo, Kondo Press, 1918), 264 pp.

Kondo's work consists of thirty-two volumes. Volume 21, written by Morishige S. Kondo, contains all the state papers exchanged between Japan and foreign nations. The most valuable part of the volume contains the government papers and personal letters of the Tokugawa shoguns and the kings of Korea. When Morishige S. Kondo wrote his work, he enjoyed the special privilege of access to the archives of the Tokugawa shogunate, and hence was in a position to use all the state papers that Japan sent to foreign nations and all the state papers that Japan received from other countries, especially from Korea during the seclusion period. This book contains state documents that cannot be duplicated in works of other nations.

4. KURONO, YOSHIBUMI. *Nichi-Ro Kotsu Shiko, 1792-1854* (Accounts of International Relations Between Japan and Russia, Beginning in 1792 and Ending in 1854; St. Petersburg, 1891), 63 pp.

Complying with the requests of Russian authorities, Kurono read thirty-six Japanese books, took from them all accounts of relations between Japan and Russia, and verified these through Russian sources. He was thus enabled to compile this book.

5. KURONO, YOSHIBUMI. *Nichi-Ro Joyaku-Shu, 1855-1875* (Compilation of All

the Treaties and Agreements Concluded and Exchanged Between Japan and Russia, Beginning in 1855 and Ending in 1875; St. Petersburg, 1892). 98 pp.

Kurono, under the instructions of Russian authorities, compiled from the Japanese texts all the treaties and agreements concluded and exchanged between Russia and Japan prior to 1875.

6. KONDO, MORISHIGE SEISAI. *Gaiban Tsusho* (State Papers Exchanged with Various Foreign Nations; Tokyo, Kokusho Kankō-Kai, 1905), 27 vols.

The original work was published about 1810, when the author was Superintendent of Archives of the Tokugawa shogunate. By reason of its great value, it was reprinted in 1905. It contains all the state papers and national documents that the Tokugawa shoguns and their officials sent to Korea, China, Annam, Siam, Cambodia, Cochin China, Holland, the Philippines, Macao, New Spain, and England, as well as some of the replies from those nations.

7. FUJITA, MOKICHI. *Bunmei Tozen-Shi* (History of Civilization in Its Advance Toward the East; Tokyo, Hakubun-Kan, 1894), 175 pp.

Fujita was a noted journalist but not a historian. However, he was greatly impressed with the work of the Catholic Church in Japan in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in this history of pamphlet size he emphasized how Catholicism had been introduced into Japan in the middle of the sixteenth century, how in a little more than half a century it had become a dominant religion in Japan, to which millions of Japanese had been converted, and why, as a result, Japan finally found it necessary to enter upon the seclusion period.

8. HIDAKA, NINIHIKO. *Kyokuto no Shikan-to-Keirin* (Historical Events and National Undertakings in the Far East; Tokyo, Senshin-Sha, 1931), 421 pp.

Hidaka first briefly explains how Russia and England succeeded Spain and Portugal as powers in the Orient, thereby threatening the interests of China and Japan, and then he explains the rise of the United States and France in the Orient. He recounts how, with the ascendancy of Japan after her reopening, Russian interests came into conflict with those of Japan, and made victims of Korea and China. Finally, he discusses all the essential features of international affairs in the Far East from the Russo-Japanese War to the creation of Manchukuo.

9. INABA, IWAKICHI KUNZAN. *Shincho Zenshi*. (A Complete History of the Imperial Manchu Dynasty; Tokyo, Waseda Univ. Press, 1914), 2 vols.

In this history, Inaba has described how the Manchus founded their empire in Manchuria, and why and how the Manchu ruler, in the middle of the seventeenth century, was invited by a Chinese general to go to Peking with a large military force and thus to establish the ruling dynasty in China. Inaba has also described how, finally, the "boy emperor" surrendered the throne to the Chinese people and advised that they establish a republican form of government, and how in the beginning of the twentieth century the Republican Government made national pledges to provide millions of dollars each year for the retired emperor and to respect him as if he were an emperor of a foreign nation. Inaba has shown in a clear and scholarly way how the Manchus had successfully ruled China. He has also emphasized the fact that under the Manchu Dynasty China had made great progress in her national development while at the same time she had been embroiled in foreign and domestic wars. In writing this history Inaba availed himself of both Chinese and foreign materials. His work is recognized as the most reliable of its kind. A Chinese scholar who considered the work a most important history translated it into Chinese. It is widely read in both China and Japan.

10. *Jiji Nenkan* (Jiji Year Book, 1919-).

In Japan, all the leading newspapers publish yearbooks. The Jiji Year Book is the most reliable and comprehensive. In Japan, it is comparable to the *World Almanac* in the United States. Under ordinary circumstances, people of all classes, including scholars, depend upon it as a reference. This yearbook is published by the *Jiji Shimpo* (newspaper), which was founded by Yukichi Fukuzawa, the "Father of Modern Japanese Civilization."

11. KOKUSHI KENKYU-KAI (Association for Research in the National History of Japan). *Ashikaga Jugodai-Shi* (History of the Ashikaga Period During the Rule of the Fifteen Shoguns; Tokyo, Daido-Kan, 1912), 404 pp.

Throughout the entire rule of the Ashikaga, Japan was in her dark age. However, in the course of these 250 years many notable national events took place. Japan entered into close relations with China. She also came into contact with Occidental civilization; Christianity and firearms were introduced. Her social and military conditions underwent radical changes. It was also in this period that cities and towns began to spring up and the foundations of the arts and industries of modern Japan were laid. This history affords clear and concise descriptions of these rapid changes in the life of Japan. It is a reliable piece of work.

12. OKUMA, SHIGENOBU. *Kaikoku Taisei-Shi* (The Reopening of Japan, and Her National Tendencies; Tokyo, Waseda Univ. Press, 1913), 1229 pp.

Okuma was one of the most distinguished statesmen of Japan. He founded Waseda University, of which he became the first president. In the latter part of his life he decided to devote himself to writing a history on the reopening of Japan, and invited statesmen who had been co-workers in the founding of New Japan and prominent members of the faculty of his university to work with him in his undertaking. The book here named was completed under his supervision. The commencement of the work dealt with the discovery of Japan in the sixteenth century. Then followed accounts of the coming of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and British, together with the development of trade and the propagation of Christianity; then, full accounts of the entrance of Japan into the Period of Seclusion in the seventeenth century; and finally, a detailed account of the arrival of envoys from Occidental nations seeking trade privileges. The book ended with an account of the reopening of Japan in the nineteenth century and the national tendencies then obtaining. Having faith in the values of his source material and confidence in his staff of co-workers, Okuma was certain that his book was most reliable. He planned to have it translated into European languages, but unfortunately he died before accomplishing his ambition.

13. OMORI, KINGORO. *Dai-Nippon Zenshi* (A Complete History of Great Japan; Tokyo, Fuzan-Bo, 1929-31), 3 vols.

Omori is a scholar of repute in Japanese history. In response to the public demand, he has written a general history of Japan, of three large volumes, each containing eight or nine hundred pages. Although this history is not remarkable in any one particular, it is a most reliable and satisfactory general work. Within the eight years ending in 1931, eight editions of it were printed.

14. REKISHI-CHIRI GAKKAI (The Learned Society of the History and Geography of Japan). *Rinji-Zokan, Rekishi-Chiri Chosen-Go* (Special Korean Historical-Geographical Number of the Magazine *Rekishi-Chiri*; Tokyo, Sansei-Do, 1910), 311 pp.

Rekishi-Chiri has been for the past forty years the official magazine in which Japanese historians publish their special articles. In November, 1910, two months after the annexation of Korea, this Korean number was published. More than

twenty scholars contributed to it. Although it is a magazine supplement, it is a book of good size, and gives reliable information on the relations of Japan and Korea, both ancient and modern.

15. SATO, DENZO, and YAMASAKI, NAOKATA. *Dai-Nippon Chishi* (Geography of Great Japan; Tokyo, Hakubun-Kan, 1903-15), 10 vols.

This is the most complete and reliable geography of Japan. It consists of ten volumes, each of which contains more than 1000 pages. It describes the general geographical features, and gives archaeological, traditional, and historical accounts of each province, something with regard to the local government and educational and religious conditions, and full accounts of the development of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, industries, mining, and commerce, together with other useful statistics. The authors enjoyed the coöperation of more than a score of scholars who were authorities in their special fields. The book sheds light on numerous mooted geographical matters. With regard to Sakhalin, it gives the following definite and authentic information. Even as early as the beginning of the Christian era, the existence of Sakhalin was known to the Chinese. During the seventh and eighth centuries, the local chiefs sent envoys to China by way of the Amur district. Meanwhile, Sakhalin was entirely unknown to the Japanese. Its existence was first recorded in Japanese accounts in the middle of the seventeenth century. Toward the end of the seventeenth century, Japanese officials began gradually to take an interest in Sakhalin.

16. TAKAKUWA, KOMAKICHI. *Toyo Rekishi Shokai* (Detailed Historical Accounts of the Orient; Tokyo, Kyoritsu-Sha, 1928), 1036 pp.

In writing this Oriental history, Takakuwa uses China as the pivotal nation, and hence gives a full historical account of China, from her beginnings to the present. Although historical accounts of Annam, Burma, India, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Manchuria, and of other Asiatic nations are also given, special stress is put upon their diplomatic and military struggles with China, emphasis being laid on causes and effects. The expansion of Russia, Great Britain, France, and other Occidental nations is touched upon concisely and clearly.

17. TAHOBASHI, KIYOSHI. *Kindai Nippon Gaikoku-Kankei Shi* (History of the Diplomatic Relations of Present-Day Japan; Tokyo, Toko Shoin, 1930), 720 pp.

Although the title refers to "present-day Japan," the book deals principally with the relations of Japan with Russia, beginning in the seventeenth century, when Russia began her advance on the Asiatic continent, and ending in the middle of the nineteenth century, when Russia advanced southward toward Japan, thus bringing the two nations into close contact. Tahobashi, in writing this book, used all obtainable Russian and Japanese source materials. Furthermore, he spent a number of years in Siberia, Kamchatka, and the surrounding districts. He actually observed and learned the geographical conditions, thus identifying and verifying accounts given in the sources. At the end of each chapter he has supplied numerous notes detailing Russian, Japanese, and other source material. Few books can duplicate the accuracy and thoroughness of this one.

18. TOKUTOMI, ICHIRO (pseud., SONO). *Sekigahara Yeki* (The Sekigahara Campaign; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1923), 692 pp.

This is the eleventh volume of Tokutomi's history, *Kinsei Nippon Kokumin-Shi*. Here the author describes the rapidly changing conditions in Japan after the death of Hideyoshi, the main content of the volume being a description of how the military men and national leaders were divided into two factions. He also gives an account of why and how the Battle of Sekigahara was fought and how the life of Japan was thereby changed into a new national life; and, of course,

an account of how Iyeyasu, through his political and military maneuvers, won a decisive victory in this battle, thus making himself Hideyoshi's successor.

19. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Osaka Yeki* (The Osaka Campaigns; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1923), 623 pp.

This is the twelfth volume of Tokutomi's history. The author describes how Iyeyasu forced war upon Hideyori, Hideyoshi's only son, whom he had pledged to serve and revere as master of the nation, and how he destroyed Hideyoshi's family. The book includes a full account of the moral and political conditions in Japan during the military age.

20. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Iyeyasu Jidai Gaikan* (A General View of the Iyeyasu Period; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1924), 295 pp.

This is the thirteenth volume of Tokutomi's history. Here, the author has carefully set forth the personality and attainments of Iyeyasu as a man of great military genius and a statesman of rare constructive ability. He has also described how firmly Iyeyasu laid the foundations of modern Japan and those of the Tokugawa shogunate, thereby making it possible for Japan to enjoy peace and prosperity for the succeeding 250 years; and Iyeyasu's ambitions and achievements toward making Japan one of the world's great trade centers.

21. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Sakoku Hen* (A Book on National Seclusion; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1924), 599 pp.

This is the fourteenth volume of Tokutomi's history. The author used all available documents and material, and describes in a scholarly way how Japan was forced to adopt its policy of absolute seclusion. He first gives the causes of the Christian uprising at Shimabara, and tells how rigorously the Seclusion Law was enforced after the suppression of that rebellion, and how Iyeyasu's ambitious plan of national expansion by means of trade was abandoned.

22. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Tosei Hen* (A Book on National Control by the Tokugawa Shogunate; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1924), 662 pp.

This is the fifteenth volume of Tokutomi's history. Here he sets forth how skillfully and painstakingly the Tokugawa shogunate enforced the policy of national seclusion in dealing with the throne, the imperial court, and the "300" feudal lords, and how rigorously the terms of the provisions were enforced when the Tokugawa shogunate had been completely organized, at the time of the third shogun, Iyemitsu.

23. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Shiso Hen* (A Book on the Changes in the National Thought; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1924), 622 pp.

This is the sixteenth volume of Tokutomi's history. It describes the reaction which gradually came with the rise of the Tokugawa to power: how men of intellectual attainments began to study the national organization, taking the throne as the center; and how reverence for and loyalty to the throne began thus to grow again.

24. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Seiji Hen* (A Book on the Tokugawa Administration; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1924), 628 pp.

This is the seventeenth volume of Tokutomi's history. It describes how firmly and completely the Tokugawa shogunate was established at the time of the fifth shogun, Tsunayoshi: the old Tokugawa policy of destroying powerful feudal families, under one pretense or another, and of creating new and weaker feudal families was practically discontinued, and hence the safe existence of the feudal families was assured; they naturally lost ambition, and their sole efforts were bent on how to gain the good will of the shogun and thereby to maintain family prosperity. Tokutomi describes the shogun as a ruler with absolute power

whose will and desire was the law of the nation. He further describes how Tsunayoshi, nicknamed the "Dog Shogun," gave dogs preferential treatment over human beings, and how during more than a score of years the Japanese people suffered under this shogun's "dog policy." The book shows particularly how the Japanese, under the Tokugawa administration, came to gain their characteristic of absolute obedience to the government.

25. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Horeki Meiwa Hen* (A Book on New National Tendencies During the Horeki and Meiwa Eras: Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1926), 509 pp.

This is the twenty-second volume of Tokutomi's history. In it, Tokutomi discusses how the intellectual Japanese gradually came to comprehend the abnormal political condition of their nation. Takenouchi, who lived in the Horeki era, was greatly grieved over the fact that the masses revered the shogun and held him in awe as the ruler of the nation with absolute ruling power, and even forgot the existence of the emperor on the throne. He therefore planned a peaceful reformation and advocated that the emperor and the court nobles should devote themselves to the study of political and intellectual subjects by ignoring Iyeyasu's law and should fit themselves to be rulers of the empire. Then the masses would pledge loyalty to the throne and express a desire for the imperial rule. Thereupon the shogun would voluntarily surrender the ruling authority to the throne. Yamagata, who lived in the Meiwa era, sympathized with the helpless situation of the emperor, and maintained that the emperor was practically confined in the imperial palace as a prisoner. He then planned the imperial restoration and discussed a plan of storming and occupying the shogun's castle at Yedo. Takenouchi and Yamagata and their followers were either arrested or exiled. Tokutomi discusses these two happenings, pointing out, on the one hand, that Takenouchi and Yamagata were merely political idealists and philosophers without military backing, and, on the other, that the people were satisfied with the Tokugawa rule, enjoying peace and prosperity, and therefore the Horeki and Meiwa undertakings ended without harm to the Tokugawa rule. Tokutomi concludes his account by stating that, just as the falling leaves indicate the coming of autumn, these two movements for the imperial restoration proved to be the forerunners of the inevitable end of the Tokugawa administration.

26. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Tanuma Jidai* (The Tanuma Period; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1926), 509 pp.

The tenth shogun, Iyeharu, put implicit trust in his chief advisor, Tanuma, who controlled national affairs in his own way. Therefore, Iyeharu's rule is called the "Tanuma Period." In this period, bribery became an important function of the administration, and the shogun's household troops lost their fighting spirit. The people as a whole became restless. The intellectual class sought new knowledge. The traders sought new sources of profit, and violated the national law in order secretly to engage in trade with foreigners. Russian vessels, for the first time in history, appeared on the coasts of Japan. Later, the Russians made their advance from the north, starting from Kamchatka and reaching Yezo through the Kuriles. Tokutomi, in this twenty-third volume of his history, describes the changing conditions of Japan both within and without, thus indicating that the rule of the Tokugawa was rapidly approaching its end.

27. TOKUTOMI, IICHIRO. *Bakufu Bunkai Sekkin Jidai* (The Period Approaching the Final Decline of the Tokugawa Shogunate; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1927), 576 pp.

This is the twenty-fifth volume of Tokutomi's history. He describes the entry

of the Tokugawa shogunate upon its critical stage. Under the rule of the eleventh shogun, Iyenari, the shogunate was unable to confront the rapidly approaching national crisis—because of financial difficulties, and by reason of lack of men of ability—and thus steadily moved to its fall. Toward the close of the eighteenth century, and in the early part of the nineteenth, Russia sent envoys on two occasions, asking trade privileges. Upon being refused, Russia made military inroads in Yezo and other northern parts of Japan. As a result of this Russian aggression, many plans were laid before the government, some of which called for the creation of a buffer state between Japan and Russia by abandoning and leaving Yezo in a wild and unapproachable condition, while others had as their goal the development of Yezo and the completion of the coast-defense works so that Japan might be able to cope with Russia in a military way with the newly organized military forces. Tokutomi discusses in his book how the shogunate was impotent militarily and financially and how the movement of *Joi* (driving the foreign devils away from Japan) was gradually developing into that of *Sono* (reverence for and loyalty to the throne), thus laying the foundation for the imperial restoration.

28. TOKUTOMI, ICHIRO. *Bunsei Tempō Jidai* (The Period of the Bunsei and Tempō Eras; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1928), 563 pp.

This is the twenty-seventh volume of Tokutomi's history. Tokutomi describes how, in the latter days of the eleventh shogun, Iyenari, the shogunate apparently reached the height of its prosperity, but actually had entered a definite period of decline. Iyenari, besides being shogun, was appointed prime minister, thus becoming the man of the highest military and civil rank. He had more than forty concubines, and he became the father of more than sixty sons and daughters, most of whom he gave in marriage to powerful feudal lords. In consequence of these marriage relations, the shogunate and the feudal families became friendly. Nevertheless, financial difficulties and the military impotency of the shogunate became more and more apparent. Furthermore, England and America approached Japan—as Russia had already done—and revealed their determination to reopen that country. Tokutomi's book explains how the end of the Seclusion Period was inevitable and the time for the imperial restoration had come.

29. TOKUTOMI, ICHIRO. *Nichi Ro-Yei-Ran Joyaku teiketsu Hen* (A Work on the Conclusion of the Treaties of Japan with Russia, England, and Holland; Tokyo, Minyu-Sha, 1930), 561 pp.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan found herself powerless to oppose by military means the demands of Occidental nations with regard to the reopening of Japan. Therefore, when Commodore Perry sailed into the Bay of Uraga with a powerful fleet and presented the American demands, the shogunate government was forced to abandon its policy of national seclusion. In this thirty-third volume of his history, Tokutomi explains in detail how Admiral Putiatin, whom Russia sent as an envoy to Japan, succeeded in concluding a treaty of good will and friendship. Tokutomi also discusses how, after lengthy negotiations and disputes over boundaries and the national interests of Russia and Japan in Sakhalin and in the Kuriles, Putiatin succeeded in embodying in the treaty an article which definitely settled these questions.

30. UYEMURA, KATSUYA. *Dai-Nippon Shiso Zensho* (A Complete Work on the Thought of Japan; Tokyo, Yoshida-Shoten, 1932-33), 18 vols.

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the national ideals and thought of Japan as they had developed during a period of two hundred years, ending in the middle of the nineteenth century.

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